Hickory DNS through 0.26.0-alpha.1 DNSSEC NSEC Validation Bypass for Empty Non-Terminals
Exploitation and risk
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cve-program · CVE-2026-123594
PublishedHickory DNS hickory-proto through 0.26.0-alpha.1 and hickory-net 0.26.0-beta.1 before 0.26.2 contain an NSEC validation flaw that returns a secure proof for NXDOMAIN responses when the covering NSEC's Next Domain Name is a strict descendant of the query name, which actually proves the name exists as an empty non-terminal. On-path attackers can flip the unsigned rcode of a genuine signed NODATA response from NOERROR to NXDOMAIN, causing validators to accept forged nonexistence of the name.
- Source published
- 8 Nov 2026 01:38:24 UTC
- Source modified
- 9 Nov 2026 13:51:34 UTC
- Saved here
- 9 Nov 2026 15:02:10 UTC
- Source terms
- CVE Program Terms of Use
Original source record · Cite this exact observation · Complete original publisher JSON
Source: cve-program · CVE Program Terms of Use. The publisher's wording is preserved. ChangeIntel groups the information and labels changes. The JSON record includes additional source fields.
CVSS 4.0 · 6.3 CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:P/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:L/VA:L/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N
CVSS 3.1 · 4.8 CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:L/A:L
euvd · EUVD-2026-119353
PublishedHickory DNS hickory-proto through 0.26.0-alpha.1 and hickory-net 0.26.0-beta.1 before 0.26.2 contain an NSEC validation flaw that returns a secure proof for NXDOMAIN responses when the covering NSEC's Next Domain Name is a strict descendant of the query name, which actually proves the name exists as an empty non-terminal. On-path attackers can flip the unsigned rcode of a genuine signed NODATA response from NOERROR to NXDOMAIN, causing validators to accept forged nonexistence of the name.
Additional publisher context
EUVD source date text has no stated timezone and is retained without inventing a UTC instant. Related bulletin membership is not an alias, common cause or applicability claim. A missing vector with a zero score is treated as unrated. Complete vendor/product and underlying source evidence remains in the original JSON.
Original publisher date fields
datePublished: Nov 8, 2026, 1:38:24 AM
dateUpdated: Nov 9, 2026, 1:51:34 PM
1 related source bulletins · separate from aliases
msrc_CVE-2026-123594: Hickory DNS through 0.26.0-alpha.1 DNSSEC NSEC Validation Bypass for Empty Non-Terminals
CVE-2026-123594
- Source published
- Nov 8, 2026, 1:38:24 AM (timezone not stated)
- Source modified
- Nov 9, 2026, 1:51:34 PM (timezone not stated)
- Saved here
- 14 Nov 2026 15:57:52 UTC
- Source terms
- ENISA EUVD · source terms and attribution apply
Original source record · Cite this exact observation · Complete original publisher JSON
Source: euvd · ENISA EUVD · source terms and attribution apply. The publisher's wording is preserved. ChangeIntel groups the information and labels changes. The JSON record includes additional source fields.
EUVD CVSS 4.0 · 6.3 CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:P/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:L/VA:L/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N
nvd · CVE-2026-123594
PublishedHickory DNS hickory-proto through 0.26.0-alpha.1 and hickory-net 0.26.0-beta.1 before 0.26.2 contain an NSEC validation flaw that returns a secure proof for NXDOMAIN responses when the covering NSEC's Next Domain Name is a strict descendant of the query name, which actually proves the name exists as an empty non-terminal. On-path attackers can flip the unsigned rcode of a genuine signed NODATA response from NOERROR to NXDOMAIN, causing validators to accept forged nonexistence of the name.
Additional publisher context
NVD analysis and CPE criteria are source context, not proof that a package or your environment is affected. Complete affected data, logical configurations and SSVC are retained in the original JSON.
Source analysis status: Deferred
Weakness classifications: CWE-345
Original publisher date fields
published: 2026-11-08T02:16:53.710
lastModified: 2026-11-10T22:15:59.797
- Source published
- 8 Nov 2026 02:16:53 UTC
- Source modified
- 10 Nov 2026 22:15:59 UTC
- Saved here
- 12 Nov 2026 15:18:38 UTC
- Source terms
- NIST NVD usage terms; underlying source attribution retained
Original source record · Cite this exact observation · Complete original publisher JSON
Source: nvd · NIST NVD usage terms; underlying source attribution retained. The publisher's wording is preserved. ChangeIntel groups the information and labels changes. The JSON record includes additional source fields.
CVSS 4.0 · [email protected] · Secondary · 6.3 CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:P/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:L/VA:L/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:X/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X
CVSS 3.1 · [email protected] · Secondary · 4.8 CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:L/A:L
osv · RUSTSEC-2026-0511
PublishedUp to 0.26.0-alpha.1, hickory-proto's NSEC validation accepted an NXDOMAIN response as secure even when the covering NSEC record's next domain name was below the queried name, which proves the name exists as an empty non-terminal. Because the response code is not signed, someone who can modify DNS responses could turn a genuine signed NODATA response into an accepted NXDOMAIN. From 0.26.0-beta.1 the DNSSEC validation code lives in the hickory-net crate, where this was fixed in hickory-net 0.26.2. No hickory-proto release contains a fix. Users of DNSSEC validation in older hickory-proto releases (directly or through hickory-resolver or hickory-recursor) should move to the 0.26.2 or later releases, which validate through hickory-net.
- Source published
- 3 Sep 2026 12:00:00 UTC
- Source modified
- 12 Nov 2026 14:40:42 UTC
- Saved here
- 12 Nov 2026 15:18:33 UTC
- Source terms
- OSV · upstream source license applies
Original source record · Cite this exact observation · Complete original publisher JSON
Source: osv · OSV · upstream source license applies. The publisher's wording is preserved. ChangeIntel groups the information and labels changes. The JSON record includes additional source fields.
osv · RUSTSEC-2026-0519
PublishedWhen an NSEC record's next domain name is below the queried name, the queried name exists as an empty non-terminal (RFC 8020 section 3.1). The NSEC validator did not check for this case and accepted an NXDOMAIN response backed by such a record as secure. The response code is not covered by any signature. An attacker who can modify DNS responses can take a genuine signed NODATA response for an empty non-terminal, change its response code to NXDOMAIN, and have the validator accept that an existing name does not exist. This affects DNSSEC validation through `DnssecDnsHandle` when built with `dnssec-ring` or `dnssec-aws-lc-rs`. The fix rejects NXDOMAIN as bogus, and validates NODATA as secure, when the covering NSEC record's next domain name is below the queried name and is not the zone apex. It is in 0.26.2.
- Source published
- 3 Sep 2026 12:00:00 UTC
- Source modified
- 12 Nov 2026 14:40:42 UTC
- Saved here
- 12 Nov 2026 15:18:33 UTC
- Source terms
- OSV · upstream source license applies
Original source record · Cite this exact observation · Complete original publisher JSON
Source: osv · OSV · upstream source license applies. The publisher's wording is preserved. ChangeIntel groups the information and labels changes. The JSON record includes additional source fields.