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Forge: Incomplete PKCS#7 padding validation in AES/DES CBC and ECB decryption

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cve-program · CVE-2026-118776

Published

Forge (also called node-forge) is a native implementation of Transport Layer Security in JavaScript. Prior to 1.4.1, the affected implementation used decipher.finish(), CBC and ECB modes, PKCS#7 padding to process the relevant input or security decision. node-forge validated only the final byte of PKCS#7 padding during CBC and ECB decryption and accepted zero, oversized, or mismatched padding bytes. Malformed ciphertext could consequently be accepted and up to four plaintext blocks could be silently removed, causing an integrity failure in applications that treated successful decryption as proof of valid padding. This issue is fixed in version 1.4.1.

Source published
29 Oct 2026 18:37:32 UTC
Source modified
4 Nov 2026 01:36:02 UTC
Saved here
4 Nov 2026 02:57:16 UTC
Source terms
CVE Program Terms of Use

Original source record · Cite this exact observation · Complete original publisher JSON

Source: cve-program · CVE Program Terms of Use. The publisher's wording is preserved. ChangeIntel groups the information and labels changes. The JSON record includes additional source fields.

CVSS 3.1 · 3.7 CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:L/A:N

euvd · EUVD-2026-113333

Published

Forge (also called node-forge) is a native implementation of Transport Layer Security in JavaScript. Prior to 1.4.1, the affected implementation used decipher.finish(), CBC and ECB modes, PKCS#7 padding to process the relevant input or security decision. node-forge validated only the final byte of PKCS#7 padding during CBC and ECB decryption and accepted zero, oversized, or mismatched padding bytes. Malformed ciphertext could consequently be accepted and up to four plaintext blocks could be silently removed, causing an integrity failure in applications that treated successful decryption as proof of valid padding. This issue is fixed in version 1.4.1.

Additional publisher context

EUVD source date text has no stated timezone and is retained without inventing a UTC instant. Related bulletin membership is not an alias, common cause or applicability claim. A missing vector with a zero score is treated as unrated. Complete vendor/product and underlying source evidence remains in the original JSON.

Original publisher date fields

datePublished: Oct 29, 2026, 6:37:32 PM

dateUpdated: Nov 4, 2026, 1:36:02 AM

1 related source bulletins · separate from aliases

msrc_CVE-2026-118776: Forge: Incomplete PKCS#7 padding validation in AES/DES CBC and ECB decryption

CVE-2026-118776

Source published
Oct 29, 2026, 6:37:32 PM (timezone not stated)
Source modified
Nov 4, 2026, 1:36:02 AM (timezone not stated)
Saved here
14 Nov 2026 17:37:48 UTC
Source terms
ENISA EUVD · source terms and attribution apply

Original source record · Cite this exact observation · Complete original publisher JSON

Source: euvd · ENISA EUVD · source terms and attribution apply. The publisher's wording is preserved. ChangeIntel groups the information and labels changes. The JSON record includes additional source fields.

EUVD CVSS 3.1 · 3.7 CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:L/A:N

nvd · CVE-2026-118776

Published

Forge (also called node-forge) is a native implementation of Transport Layer Security in JavaScript. Prior to 1.4.1, the affected implementation used decipher.finish(), CBC and ECB modes, PKCS#7 padding to process the relevant input or security decision. node-forge validated only the final byte of PKCS#7 padding during CBC and ECB decryption and accepted zero, oversized, or mismatched padding bytes. Malformed ciphertext could consequently be accepted and up to four plaintext blocks could be silently removed, causing an integrity failure in applications that treated successful decryption as proof of valid padding. This issue is fixed in version 1.4.1.

Additional publisher context

NVD analysis and CPE criteria are source context, not proof that a package or your environment is affected. Complete affected data, logical configurations and SSVC are retained in the original JSON.

Source analysis status: Analyzed

Weakness classifications: CWE-20 · CWE-354

Original publisher date fields

published: 2026-10-29T19:17:20.147

lastModified: 2026-11-04T16:52:39.170

1 source CPE criteria · context only
  • cpe:2.3:a:digitalbazaar:forge:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*

The original JSON retains the logical configuration operators, exclusions and version bounds.

Source published
29 Oct 2026 19:17:20 UTC
Source modified
4 Nov 2026 16:52:39 UTC
Saved here
10 Nov 2026 16:25:21 UTC
Source terms
NIST NVD usage terms; underlying source attribution retained

Original source record · Cite this exact observation · Complete original publisher JSON

Source: nvd · NIST NVD usage terms; underlying source attribution retained. The publisher's wording is preserved. ChangeIntel groups the information and labels changes. The JSON record includes additional source fields.

CVSS 3.1 · [email protected] · Secondary · 3.7 CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:L/A:N

CVSS 3.1 · [email protected] · Primary · 5.3 CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:L/A:N

osv · GHSA-2vgq-wchc-25w7

Published

### Summary `decipher.finish()` in CBC and ECB mode accepted malformed PKCS#7 padding: only the last byte was checked, against a limit of four blocks, so mismatched padding bytes, a zero count and oversized counts were accepted and up to four blocks of plaintext could be silently removed. Fixed in node-forge 1.4.1. ### Details `modes.cbc.prototype.unpad()` and `modes.ecb.prototype.unpad()` in `lib/cipherModes.js` read the last decrypted byte as the PKCS#7 padding count, rejected it only if it was larger than `blockSize << 2` (64 for AES, 32 for DES), and then removed that many bytes. They did not reject a count of 0 or a count larger than one block, and did not check that every padding byte equals the count, as PKCS#7 (RFC 5652 section 6.3) requires. On the Wycheproof AES-CBC-PKCS5 test vectors, 69 of 144 invalid vectors decrypted successfully. CBC and ECB without a MAC do not provide integrity: an attacker who can modify ciphertext can already make the final block decrypt to any padding. The effect of this bug is that malformed ciphertext is accepted as valid and that oversized counts silently truncate up to four blocks of plaintext. The fix does not protect against padding oracle attacks; applications that decrypt untrusted CBC data need to authenticate it (for example with an HMAC) or use AES-GCM. The fix requires a count from 1 to the block size and checks every padding byte. Data with other padding schemes that only use the last byte as the count (ANSI X.923, ISO 10126, XML Encryption) now fails to decrypt with default unpadding; set `decipher.mode.unpad = false` before `finish()` and remove such padding in application code. #### Patches Fixed in node-forge 1.4.1. CBC and ECB decryption requires valid PKCS#7 padding. #### Workarounds Authenticate CBC/ECB ciphertext before decrypting it, or use AES-GCM. To check padding on 1.4.0, set `decipher.mode.unpad = false` and validate the padding in application code. #### References - https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc5652#section-6.3 (PKCS#7 content-encryption padding) - https://github.com/C2SP/wycheproof/blob/master/testvectors_v1/aes_cbc_pkcs5_test.json - https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/354.html (CWE-354: Improper Validation of Integrity Check Value) #### Severity CVSS 3.1: CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:L/A:N (3.7, Low) CVSS 4.0 (informational): CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:P/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:L/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N (6.3) CVSS 4.0 rates this Moderate because its integrity weighting is higher; the severity rating follows CVSS 3.1. #### Credits Reported by Oren Yomtov (@orenyomtov, Fireblocks), @zebbern, and Brian Lee (@hibrian827, Georgia Tech SSLab, Team Atlanta), who also suggested the fix. ### Proof of concept var forge = require('node-forge'); // Wycheproof aes_cbc_pkcs5_test tcId 26: zero padding instead of PKCS#7 var d = forge.cipher.createDecipher('AES-CBC', forge.util.hexToBytes('db4f3e5e3795cc09a073fa6a81e5a6bc')); d.start({iv: forge.util.hexToBytes('23468aa734f5f0f19827316ff168e94f')}); d.update(forge.util.createBuffer( forge.util.hexToBytes('aa62606a287476777b92d8e4c4e53028'))); console.log(d.finish()); // 1.4.0: true; 1.4.1: false Directly, `unpad()` on 1.4.0 also accepts a final block ending in `03 02 01 04` (removing 4 bytes) and a count of 0x20 on 16-byte blocks (removing 32 bytes). Regression tests are in tests/unit/aes.js ("PKCS#7 padding checks"). ### Impact Applications that decrypt AES or DES data in CBC or ECB mode and use the result of `decipher.finish()` to decide whether the data is valid could accept malformed ciphertext, with up to four blocks of trailing plaintext removed. This also affects PKCS#7 EncryptedData/EnvelopedData decryption, PKCS#12 and encrypted private keys. Because CBC and ECB without a MAC are malleable, the additional capability given to an attacker is small. There is no confidentiality or availability impact.

Source published
10 Nov 2026 15:57:46 UTC
Source modified
10 Nov 2026 16:15:04 UTC
Saved here
10 Nov 2026 16:21:51 UTC
Source terms
GitHub Advisory Database · CC-BY-4.0

Original source record · Cite this exact observation · Complete original publisher JSON

Source: osv · GitHub Advisory Database · CC-BY-4.0. The publisher's wording is preserved. ChangeIntel groups the information and labels changes. The JSON record includes additional source fields.

CVSS_V3 · CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:L/A:N

Publisher rating · LOW

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