Russh: Configured server auth-attempt cap is not enforced in the USERAUTH_REQUEST runtime path

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No collected risk observation for these identifiers. This does not establish absence of exploitation or a zero probability.

Russh is a Rust SSH client and server library. Prior to 0.62.6, the USERAUTH_REQUEST path reached from server::run_stream in russh/src/server/encrypted.rs increments self.common.auth_attempts but never compares it with server::Config.max_auth_attempts. An unauthenticated remote client can continue submitting authentication requests on one connection beyond the configured cap, bypassing the deployment's attempt-limiting policy and increasing online guessing opportunity and backend authentication workload. This issue is fixed in version 0.62.6.

Source published

29 Sep 2026 18:31:32 UTC

Source modified

30 Sep 2026 19:29:26 UTC

Observed here

23 Oct 2026 15:48:27 UTC

Source terms

CVE Program Terms of Use

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CVSS 3.1 · 3.7 CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:N/A:N

Russh is a Rust SSH client and server library. Prior to 0.62.6, the USERAUTH_REQUEST path reached from server::run_stream in russh/src/server/encrypted.rs increments self.common.auth_attempts but never compares it with server::Config.max_auth_attempts. An unauthenticated remote client can continue submitting authentication requests on one connection beyond the configured cap, bypassing the deployment's attempt-limiting policy and increasing online guessing opportunity and backend authentication workload. This issue is fixed in version 0.62.6.

Source published

Sep 29, 2026, 6:31:32 PM (timezone not stated)

Source modified

Sep 30, 2026, 7:29:26 PM (timezone not stated)

Observed here

11 Nov 2026 05:29:31 UTC

Source terms

ENISA EUVD · source terms and attribution apply

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This view projects the publisher's source fields for reading; the original JSON retains additional fields and CVE enrichment containers. Attribution: euvd · ENISA EUVD · source terms and attribution apply. Source text is retained; field grouping and change labels are provided by ChangeIntel.

EUVD CVSS 3.1 · 3.7 CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:N/A:N

Russh is a Rust SSH client and server library. Prior to 0.62.6, the USERAUTH_REQUEST path reached from server::run_stream in russh/src/server/encrypted.rs increments self.common.auth_attempts but never compares it with server::Config.max_auth_attempts. An unauthenticated remote client can continue submitting authentication requests on one connection beyond the configured cap, bypassing the deployment's attempt-limiting policy and increasing online guessing opportunity and backend authentication workload. This issue is fixed in version 0.62.6.

Source published

29 Sep 2026 19:17:24 UTC

Source modified

30 Sep 2026 20:17:24 UTC

Observed here

25 Oct 2026 04:17:26 UTC

Source terms

NIST NVD usage terms; underlying source attribution retained

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This view projects the publisher's source fields for reading; the original JSON retains additional fields and CVE enrichment containers. Attribution: nvd · NIST NVD usage terms; underlying source attribution retained. Source text is retained; field grouping and change labels are provided by ChangeIntel.

CVSS 3.1 · [email protected] · Secondary · 3.7 CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:N/A:N

### Details #### Affected versions and vulnerable location - Confirmed present on default branch `main` at HEAD `0089c89c94753bebbec12b956c07a1cd38740379`. - Crate version at HEAD: `0.62.4`. - Vulnerable locations on current default branch: - `russh/src/server/mod.rs:91` (`pub max_auth_attempts: usize`) - `russh/src/server/mod.rs:121` (default `max_auth_attempts: 10`) - `russh/src/server/encrypted.rs:89` (`USERAUTH_REQUEST` dispatch into auth handler path) - `russh/src/server/encrypted.rs:98` (`self.common.auth_attempts += 1`) - `russh/src/server/encrypted.rs:53` (only runtime read of `auth_attempts`, used for initial reject timing, not attempt limiting) - Default-branch history check did not show a newer merged commit adding enforcement against `config.max_auth_attempts`. #### Reachability trace verified 1. Entry point: exported server API `server::run_stream` in `russh/src/server/mod.rs:1049`. 2. Session run loop in `russh/src/server/session.rs` processes incoming packets and calls `reply(...)` (`server/session.rs:725`). 3. `reply` forwards encrypted packets to `session.server_read_encrypted(...)` (`server/mod.rs:1221`). 4. `server_read_encrypted` routes `USERAUTH_REQUEST` to `enc.server_read_auth_request(...)` (`server/encrypted.rs:89`). 5. On each request, `self.common.auth_attempts += 1` executes (`server/encrypted.rs:98`). 6. No comparison against `self.common.config.max_auth_attempts` is present in this runtime flow. ### PoC #### Reproduction steps and observed output I did not run a full server process in this environment because Rust tooling is unavailable. I verified the issue from source and command output on the audited tree. 1. Show where `max_auth_attempts` appears: ```bash rtk rg -n "max_auth_attempts" .scratch/russh/russh/src/server/mod.rs .scratch/russh/russh/src/server/encrypted.rs .scratch/russh/russh/src/server/session.rs ``` Observed: ```text .scratch/russh/russh/src/server/mod.rs:91: pub max_auth_attempts: usize, .scratch/russh/russh/src/server/mod.rs:121: max_auth_attempts: 10, .scratch/russh/russh/src/server/mod.rs:148: .field("max_auth_attempts", &self.max_auth_attempts) ``` 2. Show runtime auth-attempt handling: ```bash rtk rg -n "auth_attempts == 0|auth_attempts \\+= 1" .scratch/russh/russh/src/server/encrypted.rs ``` Observed: ```text 53: let initial_none_rejection_wait_until = if self.common.auth_attempts == 0 { 98: self.common.auth_attempts += 1; ``` 3. Show production entrypoint-to-auth path references: ```bash rtk rg -n "pub async fn run_stream|match reply\\(|server_read_encrypted\\(|server_read_auth_request\\(" .scratch/russh/russh/src/server/mod.rs .scratch/russh/russh/src/server/session.rs .scratch/russh/russh/src/server/encrypted.rs ``` Observed: ```text .scratch/russh/russh/src/server/encrypted.rs:89: enc.server_read_auth_request( .scratch/russh/russh/src/server/session.rs:725: match reply(&mut self, &mut handler, &mut pkt).await { .scratch/russh/russh/src/server/mod.rs:1049:pub async fn run_stream<H, R>( .scratch/russh/russh/src/server/mod.rs:1221: session.server_read_encrypted(handler, pkt).await ``` 4. Toolchain check: ```bash cargo --version ``` Observed: ```text /bin/bash: line 1: cargo: command not found ``` ### Impact #### Attacker model - Attacker: unauthenticated remote client with TCP reachability to a russh-backed SSH service. - Preconditions: deployer expects `server::Config.max_auth_attempts` to cap attempts. - Impact: repeated `USERAUTH_REQUEST` attempts continue for a single connection beyond configured limit, increasing online guessing opportunity and backend auth workload. ### Suggested fix Enforce `max_auth_attempts` in the `USERAUTH_REQUEST` branch before invoking auth-method handlers, and fail closed once threshold is reached. Concrete patch direction in `russh/src/server/encrypted.rs`: ```rust if self.common.config.max_auth_attempts > 0 && self.common.auth_attempts >= self.common.config.max_auth_attempts { self.common.disconnect( Disconnect::NoMoreAuthMethodsAvailable, "Too many authentication attempts", "", )?; return Ok(()); } ``` ### How it was found and a note on tooling The researcher synthesized three lens outputs, then revalidated each claim against current `main`: source presence and commit history, advisory overlap checks in both GitHub advisories and OSV, entrypoint-to-sink reachability, attacker-model realism, and execution-claim integrity. The researcher used `gh`, `git`, `rg`, and direct source inspection under `.scratch/russh`. Because Rust tooling is unavailable in this worker, this report is intentionally marked `source-only`. AI assistance was used while investigating this and while drafting this report. The finding was verified by reading the cited code at HEAD. The vulnerability was not executed it, and that limit is stated plainly above rather than left implied. Credits: arpitjain099.

Source published

30 Sep 2026 23:26:17 UTC

Source modified

30 Sep 2026 23:30:05 UTC

Observed here

24 Oct 2026 13:19:54 UTC

Source terms

GitHub Advisory Database · CC-BY-4.0

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This view projects the publisher's source fields for reading; the original JSON retains additional fields and CVE enrichment containers. Attribution: osv · GitHub Advisory Database · CC-BY-4.0. Source text is retained; field grouping and change labels are provided by ChangeIntel.

CVSS_V3 · CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:N/A:N

Publisher rating · LOW