Fiber: X-Real-IP Spoofing via Header.Add() in BalancerForward
Collected exploitation and prediction evidence
Risk source coverageCISA KEV is observed exploitation evidence. FIRST EPSS is a dated prediction of exploitation in the next 30 days. Missing scores are unknown. This collector requests predictions only for explicit CVE aliases in the public NuGet archive; Microsoft release views retain their existing prediction scope.
No collected risk observation for these identifiers. This does not establish absence of exploitation or a zero probability.
cve-program · CVE-2026-45045
PublishedFiber is an Express inspired web framework written in Go. Prior to 3.3.0 and 2.52.14, the BalancerForward proxy helper in middleware/proxy/proxy.go uses Header.Add() instead of Header.Set() when injecting X-Real-IP, allowing an attacker-supplied first X-Real-IP value to be forwarded to upstream servers for logging, rate limiting, and access control. This issue is fixed in version 3.3.0 and 2.52.14.
- Source published
- 8 Jul 2026 19:26:26 UTC
- Source modified
- 9 Jul 2026 13:20:08 UTC
- Observed here
- 23 Oct 2026 15:48:27 UTC
- Source terms
- CVE Program Terms of Use
Original source record · Cite this exact observation · Complete original publisher JSON
This view projects the publisher's source fields for reading; the original JSON retains additional fields and CVE enrichment containers. Attribution: cve-program · CVE Program Terms of Use. Source text is retained; field grouping and change labels are provided by ChangeIntel.
CVSS 3.1 · 5.3 CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:L/A:N
euvd · EUVD-2026-42351
PublishedFiber is an Express inspired web framework written in Go. Prior to 3.3.0 and 2.52.14, the BalancerForward proxy helper in middleware/proxy/proxy.go uses Header.Add() instead of Header.Set() when injecting X-Real-IP, allowing an attacker-supplied first X-Real-IP value to be forwarded to upstream servers for logging, rate limiting, and access control. This issue is fixed in version 3.3.0 and 2.52.14.
EUVD source date text has no stated timezone and is retained without inventing a UTC instant. Related bulletin membership is not an alias, common cause or applicability claim. A missing vector with a zero score is treated as unrated. Complete vendor/product and underlying source evidence remains in the original JSON.
Original publisher date fields
datePublished: Jul 8, 2026, 7:26:26 PM
dateUpdated: Jul 9, 2026, 1:20:08 PM
- Source published
- Jul 8, 2026, 7:26:26 PM (timezone not stated)
- Source modified
- Jul 9, 2026, 1:20:08 PM (timezone not stated)
- Observed here
- 7 Nov 2026 13:22:49 UTC
- Source terms
- ENISA EUVD · source terms and attribution apply
Original source record · Cite this exact observation · Complete original publisher JSON
This view projects the publisher's source fields for reading; the original JSON retains additional fields and CVE enrichment containers. Attribution: euvd · ENISA EUVD · source terms and attribution apply. Source text is retained; field grouping and change labels are provided by ChangeIntel.
EUVD CVSS 3.1 · 5.3 CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:L/A:N
nvd · CVE-2026-45045
PublishedFiber is an Express inspired web framework written in Go. Prior to 3.3.0 and 2.52.14, the BalancerForward proxy helper in middleware/proxy/proxy.go uses Header.Add() instead of Header.Set() when injecting X-Real-IP, allowing an attacker-supplied first X-Real-IP value to be forwarded to upstream servers for logging, rate limiting, and access control. This issue is fixed in version 3.3.0 and 2.52.14.
NVD analysis and CPE criteria are source context, not proof that a package or your environment is affected. Complete affected data, logical configurations and SSVC are retained in the original JSON.
Source analysis status: Analyzed
Weakness classifications: CWE-290
Original publisher date fields
published: 2026-07-08T20:16:50.060
lastModified: 2026-10-25T17:10:00.197
1 source CPE criteria · context only
- cpe:2.3:a:gofiber:fiber:*:*:*:*:*:go:*:*
The original JSON retains the logical configuration operators, exclusions and version bounds.
- Source published
- 8 Jul 2026 20:16:50 UTC
- Source modified
- 25 Oct 2026 17:10:00 UTC
- Observed here
- 27 Oct 2026 11:12:23 UTC
- Source terms
- NIST NVD usage terms; underlying source attribution retained
Original source record · Cite this exact observation · Complete original publisher JSON
This view projects the publisher's source fields for reading; the original JSON retains additional fields and CVE enrichment containers. Attribution: nvd · NIST NVD usage terms; underlying source attribution retained. Source text is retained; field grouping and change labels are provided by ChangeIntel.
CVSS 3.1 · [email protected] · Secondary · 5.3 CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:L/A:N
osv · GHSA-gcfq-8gqf-4876
Published## Summary The `BalancerForward` proxy helper in GoFiber uses `Header.Add()` instead of `Header.Set()` when injecting the `X-Real-IP` header. This appends the real client IP as a second header value rather than replacing any attacker-supplied value. Upstream servers that read the first `X-Real-IP` header (nginx, Express, most HTTP servers) use the attacker's spoofed IP for logging, rate limiting, and access control. ## Vulnerable Code **File:** `middleware/proxy/proxy.go`, lines 270-285 ```go func BalancerForward(servers []string, clients ...*fasthttp.Client) fiber.Handler { r := &roundrobin{ current: 0, pool: servers, } return func(c fiber.Ctx) error { server := r.get() if !strings.HasPrefix(server, "http") { server = "http://" + server } c.Request().Header.Add("X-Real-IP", c.IP()) // line 282: Add, not Set return Do(c, server+c.OriginalURL(), clients...) } } ``` ## Data Flow 1. Attacker sends request with `X-Real-IP: 10.0.0.1` (spoofed internal IP) 2. `BalancerForward` handler executes at line 282 3. `c.Request().Header.Add("X-Real-IP", c.IP())` APPENDS the real IP as a second header 4. Upstream server receives: `X-Real-IP: 10.0.0.1` AND `X-Real-IP: <real-attacker-ip>` 5. Most HTTP servers (nginx, Node.js, Apache) read the FIRST value 6. Upstream uses `10.0.0.1` for all IP-dependent logic ## Impact - **Rate limit bypass:** IP-based rate limiting at the upstream uses the spoofed IP, allowing unlimited requests - **IP ACL bypass:** Internal IP allowlists (e.g., admin panels restricted to `10.0.0.0/8`) can be bypassed - **Audit log poisoning:** Security logs record the spoofed IP, making incident investigation unreliable - **Geolocation bypass:** IP-based geofencing or region restrictions are circumvented ## Fix Replace `Header.Add()` with `Header.Set()` at line 282: ```go c.Request().Header.Set("X-Real-IP", c.IP()) ``` `Header.Set()` replaces any existing header value, ensuring only the real client IP is forwarded.
- Source published
- 2 Jul 2026 13:50:45 UTC
- Source modified
- 10 Sep 2026 03:50:52 UTC
- Observed here
- 24 Oct 2026 13:19:41 UTC
- Source terms
- GitHub Advisory Database · CC-BY-4.0
Original source record · Cite this exact observation · Complete original publisher JSON
This view projects the publisher's source fields for reading; the original JSON retains additional fields and CVE enrichment containers. Attribution: osv · GitHub Advisory Database · CC-BY-4.0. Source text is retained; field grouping and change labels are provided by ChangeIntel.
CVSS_V3 · CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:L/A:N
Publisher rating · MODERATE
osv · GO-2026-5887
PublishedGoFiber Vulnerable to X-Real-IP Spoofing via Header.Add() in BalancerForward in github.com/gofiber/fiber
- Source published
- 24 Jul 2026 18:35:55 UTC
- Source modified
- 24 Jul 2026 19:00:26 UTC
- Observed here
- 24 Oct 2026 13:19:41 UTC
- Source terms
- OSV · upstream source license applies
Original source record · Cite this exact observation · Complete original publisher JSON
This view projects the publisher's source fields for reading; the original JSON retains additional fields and CVE enrichment containers. Attribution: osv · OSV · upstream source license applies. Source text is retained; field grouping and change labels are provided by ChangeIntel.