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next-video: Unauthenticated arbitrary file read via /api/video request handler

Collected exploitation and prediction evidence

Risk source coverage

CISA KEV is observed exploitation evidence. FIRST EPSS is a dated prediction of exploitation in the next 30 days. Missing scores are unknown. This collector requests predictions only for explicit CVE aliases in the public NuGet archive; Microsoft release views retain their existing prediction scope.

No collected risk observation for these identifiers. This does not establish absence of exploitation or a zero probability.

cve-program · CVE-2026-54150

Published

next-video is a library for adding video to Next.js applications. Prior to 2.8.1, the GET endpoint exported by next-video/request-handler and commonly mounted at /api/video accepts an unauthenticated url query parameter, while src/utils/utils.ts isRemote() treats any value without an HTTP or HTTPS prefix as a local path. src/request-handler.ts passes that value through src/assets.ts getAssetPath() to src/config.ts loadAsset(), which appends a JSON suffix and uses fs.readFile without canonicalizing the path or verifying that it remains inside the configured video folder. A remote attacker can therefore escape the intended asset directory and read JSON files accessible to the application process, including Next.js server-action encryption material, preview-mode keys, build manifests, route metadata, absolute paths, and application video asset identifiers. Applications that do not expose the runtime request handler are not affected through this route. This issue is fixed in version 2.8.1.

Source published
14 Sep 2026 17:25:38 UTC
Source modified
14 Sep 2026 19:03:28 UTC
Observed here
23 Oct 2026 15:48:27 UTC
Source terms
CVE Program Terms of Use

Original source record · Cite this exact observation · Complete original publisher JSON

This view projects the publisher's source fields for reading; the original JSON retains additional fields and CVE enrichment containers. Attribution: cve-program · CVE Program Terms of Use. Source text is retained; field grouping and change labels are provided by ChangeIntel.

CVSS 4.0 · 6.9 CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:L/VI:N/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N

euvd · EUVD-2026-77690

Published

next-video is a library for adding video to Next.js applications. Prior to 2.8.1, the GET endpoint exported by next-video/request-handler and commonly mounted at /api/video accepts an unauthenticated url query parameter, while src/utils/utils.ts isRemote() treats any value without an HTTP or HTTPS prefix as a local path. src/request-handler.ts passes that value through src/assets.ts getAssetPath() to src/config.ts loadAsset(), which appends a JSON suffix and uses fs.readFile without canonicalizing the path or verifying that it remains inside the configured video folder. A remote attacker can therefore escape the intended asset directory and read JSON files accessible to the application process, including Next.js server-action encryption material, preview-mode keys, build manifests, route metadata, absolute paths, and application video asset identifiers. Applications that do not expose the runtime request handler are not affected through this route. This issue is fixed in version 2.8.1.

EUVD source date text has no stated timezone and is retained without inventing a UTC instant. Related bulletin membership is not an alias, common cause or applicability claim. A missing vector with a zero score is treated as unrated. Complete vendor/product and underlying source evidence remains in the original JSON.

Original publisher date fields

datePublished: Sep 14, 2026, 5:25:38 PM

dateUpdated: Sep 14, 2026, 7:03:28 PM

Source published
Sep 14, 2026, 5:25:38 PM (timezone not stated)
Source modified
Sep 14, 2026, 7:03:28 PM (timezone not stated)
Observed here
11 Nov 2026 13:58:58 UTC
Source terms
ENISA EUVD · source terms and attribution apply

Original source record · Cite this exact observation · Complete original publisher JSON

This view projects the publisher's source fields for reading; the original JSON retains additional fields and CVE enrichment containers. Attribution: euvd · ENISA EUVD · source terms and attribution apply. Source text is retained; field grouping and change labels are provided by ChangeIntel.

EUVD CVSS 4.0 · 6.9 CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:L/VI:N/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N

nvd · CVE-2026-54150

Published

next-video is a library for adding video to Next.js applications. Prior to 2.8.1, the GET endpoint exported by next-video/request-handler and commonly mounted at /api/video accepts an unauthenticated url query parameter, while src/utils/utils.ts isRemote() treats any value without an HTTP or HTTPS prefix as a local path. src/request-handler.ts passes that value through src/assets.ts getAssetPath() to src/config.ts loadAsset(), which appends a JSON suffix and uses fs.readFile without canonicalizing the path or verifying that it remains inside the configured video folder. A remote attacker can therefore escape the intended asset directory and read JSON files accessible to the application process, including Next.js server-action encryption material, preview-mode keys, build manifests, route metadata, absolute paths, and application video asset identifiers. Applications that do not expose the runtime request handler are not affected through this route. This issue is fixed in version 2.8.1.

NVD analysis and CPE criteria are source context, not proof that a package or your environment is affected. Complete affected data, logical configurations and SSVC are retained in the original JSON.

Source analysis status: Deferred

Weakness classifications: CWE-22

Original publisher date fields

published: 2026-09-14T18:17:52.277

lastModified: 2026-09-30T19:57:08.043

Source published
14 Sep 2026 18:17:52 UTC
Source modified
30 Sep 2026 19:57:08 UTC
Observed here
25 Oct 2026 13:17:22 UTC
Source terms
NIST NVD usage terms; underlying source attribution retained

Original source record · Cite this exact observation · Complete original publisher JSON

This view projects the publisher's source fields for reading; the original JSON retains additional fields and CVE enrichment containers. Attribution: nvd · NIST NVD usage terms; underlying source attribution retained. Source text is retained; field grouping and change labels are provided by ChangeIntel.

CVSS 4.0 · [email protected] · Secondary · 6.9 CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:L/VI:N/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:X/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X

osv · GHSA-2p39-2jf3-fv2q

Published

### Impact The HTTP route handler exported by `next-video/request-handler` — which the README instructs consumers to mount at `/api/video` — allows an unauthenticated remote attacker to read arbitrary `.json` files from the production filesystem of any application following the documented setup. The handler's `GET` endpoint accepts a `url` query parameter and uses it to locate and serve a JSON asset descriptor from disk. The only guard between "remote URL" and "local file path" is a regex check for `^https?://`. Any value that does not match that prefix is treated as a local path, `.json` is appended, and the file is read with `fs.readFile` and returned in the HTTP response — with no authentication, no path canonicalization, and no traversal guard. On a typical Next.js deployment this exposes, at minimum: - The **Next.js Server Actions AES encryption key** (`.next/server/server-reference-manifest.json`) - The **Next.js Preview/Draft Mode keys** (`previewModeId`, `previewModeSigningKey`, `previewModeEncryptionKey`) - Internal build manifests, route registries, and absolute runtime paths - Application-specific asset metadata (e.g. Mux `uploadId`, `assetId`, `playbackId` values stored in `videos/*.json`) Any application that mounted `/api/video` following the documented one-liner is affected. ### Patches 2.8.1 ### Workarounds Until a patched version is available, wrap the exported handler in your own route file and validate the `url` parameter before passing it through: - Reject any `url` value that does not begin with `https://`, or that does not match a known allowlist of trusted remote hosts. - Alternatively, remove the `/api/video` route entirely if your application only uses build-time `import` of local video files and does not use `<Video src="https://...">` with string URLs at runtime. ### References - `src/request-handler.ts` — the vulnerable GET handler - `src/assets.ts` — `getAssetPath()`, where the local-vs-remote branching occurs - `src/utils/utils.ts` — `isRemote()`, the sole guard between the two branches - `src/config.ts` — `loadAsset()`, which performs the unconstrained `fs.readFile`

Source published
20 Aug 2026 18:35:11 UTC
Source modified
20 Aug 2026 18:48:09 UTC
Observed here
24 Oct 2026 13:17:17 UTC
Source terms
GitHub Advisory Database · CC-BY-4.0

Original source record · Cite this exact observation · Complete original publisher JSON

This view projects the publisher's source fields for reading; the original JSON retains additional fields and CVE enrichment containers. Attribution: osv · GitHub Advisory Database · CC-BY-4.0. Source text is retained; field grouping and change labels are provided by ChangeIntel.

CVSS_V4 · CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:L/VI:N/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N

Publisher rating · MODERATE

ChangeIntel

An IT change radar: releases, security, known issues, retirements, documentation changes, and service status from public sources. Every item links to supporting evidence; dates and statuses can change after they are read.

Sources read 12 Nov 03:25 UTC · 274 of 275 readable · 272 fully read · documentation 469/469 current