Public mode

No access to your tenant or devices. Every item links to its source. What this means

Sources need attention Customize Public modeDiscuss ChangeIntel on Discord

Budibase: Email Change IDOR via POST /api/v2/email allows full Account Takeover (accountId not validated against session)

Exploitation and risk

Source status

CISA KEV lists vulnerabilities known to be exploited. FIRST EPSS estimates the likelihood of exploitation in the next 30 days. An unavailable score does not mean zero risk.

Which CVEs have scores here?

This view includes predictions for CVE identifiers explicitly listed in public NuGet advisories. Microsoft release pages have their own prediction coverage. Check source status for the scope and latest checks.

No exploitation or prediction data is available here for these CVEs. This does not mean they are safe or unlikely to be exploited.

cve-program · CVE-2026-73303

Published

Budibase is an open-source low-code platform. Prior to 3.40.0, POST /api/v2/email on account.budibase.app accepted a client-controlled accountId without binding it to the authenticated session, while checking only currentEmail. An authenticated attacker who obtains a victim account identifier can start the email-change workflow for the victim, receive and submit the verification code through POST /api/v2/email/verification, move the victim email to an attacker-controlled address, and complete a password reset as the victim. This issue is fixed in version 3.40.0.

Source published
12 Aug 2026 18:51:38 UTC
Source modified
12 Aug 2026 22:11:41 UTC
Saved here
23 Oct 2026 15:48:27 UTC
Source terms
CVE Program Terms of Use

Original source record · Cite this exact observation · Complete original publisher JSON

Source: cve-program · CVE Program Terms of Use. The publisher's wording is preserved. ChangeIntel groups the information and labels changes. The JSON record includes additional source fields.

CVSS 3.1 · 8.2 CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:N

euvd · EUVD-2026-57426

Published

Budibase is an open-source low-code platform. Prior to 3.40.0, POST /api/v2/email on account.budibase.app accepted a client-controlled accountId without binding it to the authenticated session, while checking only currentEmail. An authenticated attacker who obtains a victim account identifier can start the email-change workflow for the victim, receive and submit the verification code through POST /api/v2/email/verification, move the victim email to an attacker-controlled address, and complete a password reset as the victim. This issue is fixed in version 3.40.0.

Additional publisher context

EUVD source date text has no stated timezone and is retained without inventing a UTC instant. Related bulletin membership is not an alias, common cause or applicability claim. A missing vector with a zero score is treated as unrated. Complete vendor/product and underlying source evidence remains in the original JSON.

Original publisher date fields

datePublished: Aug 12, 2026, 6:51:38 PM

dateUpdated: Aug 12, 2026, 10:11:41 PM

Source published
Aug 12, 2026, 6:51:38 PM (timezone not stated)
Source modified
Aug 12, 2026, 10:11:41 PM (timezone not stated)
Saved here
17 Nov 2026 19:40:37 UTC
Source terms
ENISA EUVD · source terms and attribution apply

Original source record · Cite this exact observation · Complete original publisher JSON

Source: euvd · ENISA EUVD · source terms and attribution apply. The publisher's wording is preserved. ChangeIntel groups the information and labels changes. The JSON record includes additional source fields.

EUVD CVSS 3.1 · 8.2 CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:N

nvd · CVE-2026-73303

Published

Budibase is an open-source low-code platform. Prior to 3.40.0, POST /api/v2/email on account.budibase.app accepted a client-controlled accountId without binding it to the authenticated session, while checking only currentEmail. An authenticated attacker who obtains a victim account identifier can start the email-change workflow for the victim, receive and submit the verification code through POST /api/v2/email/verification, move the victim email to an attacker-controlled address, and complete a password reset as the victim. This issue is fixed in version 3.40.0.

Additional publisher context

NVD analysis and CPE criteria are source context, not proof that a package or your environment is affected. Complete affected data, logical configurations and SSVC are retained in the original JSON.

Source analysis status: Deferred

Weakness classifications: CWE-639

Original publisher date fields

published: 2026-08-12T20:17:54.133

lastModified: 2026-09-08T20:56:50.520

Source published
12 Aug 2026 20:17:54 UTC
Source modified
8 Sep 2026 20:56:50 UTC
Saved here
25 Oct 2026 15:19:03 UTC
Source terms
NIST NVD usage terms; underlying source attribution retained

Original source record · Cite this exact observation · Complete original publisher JSON

Source: nvd · NIST NVD usage terms; underlying source attribution retained. The publisher's wording is preserved. ChangeIntel groups the information and labels changes. The JSON record includes additional source fields.

CVSS 3.1 · [email protected] · Secondary · 8.2 CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:N

osv · GHSA-c8vc-7pv3-g98p

Published

## Summary `POST /api/v2/email` on the account portal (`account.budibase.app`) starts an email-change workflow using a client-supplied `accountId` that is **not validated against the authenticated session**. A logged-in attacker supplies a victim's `accountId` and an email address they control; the verification code is delivered to the attacker's address, and completing the workflow changes the **victim's** account email. The attacker then password-resets the victim's account through the controlled address and logs in — full account takeover with no victim interaction. ## Vulnerability Details The endpoint session-checks the `currentEmail` field (a mismatch returns 403), but it does not enforce `body.accountId === session.accountId`. The account-portal frontend only ever submits the logged-in user's own accountId, so in normal use the two always match — the server simply trusts the body value. An attacker who has a victim's `accountId` can point the workflow at the victim's account while passing their own `currentEmail` to clear the session check. This is more powerful than a direct password reset: `PUT /api/v2/auth/password {email}` already exists and is gated only on knowing the victim's email, but the reset link is sent to the address on the account — the victim's inbox, which the attacker does not control. This IDOR moves the victim's email to an attacker-controlled inbox first, so the attacker receives the reset link and sets a password they know. **accountId obtainability.** We checked every endpoint reachable from a non-admin free-tier account — `GET /api/global/users` (no UUID in any user record), `GET /api/global/auditlogs/search` (no accountId field), `GET /api/global/users/invites` (code + email + name only), `GET /api/v2/tenant` (one tenant-internal UUID, not a user accountId), the account-portal frontend (passes the session's own accountId only), and all unauthenticated endpoints — and the victim's `accountId` was not present in any of them. The attacker must obtain the UUID through some channel other than the normal API surface (support channel, screenshot, a leak, prior compromise, etc.). ## Steps to Reproduce **Setup:** Two account-portal accounts at `https://account.budibase.app` — Account A (attacker) and Account B (victim). From Account B's session, `GET /api/auth/self` returns `account.accountId` — this is the value the attacker needs. 1. **Start the email-change workflow pointed at the victim's accountId, newEmail = attacker-controlled.** ```http POST /api/v2/email HTTP/1.1 Host: account.budibase.app Content-Type: application/json Cookie: budibase:auth=<ACCOUNT_A_JWT> {"currentEmail":"<ACCOUNT_A_EMAIL>","newEmail":"[email protected]","accountId":"<VICTIM_ACCOUNT_ID>"} ``` Response: `201 Created`, sets `budibase:change_email:correlationkey` (HttpOnly), `:instancekey`, `:status`, `:newemail` cookies. The workflow started against the victim's accountId even though the caller is Account A. 2. **Complete the change with the code from the attacker-controlled inbox (or read directly from the `correlationkey` cookie set in step 1).** ```http POST /api/v2/email/verification HTTP/1.1 Host: account.budibase.app Content-Type: application/json Cookie: budibase:auth=<ACCOUNT_A_JWT>; budibase:change_email:correlationkey=<CODE>; budibase:change_email:instancekey=<KEY> {"verificationCode":"<code>","processInstanceKey":"<key>"} ``` Response: `200 OK`. The victim's account email is now `[email protected]`. 3. **Confirm the change hit the victim, not the caller (false-positive control).** - Account A (caller) still logs in with its own original email — 200, unchanged. - Account B's (victim) original email is now rejected — 403, locked out. - `[email protected]` now logs into the victim's account — 200. 4. **Take over the account.** ```http PUT /api/v2/auth/password HTTP/1.1 Host: account.budibase.app Content-Type: application/json {"email":"[email protected]"} ``` Response: `202 Accepted`, reset link delivered to the attacker's own inbox. Complete the reset with `PUT /api/v2/auth/password/verification`, then log in as the victim with the attacker-chosen password. `GET /api/auth/self` afterward returns the victim's real `accountId` and `tenantId` — full account takeover, confirmed via a genuinely separate account/tenant (not a same-account self-test). ## Impact An authenticated account-portal user who obtains a victim's `accountId` (out-of-band — it is not exposed anywhere in the normal cross-user API surface we could find) can take over that victim's account: rewrite the login email to an attacker address, set a new password, and access the victim's tenants, apps, and stored datasource credentials (REST/SQL/S3 auth). The victim is locked out of their own account. Every step from the initial IDOR write to full login-as-victim is deterministic and 100% reliable once the accountId is known — no additional vulnerability or guessing is required, since the chain uses nothing but the platform's own stock password-reset flow. ## Remediation Validate that the body's `accountId` equals the authenticated session's `accountId` before starting or completing the email-change workflow (the same check already applied to `currentEmail`). Do not trust a client-supplied `accountId` to select the workflow target.

Source published
24 Jul 2026 21:14:49 UTC
Source modified
12 Aug 2026 19:11:12 UTC
Saved here
24 Oct 2026 13:17:17 UTC
Source terms
GitHub Advisory Database · CC-BY-4.0

Original source record · Cite this exact observation · Complete original publisher JSON

Source: osv · GitHub Advisory Database · CC-BY-4.0. The publisher's wording is preserved. ChangeIntel groups the information and labels changes. The JSON record includes additional source fields.

Publisher rating · HIGH

ChangeIntel

An IT change radar: releases, security, known issues, retirements, documentation changes, and service status from public sources. Every item links to supporting evidence; dates and statuses can change after they are read.

Sources read 19 Nov 09:42 UTC · 273 of 275 readable · 269 fully read · documentation 469/469 current