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Prototype pollution and path traversal in i18next-http-middleware via user-controlled language and namespace parameters

Collected exploitation and prediction evidence

Risk source coverage

CISA KEV is observed exploitation evidence. FIRST EPSS is a dated prediction of exploitation in the next 30 days. Missing scores are unknown. This collector requests predictions only for explicit CVE aliases in the public NuGet archive; Microsoft release views retain their existing prediction scope.

No collected risk observation for these identifiers. This does not establish absence of exploitation or a zero probability.

cve-program · CVE-2026-41690

Published

18next-http-middleware is a middleware to be used with Node.js web frameworks like express or Fastify and also for Deno. Versions prior to 3.9.3 allow an unauthenticated HTTP client to pollute Object.prototype in the Node.js process hosting the middleware, via two unvalidated entry points that reach internal object-key writes: getResourcesHandler and missingKeyHandler. This can break authorisation checks (if (user.isAdmin) returning true for any user), cause type-confusion DoS, and depending on downstream code it can be chained into RCE.

Source published
8 May 2026 15:24:12 UTC
Source modified
8 May 2026 16:43:48 UTC
Observed here
23 Oct 2026 15:48:27 UTC
Source terms
CVE Program Terms of Use

Original source record · Cite this exact observation · Complete original publisher JSON

This view projects the publisher's source fields for reading; the original JSON retains additional fields and CVE enrichment containers. Attribution: cve-program · CVE Program Terms of Use. Source text is retained; field grouping and change labels are provided by ChangeIntel.

CVSS 3.1 · 8.6 CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:H/A:L

euvd · EUVD-2026-28792

Published

18next-http-middleware is a middleware to be used with Node.js web frameworks like express or Fastify and also for Deno. Versions prior to 3.9.3 allow an unauthenticated HTTP client to pollute Object.prototype in the Node.js process hosting the middleware, via two unvalidated entry points that reach internal object-key writes: getResourcesHandler and missingKeyHandler. This can break authorisation checks (if (user.isAdmin) returning true for any user), cause type-confusion DoS, and depending on downstream code it can be chained into RCE.

EUVD source date text has no stated timezone and is retained without inventing a UTC instant. Related bulletin membership is not an alias, common cause or applicability claim. A missing vector with a zero score is treated as unrated. Complete vendor/product and underlying source evidence remains in the original JSON.

Original publisher date fields

datePublished: May 8, 2026, 3:24:12 PM

dateUpdated: May 8, 2026, 4:43:48 PM

Source published
May 8, 2026, 3:24:12 PM (timezone not stated)
Source modified
May 8, 2026, 4:43:48 PM (timezone not stated)
Observed here
6 Nov 2026 00:46:11 UTC
Source terms
ENISA EUVD · source terms and attribution apply

Original source record · Cite this exact observation · Complete original publisher JSON

This view projects the publisher's source fields for reading; the original JSON retains additional fields and CVE enrichment containers. Attribution: euvd · ENISA EUVD · source terms and attribution apply. Source text is retained; field grouping and change labels are provided by ChangeIntel.

EUVD CVSS 3.1 · 8.6 CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:H/A:L

nvd · CVE-2026-41690

Published

18next-http-middleware is a middleware to be used with Node.js web frameworks like express or Fastify and also for Deno. Versions prior to 3.9.3 allow an unauthenticated HTTP client to pollute Object.prototype in the Node.js process hosting the middleware, via two unvalidated entry points that reach internal object-key writes: getResourcesHandler and missingKeyHandler. This can break authorisation checks (if (user.isAdmin) returning true for any user), cause type-confusion DoS, and depending on downstream code it can be chained into RCE.

NVD analysis and CPE criteria are source context, not proof that a package or your environment is affected. Complete affected data, logical configurations and SSVC are retained in the original JSON.

Source analysis status: Deferred

Weakness classifications: CWE-22 · CWE-1321

Original publisher date fields

published: 2026-05-08T16:16:11.473

lastModified: 2026-10-26T18:10:00.173

Source published
8 May 2026 16:16:11 UTC
Source modified
26 Oct 2026 18:10:00 UTC
Observed here
27 Oct 2026 10:10:19 UTC
Source terms
NIST NVD usage terms; underlying source attribution retained

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This view projects the publisher's source fields for reading; the original JSON retains additional fields and CVE enrichment containers. Attribution: nvd · NIST NVD usage terms; underlying source attribution retained. Source text is retained; field grouping and change labels are provided by ChangeIntel.

CVSS 3.1 · [email protected] · Secondary · 8.6 CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:H/A:L

osv · GHSA-5fgg-jcpf-8jjw

Published

### Summary Versions of `i18next-http-middleware` prior to 3.9.3 pass user-controlled `lng` and `ns` parameters to two internal paths that use them in ways that enable prototype pollution and, depending on the configured backend, path traversal or SSRF. The vulnerable entry points are unauthenticated HTTP handlers that are part of the middleware's public API: - `getResourcesHandler` — reads `lng`/`ns` from query parameters or route params and passes them unvalidated to: - `utils.setPath(resources, [lng, ns], ...)` — the `setPath` helper did not guard against `__proto__`, `constructor`, or `prototype` keys, writing into `Object.prototype` when those values were supplied. - `i18next.services.backendConnector.load(languages, namespaces, ...)` — depending on the configured backend, unvalidated path segments enabled filesystem path traversal (e.g. with `i18next-fs-backend`) or SSRF (e.g. with `i18next-http-backend`). - A `namespaces.forEach(ns => i18next.options.ns.push(ns))` loop additionally performed permanent, unbounded growth of the shared singleton namespace list. - `missingKeyHandler` — iterated the incoming request body with `for...in`, which traverses inherited prototype-chain properties. A POST body like `{"__proto__": {"isAdmin": true}}` was forwarded into `saveMissing`. ### Impact - **Prototype pollution** — a single unauthenticated request of the form `GET /locales/resources.json?lng=__proto__&ns=isAdmin` writes into `Object.prototype`, affecting every plain object created subsequently in the Node.js process. This can break authorization checks (`if (user.isAdmin)`), cause denial of service via type confusion, or be chained into RCE depending on what downstream code reads from polluted objects. - **Path traversal / SSRF** — with filesystem or HTTP backends that interpolate `lng`/`ns` into paths or URLs, attacker-controlled values like `ns=../../etc/passwd` or `lng=internal-service` could reach resources outside the intended scope. - **Denial of service** — the unbounded `i18next.options.ns` growth, plus repeated backend load calls, enabled memory and CPU exhaustion from unique namespace payloads. ### Affected versions `< 3.9.3`. ### Patch Fixed in **3.9.3**. The patch: 1. Blocks `__proto__`, `constructor`, and `prototype` keys in `utils.setPath`. 2. Replaces the `for...in` body iteration in `missingKeyHandler` with `Object.keys()` plus an explicit dangerous-keys guard. 3. Introduces a `utils.isSafeIdentifier` helper (denylist approach — still permits any legitimate i18next language code shape) that filters `lng`/`ns` values for path-traversal, path separators, control characters, prototype keys, and over-long inputs before they reach the backend connector and before they are pushed into `i18next.options.ns`. ### Workarounds No workaround short of upgrading. Front-proxying the middleware with a WAF rule that rejects requests containing `__proto__`, `constructor`, `prototype`, `..`, or control characters in `lng`/`ns` query parameters or body keys is a partial mitigation. ### Credits Discovered via an internal security audit of the i18next ecosystem.

Source published
22 Apr 2026 17:40:47 UTC
Source modified
13 May 2026 13:56:02 UTC
Observed here
24 Oct 2026 13:17:17 UTC
Source terms
GitHub Advisory Database · CC-BY-4.0

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This view projects the publisher's source fields for reading; the original JSON retains additional fields and CVE enrichment containers. Attribution: osv · GitHub Advisory Database · CC-BY-4.0. Source text is retained; field grouping and change labels are provided by ChangeIntel.

CVSS_V3 · CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:H/A:L

Publisher rating · HIGH

ChangeIntel

An IT change radar: releases, security, known issues, retirements, documentation changes, and service status from public sources. Every item links to supporting evidence; dates and statuses can change after they are read.

Sources read 7 Nov 16:11 UTC · 275 of 275 readable · 274 fully read · documentation 469/469 current