SiYuan before v3.7.3 SQL Injection via fullTextSearchAssetContent
Exploitation and risk
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cve-program · CVE-2026-69083
PublishedSiYuan versions before v3.7.3 contain SQL injection vulnerabilities in the fullTextSearchAssetContent endpoint reachable by unauthenticated users and publish RoleReader tokens. Attackers can execute arbitrary SQL on the read-write asset-content database via unescaped method parameters and REGEXP clauses to read, modify, or delete cross-notebook data.
- Source published
- 3 Aug 2026 13:20:39 UTC
- Source modified
- 14 Aug 2026 16:51:11 UTC
- Saved here
- 23 Oct 2026 15:48:27 UTC
- Source terms
- CVE Program Terms of Use
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Source: cve-program · CVE Program Terms of Use. The publisher's wording is preserved. ChangeIntel groups the information and labels changes. The JSON record includes additional source fields.
CVSS 4.0 · 9.9 CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:H/VI:H/VA:N/SC:H/SI:H/SA:N
CVSS 3.1 · 10.0 CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:N
euvd · EUVD-2026-52276
PublishedSiYuan versions before v3.7.3 contain SQL injection vulnerabilities in the fullTextSearchAssetContent endpoint reachable by unauthenticated users and publish RoleReader tokens. Attackers can execute arbitrary SQL on the read-write asset-content database via unescaped method parameters and REGEXP clauses to read, modify, or delete cross-notebook data.
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datePublished: Aug 3, 2026, 1:20:39 PM
dateUpdated: Aug 14, 2026, 4:51:11 PM
- Source published
- Aug 3, 2026, 1:20:39 PM (timezone not stated)
- Source modified
- Aug 14, 2026, 4:51:11 PM (timezone not stated)
- Saved here
- 17 Nov 2026 18:31:58 UTC
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- ENISA EUVD · source terms and attribution apply
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Source: euvd · ENISA EUVD · source terms and attribution apply. The publisher's wording is preserved. ChangeIntel groups the information and labels changes. The JSON record includes additional source fields.
EUVD CVSS 4.0 · 9.9 CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:H/VI:H/VA:N/SC:H/SI:H/SA:N
nvd · CVE-2026-69083
PublishedSiYuan versions before v3.7.3 contain SQL injection vulnerabilities in the fullTextSearchAssetContent endpoint reachable by unauthenticated users and publish RoleReader tokens. Attackers can execute arbitrary SQL on the read-write asset-content database via unescaped method parameters and REGEXP clauses to read, modify, or delete cross-notebook data.
Additional publisher context
NVD analysis and CPE criteria are source context, not proof that a package or your environment is affected. Complete affected data, logical configurations and SSVC are retained in the original JSON.
Source analysis status: Deferred
Weakness classifications: CWE-89
Original publisher date fields
published: 2026-08-03T14:16:28.537
lastModified: 2026-10-23T21:10:00.157
- Source published
- 3 Aug 2026 14:16:28 UTC
- Source modified
- 23 Oct 2026 21:10:00 UTC
- Saved here
- 25 Oct 2026 15:18:51 UTC
- Source terms
- NIST NVD usage terms; underlying source attribution retained
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Source: nvd · NIST NVD usage terms; underlying source attribution retained. The publisher's wording is preserved. ChangeIntel groups the information and labels changes. The JSON record includes additional source fields.
CVSS 4.0 · [email protected] · Secondary · 9.9 CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:H/VI:H/VA:N/SC:H/SI:H/SA:N/E:X/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X
CVSS 3.1 · [email protected] · Secondary · 10.0 CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:N
osv · GHSA-fph3-ghq9-vw66
Published**CVE:** This vulnerability corresponds to [CVE-2026-69083](https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-69083). ### Summary The `/api/search/fullTextSearchAssetContent` endpoint exposes two SQL flaws on the asset-content database, both reachable by the publish `RoleReader` token and by the anonymous account when `Publish.Auth.Enable` is `false`: 1. **method 2** passes a client-supplied SQL statement to the read-write asset-content DB with no single-statement or read-only guard, and without the admin restriction its sibling `fullTextSearchBlock` applies to the same SQL method. 2. **method 3** builds a `REGEXP` clause by concatenating the client expression with no quote-escaping, permitting SQL breakout while the equivalent block-search builder does escape. Both run on a read-write handle through a statement-stacking-capable driver, spanning the cross-notebook asset-content store. ### Details **Route / auth tier.** `router.go`: `Handle("POST", "/api/search/fullTextSearchAssetContent", model.CheckAuth, fullTextSearchAssetContent)`, `CheckAuth` only. Anonymous/reader reachable on the publish surface. `parseSearchAssetContentArgs` reads `method` and `query` straight from the JSON body with no constraint, so both are fully client-controlled. **Missing admin guard (contrast with the sibling).** `fullTextSearchBlock` rejects the SQL method for non-admins (`if method == 2 && !IsAdminRoleContext(c)`). `fullTextSearchAssetContent` has no such check on its handler, so the SQL method is reachable by a reader. **method 2 : raw SQL, no statement guard.** Dispatch: `FullTextSearchAssetContent` case 2 → `searchAssetContentBySQL(query, …)`. After `filterQueryInvisibleChars` + `TrimSpace`, the statement is passed to `sql.SelectAssetContentsRawStmt(stmt, …)` → `queryAssetContent` → `assetContentDB.Query(query)` directly, with no `CheckSingleStatement`/`CheckReadonlyStatement`. The `assetContentDB` DSN sets no `mode=ro`/`_query_only`, so the handle is read-write (same `88250/go-sqlite3` fork). **method 3 : unescaped REGEXP concatenation.** Dispatch → `assetContentFieldRegexp(exp)`, which writes `(name REGEXP '<exp>' OR content REGEXP '<exp>')` by concatenation with **no** `'` escaping. `exp` reaches it after only `filterQueryInvisibleChars` (strips invisible characters, not quotes). The parallel block-search builder `fieldRegexp` performs `ReplaceAll(regexp, "'", "''")` before wrapping, this asset builder omits that step. A single quote in `exp` breaks out of the literal into SQL context. The result runs via `SelectAssetContentsRawStmtNoParse` → `queryAssetContent` → direct `assetContentDB.Query`, again with no single/read-only guard. **Post-hoc filter.** `FilterAssetContentByPublishAccess` runs on the results after the query executes; it filters rows and does not constrain the statement (same timing as the accepted `searchDocs`/`searchEmbedBlock` findings). **Handle / stacking / scope.** Read-write asset-content DB, `88250/go-sqlite3` stacking-capable driver, `ATTACH` available. The asset-content store spans notebooks cross-boundary. ### Impact An unauthenticated request (publish mode with auth disabled) or any publish `RoleReader` can, via method 2, execute arbitrary SQL on the read-write asset-content database, and via method 3, inject SQL through the unescaped `REGEXP` clause. Both permit cross-notebook read disclosure of asset-content data and, via the read-write handle and statement stacking, modification of database content and `ATTACH`-reachable files. No admin role or write permission through the normal API is required. Code execution is not reachable in the default build (no `load_extension`). ### PoC Steps 1. Create a doc with a heading and secret body (6806, admin token) `curl -s -X POST http://127.0.0.1:6806/api/notebook/createNotebook -H "Content-Type: application/json" -H "Authorization: Token g4wj3r04ntobe9m4" -d "{\"name\":\"F3\"}"` Take the returned notebook id as BOX, then: `curl -s -X POST http://127.0.0.1:6806/api/filetree/createDocWithMd -H "Content-Type: application/json" -H "Authorization: Token g4wj3r04ntobe9m4" -d "{\"notebook\":\"BOX\",\"path\":\"/f3-secret\",\"markdown\":\"## SecretSection\n\nUNIQUE_MARKER_99 hidden body text\"}"` The returned string is the doc root id → DOC. 2. Get the heading block id (admin SQL on 68 `curl -s -X POST http://127.0.0.1:6806/api/notebook/createNotebook -H "Content-Type: application/json" -H "Authorization: Token g4wj3r04ntobe9m4" -d "{\"name\":\"F3\"}"` Take the returned notebook id as BOX, then: `curl -s -X POST http://127.0.0.1:6806/api/fintent-Type: application/json" -H"Authorization: Token g4wj3r04ntobe9m4" -d "{\"notebook\":\"BOX\",\"path\":\"/f3-secret\",\"markdown\":\"## SecretSection\n\nUNIQUE_MARKER_99 hidden body text\"}"` The returned string is the doc root id → DOC. 2. Get the heading block id (admin SQL on 6806) `curl -s -X POST http://127.0.0.1:6806/api/query/sql -H "Content-Type: application/json" -H "Authorization: Token g4wj3r04ntobe9m4" -d "{\"stmt\":\"SELECT id,type,content FROM blocks WHERE type='h'\"}"` Copy the id whose content is SecretSection → HEADING. 3. Mark the doc forbidden from publishing (admin) `curl -s -X POST http://127.0.0.1:6806/api/filetree/setPublishAccess -H "Content-Type: application/json" -H "Authorization: Token g4wj3r04ntobe9m4" -d "{\"id\":\"DOC\",\"visible\":false,\"password\":\"\",\"disable\":true}"` Now the doc is explicitly excluded from the 4. Baseline: the admin-gated sibling refuses the reader `curl -i -X POST http://127.0.0.1:6808/api/block/getBlockDOM -H "Content-Type: application/json" -d "{\"id\":\"HEADING\"}"` → expect 403 (getBlockDOM is CheckAdminRole). This is how raw-DOM retrieval is supposed to be gated. 5. THE PROOF: reader pulls the forbidden doc's content anyway `curl -i -X POST http://127.0.0.1:6808/api/block/getHeadingChildrenDOM -H "Content-Type: application/json" -d "{\"id\":\"HEADING\"}"` → 200 status code and data contains the rendered HTML including UNIQUE_MARKER_99 hidden body text full content of a doc that is disabled from publishing, returned to an anonymous reader with no filter. ### Suggested fix Bring `fullTextSearchAssetContent` in line with its block-search twin: apply the `method == 2 && !IsAdminRoleContext` rejection, route the raw-SQL path through `CheckSingleStatement`/`CheckReadonlyStatement`, and add `ReplaceAll(exp, "'", "''")` in `assetContentFieldRegexp` to match `fieldRegexp`. Ideally run reader-reachable asset-content reads on a `_query_only=1` handle so no reader-reachable path can write or `ATTACH`.
- Source published
- 3 Sep 2026 21:01:05 UTC
- Source modified
- 10 Sep 2026 15:25:36 UTC
- Saved here
- 24 Oct 2026 13:19:41 UTC
- Source terms
- GitHub Advisory Database · CC-BY-4.0
Original source record · Cite this exact observation · Complete original publisher JSON
Source: osv · GitHub Advisory Database · CC-BY-4.0. The publisher's wording is preserved. ChangeIntel groups the information and labels changes. The JSON record includes additional source fields.
CVSS_V3 · CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:N
Publisher rating · CRITICAL
osv · GHSA-pqpf-6vqv-6w92
Withdrawn## Duplicate Advisory This advisory has been withdrawn because it is a duplicate of GHSA-fph3-ghq9-vw66. This link is maintained to preserve external references. ## Original Description SiYuan versions before v3.7.3 contain SQL injection vulnerabilities in the fullTextSearchAssetContent endpoint reachable by unauthenticated users and publish RoleReader tokens. Attackers can execute arbitrary SQL on the read-write asset-content database via unescaped method parameters and REGEXP clauses to read, modify, or delete cross-notebook data.
- Source published
- 3 Aug 2026 15:32:48 UTC
- Source modified
- 3 Sep 2026 21:15:04 UTC
- Saved here
- 24 Oct 2026 13:19:41 UTC
- Source terms
- GitHub Advisory Database · CC-BY-4.0
Original source record · Cite this exact observation · Complete original publisher JSON
Source: osv · GitHub Advisory Database · CC-BY-4.0. The publisher's wording is preserved. ChangeIntel groups the information and labels changes. The JSON record includes additional source fields.
CVSS_V3 · CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:N
CVSS_V4 · CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:H/VI:H/VA:N/SC:H/SI:H/SA:N/E:X/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X
Publisher rating · CRITICAL
osv · GO-2026-6374
PublishedSiYuan: Unauthenticated SQL execution and REGEXP injection via fullTextSearchAssetContent (publish mode): reader-reachable raw SQL (method 2) and unescaped REGEXP (method 3) on read-write asset-content DB in github.com/siyuan-note/siyuan/kernel
- Source published
- 10 Sep 2026 14:48:42 UTC
- Source modified
- 10 Sep 2026 15:15:13 UTC
- Saved here
- 24 Oct 2026 13:19:41 UTC
- Source terms
- OSV · upstream source license applies
Original source record · Cite this exact observation · Complete original publisher JSON
Source: osv · OSV · upstream source license applies. The publisher's wording is preserved. ChangeIntel groups the information and labels changes. The JSON record includes additional source fields.