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OliveTin OS Command Injection via Custom regex: Argument Type Bypassing Shell Safety Check

Exploitation and risk

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cve-program · CVE-2026-67438

Published

OliveTin gives access to predefined shell commands from a web interface. From 3000.2.0 until 3000.17.0, the service/internal/executor/arguments.go checkShellArgumentSafety function does not treat regex: custom argument types as unsafe for Shell mode actions, allowing values that pass typeSafetyCheckRegex to be interpolated by wrapCommandInShell into an sh -c command string and enabling OS command injection. This issue is fixed in version 3000.17.0.

Source published
29 Jul 2026 20:53:09 UTC
Source modified
30 Jul 2026 15:18:25 UTC
Saved here
23 Oct 2026 15:48:27 UTC
Source terms
CVE Program Terms of Use

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Source: cve-program · CVE Program Terms of Use. The publisher's wording is preserved. ChangeIntel groups the information and labels changes. The JSON record includes additional source fields.

CVSS 3.1 · 6.6 CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:H/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H

euvd · EUVD-2026-50564

Published

OliveTin gives access to predefined shell commands from a web interface. From 3000.2.0 until 3000.17.0, the service/internal/executor/arguments.go checkShellArgumentSafety function does not treat regex: custom argument types as unsafe for Shell mode actions, allowing values that pass typeSafetyCheckRegex to be interpolated by wrapCommandInShell into an sh -c command string and enabling OS command injection. This issue is fixed in version 3000.17.0.

Additional publisher context

EUVD source date text has no stated timezone and is retained without inventing a UTC instant. Related bulletin membership is not an alias, common cause or applicability claim. A missing vector with a zero score is treated as unrated. Complete vendor/product and underlying source evidence remains in the original JSON.

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datePublished: Jul 29, 2026, 8:53:09 PM

dateUpdated: Jul 30, 2026, 3:18:25 PM

Source published
Jul 29, 2026, 8:53:09 PM (timezone not stated)
Source modified
Jul 30, 2026, 3:18:25 PM (timezone not stated)
Saved here
19 Nov 2026 18:44:46 UTC
Source terms
ENISA EUVD · source terms and attribution apply

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EUVD CVSS 3.1 · 6.6 CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:H/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H

nvd · CVE-2026-67438

Published

OliveTin gives access to predefined shell commands from a web interface. From 3000.2.0 until 3000.17.0, the service/internal/executor/arguments.go checkShellArgumentSafety function does not treat regex: custom argument types as unsafe for Shell mode actions, allowing values that pass typeSafetyCheckRegex to be interpolated by wrapCommandInShell into an sh -c command string and enabling OS command injection. This issue is fixed in version 3000.17.0.

Additional publisher context

NVD analysis and CPE criteria are source context, not proof that a package or your environment is affected. Complete affected data, logical configurations and SSVC are retained in the original JSON.

Source analysis status: Deferred

Weakness classifications: CWE-78

Original publisher date fields

published: 2026-07-29T21:17:48.120

lastModified: 2026-07-30T19:21:23.297

Source published
29 Jul 2026 21:17:48 UTC
Source modified
30 Jul 2026 19:21:23 UTC
Saved here
25 Oct 2026 15:18:51 UTC
Source terms
NIST NVD usage terms; underlying source attribution retained

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CVSS 3.1 · [email protected] · Secondary · 6.6 CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:H/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H

osv · GHSA-xc5w-4v5w-7x65

Published

### Summary OliveTin's checkShellArgumentSafety() function maintains a blocklist of argument types unsafe for Shell mode actions, but does not include regex:-prefixed types. Because regex: support was added independently via typeSafetyCheckRegex(), any Shell mode action using a regex:-typed argument bypasses the safety check unconditionally. The unvalidated value is then interpolated directly into the sh -c command string via Go's text/template with no escaping, enabling shell injection. Notably, even restrictive-looking patterns are exploitable — for example, a pattern blocking common shell metacharacters remains bypassable via POSIX command substitution. ### Details OliveTin is an open source web UI for running pre-configured shell commands. In the OliveTin service component, the function checkShellArgumentSafety() in service/internal/executor/arguments.go enforces a blocklist of argument types that are unsafe for use in Shell mode actions (actions that execute via sh -c). The blocklist includes password, very_dangerous_raw_string, url, email, and raw_string_multiline. It does not handle custom regex: prefixed argument types. Custom regex: types are supported by a separate function, typeSafetyCheckRegex(), which checks whether a submitted value matches the provided pattern. These two functions evolved independently: when regex: prefix support was added to typeSafetyCheckRegex, checkShellArgumentSafety was not updated to treat regex: types as unsafe for Shell mode. As a result, any action configured with a Shell mode handler and a regex:-typed argument passes the safety check unconditionally, regardless of how permissive or restrictive the pattern is. The argument value then reaches handleShellBranch → wrapCommandInShell, where Go's text/template interpolates it directly into the sh -c command string with no escaping. Critically, this vulnerability is not limited to obviously permissive patterns like regex:.*. An admin who writes a restrictive-looking pattern such as regex: ^[^;|&<>]+$ - explicitly blocking the five most common shell injection characters (semicolon, pipe, ampersand, both redirects) — is still fully exploitable via POSIX command substitution. ### PoC 1. Deploy OliveTin ```bash docker run -d --name olivetin-poc -p 1337:1337 \ -v /tmp/olivetin-poc/config:/config \ ghcr.io/olivetin/olivetin:3000.11.3 ``` 2. Write the configuration below as /tmp/olivetin-poc/config/config.yaml , which represents a realistic admin-authored action: a Shell mode command that accepts user-supplied input validated by a custom regex pattern. ```yaml actions: - title: Custom Input Action id: custom_input shell: echo "Input was {{ .Arguments.customInput }}" arguments: - name: customInput type: "regex:^[^;|&<>]+$" title: Custom Input ``` 3. Trigger RCE via command substitution. ```bash curl -s -X POST http://localhost:1337/api/v1/StartAction \ -H "Content-Type: application/json" \ -d '{"bindingId":"custom_input","arguments":[{"name":"customInput","value":"$(touch /tmp/rce_proof)"}]}' ``` 4. Now verify RCE by checking presence of file ```bash docker exec olivetin-poc ls -la /tmp/rce_proof ``` <img width="1533" height="319" alt="olivetin_proof" src="https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/82c9cc50-8f05-41f8-8cee-bceb3d4b3a2d" /> ### Impact An unauthenticated attacker with network access to an OliveTin instance can achieve full OS command injection - and in practice remote code execution — as the OliveTin process user, provided a Shell mode action exists with any regex:-typed argument whose pattern permits $, backtick, or parentheses.

Source published
30 Jul 2026 14:31:12 UTC
Source modified
18 Aug 2026 15:10:33 UTC
Saved here
24 Oct 2026 13:19:41 UTC
Source terms
GitHub Advisory Database · CC-BY-4.0

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Source: osv · GitHub Advisory Database · CC-BY-4.0. The publisher's wording is preserved. ChangeIntel groups the information and labels changes. The JSON record includes additional source fields.

CVSS_V3 · CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:H/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H

Publisher rating · MODERATE

osv · GO-2026-6145

Published

OliveTin OS Command Injection via Custom regex: Argument Type Bypassing Shell Safety Check in github.com/OliveTin/OliveTin

Source published
18 Aug 2026 14:32:29 UTC
Source modified
18 Aug 2026 15:00:22 UTC
Saved here
24 Oct 2026 13:19:41 UTC
Source terms
OSV · upstream source license applies

Original source record · Cite this exact observation · Complete original publisher JSON

Source: osv · OSV · upstream source license applies. The publisher's wording is preserved. ChangeIntel groups the information and labels changes. The JSON record includes additional source fields.

ChangeIntel

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Sources read 21 Nov 13:30 UTC · 274 of 275 readable · 270 fully read · documentation 463/469 current