Telepresence: Traffic Manager gRPC has no auth — any pod claims arbitrary namespace and intercepts services, receiving victim environment secrets

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Telepresence enables local development against a remote Kubernetes or OpenShift cluster. Prior to 2.31.0, the Traffic Manager gRPC API on port 8081 accepts unauthenticated cluster-network callers, ArriveAsClient stores a caller-supplied Namespace using only the ManagesNamespace manager watchlist check, and CreateIntercept can target any managed namespace without checking the session's Kubernetes RBAC. An attacker operating any pod with network access to the manager can register in an arbitrary managed namespace, create service intercepts, receive intercepted traffic, and obtain the victim pod's complete container environment, including secrets, tokens, and API keys. The default cluster-wide deployment manages all namespaces. This vulnerability is fixed in 2.31.0.

Source published

4 Nov 2026 20:39:55 UTC

Source modified

9 Nov 2026 16:58:40 UTC

Saved here

9 Nov 2026 18:02:10 UTC

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CVSS 3.1 · 8.5 CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:L/A:N

Telepresence enables local development against a remote Kubernetes or OpenShift cluster. Prior to 2.31.0, the Traffic Manager gRPC API on port 8081 accepts unauthenticated cluster-network callers, ArriveAsClient stores a caller-supplied Namespace using only the ManagesNamespace manager watchlist check, and CreateIntercept can target any managed namespace without checking the session's Kubernetes RBAC. An attacker operating any pod with network access to the manager can register in an arbitrary managed namespace, create service intercepts, receive intercepted traffic, and obtain the victim pod's complete container environment, including secrets, tokens, and API keys. The default cluster-wide deployment manages all namespaces. This vulnerability is fixed in 2.31.0.

Source published

Nov 4, 2026, 8:39:55 PM (timezone not stated)

Source modified

Nov 9, 2026, 4:58:40 PM (timezone not stated)

Saved here

14 Nov 2026 07:03:24 UTC

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EUVD CVSS 3.1 · 8.5 CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:L/A:N

Telepresence enables local development against a remote Kubernetes or OpenShift cluster. Prior to 2.31.0, the Traffic Manager gRPC API on port 8081 accepts unauthenticated cluster-network callers, ArriveAsClient stores a caller-supplied Namespace using only the ManagesNamespace manager watchlist check, and CreateIntercept can target any managed namespace without checking the session's Kubernetes RBAC. An attacker operating any pod with network access to the manager can register in an arbitrary managed namespace, create service intercepts, receive intercepted traffic, and obtain the victim pod's complete container environment, including secrets, tokens, and API keys. The default cluster-wide deployment manages all namespaces. This vulnerability is fixed in 2.31.0.

Source published

4 Nov 2026 21:17:40 UTC

Source modified

12 Nov 2026 20:04:52 UTC

Saved here

13 Nov 2026 23:59:06 UTC

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CVSS 3.1 · [email protected] · Secondary · 8.5 CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:L/A:N

## Summary Telepresence's Traffic Manager gRPC API (port 8081) requires no authentication. Any pod with cluster-network access to the Traffic Manager can register as a client in an arbitrary managed namespace and create intercepts against services in that namespace, regardless of Kubernetes RBAC. On interception the victim pod's complete container environment (secrets, tokens, API keys) is delivered to the attacker. Tested on HEAD v2.28.0, commit b2231a4. ## Details The gRPC server is started with no auth interceptor (pkg/grpc/server/server.go). The connection uses plaintext: `grpc.WithTransportCredentials(insecure.NewCredentials())`. `ArriveAsClient` stores the caller-supplied `Namespace` without verifying the caller is in that namespace. The only gate is whether the namespace is in the Traffic Manager's watchlist (`ManagesNamespace`): ```go // cmd/traffic/cmd/manager/service.go:181-201 func (s *service) ArriveAsClient(..., client *rpc.ClientInfo) (*rpc.SessionInfo, error) { if !s.State().ManagesNamespace(ctx, client.Namespace) { return nil, status.Error(codes.FailedPrecondition, ...) } // No SAR, no bearer token, no kubeconfig check return &rpc.SessionInfo{SessionId: string(s.state.AddClient(client, ...))}, nil } ``` `CreateIntercept` calls `managedTargetNamespace()` which also only checks `ManagesNamespace(target_ns)` — never that the target equals the client's own registered namespace (service.go:929). A session registered in namespace A can intercept namespace B as long as B is also watched. On interception, the victim pod's full container environment is forwarded via `intercept.Environment = rIReq.Environment`. ## Proof of Concept From any pod in the cluster: ```go conn, _ := grpc.NewClient("traffic-manager.ambassador:8081", grpc.WithTransportCredentials(insecure.NewCredentials())) mgr := rpc.NewManagerClient(conn) session, _ := mgr.ArriveAsClient(ctx, &rpc.ClientInfo{ Name: "attacker@pod", Namespace: "payments", InstallId: uuid.NewString(), Product: "telepresence", Version: "2.20.0", }) mgr.CreateIntercept(ctx, &rpc.CreateInterceptRequest{ Session: session, InterceptSpec: &rpc.InterceptSpec{ Name: "steal", Agent: "payments-api", Namespace: "payments", Mechanism: "tcp", Client: "attacker@pod", }, }) ``` Supplying a namespace not in the TM watchlist returns FailedPrecondition, confirming the only gate is the watchlist check. ## Impact Any pod operator in the cluster can intercept services in namespaces they have no Kubernetes RBAC access to, receiving all traffic and environment variables. In the default cluster-wide Traffic Manager deployment all namespaces are managed. Secrets mounted as environment variables (database passwords, API keys, service account tokens) are exfiltrated with no audit trail on the victim namespace.

Source published

9 Nov 2026 21:59:49 UTC

Source modified

9 Nov 2026 22:15:03 UTC

Saved here

9 Nov 2026 23:04:27 UTC

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GitHub Advisory Database · CC-BY-4.0

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CVSS_V3 · CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:L/A:N

Publisher rating · HIGH