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Klever-Go KVM: Throttler slot leak in trie account-data sync causes epoch bootstrap / state sync DoS

Collected exploitation and prediction evidence

Risk source coverage

CISA KEV is observed exploitation evidence. FIRST EPSS is a dated prediction of exploitation in the next 30 days. Missing scores are unknown. This collector requests predictions only for explicit CVE aliases in the public NuGet archive; Microsoft release views retain their existing prediction scope.

No collected risk observation for these identifiers. This does not establish absence of exploitation or a zero probability.

cve-program · CVE-2026-49343

Published

Klever-Go is the Go implementation of the Klever blockchain protocol. In versions prior to 1.7.18, the account-data trie syncers are vulnerable to a resource-exhaustion flaw that leaks bounded throttler slots on error paths. In syncDataTrie() (in both userAccountsSyncer.go and kappAccountsSyncer.go), StartProcessing() reserves a slot from the NumGoRoutinesThrottler, but the corresponding EndProcessing() is only called on the success path and on the duplicate-root early return. As a result, any error from trie.NewTrie(), trie.NewTrieSyncer(), or trieSyncer.StartSyncing() (including the network-dependent timeout path) permanently consumes one slot for the lifetime of the throttler. An attacker who can repeatedly cause trie-node sync failures or timeouts during bootstrap can exhaust the bounded throttler, after which further account-data trie syncs stop making progress and SyncAccounts() returns a timeout. Because epoch bootstrap in syncUserAccountsState() and syncKappAccountsState() aborts on any such error, this causes bootstrap to fail, a core availability issue affecting fresh, restarting, or resyncing nodes and validators. This issue is fixed in version 1.7.18.

Source published
7 Aug 2026 22:18:18 UTC
Source modified
13 Aug 2026 18:40:16 UTC
Observed here
23 Oct 2026 15:48:27 UTC
Source terms
CVE Program Terms of Use

Original source record · Cite this exact observation · Complete original publisher JSON

This view projects the publisher's source fields for reading; the original JSON retains additional fields and CVE enrichment containers. Attribution: cve-program · CVE Program Terms of Use. Source text is retained; field grouping and change labels are provided by ChangeIntel.

CVSS 3.1 · 5.9 CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H

euvd · EUVD-2026-54716

Published

Klever-Go is the Go implementation of the Klever blockchain protocol. In versions prior to 1.7.18, the account-data trie syncers are vulnerable to a resource-exhaustion flaw that leaks bounded throttler slots on error paths. In syncDataTrie() (in both userAccountsSyncer.go and kappAccountsSyncer.go), StartProcessing() reserves a slot from the NumGoRoutinesThrottler, but the corresponding EndProcessing() is only called on the success path and on the duplicate-root early return. As a result, any error from trie.NewTrie(), trie.NewTrieSyncer(), or trieSyncer.StartSyncing() (including the network-dependent timeout path) permanently consumes one slot for the lifetime of the throttler. An attacker who can repeatedly cause trie-node sync failures or timeouts during bootstrap can exhaust the bounded throttler, after which further account-data trie syncs stop making progress and SyncAccounts() returns a timeout. Because epoch bootstrap in syncUserAccountsState() and syncKappAccountsState() aborts on any such error, this causes bootstrap to fail, a core availability issue affecting fresh, restarting, or resyncing nodes and validators. This issue is fixed in version 1.7.18.

EUVD source date text has no stated timezone and is retained without inventing a UTC instant. Related bulletin membership is not an alias, common cause or applicability claim. A missing vector with a zero score is treated as unrated. Complete vendor/product and underlying source evidence remains in the original JSON.

Original publisher date fields

datePublished: Aug 7, 2026, 10:18:18 PM

dateUpdated: Aug 13, 2026, 6:40:16 PM

Source published
Aug 7, 2026, 10:18:18 PM (timezone not stated)
Source modified
Aug 13, 2026, 6:40:16 PM (timezone not stated)
Observed here
7 Nov 2026 11:31:31 UTC
Source terms
ENISA EUVD · source terms and attribution apply

Original source record · Cite this exact observation · Complete original publisher JSON

This view projects the publisher's source fields for reading; the original JSON retains additional fields and CVE enrichment containers. Attribution: euvd · ENISA EUVD · source terms and attribution apply. Source text is retained; field grouping and change labels are provided by ChangeIntel.

EUVD CVSS 3.1 · 5.9 CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H

nvd · CVE-2026-49343

Published

Klever-Go is the Go implementation of the Klever blockchain protocol. In versions prior to 1.7.18, the account-data trie syncers are vulnerable to a resource-exhaustion flaw that leaks bounded throttler slots on error paths. In syncDataTrie() (in both userAccountsSyncer.go and kappAccountsSyncer.go), StartProcessing() reserves a slot from the NumGoRoutinesThrottler, but the corresponding EndProcessing() is only called on the success path and on the duplicate-root early return. As a result, any error from trie.NewTrie(), trie.NewTrieSyncer(), or trieSyncer.StartSyncing() (including the network-dependent timeout path) permanently consumes one slot for the lifetime of the throttler. An attacker who can repeatedly cause trie-node sync failures or timeouts during bootstrap can exhaust the bounded throttler, after which further account-data trie syncs stop making progress and SyncAccounts() returns a timeout. Because epoch bootstrap in syncUserAccountsState() and syncKappAccountsState() aborts on any such error, this causes bootstrap to fail, a core availability issue affecting fresh, restarting, or resyncing nodes and validators. This issue is fixed in version 1.7.18.

NVD analysis and CPE criteria are source context, not proof that a package or your environment is affected. Complete affected data, logical configurations and SSVC are retained in the original JSON.

Source analysis status: Deferred

Weakness classifications: CWE-400 · CWE-772

Original publisher date fields

published: 2026-08-07T23:17:04.450

lastModified: 2026-10-24T16:10:00.153

Source published
7 Aug 2026 23:17:04 UTC
Source modified
24 Oct 2026 16:10:00 UTC
Observed here
25 Oct 2026 12:17:32 UTC
Source terms
NIST NVD usage terms; underlying source attribution retained

Original source record · Cite this exact observation · Complete original publisher JSON

This view projects the publisher's source fields for reading; the original JSON retains additional fields and CVE enrichment containers. Attribution: nvd · NIST NVD usage terms; underlying source attribution retained. Source text is retained; field grouping and change labels are provided by ChangeIntel.

CVSS 3.1 · [email protected] · Secondary · 5.9 CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H

osv · GHSA-fw38-pc54-jvx9

Published

## Summary The account-data trie syncers leak bounded throttler slots on error paths in `syncDataTrie()`. Each failed trie sync permanently consumes one slot from the `NumGoRoutinesThrottler`, and the slot is never returned unless the sync succeeds or the root hash was already present. I confirmed this on the current default branch `develop` at commit `9640d63` (observed on May 20, 2026). I also confirmed the bug with a runtime PoC using the real timeout path in `trieSyncer.StartSyncing()`: two timed-out sync attempts are enough to exhaust a throttler with capacity `2`. This affects the epoch bootstrap path because `syncUserAccountsState()` and `syncKappAccountsState()` create bounded throttlers and abort bootstrap immediately if the syncer returns an error. Once enough trie-root sync attempts fail, the syncer cannot make forward progress and bootstrap fails. ## Affected Components - `data/syncer/userAccountsSyncer.go` - `data/syncer/kappAccountsSyncer.go` - `data/trie/sync.go` - `core/throttler/numGoRoutinesThrottler.go` - `core/bootstrap/process.go` ## Affected Version Verified on: - `develop` HEAD `9640d63` Please check whether the same code is present in supported `1.7.x` releases. ## Suggested Severity High ## Vulnerability Details ### Root Cause Both account-data syncers call `StartProcessing()` before creating / starting the trie syncer, but they only call `EndProcessing()` on the success path and on the duplicate-root early return. `userAccountsSyncer.syncDataTrie()`: ```go func (u *userAccountsSyncer) syncDataTrie(rootHash []byte, ssh data.SyncStatisticsHandler, ctx context.Context) error { u.throttler.StartProcessing() u.syncerMutex.Lock() if _, ok := u.dataTries[string(rootHash)]; ok { u.syncerMutex.Unlock() u.throttler.EndProcessing() return nil } dataTrie, err := trie.NewTrie(...) if err != nil { u.syncerMutex.Unlock() return err } trieSyncer, err := trie.NewTrieSyncer(arg) if err != nil { u.syncerMutex.Unlock() return err } u.syncerMutex.Unlock() err = trieSyncer.StartSyncing(rootHash, ctx) if err != nil { return err } u.throttler.EndProcessing() return nil } The same bug exists in kappAccountsSyncer.syncDataTrie(). ``` ### Missing slot release paths After StartProcessing(), the following error paths return without EndProcessing(): 1. trie.NewTrie(...) returns an error 2. trie.NewTrieSyncer(...) returns an error 3. trieSyncer.StartSyncing(...) returns an error ### Why this matters NumGoRoutinesThrottler is a strict bounded counter: ``` func (ngrt *NumGoRoutinesThrottler) CanProcess() bool { valCounter := atomic.LoadInt32(&ngrt.counter) return valCounter < ngrt.max } func (ngrt *NumGoRoutinesThrottler) StartProcessing() { atomic.AddInt32(&ngrt.counter, 1) } func (ngrt *NumGoRoutinesThrottler) EndProcessing() { atomic.AddInt32(&ngrt.counter, -1) } Once leaked, a slot remains consumed for the lifetime of that throttler instance. The parent loops in both syncers wait for capacity before starting the next account-data trie sync: for !u.throttler.CanProcess() { select { case <-time.After(timeBetweenRetries): continue case <-ctx.Done(): return common.ErrTimeIsOut } } ``` So after enough failures, further roots stop progressing and the sync operation eventually returns time is out. ### Bootstrap impact Epoch bootstrap uses these syncers directly and aborts on any error: ``` err = e.syncUserAccountsState(e.epochStartMeta.Header.TrieRoot) if err != nil { return nil, nil, err } err = e.syncKappAccountsState(e.epochStartMeta.Header.KAppsTrieRoot) if err != nil { return nil, nil, err } ``` The throttlers for these paths are real bounded throttlers created from numConcurrentTrieSyncers. ## Proof of Concept I verified the bug with the real timeout path, not only with a canceled context. The PoC below uses: - a real NumGoRoutinesThrottler with capacity 2 - a real trieSyncer.StartSyncing() - an empty trie-node cache and a request handler that never supplies nodes - a short sync timeout (1s) so StartSyncing() returns trie.ErrTimeIsOut After the first failed sync, one slot remains leaked. After the second failed sync, the throttler is exhausted. ### PoC test ``` package syncer import ( "context" "testing" "time" commonmock "github.com/klever-io/klever-go/common/mock" corethrottler "github.com/klever-io/klever-go/core/throttler" "github.com/klever-io/klever-go/data" "github.com/klever-io/klever-go/data/trie" triestats "github.com/klever-io/klever-go/data/trie/statistics" "github.com/stretchr/testify/require" ) func newBaseSyncerForTimeoutPOC(t *testing.T) *baseAccountsSyncer { t.Helper() storageManager, err := trie.NewTrieStorageManagerWithoutPruning(commonmock.NewMemDbMock()) require.NoError(t, err) return &baseAccountsSyncer{ hasher: commonmock.HasherMock{}, marshalizer: &commonmock.MarshalizerMock{}, trieSyncers: make(map[string]data.TrieSyncer), dataTries: make(map[string]data.Trie), trieStorageManager: storageManager, requestHandler: &commonmock.RequestHandlerStub{}, timeout: time.Second, cacher: commonmock.NewCacherStub(), maxTrieLevelInMemory: 5, name: "timeout-poc", maxHardCapForMissingNodes: 1, } } func TestPOC_UserAccountsSyncer_LeaksThrottlerSlotOnTrieTimeout(t *testing.T) { thr, err := corethrottler.NewNumGoRoutinesThrottler(2) require.NoError(t, err) s := &userAccountsSyncer{ baseAccountsSyncer: newBaseSyncerForTimeoutPOC(t), throttler: thr, } err = s.syncDataTrie([]byte("missing-root-1"), triestats.NewTrieSyncStatistics(), context.Background()) require.ErrorIs(t, err, trie.ErrTimeIsOut) require.True(t, thr.CanProcess()) err = s.syncDataTrie([]byte("missing-root-2"), triestats.NewTrieSyncStatistics(), context.Background()) require.ErrorIs(t, err, trie.ErrTimeIsOut) require.False(t, thr.CanProcess()) } func TestPOC_KappAccountsSyncer_LeaksThrottlerSlotOnTrieTimeout(t *testing.T) { thr, err := corethrottler.NewNumGoRoutinesThrottler(2) require.NoError(t, err) s := &kappAccountsSyncer{ baseAccountsSyncer: newBaseSyncerForTimeoutPOC(t), throttler: thr, } err = s.syncDataTrie([]byte("missing-root-1"), triestats.NewTrieSyncStatistics(), context.Background()) require.ErrorIs(t, err, trie.ErrTimeIsOut) require.True(t, thr.CanProcess()) err = s.syncDataTrie([]byte("missing-root-2"), triestats.NewTrieSyncStatistics(), context.Background()) require.ErrorIs(t, err, trie.ErrTimeIsOut) require.False(t, thr.CanProcess()) } ``` ### Command used ``` go test ./data/syncer -run 'TestPOC_(User|Kapp)AccountsSyncer_LeaksThrottlerSlotOnTrieTimeout' -count=1 ``` ### Result ``` ok github.com/klever-io/klever-go/data/syncer 4.005s ``` This confirms the leak with the real timeout path from trieSyncer.StartSyncing(). ## Impact An attacker who can repeatedly cause trie-node sync failures or timeouts during bootstrap can consume the bounded sync throttler until no capacity remains. Once enough slots are leaked: - additional account-data trie sync attempts stop making progress - the parent loop waits until context timeout - SyncAccounts() fails - epoch bootstrap fails This is a core node availability issue. It affects fresh/restarting nodes and validators that need to bootstrap or resync state. This is not a theoretical issue: - StartSyncing() performs network-dependent trie-node retrieval - it already has explicit timeout / failure paths - the leaked throttler slots are confirmed by runtime PoC ## Recommended Fix Release the slot with defer immediately after StartProcessing() and cancel the defer only if ownership is intentionally transferred, which is not the case here. Example fix pattern: ``` func (u *userAccountsSyncer) syncDataTrie(rootHash []byte, ssh data.SyncStatisticsHandler, ctx context.Context) error { u.throttler.StartProcessing() defer u.throttler.EndProcessing() u.syncerMutex.Lock() defer u.syncerMutex.Unlock() if _, ok := u.dataTries[string(rootHash)]; ok { return nil } dataTrie, err := trie.NewTrie(...) if err != nil { return err } trieSyncer, err := trie.NewTrieSyncer(arg) if err != nil { return err } u.trieSyncers[string(rootHash)] = trieSyncer return trieSyncer.StartSyncing(rootHash, ctx) } ``` The same pattern should be applied to: - data/syncer/userAccountsSyncer.go - data/syncer/kappAccountsSyncer.go ## References - data/syncer/userAccountsSyncer.go - data/syncer/kappAccountsSyncer.go - data/trie/sync.go - core/throttler/numGoRoutinesThrottler.go - core/bootstrap/process.go - SECURITY.md

Source published
5 Jun 2026 16:40:40 UTC
Source modified
25 Jun 2026 19:56:02 UTC
Observed here
24 Oct 2026 13:19:41 UTC
Source terms
GitHub Advisory Database · CC-BY-4.0

Original source record · Cite this exact observation · Complete original publisher JSON

This view projects the publisher's source fields for reading; the original JSON retains additional fields and CVE enrichment containers. Attribution: osv · GitHub Advisory Database · CC-BY-4.0. Source text is retained; field grouping and change labels are provided by ChangeIntel.

CVSS_V3 · CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H

Publisher rating · MODERATE

osv · GO-2026-5379

Published

Klever-Go KVM: Throttler slot leak in trie account-data sync causes epoch bootstrap / state sync DoS in github.com/klever-io/klever-go

Source published
25 Jun 2026 18:43:19 UTC
Source modified
25 Jun 2026 19:45:37 UTC
Observed here
24 Oct 2026 13:19:41 UTC
Source terms
OSV · upstream source license applies

Original source record · Cite this exact observation · Complete original publisher JSON

This view projects the publisher's source fields for reading; the original JSON retains additional fields and CVE enrichment containers. Attribution: osv · OSV · upstream source license applies. Source text is retained; field grouping and change labels are provided by ChangeIntel.

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