ZEBRA: Repeated Non-Finalized Shielded Transaction Aborts Zebra Before Duplicate-Nullifier Rejection
Exploitation and risk
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cve-program · CVE-2026-52739
PublishedZEBRA is a Zcash node written entirely in Rust. Prior to 4.5.0, a malicious block producer can terminate zebrad by placing the same shielded transaction in a non-finalized parent block and its child. In zebra-state/src/service/non_finalized_state/chain.rs, Chain::push originally inserted the transaction hash into tx_loc_by_hash and asserted uniqueness before updating shielded data and running the duplicate Sprout, Sapling, or Orchard nullifier checks. The repeated transaction therefore reached the transactions must be unique within a single chain assertion before contextual validation could reject it cleanly. Zebra release builds use panic equals abort, so the reachable assertion terminates the entire process; exploitation requires either two consecutive attacker-mined blocks or an attacker-mined child immediately after an honest block includes the attacker's shielded transaction. This issue is fixed in version 4.5.0.
- Source published
- 18 Aug 2026 19:22:19 UTC
- Source modified
- 19 Aug 2026 18:20:38 UTC
- Saved here
- 23 Oct 2026 15:48:27 UTC
- Source terms
- CVE Program Terms of Use
Original source record · Cite this exact observation · Complete original publisher JSON
Source: cve-program · CVE Program Terms of Use. The publisher's wording is preserved. ChangeIntel groups the information and labels changes. The JSON record includes additional source fields.
CVSS 3.1 · 5.9 CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H
euvd · EUVD-2026-61165
PublishedZEBRA is a Zcash node written entirely in Rust. Prior to 4.5.0, a malicious block producer can terminate zebrad by placing the same shielded transaction in a non-finalized parent block and its child. In zebra-state/src/service/non_finalized_state/chain.rs, Chain::push originally inserted the transaction hash into tx_loc_by_hash and asserted uniqueness before updating shielded data and running the duplicate Sprout, Sapling, or Orchard nullifier checks. The repeated transaction therefore reached the transactions must be unique within a single chain assertion before contextual validation could reject it cleanly. Zebra release builds use panic equals abort, so the reachable assertion terminates the entire process; exploitation requires either two consecutive attacker-mined blocks or an attacker-mined child immediately after an honest block includes the attacker's shielded transaction. This issue is fixed in version 4.5.0.
Additional publisher context
EUVD source date text has no stated timezone and is retained without inventing a UTC instant. Related bulletin membership is not an alias, common cause or applicability claim. A missing vector with a zero score is treated as unrated. Complete vendor/product and underlying source evidence remains in the original JSON.
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datePublished: Aug 18, 2026, 7:22:19 PM
dateUpdated: Aug 19, 2026, 6:20:38 PM
- Source published
- Aug 18, 2026, 7:22:19 PM (timezone not stated)
- Source modified
- Aug 19, 2026, 6:20:38 PM (timezone not stated)
- Saved here
- 20 Nov 2026 12:10:39 UTC
- Source terms
- ENISA EUVD · source terms and attribution apply
Original source record · Cite this exact observation · Complete original publisher JSON
Source: euvd · ENISA EUVD · source terms and attribution apply. The publisher's wording is preserved. ChangeIntel groups the information and labels changes. The JSON record includes additional source fields.
EUVD CVSS 3.1 · 5.9 CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H
nvd · CVE-2026-52739
PublishedZEBRA is a Zcash node written entirely in Rust. Prior to 4.5.0, a malicious block producer can terminate zebrad by placing the same shielded transaction in a non-finalized parent block and its child. In zebra-state/src/service/non_finalized_state/chain.rs, Chain::push originally inserted the transaction hash into tx_loc_by_hash and asserted uniqueness before updating shielded data and running the duplicate Sprout, Sapling, or Orchard nullifier checks. The repeated transaction therefore reached the transactions must be unique within a single chain assertion before contextual validation could reject it cleanly. Zebra release builds use panic equals abort, so the reachable assertion terminates the entire process; exploitation requires either two consecutive attacker-mined blocks or an attacker-mined child immediately after an honest block includes the attacker's shielded transaction. This issue is fixed in version 4.5.0.
Additional publisher context
NVD analysis and CPE criteria are source context, not proof that a package or your environment is affected. Complete affected data, logical configurations and SSVC are retained in the original JSON.
Source analysis status: Deferred
Weakness classifications: CWE-248
Original publisher date fields
published: 2026-08-18T20:17:18.127
lastModified: 2026-11-09T20:10:00.200
- Source published
- 18 Aug 2026 20:17:18 UTC
- Source modified
- 9 Nov 2026 20:10:00 UTC
- Saved here
- 10 Nov 2026 18:23:47 UTC
- Source terms
- NIST NVD usage terms; underlying source attribution retained
Original source record · Cite this exact observation · Complete original publisher JSON
Source: nvd · NIST NVD usage terms; underlying source attribution retained. The publisher's wording is preserved. ChangeIntel groups the information and labels changes. The JSON record includes additional source fields.
CVSS 3.1 · [email protected] · Secondary · 5.9 CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H
osv · GHSA-hhm7-qrv5-h4r6
Published### Am I affected You are affected if: 1. You run `zebrad` up to and including `v4.4.1`. 2. Your node processes blocks past the checkpoint height (non-finalized state is active). 3. The network has NU5 or later activated. All default configurations are affected. ### Summary `Chain::push` in the non-finalized state updates the transaction-location index (`tx_loc_by_hash`) before it runs the duplicate shielded-nullifier guard. When an invalid child block repeats a shielded transaction from its non-finalized parent, the `assert_eq!(prior_pair, None, "transactions must be unique within a single chain")` fires before the contextual validation that would cleanly reject the duplicate. Under Zebra's `panic = "abort"` release profile, this terminates the entire node process. The block should be rejected with a duplicate-nullifier contextual validation error. Instead, the ordering of index updates within `Chain::push` causes the process to abort. ### Details In `zebra-state/src/service/non_finalized_state/chain.rs:1608-1628`, the block push sequence is: 1. Insert transaction hash into `tx_loc_by_hash` with `assert_eq!` on uniqueness 2. Update transparent outputs and inputs 3. Update shielded data (JoinSplit, Sapling, Orchard) — including nullifier uniqueness checks The shielded nullifier uniqueness check at step 3 would correctly reject the duplicate transaction. But the `assert_eq!` at step 1 fires first because the transaction hash is already in `tx_loc_by_hash` from the parent block on the same chain. The block transaction verifier does not run the best-chain nullifier query for block transactions — that check is gated on mempool transactions only (`zebra-consensus/src/transaction.rs:521-526`). Initial contextual validation checks nullifiers in finalized state only (`zebra-state/src/service/check.rs:407-415`), but the parent transaction is still in non-finalized state. There are two attack models: **Model A (two attacker blocks):** The attacker mines two consecutive valid-work blocks: parent B1 containing a shielded transaction T, and child B2 repeating T. This requires controlling both blocks consecutively. **Model B (one attacker block after an honest block):** The attacker broadcasts a shielded transaction T into the mempool. When any honest miner includes T in their block B1, the attacker only needs to mine the next child block B2 containing the same T. This requires controlling only one block immediately after an honest block that included the attacker's transaction. The attacker can broadcast a suitable shielded transaction every block until one is included by an honest miner, then attempt to mine the follow-up. Both models require the child block to repeat the shielded-only V5 transaction while the parent is still in non-finalized state. ### Patches zebra-state 7.0.0 and zebrad 4.5.0. Replace the `assert_eq!` with an `Entry`-based check that returns `ValidateContextError::DuplicateTransaction` instead of panicking: ```rust match self.tx_loc_by_hash.entry(transaction_hash) { Entry::Vacant(entry) => { entry.insert(transaction_location); } Entry::Occupied(_) => { return Err(ValidateContextError::DuplicateTransaction { transaction_hash }); } } ``` ### Workarounds There is no configuration-level workaround. The assert is in the non-finalized state push path, which is exercised by all block processing past the checkpoint height. ### Impact A malicious block producer can crash targeted Zebra nodes. There are two attack models: In the first model, the attacker mines two consecutive valid-work blocks where the child repeats a shielded transaction from the parent. At 10% hashrate, the attacker has approximately 11.5 opportunities per day; at 5%, approximately 2.9 per day; at 1%, approximately one every 8.7 days. In the second model, the attacker broadcasts a shielded transaction into the mempool and waits for any honest miner to include it. The attacker then only needs to mine the next block containing the same transaction. This is cheaper because the attacker does not need to mine the parent block. At 10% hashrate, the attacker has approximately 14.4 single-block opportunities per day; at 5%, approximately 7.2 per day; at 1%, approximately 1.4 per day. The crash is a process abort (not recoverable within the process). The node must be restarted. Repeated attacks can keep a node down for extended periods. This is a liveness issue, not a consensus divergence: zcashd cleanly rejects the invalid child block while Zebra aborts. ### Credit Reported by `@haxatron` via email disclosure.
- Source published
- 2 Jul 2026 19:46:35 UTC
- Source modified
- 2 Jul 2026 20:11:29 UTC
- Saved here
- 24 Oct 2026 13:19:54 UTC
- Source terms
- GitHub Advisory Database · CC-BY-4.0
Original source record · Cite this exact observation · Complete original publisher JSON
Source: osv · GitHub Advisory Database · CC-BY-4.0. The publisher's wording is preserved. ChangeIntel groups the information and labels changes. The JSON record includes additional source fields.
CVSS_V3 · CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H
Publisher rating · MODERATE