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Unauthenticated Remote Code Execution in Gemini CLI CI/CD Workflows

Collected exploitation and prediction evidence

Risk source coverage

CISA KEV is observed exploitation evidence. FIRST EPSS is a dated prediction of exploitation in the next 30 days. Missing scores are unknown. This collector requests predictions only for explicit CVE aliases in the public NuGet archive; Microsoft release views retain their existing prediction scope.

No collected risk observation for these identifiers. This does not establish absence of exploitation or a zero probability.

cve-program · CVE-2026-12537

Published

Improper Neutralization used in an OS Command in the container launcher in Google Gemini CLI (versions prior to 0.39.1) and run-gemini-cli GitHub Action (versions prior to 0.1.22) on headless CI platforms allows an unprivileged attacker to achieve pre-sandbox host-level code execution a maliciously crafted .gemini/.env file.

Source published
24 Jun 2026 13:37:21 UTC
Source modified
24 Jun 2026 13:53:24 UTC
Observed here
23 Oct 2026 15:48:27 UTC
Source terms
CVE Program Terms of Use

Original source record · Cite this exact observation · Complete original publisher JSON

This view projects the publisher's source fields for reading; the original JSON retains additional fields and CVE enrichment containers. Attribution: cve-program · CVE Program Terms of Use. Source text is retained; field grouping and change labels are provided by ChangeIntel.

CVSS 4.0 · 10.0 CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:H/VI:H/VA:H/SC:H/SI:H/SA:H/U:Clear

euvd · EUVD-2026-38790

Published

Improper Neutralization used in an OS Command in the container launcher in Google Gemini CLI (versions prior to 0.39.1) and run-gemini-cli GitHub Action (versions prior to 0.1.22) on headless CI platforms allows an unprivileged attacker to achieve pre-sandbox host-level code execution a maliciously crafted .gemini/.env file.

EUVD source date text has no stated timezone and is retained without inventing a UTC instant. Related bulletin membership is not an alias, common cause or applicability claim. A missing vector with a zero score is treated as unrated. Complete vendor/product and underlying source evidence remains in the original JSON.

Original publisher date fields

datePublished: Jun 24, 2026, 1:37:21 PM

dateUpdated: Jun 24, 2026, 1:53:24 PM

Source published
Jun 24, 2026, 1:37:21 PM (timezone not stated)
Source modified
Jun 24, 2026, 1:53:24 PM (timezone not stated)
Observed here
11 Nov 2026 06:26:26 UTC
Source terms
ENISA EUVD · source terms and attribution apply

Original source record · Cite this exact observation · Complete original publisher JSON

This view projects the publisher's source fields for reading; the original JSON retains additional fields and CVE enrichment containers. Attribution: euvd · ENISA EUVD · source terms and attribution apply. Source text is retained; field grouping and change labels are provided by ChangeIntel.

EUVD CVSS 4.0 · 10.0 CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:H/VI:H/VA:H/SC:H/SI:H/SA:H/U:Clear

nvd · CVE-2026-12537

Published

Improper Neutralization used in an OS Command in the container launcher in Google Gemini CLI (versions prior to 0.39.1) and run-gemini-cli GitHub Action (versions prior to 0.1.22) on headless CI platforms allows an unprivileged attacker to achieve pre-sandbox host-level code execution a maliciously crafted .gemini/.env file.

NVD analysis and CPE criteria are source context, not proof that a package or your environment is affected. Complete affected data, logical configurations and SSVC are retained in the original JSON.

Source analysis status: Analyzed

Weakness classifications: CWE-20 · CWE-78

Original publisher date fields

published: 2026-06-24T14:17:29.630

lastModified: 2026-07-02T19:46:27.890

3 source CPE criteria · context only
  • cpe:2.3:a:google:gemini-cli:*:*:*:*:*:node.js:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:a:google:gemini-cli:0.40.0:preview2:*:*:*:node.js:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:a:google:run-gemini-cli:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*

The original JSON retains the logical configuration operators, exclusions and version bounds.

Source published
24 Jun 2026 14:17:29 UTC
Source modified
2 Jul 2026 19:46:27 UTC
Observed here
25 Oct 2026 05:17:25 UTC
Source terms
NIST NVD usage terms; underlying source attribution retained

Original source record · Cite this exact observation · Complete original publisher JSON

This view projects the publisher's source fields for reading; the original JSON retains additional fields and CVE enrichment containers. Attribution: nvd · NIST NVD usage terms; underlying source attribution retained. Source text is retained; field grouping and change labels are provided by ChangeIntel.

CVSS 4.0 · f45cbf4e-4146-4068-b7e1-655ffc2c548c · Secondary · 10.0 CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:H/VI:H/VA:H/SC:H/SI:H/SA:H/E:X/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:Clear

CVSS 3.1 · [email protected] · Primary · 7.8 CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H

osv · GHSA-wpqr-6v78-jr5g

Published

# Summary Gemini CLI (`@google/gemini-cli`) and the `run-gemini-cli` GitHub Action are being updated to harden workspace trust and tool allowlisting, in particular when used in untrusted environments like GitHub Actions. This update introduces a breaking change to how non-interactive (headless) environments handle folder trust, which may impact existing CI/CD workflows under specific conditions. # Details Folder Trust in Headless Mode In previous versions, Gemini CLI running in CI environments (headless mode) automatically trusted workspace folders for the purpose of loading configuration and environment variables. This is potentially risky in situations where Gemini CLI runs on untrusted folders in headless mode (e.g. CI workflows that review user-submitted pull requests). If used with untrusted directory contents, this could lead to remote code execution via malicious environment variables in the local `.gemini/` directory. To ensure consistency and user control, the latest update aligns headless mode behavior with interactive mode, requiring folders to be explicitly trusted before configuration files (such as `.env`) are processed. As a result of this change, GitHub Actions and other automated pipelines that rely on the previous automatic trust behavior will fail to load workspace-specific settings until they are updated to use explicit trust mechanisms. Tool Allowlisting under \--yolo In previous versions, when Gemini CLI was configured to run in `--yolo` mode, it would ignore any fine grained tool allowlist in `~/.gemini/settings.json` (e.g. `run_shell_command(echo)` would allow any command). This is potentially risky in situations where Gemini CLI runs on untrusted inputs with `--yolo` (e.g. CI workflows that triage user-submitted GitHub issues where we recommend a strict allowlist). If used with untrusted content and a tool allowlist that permits `run_shell_command`, this could lead to remote code execution via prompt injection. In version `0.39.1`, the Gemini CLI policy engine now evaluates tool allowlisting under `--yolo` mode, which is useful for CI workflows that allowlist a few safe commands to run when processing untrusted inputs. As a result, some workflows that previously depended on this behavior may fail silently unless tool allowlists are modified to fit the task. # Impact This impact is limited to workflows using Gemini CLI in headless mode. Any use of Gemini CLI in headless mode without folder trust will require manual review to correctly configure folder trust. **This affects all Gemini CLI GitHub Actions.** Users must review their workflows, and take one of two approaches: 1\. If the workflow runs on trusted inputs (e.g. reviewing PRs from trusted collaborators), set `GEMINI_TRUST_WORKSPACE: 'true'` in your workflow. 2\. If the workflow runs on untrusted inputs, review our guidance in [google-github-actions/run-gemini-cli](https://github.com/google-github-actions/run-gemini-cli) to harden your workflow against malicious content, and set the environment variable. # Patches The folder trust and tool allowlisting mitigations are available in `@google/gemini-cli` version `0.39.1` and `0.40.0-preview.3`. By default, the `run-gemini-cli` GitHub Action will receive and run the latest version of `gemini-cli`. However, if your workflow specifies a version of `gemini-cli` by setting the [gemini\_cli\_version](https://github.com/google-github-actions/run-gemini-cli#user-content-__input_gemini_cli_version), you are encouraged to upgrade to one of the patched versions and audit the workflow settings that use Gemini CLI. # Credits Gemini thanks the following security researchers for reporting this issue through the Vulnerability Rewards Program (g.co/vulnz): * Elad Meged, Novee Security * Dan Lisichkin, Pillar Security research team

Source published
24 Apr 2026 19:30:01 UTC
Source modified
25 Sep 2026 03:55:55 UTC
Observed here
24 Oct 2026 13:17:17 UTC
Source terms
GitHub Advisory Database · CC-BY-4.0

Original source record · Cite this exact observation · Complete original publisher JSON

This view projects the publisher's source fields for reading; the original JSON retains additional fields and CVE enrichment containers. Attribution: osv · GitHub Advisory Database · CC-BY-4.0. Source text is retained; field grouping and change labels are provided by ChangeIntel.

CVSS_V3 · CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H

Publisher rating · CRITICAL

ChangeIntel

An IT change radar: releases, security, known issues, retirements, documentation changes, and service status from public sources. Every item links to supporting evidence; dates and statuses can change after they are read.

Sources read 12 Nov 12:12 UTC · 274 of 275 readable · 272 fully read · documentation 469/469 current