fast-jwt: Stateful RegExp (/g or /y) causes non-deterministic allowed-claim validation (logical DoS)

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fast-jwt provides fast JSON Web Token (JWT) implementation. Prior to 6.2.1, using certain modifiers on RegExp objects in the allowedAud, allowedIss, allowedSub, allowedJti, or allowedNonce options in verify functions can cause certain unintended behaviours. This is because some modifiers are stateful and will cause failures in every second verification attempt regardless of the validity of the token provided. Such modifiers are /g (global matching) and /y (sticky matching). This does NOT allow invalid tokens to be accepted, only for valid tokens to be improperly rejected in some configurations. Instead it causes 50% of valid authentication requests to fail in an alternating pattern. This vulnerability is fixed in 6.2.1.

Source published

9 Apr 2026 14:52:56 UTC

Source modified

13 Apr 2026 20:03:41 UTC

Observed here

23 Oct 2026 15:48:27 UTC

Source terms

CVE Program Terms of Use

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CVSS 3.1 · 5.3 CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:L

fast-jwt provides fast JSON Web Token (JWT) implementation. Prior to 6.2.1, using certain modifiers on RegExp objects in the allowedAud, allowedIss, allowedSub, allowedJti, or allowedNonce options in verify functions can cause certain unintended behaviours. This is because some modifiers are stateful and will cause failures in every second verification attempt regardless of the validity of the token provided. Such modifiers are /g (global matching) and /y (sticky matching). This does NOT allow invalid tokens to be accepted, only for valid tokens to be improperly rejected in some configurations. Instead it causes 50% of valid authentication requests to fail in an alternating pattern. This vulnerability is fixed in 6.2.1.

Source published

Apr 9, 2026, 2:52:56 PM (timezone not stated)

Source modified

Apr 13, 2026, 8:03:41 PM (timezone not stated)

Observed here

1 Nov 2026 06:08:09 UTC

Source terms

ENISA EUVD · source terms and attribution apply

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This view projects the publisher's source fields for reading; the original JSON retains additional fields and CVE enrichment containers. Attribution: euvd · ENISA EUVD · source terms and attribution apply. Source text is retained; field grouping and change labels are provided by ChangeIntel.

EUVD CVSS 3.1 · 5.3 CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:L

fast-jwt provides fast JSON Web Token (JWT) implementation. Prior to 6.2.1, using certain modifiers on RegExp objects in the allowedAud, allowedIss, allowedSub, allowedJti, or allowedNonce options in verify functions can cause certain unintended behaviours. This is because some modifiers are stateful and will cause failures in every second verification attempt regardless of the validity of the token provided. Such modifiers are /g (global matching) and /y (sticky matching). This does NOT allow invalid tokens to be accepted, only for valid tokens to be improperly rejected in some configurations. Instead it causes 50% of valid authentication requests to fail in an alternating pattern. This vulnerability is fixed in 6.2.1.

Source published

9 Apr 2026 16:16:27 UTC

Source modified

26 Oct 2026 21:10:00 UTC

Observed here

27 Oct 2026 09:03:08 UTC

Source terms

NIST NVD usage terms; underlying source attribution retained

Original source record · Cite this exact observation · Complete original publisher JSON

This view projects the publisher's source fields for reading; the original JSON retains additional fields and CVE enrichment containers. Attribution: nvd · NIST NVD usage terms; underlying source attribution retained. Source text is retained; field grouping and change labels are provided by ChangeIntel.

CVSS 3.1 · [email protected] · Secondary · 5.3 CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:L

## Impact Using certain modifiers on RegExp objects in the allowedAud, allowedIss, allowedSub, allowedJti, or allowedNonce options in verify functions can cause certain unintended behaviours. This is because some modifiers are stateful and will cause failures in every second verification attempt regardless of the validity of the token provided. Such modifiers are: - /g : Global matching - /y : Sticky matching This does NOT allow invalid tokens to be accepted, only for valid tokens to be improperly rejected in some configurations. Instead it causes **50% of valid authentication requests to fail** in an alternating pattern, leading to: - Intermittent user authentication failures - Potential retry storms in applications - Operational monitoring alerts ## Affected Configurations ### This vulnerability ONLY affects applications that: - Use RegExp objects (not strings) in the allowedAud, allowedIss, allowedSub, allowedJti, or allowedNonce options - Use stateful RegExp modifiers such a /g or /y Example: allowedAud: /abc/g ← IMPACTED Example: allowedAud: "/abc/" ← SAFE ### Not Affected - Applications using string patterns for audience validation (most common) - Applications using RegExp patterns without stateful modifiers ### Assessment Guide To determine if you're affected: Check if allowedAud, allowedIss, allowedSub, allowedJti, or allowedNonce options use RegExp objects (/pattern/ or new RegExp()) If yes, review the pattern for stateful modifiers like /g, /y If no RegExp usage or no stateful modifiers, you are NOT affected ## Mitigation Options While a fix will be coming in the next version of the package you can take steps to mitigate the issue immediately by removing any such modifiers (/g, /y) from the regex. --- Summary fast-jwt accepts RegExp for allowedAud, allowedIss, allowedSub, allowedJti, and allowedNonce. If the provided regular expression uses the g (global) or y (sticky) flag, verification becomes non-deterministic: the same valid token alternates between acceptance and rejection across successive calls. This occurs because RegExp.prototype.test() is stateful when g/y is set (it mutates lastIndex), and fast-jwt reuses the same RegExp object without resetting lastIndex. Affected component src/verifier.js ensureStringClaimMatcher() returns the RegExp object directly. validateClaimValues() performs repeated a.test(v) calls without resetting lastIndex. Impact Logical denial-of-service / authentication flapping. A valid signed JWT can be intermittently rejected. Causes unpredictable authentication outcomes across repeated verification calls. Can trigger retry storms and cascading failures in API gateways and authentication middleware. Affects any deployment that configures allowed* using RegExp and includes g or y flags. Root cause validateClaimValues() uses: allowed.some(a => a.test(v)) When `a` is a RegExp with g or y, `a.test()` mutates `a.lastIndex`. Subsequent calls against the same input can return different results. Proof of concept Environment - fast-jwt: 6.1.0 (repo HEAD) - Node.js: v24.13.1 PoC const { createSigner, createVerifier } = require('fast-jwt') const sign = createSigner({ key: 'secret' }) const token = sign({ aud: 'admin', iss: 'issuer' }) function run(name, opts) { const verify = createVerifier({ key: 'secret', ...opts }) console.log('\n==', name) for (let i = 0; i < 8; i++) { try { verify(token); console.log(i, 'PASS') } catch (e) { console.log(i, 'FAIL', e.code || e.message) } } } run('allowedAud global regex', { allowedAud: /^admin$/g }) run('allowedIss global regex', { allowedIss: /^issuer$/g }) run('control (non-global regex)', { allowedAud: /^admin$/ }) Observed behavior - allowedAud with `/g` alternates PASS/FAIL across calls - allowedIss with `/g` alternates PASS/FAIL across calls - control regex (no g/y) is deterministic and always PASS Expected behavior Validation must be deterministic. The same token under the same verifier configuration must always yield the same decision. Suggested fix (minimal and safe) Wrap RegExp matchers inside ensureStringClaimMatcher() to reset lastIndex before calling test(): if (r instanceof RegExp) { return { test: v => { r.lastIndex = 0; return r.test(v) } } } This preserves semantics for non-global regexes, makes g/y deterministic, and avoids changes in the rest of the verifier logic. Security classification Logical DoS / authentication reliability failure. This can be weaponized to produce production outages via retry storms and auth instability. Why this is not “misuse” - The library explicitly accepts RegExp for allowed* claim validation. - The behavior difference is caused by internal state mutation of RegExp.test(). - The same token, same verifier config, same runtime yields different outcomes. - Security decisions must be deterministic; non-determinism at the verification layer is a correctness flaw. - Consumers cannot reliably defend against this unless the library normalizes matcher state. Notes - Affects allowedAud, allowedIss, allowedSub, allowedJti, allowedNonce equally (shared matcher logic). - Independent from the previously reported ReDoS; this is a determinism and correctness failure that can still produce production DoS effects. PoC Code: 'use strict' /** * PoC: Stateful RegExp flags (g/y) cause non-deterministic allowed-claim validation * fast-jwt reuses the same RegExp object; RegExp.test() mutates lastIndex when g/y is set. * * This script prints a human-readable log AND writes evidence to JSON. * * Usage: * node poc_regex_state_evidence.js */ const fs = require('node:fs') const path = require('node:path') const { createSigner, createVerifier } = require('fast-jwt') const OUT_JSON = path.join(process.cwd(), 'evidence-regex-stateful-fastjwt.json') const OUT_LOG = path.join(process.cwd(), 'evidence-regex-stateful-fastjwt.log') // Make a stable, valid token const sign = createSigner({ key: 'secret' }) const token = sign({ aud: 'admin', iss: 'issuer', sub: 'subject', jti: 'id-123', nonce: 'nonce-xyz' }) function runCase(name, verifierOpts, iterations = 12) { const verify = createVerifier({ key: 'secret', ...verifierOpts }) const results = [] for (let i = 0; i < iterations; i++) { try { verify(token) results.push({ i, ok: true }) } catch (e) { results.push({ i, ok: false, code: e.code || null, message: e.message || String(e) }) } } return results } function summarize(results) { const seq = results.map(r => (r.ok ? 'PASS' : 'FAIL')).join(' ') const pass = results.filter(r => r.ok).length const fail = results.length - pass return { pass, fail, seq } } function printCase(name, opts, results) { const s = summarize(results) const lines = [] lines.push(`== ${name}`) lines.push(`opts: ${JSON.stringify(opts)}`) lines.push(`PASS=${s.pass} FAIL=${s.fail}`) lines.push(`sequence: ${s.seq}`) lines.push('') return lines.join('\n') } function main() { const meta = { poc: 'stateful-regexp-allowed-claims', package: 'fast-jwt', node: process.version, timestamp: new Date().toISOString(), note: 'RegExp.test is stateful when g/y flags are set; lastIndex mutation causes alternating PASS/FAIL.' } // Cases: g/y should flap, control should be stable const cases = [ { name: 'allowedAud with global RegExp /g (expected: flapping)', opts: { allowedAud: /^admin$/g } }, { name: 'allowedAud with sticky RegExp /y (expected: flapping)', opts: { allowedAud: /^admin$/y } }, { name: 'allowedIss with global RegExp /g (expected: flapping)', opts: { allowedIss: /^issuer$/g } }, { name: 'allowedSub with global RegExp /g (expected: flapping)', opts: { allowedSub: /^subject$/g } }, { name: 'allowedJti with global RegExp /g (expected: flapping)', opts: { allowedJti: /^id-123$/g } }, { name: 'allowedNonce with global RegExp /g (expected: flapping)', opts: { allowedNonce: /^nonce-xyz$/g } }, { name: 'CONTROL: allowedAud with non-global RegExp (expected: stable PASS)', opts: { allowedAud: /^admin$/ } } ] const evidence = { meta, token: { alg: 'HS256 (autodetected by fast-jwt)', signed: true, jwt: token }, cases: [] } let log = '' for (const c of cases) { const results = runCase(c.name, c.opts, 12) const s = summarize(results) evidence.cases.push({ name: c.name, opts: c.opts, iterations: results.length, pass: s.pass, fail: s.fail, sequence: s.seq, results }) log += printCase(c.name, c.opts, results) } fs.writeFileSync(OUT_JSON, JSON.stringify(evidence, null, 2)) fs.writeFileSync(OUT_LOG, log) console.log(log) console.log(`[+] Wrote JSON evidence: ${OUT_JSON}`) console.log(`[+] Wrote LOG evidence : ${OUT_LOG}`) } main() Output: PS C:\Users\Franciny Rojas\Desktop\crypto-research\fast-jwt> node .\poc_regex_state_evidence.js == allowedAud with global RegExp /g (expected: flapping) opts: {"allowedAud":{}} PASS=6 FAIL=6 sequence: PASS FAIL PASS FAIL PASS FAIL PASS FAIL PASS FAIL PASS FAIL == allowedAud with sticky RegExp /y (expected: flapping) opts: {"allowedAud":{}} PASS=6 FAIL=6 sequence: PASS FAIL PASS FAIL PASS FAIL PASS FAIL PASS FAIL PASS FAIL == allowedIss with global RegExp /g (expected: flapping) opts: {"allowedIss":{}} PASS=6 FAIL=6 sequence: PASS FAIL PASS FAIL PASS FAIL PASS FAIL PASS FAIL PASS FAIL == allowedSub with global RegExp /g (expected: flapping) opts: {"allowedSub":{}} PASS=6 FAIL=6 sequence: PASS FAIL PASS FAIL PASS FAIL PASS FAIL PASS FAIL PASS FAIL == allowedJti with global RegExp /g (expected: flapping) opts: {"allowedJti":{}} PASS=6 FAIL=6 sequence: PASS FAIL PASS FAIL PASS FAIL PASS FAIL PASS FAIL PASS FAIL == allowedNonce with global RegExp /g (expected: flapping) opts: {"allowedNonce":{}} PASS=6 FAIL=6 sequence: PASS FAIL PASS FAIL PASS FAIL PASS FAIL PASS FAIL PASS FAIL == CONTROL: allowedAud with non-global RegExp (expected: stable PASS) opts: {"allowedAud":{}} PASS=12 FAIL=0 sequence: PASS PASS PASS PASS PASS PASS PASS PASS PASS PASS PASS PASS [+] Wrote JSON evidence: C:\Users\Franciny Rojas\Desktop\crypto-research\fast-jwt\evidence-regex-stateful-fastjwt.json [+] Wrote LOG evidence : C:\Users\Franciny Rojas\Desktop\crypto-research\fast-jwt\evidence-regex-stateful-fastjwt.log PS C:\Users\Franciny Rojas\Desktop\crypto-research\fast-jwt>

Source published

9 Apr 2026 16:41:20 UTC

Source modified

9 Apr 2026 19:17:26 UTC

Observed here

24 Oct 2026 13:17:17 UTC

Source terms

GitHub Advisory Database · CC-BY-4.0

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This view projects the publisher's source fields for reading; the original JSON retains additional fields and CVE enrichment containers. Attribution: osv · GitHub Advisory Database · CC-BY-4.0. Source text is retained; field grouping and change labels are provided by ChangeIntel.

CVSS_V3 · CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:L

Publisher rating · MODERATE