Arc: DuckDB I/O aliases bypass database RBAC after CVE-2026-47735
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cve-program · CVE-2026-55098
PublishedArc is an open, SQL-native time-series database for telemetry. Prior to the repository-verified 26.06.2 repair, the remediation of `CVE-2026-47735` leaves a cross-database authorization bypass through DuckDB table-valued I/O functions. In `internal/database/sandbox.go`, `allowed_directories` uses `cfg.LocalStorageRoot`, configured by `storage.local_path`, while `enable_external_access=false` blocks access outside that entire multi-tenant root. `GetStoragePath` in `internal/storage/util.go` stores all databases beneath it. In `internal/api/query.go`, `extractTableReferences` skips names followed by an opening parenthesis and `checkQueryPermissions` allows queries with no extracted table references, including tokens with `permissions: []`. The `userSQLReadParquetPattern` denylist catches literal `read_parquet(` and the earlier protection also blocks `arc_partition_agg(`, but misses the `parquet_scan` alias and `glob`, `parquet_metadata`, `parquet_schema`, `read_blob`, `read_csv_auto`, `read_json` and `read_text`. A request to `POST /api/v1/query` using these unblocked functions passes `ValidateSQLRequest` and `convertSQLToStoragePaths` without tenant authorization, allowing reads and enumeration of other databases' time-series data, schema and per-column value-range statistics within the allowlisted root. The sandbox still blocks out-of-root OS files and HTTP SSRF, and the sibling SQLite token database outside the root is not exposed by this mechanism. The earlier 26.06.1 remediation does not comprehensively deny these I/O functions. Repository tag 26.06.2 contains the I/O-function repair and supplies the provisional remediation boundary; conflicting advisory affected-version statements require curator adjudication.
- Source published
- 30 Oct 2026 20:09:04 UTC
- Source modified
- 2 Nov 2026 15:00:56 UTC
- Saved here
- 2 Nov 2026 15:57:16 UTC
- Source terms
- CVE Program Terms of Use
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Source: cve-program · CVE Program Terms of Use. The publisher's wording is preserved. ChangeIntel groups the information and labels changes. The JSON record includes additional source fields.
CVSS 3.1 · 6.5 CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N
euvd · EUVD-2026-114443
PublishedArc is an open, SQL-native time-series database for telemetry. Prior to the repository-verified 26.06.2 repair, the remediation of `CVE-2026-47735` leaves a cross-database authorization bypass through DuckDB table-valued I/O functions. In `internal/database/sandbox.go`, `allowed_directories` uses `cfg.LocalStorageRoot`, configured by `storage.local_path`, while `enable_external_access=false` blocks access outside that entire multi-tenant root. `GetStoragePath` in `internal/storage/util.go` stores all databases beneath it. In `internal/api/query.go`, `extractTableReferences` skips names followed by an opening parenthesis and `checkQueryPermissions` allows queries with no extracted table references, including tokens with `permissions: []`. The `userSQLReadParquetPattern` denylist catches literal `read_parquet(` and the earlier protection also blocks `arc_partition_agg(`, but misses the `parquet_scan` alias and `glob`, `parquet_metadata`, `parquet_schema`, `read_blob`, `read_csv_auto`, `read_json` and `read_text`. A request to `POST /api/v1/query` using these unblocked functions passes `ValidateSQLRequest` and `convertSQLToStoragePaths` without tenant authorization, allowing reads and enumeration of other databases' time-series data, schema and per-column value-range statistics within the allowlisted root. The sandbox still blocks out-of-root OS files and HTTP SSRF, and the sibling SQLite token database outside the root is not exposed by this mechanism. The earlier 26.06.1 remediation does not comprehensively deny these I/O functions. Repository tag 26.06.2 contains the I/O-function repair and supplies the provisional remediation boundary; conflicting advisory affected-version statements require curator adjudication.
Additional publisher context
EUVD source date text has no stated timezone and is retained without inventing a UTC instant. Related bulletin membership is not an alias, common cause or applicability claim. A missing vector with a zero score is treated as unrated. Complete vendor/product and underlying source evidence remains in the original JSON.
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datePublished: Oct 30, 2026, 8:09:04 PM
dateUpdated: Nov 2, 2026, 3:00:56 PM
- Source published
- Oct 30, 2026, 8:09:04 PM (timezone not stated)
- Source modified
- Nov 2, 2026, 3:00:56 PM (timezone not stated)
- Saved here
- 14 Nov 2026 21:28:16 UTC
- Source terms
- ENISA EUVD · source terms and attribution apply
Original source record · Cite this exact observation · Complete original publisher JSON
Source: euvd · ENISA EUVD · source terms and attribution apply. The publisher's wording is preserved. ChangeIntel groups the information and labels changes. The JSON record includes additional source fields.
EUVD CVSS 3.1 · 6.5 CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N
nvd · CVE-2026-55098
PublishedArc is an open, SQL-native time-series database for telemetry. Prior to the repository-verified 26.06.2 repair, the remediation of `CVE-2026-47735` leaves a cross-database authorization bypass through DuckDB table-valued I/O functions. In `internal/database/sandbox.go`, `allowed_directories` uses `cfg.LocalStorageRoot`, configured by `storage.local_path`, while `enable_external_access=false` blocks access outside that entire multi-tenant root. `GetStoragePath` in `internal/storage/util.go` stores all databases beneath it. In `internal/api/query.go`, `extractTableReferences` skips names followed by an opening parenthesis and `checkQueryPermissions` allows queries with no extracted table references, including tokens with `permissions: []`. The `userSQLReadParquetPattern` denylist catches literal `read_parquet(` and the earlier protection also blocks `arc_partition_agg(`, but misses the `parquet_scan` alias and `glob`, `parquet_metadata`, `parquet_schema`, `read_blob`, `read_csv_auto`, `read_json` and `read_text`. A request to `POST /api/v1/query` using these unblocked functions passes `ValidateSQLRequest` and `convertSQLToStoragePaths` without tenant authorization, allowing reads and enumeration of other databases' time-series data, schema and per-column value-range statistics within the allowlisted root. The sandbox still blocks out-of-root OS files and HTTP SSRF, and the sibling SQLite token database outside the root is not exposed by this mechanism. The earlier 26.06.1 remediation does not comprehensively deny these I/O functions. Repository tag 26.06.2 contains the I/O-function repair and supplies the provisional remediation boundary; conflicting advisory affected-version statements require curator adjudication.
Additional publisher context
NVD analysis and CPE criteria are source context, not proof that a package or your environment is affected. Complete affected data, logical configurations and SSVC are retained in the original JSON.
Source analysis status: Deferred
Weakness classifications: CWE-200 · CWE-863
Original publisher date fields
published: 2026-10-30T20:17:09.773
lastModified: 2026-11-02T19:35:33.347
- Source published
- 30 Oct 2026 20:17:09 UTC
- Source modified
- 2 Nov 2026 19:35:33 UTC
- Saved here
- 4 Nov 2026 18:05:55 UTC
- Source terms
- NIST NVD usage terms; underlying source attribution retained
Original source record · Cite this exact observation · Complete original publisher JSON
Source: nvd · NIST NVD usage terms; underlying source attribution retained. The publisher's wording is preserved. ChangeIntel groups the information and labels changes. The JSON record includes additional source fields.
CVSS 3.1 · [email protected] · Secondary · 6.5 CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N
osv · GHSA-93cm-2v4m-c56c
Published### Summary The fix for CVE-2026-47735 (released 2026.06.1) is incomplete. It added a DuckDB sandbox (`SET GLOBAL allowed_directories=[<storage root>]; SET GLOBAL enable_external_access=false`) and an Arc SQL-layer denylist of the **literal** functions `read_parquet(` and `arc_partition_agg(`. The sandbox correctly blocks reads **outside** the storage root (OS files, `http://` SSRF), but it allowlists the **entire multi-tenant storage root**, and the SQL denylist still misses the rest of the DuckDB I/O family the original advisory enumerated. As a result, any authenticated token — including one with `permissions: []` — can read or enumerate **every other database's data** within the deployment, defeating RBAC. Verified at HEAD `c08b892` (`v26.06.1-36`, includes 26.06.2). Confirmed still live; no later commit blocks these functions. ### Root cause (three composing gaps) 1. **Sandbox scope is the whole storage root, not the tenant.** `internal/database/sandbox.go:111` allowlists `cfg.LocalStorageRoot` (default `storage.local_path=./data/arc`). Every database lives under it — `internal/storage/util.go:33` `GetStoragePath` => `<base>/<database>/<measurement>/**/*.parquet`. Any in-root path is sandbox-permitted regardless of which database owns it. 2. **RBAC never inspects table-valued functions.** `checkQueryPermissions` (`internal/api/query.go:1181`) extracts table refs via `extractTableReferences`, which skips any name followed by `(` as a function (`internal/api/query.go:1116`); with zero refs it returns allow (`:1213-1216`). So `parquet_scan(...)`, `glob(...)`, `parquet_metadata(...)`, `read_blob(...)`, `read_csv_auto(...)` are never authorization-checked. 3. **The SQL denylist matches only the literal spelling.** `userSQLReadParquetPattern` (`internal/api/query.go:2087`) is `\bread_parquet\s*\(`. DuckDB's documented alias **`parquet_scan(`** is not matched, and `read_csv_auto`/`read_json`/`read_text`/`read_blob`/`glob`/`parquet_metadata`/`parquet_schema` are not blocked anywhere. The fix author documented this very threat at `internal/api/query.go:2061-2064` (“a user scoped to db1.m1 could read /data/db2/secrets/**/*.parquet”) but blocked only the literal `read_parquet(`. ### Exploit (authenticated, any token incl. permissions:[]) ``` POST /api/v1/query Authorization: Bearer <token> Content-Type: application/json {"sql": "SELECT * FROM parquet_scan('./data/arc/<victim-db>/<measurement>/**/*.parquet')"} ``` - `ValidateSQLRequest` passes (`parquet_scan(` is not `read_parquet(`, not a dangerous keyword, single statement). - `checkQueryPermissions` extracts 0 table refs (it is a function call) and allows. - `convertSQLToStoragePaths` finds no `read_parquet` literal and no bare `FROM measurement` to rewrite, so the query passes through unchanged. - DuckDB runs `parquet_scan('<root>/<victim-db>/...')`; the path is inside `allowed_directories`, so the other database's rows are returned. `glob('./data/arc/**/*')` enumerates every database/measurement/file; `parquet_metadata(...)`/`parquet_schema(...)` leak column names and per-column min/max value statistics; `read_blob(...)` returns raw file bytes. All operate within the allowlisted root. ### Proof (poc/poc_sandbox_alias_bypass.py, poc/OUTPUT.txt) Reproduces Arc's exact sandbox config (`allowed_directories=[<root>]`, `enable_external_access=false`) on DuckDB 1.5.x (Arc pins duckdb-go-bindings 1.5.1) with a victim parquet written under the root: ``` [BLOCKED ] read_blob OUTSIDE root -> Permission Error: Cannot access file ... [EXECUTES] parquet_scan victim (read_parquet ALIAS) -> [('tenant-VICTIM-row', 42)] [EXECUTES] glob enumerate every db under root -> [('.../data/arc/victim-db/secrets/f.parquet',)] [EXECUTES] parquet_metadata victim -> [('leaked','tenant-VICTIM-row','tenant-VICTIM-row'), ('v','42','42')] ``` The sandbox blocks escape (as designed) but permits every in-root cross-database read. ### Impact Cross-database / cross-tenant confidential read by any authenticated principal, including a least-privileged (`permissions: []`) token, on RBAC-enabled deployments. This is the same RBAC-bypass impact the original advisory described for `read_parquet`, still reachable via the alias and the unblocked I/O family. (Arc's SQLite token DB `./data/arc.db` is a sibling of `./data/arc/` and is **not** in the allowlist, so it is not readable this way — the exposure is the time-series data of every database, plus its schema and value-range statistics.) ### Remediation Per-request scope the sandbox to the requesting token's authorized database path(s): `allowed_directories = ['<base>/<authorized-db>/']`, so the file layer cannot cross the RBAC boundary regardless of which function is used. Alternatively, replace the function-name denylist with a strict allowlist of permitted table functions (alias-resolved, reject all others). A denylist of literal spellings is structurally fragile — this is the second alias/family miss after the original audit.
- Source published
- 4 Nov 2026 17:02:37 UTC
- Source modified
- 5 Nov 2026 23:26:12 UTC
- Saved here
- 5 Nov 2026 23:38:32 UTC
- Source terms
- GitHub Advisory Database · CC-BY-4.0
Original source record · Cite this exact observation · Complete original publisher JSON
Source: osv · GitHub Advisory Database · CC-BY-4.0. The publisher's wording is preserved. ChangeIntel groups the information and labels changes. The JSON record includes additional source fields.
CVSS_V3 · CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N
Publisher rating · MODERATE
osv · GO-2026-6913
PublishedArc: DuckDB I/O aliases bypass database RBAC after CVE-2026-47735 in github.com/basekick-labs/arc
- Source published
- 5 Nov 2026 22:55:09 UTC
- Source modified
- 5 Nov 2026 23:15:18 UTC
- Saved here
- 5 Nov 2026 23:38:32 UTC
- Source terms
- OSV · upstream source license applies
Original source record · Cite this exact observation · Complete original publisher JSON
Source: osv · OSV · upstream source license applies. The publisher's wording is preserved. ChangeIntel groups the information and labels changes. The JSON record includes additional source fields.