rustls before 0.23.46 Key Exchange Downgrade via Unauthenticated ServerHello
Exploitation and risk
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cve-program · CVE-2026-123611
Publishedrustls before 0.23.46 contains a key exchange downgrade vulnerability that allows network attackers to poison the per-server-name key-exchange group record via an unauthenticated ServerHello. Attackers can answer one connection with a ServerHello selecting X25519, causing later ClientHellos to send only classical shares and lose post-quantum confidentiality.
- Source published
- 8 Nov 2026 01:38:36 UTC
- Source modified
- 13 Nov 2026 03:12:15 UTC
- Saved here
- 13 Nov 2026 05:16:18 UTC
- Source terms
- CVE Program Terms of Use
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Source: cve-program · CVE Program Terms of Use. The publisher's wording is preserved. ChangeIntel groups the information and labels changes. The JSON record includes additional source fields.
CVSS 4.0 · 6.3 CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:H/AT:P/PR:N/UI:N/VC:L/VI:N/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N
CVSS 3.1 · 3.7 CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:N/A:N
euvd · EUVD-2026-119370
Publishedrustls before 0.23.46 contains a key exchange downgrade vulnerability that allows network attackers to poison the per-server-name key-exchange group record via an unauthenticated ServerHello. Attackers can answer one connection with a ServerHello selecting X25519, causing later ClientHellos to send only classical shares and lose post-quantum confidentiality.
Additional publisher context
EUVD source date text has no stated timezone and is retained without inventing a UTC instant. Related bulletin membership is not an alias, common cause or applicability claim. A missing vector with a zero score is treated as unrated. Complete vendor/product and underlying source evidence remains in the original JSON.
Original publisher date fields
datePublished: Nov 8, 2026, 1:38:36 AM
dateUpdated: Nov 13, 2026, 3:12:15 AM
1 related source bulletins · separate from aliases
msrc_CVE-2026-123611: rustls before 0.23.46 Key Exchange Downgrade via Unauthenticated ServerHello
CVE-2026-123611
- Source published
- Nov 8, 2026, 1:38:36 AM (timezone not stated)
- Source modified
- Nov 13, 2026, 3:12:15 AM (timezone not stated)
- Saved here
- 16 Nov 2026 12:46:17 UTC
- Source terms
- ENISA EUVD · source terms and attribution apply
Original source record · Cite this exact observation · Complete original publisher JSON
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EUVD CVSS 4.0 · 6.3 CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:H/AT:P/PR:N/UI:N/VC:L/VI:N/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N
nvd · CVE-2026-123611
Publishedrustls before 0.23.46 contains a key exchange downgrade vulnerability that allows network attackers to poison the per-server-name key-exchange group record via an unauthenticated ServerHello. Attackers can answer one connection with a ServerHello selecting X25519, causing later ClientHellos to send only classical shares and lose post-quantum confidentiality.
Additional publisher context
NVD analysis and CPE criteria are source context, not proof that a package or your environment is affected. Complete affected data, logical configurations and SSVC are retained in the original JSON.
Source analysis status: Awaiting Analysis
Weakness classifications: CWE-757
Original publisher date fields
published: 2026-11-08T02:16:56.440
lastModified: 2026-11-13T04:17:38.717
- Source published
- 8 Nov 2026 02:16:56 UTC
- Source modified
- 13 Nov 2026 04:17:38 UTC
- Saved here
- 14 Nov 2026 12:57:57 UTC
- Source terms
- NIST NVD usage terms; underlying source attribution retained
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Source: nvd · NIST NVD usage terms; underlying source attribution retained. The publisher's wording is preserved. ChangeIntel groups the information and labels changes. The JSON record includes additional source fields.
CVSS 4.0 · [email protected] · Secondary · 6.3 CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:H/AT:P/PR:N/UI:N/VC:L/VI:N/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:X/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X
CVSS 3.1 · [email protected] · Secondary · 3.7 CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:N/A:N
osv · GHSA-w44r-93j7-qv28
Published## Summary The client records the server-selected key-exchange group per server name when it processes the ServerHello, before the server is authenticated. A network attacker can answer one connection attempt for a target name with a ServerHello that selects X25519 and close the connection. Later ClientHellos for that name carry one X25519 share while supported_groups still lists X25519MLKEM768 first. If the server accepts that share instead of sending a HelloRetryRequest, the handshake completes with classical key exchange only and no error. An attacker that answers one connection attempt for the target name with a ServerHello selecting X25519 changes every later ClientHello of that client for that name, for as long as the entry stays in the store. No certificate or completed handshake is needed: it parses the ClientHello, sends the ServerHello, and closes. TLS 1.3 transcript binding stops an on-path attacker from editing the ClientHello of one connection. It does not stop the attacker from steering the client's prediction state beforehand, because that state is written from an unauthenticated message. ## What does not trigger it - Servers that send a HelloRetryRequest. The connection stays hybrid and costs one extra round trip. - A client configuration with resumption disabled: nothing is stored. - A different server name: the record is per name. ## Impact If the genuine server picks the group for which a share is present, instead of sending a HelloRetryRequest for its preferred hybrid group, the handshake completes with classical key exchange only, between two peers that both support the hybrid group. No error is raised. The confidentiality of recorded sessions against a future quantum adversary is lost for those connections (harvest now, decrypt later). There is no key compromise and no authentication bypass. Note that this behaviour is discussed at length in [draft-ietf-tls-key-share-prediction](https://www.ietf.org/archive/id/draft-ietf-tls-key-share-prediction-01.html#name-security-considerations) so the actual security impact is largely down to a server policy decision.
- Source published
- 27 Oct 2026 16:08:54 UTC
- Source modified
- 8 Nov 2026 10:55:46 UTC
- Saved here
- 8 Nov 2026 11:07:08 UTC
- Source terms
- GitHub Advisory Database · CC-BY-4.0
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CVSS_V3 · CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:N/A:N
Publisher rating · LOW
osv · RUSTSEC-2026-0349
PublishedThe client recorded the server-selected key exchange group for each server name when processing the ServerHello, before the server was authenticated. This record is used to predict which key share to send in future ClientHellos to that server name. A network attacker can answer one connection attempt with a ServerHello selecting X25519, and then close the connection. Later ClientHellos for that name carry only an X25519 key share, while `supported_groups` still lists X25519MLKEM768 first. If the genuine server accepts that share rather than sending a HelloRetryRequest for its preferred hybrid group, the handshake completes with classical-only key exchange and no error. This persists for as long as the entry stays in the client's session store. The impact is loss of post-quantum confidentiality for affected connections ("harvest now, decrypt later"). There is no key compromise and no authentication bypass. The following are not affected: - connections to servers which send a HelloRetryRequest for their preferred group, - clients with resumption disabled (as nothing is stored), and - other server names. This behaviour is discussed in [draft-ietf-tls-key-share-prediction](https://www.ietf.org/archive/id/draft-ietf-tls-key-share-prediction-01.html#name-security-considerations), so the practical impact depends largely on server policy.
- Source published
- 14 Oct 2026 12:00:00 UTC
- Source modified
- 9 Nov 2026 09:21:20 UTC
- Saved here
- 9 Nov 2026 10:04:30 UTC
- Source terms
- OSV · upstream source license applies
Original source record · Cite this exact observation · Complete original publisher JSON
Source: osv · OSV · upstream source license applies. The publisher's wording is preserved. ChangeIntel groups the information and labels changes. The JSON record includes additional source fields.
CVSS_V3 · CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:N/A:N