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Fleet: Cross-Team Policy Data Exposure via Global Policy Read Endpoint

Exploitation and risk

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cve-program · CVE-2026-41262

Published

Fleet is an open-source device management platform built on osquery. In versions prior to 4.85.0, the global policy read endpoint (GET /api/latest/fleet/policies/{policy_id}) fails to verify team ownership of the requested policy, allowing an authenticated user with observer-level access on any single team to read the full details of policies belonging to any other team and bypass Fleet's team isolation model. The handler authorizes the request against an empty policy object whose TeamID is nil, which an authorization rule permits for any user holding a role on any team, and then fetches the policy by ID with no team filter and returns it without any post-fetch scope check. Because policy IDs are sequential integers, an attacker can enumerate them to read other teams' policy SQL queries, host pass and fail counts, and associated software-installer and script metadata, exposing security-monitoring strategies and compliance posture across team boundaries. This issue is fixed in version 4.85.0.

Source published
26 Aug 2026 18:32:30 UTC
Source modified
26 Aug 2026 18:57:43 UTC
Saved here
23 Oct 2026 15:48:27 UTC
Source terms
CVE Program Terms of Use

Original source record · Cite this exact observation · Complete original publisher JSON

Source: cve-program · CVE Program Terms of Use. The publisher's wording is preserved. ChangeIntel groups the information and labels changes. The JSON record includes additional source fields.

CVSS 3.1 · 4.3 CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:N/A:N

euvd · EUVD-2026-66659

Published

Fleet is an open-source device management platform built on osquery. In versions prior to 4.85.0, the global policy read endpoint (GET /api/latest/fleet/policies/{policy_id}) fails to verify team ownership of the requested policy, allowing an authenticated user with observer-level access on any single team to read the full details of policies belonging to any other team and bypass Fleet's team isolation model. The handler authorizes the request against an empty policy object whose TeamID is nil, which an authorization rule permits for any user holding a role on any team, and then fetches the policy by ID with no team filter and returns it without any post-fetch scope check. Because policy IDs are sequential integers, an attacker can enumerate them to read other teams' policy SQL queries, host pass and fail counts, and associated software-installer and script metadata, exposing security-monitoring strategies and compliance posture across team boundaries. This issue is fixed in version 4.85.0.

Additional publisher context

EUVD source date text has no stated timezone and is retained without inventing a UTC instant. Related bulletin membership is not an alias, common cause or applicability claim. A missing vector with a zero score is treated as unrated. Complete vendor/product and underlying source evidence remains in the original JSON.

Original publisher date fields

datePublished: Aug 26, 2026, 6:32:30 PM

dateUpdated: Aug 26, 2026, 6:57:43 PM

1 related source bulletins · separate from aliases

WID-SEC-W-2026-2101: Fleet: Schwachstelle ermöglicht Offenlegung von Informationen

CVE-2026-41262

Source published
Aug 26, 2026, 6:32:30 PM (timezone not stated)
Source modified
Aug 26, 2026, 6:57:43 PM (timezone not stated)
Saved here
17 Nov 2026 12:38:37 UTC
Source terms
ENISA EUVD · source terms and attribution apply

Original source record · Cite this exact observation · Complete original publisher JSON

Source: euvd · ENISA EUVD · source terms and attribution apply. The publisher's wording is preserved. ChangeIntel groups the information and labels changes. The JSON record includes additional source fields.

EUVD CVSS 3.1 · 4.3 CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:N/A:N

nvd · CVE-2026-41262

Published

Fleet is an open-source device management platform built on osquery. In versions prior to 4.85.0, the global policy read endpoint (GET /api/latest/fleet/policies/{policy_id}) fails to verify team ownership of the requested policy, allowing an authenticated user with observer-level access on any single team to read the full details of policies belonging to any other team and bypass Fleet's team isolation model. The handler authorizes the request against an empty policy object whose TeamID is nil, which an authorization rule permits for any user holding a role on any team, and then fetches the policy by ID with no team filter and returns it without any post-fetch scope check. Because policy IDs are sequential integers, an attacker can enumerate them to read other teams' policy SQL queries, host pass and fail counts, and associated software-installer and script metadata, exposing security-monitoring strategies and compliance posture across team boundaries. This issue is fixed in version 4.85.0.

Additional publisher context

NVD analysis and CPE criteria are source context, not proof that a package or your environment is affected. Complete affected data, logical configurations and SSVC are retained in the original JSON.

Source analysis status: Deferred

Weakness classifications: CWE-863

Original publisher date fields

published: 2026-08-26T19:16:50.480

lastModified: 2026-09-09T21:09:13.080

Source published
26 Aug 2026 19:16:50 UTC
Source modified
9 Sep 2026 21:09:13 UTC
Saved here
25 Oct 2026 09:17:30 UTC
Source terms
NIST NVD usage terms; underlying source attribution retained

Original source record · Cite this exact observation · Complete original publisher JSON

Source: nvd · NIST NVD usage terms; underlying source attribution retained. The publisher's wording is preserved. ChangeIntel groups the information and labels changes. The JSON record includes additional source fields.

CVSS 3.1 · [email protected] · Secondary · 4.3 CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:N/A:N

osv · GHSA-gm7f-v959-fr2g

Published

## Summary The global policy read endpoint (`GET /api/latest/fleet/policies/{policy_id}`) performs authorization against an empty `fleet.Policy{}` struct with nil TeamID, then fetches any policy by ID from the database without verifying the fetched policy actually belongs to the global scope. This allows a user with observer-level access on any single team to read the full details of policies belonging to any other team, bypassing Fleet's team isolation model. ## Details The vulnerability is in `GetPolicyByIDQueries` at `server/service/global_policies.go:163-180`: ```go func (svc Service) GetPolicyByIDQueries(ctx context.Context, policyID uint) (*fleet.Policy, error) { // Auth check uses empty Policy{} — TeamID is nil if err := svc.authz.Authorize(ctx, &fleet.Policy{}, fleet.ActionRead); err != nil { return nil, err } // Fetches ANY policy by ID, regardless of team ownership policy, err := svc.ds.Policy(ctx, policyID) if err != nil { return nil, err } // ... populates install_software and run_script, returns full policy return policy, nil } ``` The authorization passes because the OPA rule at `server/authz/policy.rego:724-728` allows reading policies with null `team_id` for any user who holds a role on any team: ```rego allow { is_null(object.team_id) object.type == "policy" team_role(subject, subject.teams[_].id) == [admin, maintainer, technician, observer, observer_plus][_] action == read } ``` Since the auth object has nil TeamID, this rule fires for any team member. After authorization, `ds.Policy()` calls `policyDB()` at `server/datastore/mysql/policies.go:283-288` with a nil teamID: ```go func policyDB(ctx context.Context, q sqlx.QueryerContext, id uint, teamID *uint) (*fleet.Policy, error) { teamWhere := "TRUE" // nil teamID → no team filter args := []interface{}{id} if teamID != nil { teamWhere = "team_id = ?" args = append(args, *teamID) } // ... executes SELECT with WHERE p.id = ? AND {teamWhere} ``` This returns any policy regardless of team ownership, and the full policy object is returned to the caller without any post-fetch team verification. By contrast, the properly-secured endpoints verify team scope: - `GetTeamPolicyByIDQueries` (`team_policies.go:421-428`) sets `TeamID: ptr.Uint(teamID)` on the auth object and calls `ds.TeamPolicy()` which filters by team - `DeleteGlobalPolicies` (`global_policies.go:255-263`) explicitly checks `policy.PolicyData.TeamID != nil` after fetching ## PoC Prerequisites: A Fleet instance with at least two teams. User A has observer role on Team 1 only. Team 2 has policies that User A should not be able to view. ```bash # Step 1: Authenticate as User A (Team 1 observer only) TOKEN=$(curl -s -X POST https://fleet.example.com/api/latest/fleet/login \ -H 'Content-Type: application/json' \ -d '{"email":"[email protected]","password":"password"}' | jq -r '.token') # Step 2: Enumerate policy IDs (they are sequential integers) # Attempt to read a policy belonging to Team 2 (e.g., policy ID 5) curl -s -H "Authorization: Bearer $TOKEN" \ https://fleet.example.com/api/latest/fleet/policies/5 # Expected: 403 Forbidden (user has no access to Team 2) # Actual: 200 OK with full policy data: # { # "policy": { # "id": 5, # "name": "Team 2 Sensitive Policy", # "query": "SELECT * FROM sensitive_table WHERE ...", # "team_id": 2, # "passing_host_count": 42, # "failing_host_count": 7, # "description": "...", # "resolution": "...", # ... # } # } ``` ## Impact An authenticated user with observer-level access on any single team can: - **Read SQL queries** from all team policies across the Fleet instance, potentially revealing security monitoring strategies, compliance checks, and internal infrastructure details - **View host pass/fail counts** for other teams' policies, leaking compliance posture data across team boundaries - **Access software installer and script metadata** associated with other teams' policies via the `populatePolicyInstallSoftware` and `populatePolicyRunScript` calls - **Enumerate all policies** by iterating sequential integer IDs This breaks Fleet's team isolation model, which is designed to restrict visibility between teams. Organizations using teams to separate departments, clients, or security zones would have their policy data exposed across boundaries. ## Recommended Fix Add a post-fetch check in `GetPolicyByIDQueries` to verify the returned policy is actually a global policy (nil TeamID), consistent with how `DeleteGlobalPolicies` operates: ```go func (svc Service) GetPolicyByIDQueries(ctx context.Context, policyID uint) (*fleet.Policy, error) { if err := svc.authz.Authorize(ctx, &fleet.Policy{}, fleet.ActionRead); err != nil { return nil, err } policy, err := svc.ds.Policy(ctx, policyID) if err != nil { return nil, err } // Verify this is actually a global policy — team policies must be // accessed via the team-scoped endpoint which enforces team authorization if policy.TeamID != nil { return nil, authz.ForbiddenWithInternal( "attempting to read team policy via global endpoint", authz.UserFromContext(ctx), policy, fleet.ActionRead, ) } if err := svc.populatePolicyInstallSoftware(ctx, policy); err != nil { return nil, ctxerr.Wrap(ctx, err, "populate install_software") } if err := svc.populatePolicyRunScript(ctx, policy); err != nil { return nil, ctxerr.Wrap(ctx, err, "populate run_script") } return policy, nil } ``` Alternatively, re-authorize against the actual fetched policy object so OPA rules properly evaluate team membership, similar to how other Fleet endpoints handle object-level authorization.

Source published
26 Jun 2026 20:30:27 UTC
Source modified
7 Jul 2026 20:41:04 UTC
Saved here
24 Oct 2026 13:19:41 UTC
Source terms
GitHub Advisory Database · CC-BY-4.0

Original source record · Cite this exact observation · Complete original publisher JSON

Source: osv · GitHub Advisory Database · CC-BY-4.0. The publisher's wording is preserved. ChangeIntel groups the information and labels changes. The JSON record includes additional source fields.

CVSS_V3 · CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:N/A:N

Publisher rating · MODERATE

osv · GO-2026-5812

Published

Fleet DM Vulnerable to Cross-Team Policy Data Exposure via Global Policy Read Endpoint in github.com/fleetdm/fleet

Source published
7 Jul 2026 16:41:46 UTC
Source modified
7 Jul 2026 20:30:15 UTC
Saved here
24 Oct 2026 13:19:41 UTC
Source terms
OSV · upstream source license applies

Original source record · Cite this exact observation · Complete original publisher JSON

Source: osv · OSV · upstream source license applies. The publisher's wording is preserved. ChangeIntel groups the information and labels changes. The JSON record includes additional source fields.

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An IT change radar: releases, security, known issues, retirements, documentation changes, and service status from public sources. Every item links to supporting evidence; dates and statuses can change after they are read.

Sources read 19 Nov 05:53 UTC · 273 of 275 readable · 269 fully read · documentation 469/469 current