Lemmy: SSRF in /api/v3/post via Webmention dispatch
Collected exploitation and prediction evidence
Risk source coverageCISA KEV is observed exploitation evidence. FIRST EPSS is a dated prediction of exploitation in the next 30 days. Missing scores are unknown. This collector requests predictions only for explicit CVE aliases in the public NuGet archive; Microsoft release views retain their existing prediction scope.
No collected risk observation for these identifiers. This does not establish absence of exploitation or a zero probability.
cve-program · CVE-2026-42180
PublishedLemmy is a link aggregator and forum for the fediverse. Prior to version 0.19.18, Lemmy allows an authenticated low-privileged user to create a link post through POST /api/v3/post. When a post is created in a public community, the backend asynchronously sends a Webmention to the attacker-controlled link target. The submitted URL is checked for syntax and scheme, but the audited code path does not reject loopback, private, or link-local destinations before the Webmention request is issued. This lets a normal user trigger server-side HTTP requests toward internal services. This issue has been patched in version 0.19.18.
- Source published
- 8 May 2026 19:29:04 UTC
- Source modified
- 13 May 2026 17:18:23 UTC
- Observed here
- 23 Oct 2026 15:48:27 UTC
- Source terms
- CVE Program Terms of Use
Original source record · Cite this exact observation · Complete original publisher JSON
This view projects the publisher's source fields for reading; the original JSON retains additional fields and CVE enrichment containers. Attribution: cve-program · CVE Program Terms of Use. Source text is retained; field grouping and change labels are provided by ChangeIntel.
CVSS 3.1 · 6.3 CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:L/A:L
euvd · EUVD-2026-28819
PublishedLemmy is a link aggregator and forum for the fediverse. Prior to version 0.19.18, Lemmy allows an authenticated low-privileged user to create a link post through POST /api/v3/post. When a post is created in a public community, the backend asynchronously sends a Webmention to the attacker-controlled link target. The submitted URL is checked for syntax and scheme, but the audited code path does not reject loopback, private, or link-local destinations before the Webmention request is issued. This lets a normal user trigger server-side HTTP requests toward internal services. This issue has been patched in version 0.19.18.
EUVD source date text has no stated timezone and is retained without inventing a UTC instant. Related bulletin membership is not an alias, common cause or applicability claim. A missing vector with a zero score is treated as unrated. Complete vendor/product and underlying source evidence remains in the original JSON.
Original publisher date fields
datePublished: May 8, 2026, 7:29:04 PM
dateUpdated: May 13, 2026, 5:18:23 PM
- Source published
- May 8, 2026, 7:29:04 PM (timezone not stated)
- Source modified
- May 13, 2026, 5:18:23 PM (timezone not stated)
- Observed here
- 7 Nov 2026 09:32:16 UTC
- Source terms
- ENISA EUVD · source terms and attribution apply
Original source record · Cite this exact observation · Complete original publisher JSON
This view projects the publisher's source fields for reading; the original JSON retains additional fields and CVE enrichment containers. Attribution: euvd · ENISA EUVD · source terms and attribution apply. Source text is retained; field grouping and change labels are provided by ChangeIntel.
EUVD CVSS 3.1 · 6.3 CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:L/A:L
nvd · CVE-2026-42180
PublishedLemmy is a link aggregator and forum for the fediverse. Prior to version 0.19.18, Lemmy allows an authenticated low-privileged user to create a link post through POST /api/v3/post. When a post is created in a public community, the backend asynchronously sends a Webmention to the attacker-controlled link target. The submitted URL is checked for syntax and scheme, but the audited code path does not reject loopback, private, or link-local destinations before the Webmention request is issued. This lets a normal user trigger server-side HTTP requests toward internal services. This issue has been patched in version 0.19.18.
NVD analysis and CPE criteria are source context, not proof that a package or your environment is affected. Complete affected data, logical configurations and SSVC are retained in the original JSON.
Source analysis status: Deferred
Weakness classifications: CWE-918
Original publisher date fields
published: 2026-05-08T20:16:31.023
lastModified: 2026-10-26T18:10:00.173
- Source published
- 8 May 2026 20:16:31 UTC
- Source modified
- 26 Oct 2026 18:10:00 UTC
- Observed here
- 27 Oct 2026 11:12:01 UTC
- Source terms
- NIST NVD usage terms; underlying source attribution retained
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This view projects the publisher's source fields for reading; the original JSON retains additional fields and CVE enrichment containers. Attribution: nvd · NIST NVD usage terms; underlying source attribution retained. Source text is retained; field grouping and change labels are provided by ChangeIntel.
CVSS 3.1 · [email protected] · Secondary · 6.3 CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:L/A:L
osv · GHSA-3jvj-v6w2-h948
Published### Summary Lemmy allows an authenticated low-privileged user to create a link post through `POST /api/v3/post`. When a post is created in a public community, the backend asynchronously sends a Webmention to the attacker-controlled link target. The submitted URL is checked for syntax and scheme, but the audited code path does not reject loopback, private, or link-local destinations before the Webmention request is issued. This lets a normal user trigger server-side HTTP requests toward internal services. ### Details The entry point is the normal post creation API. The user-controlled `url` field is accepted, normalized with `diesel_url_create()`, and only validated with `is_valid_url()`. That validation allows `http` and `https` but does not implement internal address rejection. The post creation flow then schedules Webmention delivery for public communities. This creates a direct source-to-sink path from an externally supplied post URL to a server-side outbound HTTP request. Core vulnerable code path: ```rust // crates/api_crud/src/post/create.rs let url = diesel_url_create(data.url.as_deref())?; if let Some(url) = &url { is_url_blocked(url, &url_blocklist)?; is_valid_url(url)?; } ``` ```rust // crates/utils/src/utils/validation.rs pub fn is_valid_url(url: &Url) -> LemmyResult<()> { let is_valid = ["http", "https", "magnet"].contains(&url.scheme()); if !is_valid { Err(LemmyErrorType::InvalidUrl)? } Ok(()) } ``` ```rust // crates/api_crud/src/post/create.rs if community.visibility == CommunityVisibility::Public { let post = inserted_post.clone(); let url = url.clone(); spawn_try_task(async move { if let Some(url) = url { Webmention::new(post.ap_id.clone().into(), url.into()).send().await?; } Ok(()) }); } ``` These snippets matter because they show that the attacker controls `CreatePost.url`, the only validation is scheme-level, and the resulting URL is later used for server-side Webmention delivery. ### PoC _Complete instructions, including specific configuration details, to reproduce the vulnerability._Prerequisites: - The attacker has a valid low-privileged account. - The attacker can post to a public community. Practical reproduction flow: 1. Run an HTTP listener on an internal or loopback-reachable address from the Lemmy server's perspective, such as `127.0.0.1:8081`. 2. Authenticate as a normal user. 3. Submit a post to a public community with `url` set to the internal target. 4. Observe the Lemmy API return a normal post creation response. 5. Observe the internal HTTP listener receive a request from the Lemmy server shortly afterwards. Complete PoC: ```http POST /api/v3/post HTTP/1.1 Host: victim.example Authorization: Bearer <low-priv-jwt> Content-Type: application/json { "name": "wm-ssrf", "community_id": 1, "url": "http://127.0.0.1:8081/", "body": null, "alt_text": null, "honeypot": null, "nsfw": false, "language_id": null, "custom_thumbnail": null } ``` Outcome: - The API returns a successful `post_view` response. - The Lemmy server later issues an outbound request toward `http://127.0.0.1:8081/` as part of Webmention processing. ### Impact An authenticated user can use the application server as a blind SSRF primitive against internal HTTP services. This can expose internal network reachability, trigger internal webhooks or administrative endpoints, and expand the attack surface beyond the public deployment boundary. Because the sink is reached after ordinary user content submission, the issue is practical to exploit in real deployments where normal users can post to public communities.
- Source published
- 24 Apr 2026 15:22:49 UTC
- Source modified
- 13 May 2026 13:56:07 UTC
- Observed here
- 24 Oct 2026 13:19:54 UTC
- Source terms
- GitHub Advisory Database · CC-BY-4.0
Original source record · Cite this exact observation · Complete original publisher JSON
This view projects the publisher's source fields for reading; the original JSON retains additional fields and CVE enrichment containers. Attribution: osv · GitHub Advisory Database · CC-BY-4.0. Source text is retained; field grouping and change labels are provided by ChangeIntel.
CVSS_V3 · CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:L/A:L
Publisher rating · MODERATE