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Forge: verifyCertificateChain() removes trusted CA certificates with the same subject from the CA store

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cve-program · CVE-2026-118780

Published

Forge (also called node-forge) is a native implementation of Transport Layer Security in JavaScript. Prior to 1.4.1, the affected implementation used pki.verifyCertificateChain(), pki.createCaStore(), duplicate subject names to process the relevant input or security decision. node-forge modified the CA store while trying certificates that shared a subject name during pki.verifyCertificateChain(). A failed chain verification could permanently remove trusted CA certificates from the store, causing later valid chains to fail and creating a persistent availability impact for applications that reused the store. This issue is fixed in version 1.4.1.

Source published
29 Oct 2026 18:47:35 UTC
Source modified
4 Nov 2026 01:37:04 UTC
Saved here
4 Nov 2026 02:57:16 UTC
Source terms
CVE Program Terms of Use

Original source record · Cite this exact observation · Complete original publisher JSON

Source: cve-program · CVE Program Terms of Use. The publisher's wording is preserved. ChangeIntel groups the information and labels changes. The JSON record includes additional source fields.

CVSS 3.1 · 3.7 CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:L

euvd · EUVD-2026-113338

Published

Forge (also called node-forge) is a native implementation of Transport Layer Security in JavaScript. Prior to 1.4.1, the affected implementation used pki.verifyCertificateChain(), pki.createCaStore(), duplicate subject names to process the relevant input or security decision. node-forge modified the CA store while trying certificates that shared a subject name during pki.verifyCertificateChain(). A failed chain verification could permanently remove trusted CA certificates from the store, causing later valid chains to fail and creating a persistent availability impact for applications that reused the store. This issue is fixed in version 1.4.1.

Additional publisher context

EUVD source date text has no stated timezone and is retained without inventing a UTC instant. Related bulletin membership is not an alias, common cause or applicability claim. A missing vector with a zero score is treated as unrated. Complete vendor/product and underlying source evidence remains in the original JSON.

Original publisher date fields

datePublished: Oct 29, 2026, 6:47:35 PM

dateUpdated: Nov 4, 2026, 1:37:04 AM

1 related source bulletins · separate from aliases

msrc_CVE-2026-118780: Forge: verifyCertificateChain() removes trusted CA certificates with the same subject from the CA store

CVE-2026-118780

Source published
Oct 29, 2026, 6:47:35 PM (timezone not stated)
Source modified
Nov 4, 2026, 1:37:04 AM (timezone not stated)
Saved here
16 Nov 2026 07:41:15 UTC
Source terms
ENISA EUVD · source terms and attribution apply

Original source record · Cite this exact observation · Complete original publisher JSON

Source: euvd · ENISA EUVD · source terms and attribution apply. The publisher's wording is preserved. ChangeIntel groups the information and labels changes. The JSON record includes additional source fields.

EUVD CVSS 3.1 · 3.7 CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:L

nvd · CVE-2026-118780

Published

Forge (also called node-forge) is a native implementation of Transport Layer Security in JavaScript. Prior to 1.4.1, the affected implementation used pki.verifyCertificateChain(), pki.createCaStore(), duplicate subject names to process the relevant input or security decision. node-forge modified the CA store while trying certificates that shared a subject name during pki.verifyCertificateChain(). A failed chain verification could permanently remove trusted CA certificates from the store, causing later valid chains to fail and creating a persistent availability impact for applications that reused the store. This issue is fixed in version 1.4.1.

Additional publisher context

NVD analysis and CPE criteria are source context, not proof that a package or your environment is affected. Complete affected data, logical configurations and SSVC are retained in the original JSON.

Source analysis status: Analyzed

Weakness classifications: CWE-295 · CWE-471

Original publisher date fields

published: 2026-10-29T19:17:20.703

lastModified: 2026-11-10T19:34:02.970

1 source CPE criteria · context only
  • cpe:2.3:a:digitalbazaar:forge:*:*:*:*:*:node.js:*:*

The original JSON retains the logical configuration operators, exclusions and version bounds.

Source published
29 Oct 2026 19:17:20 UTC
Source modified
10 Nov 2026 19:34:02 UTC
Saved here
12 Nov 2026 02:56:47 UTC
Source terms
NIST NVD usage terms; underlying source attribution retained

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Source: nvd · NIST NVD usage terms; underlying source attribution retained. The publisher's wording is preserved. ChangeIntel groups the information and labels changes. The JSON record includes additional source fields.

CVSS 3.1 · [email protected] · Secondary · 3.7 CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:L

osv · GHSA-4487-j8r4-4g2f

Published

### Summary When a CA store created by `pki.createCaStore()` holds two or more certificates with the same subject name, `pki.verifyCertificateChain()` permanently removes those certificates from the store while trying each one as the issuer. A peer can send any certificate that names that subject as its issuer to make all later verifications against those CA certificates fail. Fixed in node-forge 1.4.1. ### Details `pki.verifyCertificateChain()` (`lib/x509.js`) asks the CA store for the issuer of each certificate with `caStore.getIssuer()`. When the store holds several certificates with the same subject, `caStore.getIssuer()` returns the store's own internal array of those certificates (`caStore.certs[hash]`, built by `addCertificate()`). `verifyCertificateChain()` used that array directly as its list of candidate parents and called `parents.shift()` on it while trying each candidate. Every candidate it tried, including the one that finally verified the certificate, was removed from the store. Once the array is empty, `getIssuer()` returns an empty list, no candidate is tried, and verification fails with "Certificate signature is invalid." `hasCertificate()` and `listAllCertificates()` no longer see the removed certificates. The store stays in this state for as long as the object is used. The attacker's certificate only needs an issuer name equal to the shared subject name, which is public. Its signature and key can be arbitrary: every candidate is tried and shifted out because none verifies, and errors from `parent.verify()` are caught by the loop. Verification of the attacker's chain fails as expected. Verifying valid chains has a similar effect: the CA certificate that verified the chain and any tried before it are removed. No chain is accepted that should be rejected. Removing candidates can only turn a success into a failure. RFC 5280, Section 6.1.1(d) treats trust anchor information as an input to path validation. Validation should not consume it. The fix copies the array returned by `getIssuer()` before iterating over it, so the CA store is no longer modified. `getIssuer()` itself is unchanged. ### Patches Fixed in node-forge 1.4.1. `pki.verifyCertificateChain()` now works on a copy of the candidate issuer list instead of shifting entries out of the CA store. ### Workarounds - Pass a fresh CA store to each `pki.verifyCertificateChain()` call (for example `pki.createCaStore(trustedCerts)`), or pass `caStore` to `forge.tls.createConnection()` as an array of certificates instead of a store object, so that forge creates a new store per connection. - Or wrap the store so that `getIssuer()` returns a copy: var getIssuer = caStore.getIssuer; caStore.getIssuer = function(cert) { var r = getIssuer(cert); return Array.isArray(r) ? r.slice() : r; }; ### Proof of concept Two trusted self-signed CA certificates, `rootA` and `rootB`, share the subject `CN=Root`. `bogus` is any certificate whose issuer is `CN=Root`, signed with an unrelated key. `leafA` is a valid certificate issued by `rootA`. var caStore = forge.pki.createCaStore([rootA, rootB]); caStore.listAllCertificates().length; // 2 try { forge.pki.verifyCertificateChain(caStore, [bogus]); } catch(e) {} // rejected as expected ("Certificate signature is invalid.") caStore.listAllCertificates().length; // 0: both CA certificates are gone forge.pki.verifyCertificateChain(caStore, [leafA]); // throws "Certificate signature is invalid." (valid chain now rejected) Without the attacker certificate, verifying `leafA` twice against a fresh store gives the same result: the first call succeeds and removes `rootA`, the second fails. With the fix, the store keeps both certificates and every valid chain verifies. The regression tests are in `tests/unit/x509.js` ("CA store" section). ### Impact Applications that keep a long-lived CA store holding several trusted certificates with the same subject name, and that verify certificate chains received from other parties with `pki.verifyCertificateChain()`. This includes `forge.tls` clients that pass the same `caStore` object to several connections. Duplicate subject names occur with re-keyed or renewed CAs that kept their name, or a CA next to a cross-signed version of itself, mostly in private PKIs. A remote, unauthenticated peer (for example a malicious TLS server or a party submitting a signed document) can send a certificate naming the shared subject as its issuer. This removes every certificate with that subject from the store, so later verifications of valid chains issued by those CA certificates fail until the store is recreated. This is a persistent denial of service for certificate verification against those CA certificates. Verification against other trusted CAs keeps working, no invalid chain is accepted, and stores without duplicate subject names are not affected.

Source published
30 Oct 2026 23:02:14 UTC
Source modified
30 Oct 2026 23:15:05 UTC
Saved here
30 Oct 2026 23:45:44 UTC
Source terms
GitHub Advisory Database · CC-BY-4.0

Original source record · Cite this exact observation · Complete original publisher JSON

Source: osv · GitHub Advisory Database · CC-BY-4.0. The publisher's wording is preserved. ChangeIntel groups the information and labels changes. The JSON record includes additional source fields.

CVSS_V3 · CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:L

Publisher rating · LOW

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