praktor: Telegram upload traversal permits persistent agent instruction injection

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praktor is a multi-agent Claude Code orchestrator with Telegram input and output, Docker isolation, and a Mission Control UI. Prior to 0.9.1, both Telegram upload sites in `internal/telegram/bot.go` concatenate the attacker-controlled document filename into a destination path without sanitization, and `path.Join` collapses parent-directory traversal. A remote Telegram user who can message the bot can therefore write outside `uploads/` within the persistent agent workspace mounted at `/workspace/agent`. Because `allow_from: []` permits all senders by default, no prior authentication or privilege is required in that configuration. The attacker can plant or overwrite `CLAUDE.md`, instruction, skill, hook, or configuration files that the Claude agent reads and operates on across later runs, turning a document upload into stored instruction injection. The demonstrated arbitrary-write scope is the persistent agent workspace volume, not an unrestricted host-filesystem write. This issue is fixed in version 0.9.1.

Source published

30 Oct 2026 19:00:25 UTC

Source modified

30 Oct 2026 19:46:25 UTC

Saved here

30 Oct 2026 22:45:26 UTC

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CVSS 3.1 · 8.2 CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:H/A:N

praktor is a multi-agent Claude Code orchestrator with Telegram input and output, Docker isolation, and a Mission Control UI. Prior to 0.9.1, both Telegram upload sites in `internal/telegram/bot.go` concatenate the attacker-controlled document filename into a destination path without sanitization, and `path.Join` collapses parent-directory traversal. A remote Telegram user who can message the bot can therefore write outside `uploads/` within the persistent agent workspace mounted at `/workspace/agent`. Because `allow_from: []` permits all senders by default, no prior authentication or privilege is required in that configuration. The attacker can plant or overwrite `CLAUDE.md`, instruction, skill, hook, or configuration files that the Claude agent reads and operates on across later runs, turning a document upload into stored instruction injection. The demonstrated arbitrary-write scope is the persistent agent workspace volume, not an unrestricted host-filesystem write. This issue is fixed in version 0.9.1.

Source published

Oct 30, 2026, 7:00:25 PM (timezone not stated)

Source modified

Oct 30, 2026, 7:46:25 PM (timezone not stated)

Saved here

13 Nov 2026 21:08:02 UTC

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EUVD CVSS 3.1 · 8.2 CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:H/A:N

praktor is a multi-agent Claude Code orchestrator with Telegram input and output, Docker isolation, and a Mission Control UI. Prior to 0.9.1, both Telegram upload sites in `internal/telegram/bot.go` concatenate the attacker-controlled document filename into a destination path without sanitization, and `path.Join` collapses parent-directory traversal. A remote Telegram user who can message the bot can therefore write outside `uploads/` within the persistent agent workspace mounted at `/workspace/agent`. Because `allow_from: []` permits all senders by default, no prior authentication or privilege is required in that configuration. The attacker can plant or overwrite `CLAUDE.md`, instruction, skill, hook, or configuration files that the Claude agent reads and operates on across later runs, turning a document upload into stored instruction injection. The demonstrated arbitrary-write scope is the persistent agent workspace volume, not an unrestricted host-filesystem write. This issue is fixed in version 0.9.1.

Source published

30 Oct 2026 19:18:33 UTC

Source modified

30 Oct 2026 20:17:12 UTC

Saved here

3 Nov 2026 17:59:19 UTC

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CVSS 3.1 · [email protected] · Secondary · 8.2 CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:H/A:N

### Impact A remote Telegram user can write files to arbitrary paths inside an agent's persistent workspace volume (`praktor-wk-<workspace>`, mounted at `/workspace/agent`), escaping the documented `uploads/` directory. The attacker controls the Telegram document filename, which was concatenated into the destination path without sanitization (`internal/telegram/bot.go`, at both upload sites) and resolved with `path.Join`, which collapses `../` sequences. A filename like `../../../CLAUDE.md` resolved to the root of the agent workspace volume, outside `uploads/`. Because the agent workspace is the persistent working directory the Claude agent reads from and operates on across runs, writing outside `uploads/` lets an attacker plant or overwrite files the agent later consumes — e.g. `CLAUDE.md`, agent instruction/skill/hook files, or other config under `/workspace/agent`. This turns a file upload into a stored injection into the agent's instruction/execution surface (CWE-22 path traversal escalating to stored instruction injection). ### Reachability By default the bot has no user allowlist (`allow_from: []` means "allow all"), so the only precondition is that a user can message the bot. No authentication or prior privilege is required. ### Affected versions Through `v0.9.0` (and HEAD `3902d29`). ### Patched versions `v0.9.1`, containing PR #228. ### Workarounds Restrict `telegram.allow_from` to trusted user IDs to limit who can send uploads to the bot. Upgrading to `v0.9.1` is the recommended fix. ### Fix (defense in depth) - `internal/telegram/bot.go`: apply `path.Base()` to the attacker-controlled filename at both upload sites, stripping directory components and `..`. - `internal/container/manager.go`: `WriteVolumeBytes` now rejects any path that escapes `/vol` after `path.Join`, protecting future callers. ### Credit Reported privately by [tonghuaroot](https://github.com/tonghuaroot), who provided a detailed root-cause analysis, a deployed end-to-end proof of concept against the real `container.Manager`, and fix verification.

Source published

3 Nov 2026 17:27:25 UTC

Source modified

5 Nov 2026 23:25:53 UTC

Saved here

5 Nov 2026 23:38:32 UTC

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GitHub Advisory Database · CC-BY-4.0

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CVSS_V3 · CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:H/A:N

Publisher rating · HIGH

praktor: Path traversal in Telegram file uploads allows writing outside the agent workspace uploads/ directory (stored instruction injection) in github.com/mtzanidakis/praktor

Source published

5 Nov 2026 22:55:09 UTC

Source modified

5 Nov 2026 23:15:18 UTC

Saved here

5 Nov 2026 23:38:32 UTC

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OSV · upstream source license applies

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