better-auth Stale Sessions Persist After User Deletion

CISA KEV is observed exploitation evidence. FIRST EPSS is a dated prediction of exploitation in the next 30 days. Missing scores are unknown. This collector requests predictions only for explicit CVE aliases in the public NuGet archive; Microsoft release views retain their existing prediction scope.

No collected risk observation for these identifiers. This does not establish absence of exploitation or a zero probability.

better-auth versions before 1.6.11 fail to delete cached sessions when removing users via admin, anonymous, or SCIM endpoints when secondaryStorage is configured and storeSessionInDatabase is false. Attackers can reuse deleted user session tokens to maintain authentication for up to seven days after account deletion.

Source published

1 Aug 2026 12:22:18 UTC

Source modified

8 Oct 2026 15:24:12 UTC

Observed here

23 Oct 2026 15:48:27 UTC

Source terms

CVE Program Terms of Use

Original source record · Cite this exact observation · Complete original publisher JSON

This view projects the publisher's source fields for reading; the original JSON retains additional fields and CVE enrichment containers. Attribution: cve-program · CVE Program Terms of Use. Source text is retained; field grouping and change labels are provided by ChangeIntel.

CVSS 4.0 · 5.1 CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:H/UI:N/VC:L/VI:L/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N

CVSS 3.1 · 3.8 CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:H/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:L/A:N

better-auth versions before 1.6.11 fail to delete cached sessions when removing users via admin, anonymous, or SCIM endpoints when secondaryStorage is configured and storeSessionInDatabase is false. Attackers can reuse deleted user session tokens to maintain authentication for up to seven days after account deletion.

Source published

Aug 1, 2026, 12:22:18 PM (timezone not stated)

Source modified

Oct 8, 2026, 3:24:12 PM (timezone not stated)

Observed here

9 Nov 2026 14:16:11 UTC

Source terms

ENISA EUVD · source terms and attribution apply

Original source record · Cite this exact observation · Complete original publisher JSON

This view projects the publisher's source fields for reading; the original JSON retains additional fields and CVE enrichment containers. Attribution: euvd · ENISA EUVD · source terms and attribution apply. Source text is retained; field grouping and change labels are provided by ChangeIntel.

EUVD CVSS 4.0 · 5.1 CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:H/UI:N/VC:L/VI:L/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N

better-auth versions before 1.6.11 fail to delete cached sessions when removing users via admin, anonymous, or SCIM endpoints when secondaryStorage is configured and storeSessionInDatabase is false. Attackers can reuse deleted user session tokens to maintain authentication for up to seven days after account deletion.

Source published

1 Aug 2026 13:17:04 UTC

Source modified

8 Oct 2026 16:17:32 UTC

Observed here

25 Oct 2026 15:18:51 UTC

Source terms

NIST NVD usage terms; underlying source attribution retained

Original source record · Cite this exact observation · Complete original publisher JSON

This view projects the publisher's source fields for reading; the original JSON retains additional fields and CVE enrichment containers. Attribution: nvd · NIST NVD usage terms; underlying source attribution retained. Source text is retained; field grouping and change labels are provided by ChangeIntel.

CVSS 4.0 · [email protected] · Secondary · 5.1 CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:H/UI:N/VC:L/VI:L/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:X/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X

CVSS 3.1 · [email protected] · Secondary · 3.8 CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:H/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:L/A:N

### Am I affected? Users are affected if all of the following are true: - They configure `secondaryStorage` on `betterAuth(...)` (Redis, KV, or any external session cache). - `session.storeSessionInDatabase` is left unset or set to `false` (the default). - Their application's deployment uses one or more of: - The `admin` plugin and calls `auth.api.removeUser(...)` or `authClient.admin.removeUser(...)`. - The `anonymous` plugin and exposes `/delete-anonymous-user` or relies on the after-link hook to clean up the anonymous user. - The `@better-auth/scim` plugin and exposes `DELETE /scim/v2/Users/:userId`. If `storeSessionInDatabase` is `true`, sessions are also written to the database, and the database delete cascades; users are not affected. Fix: 1. Upgrade to `better-auth@<patched-version>` or later (and `@better-auth/scim@<patched-version>` if they use SCIM). 2. If they cannot upgrade, see workarounds below. ### Summary When `secondaryStorage` is configured and `storeSessionInDatabase` is `false`, three user-deletion endpoints in `better-auth` plus one in `@better-auth/scim` call `internalAdapter.deleteUser(userId)` without first calling `internalAdapter.deleteSessions(userId)`. The deleted user's session payload (which carries a cached user object) remains in secondary storage, and `internalAdapter.findSession(token)` keeps returning it as a valid session until the session TTL elapses (default 7 days). ### Details The vulnerable call sites are: - `admin` plugin's `removeUser` (`packages/better-auth/src/plugins/admin/routes.ts:1463`). - `anonymous` plugin's self-delete endpoint (`packages/better-auth/src/plugins/anonymous/index.ts:222`). - `anonymous` plugin's after-link hook (`packages/better-auth/src/plugins/anonymous/index.ts:325`). - `@better-auth/scim`'s `DELETE /scim/v2/Users/:userId` (`packages/scim/src/routes.ts:1019`). Working callers that already do the right thing: the core `/delete-user` self-delete and `/delete-user/callback` (`packages/better-auth/src/api/routes/update-user.ts:551`). The fix shape extends each vulnerable caller to invoke `deleteSessions(userId)` before `deleteUser(userId)`. The architectural follow-up centralizes the cleanup inside `deleteUser` itself or introduces a single `deleteUserAndSessions` orchestrator so future callers cannot regress this contract. ### Patches Fixed in `better-auth@<patched-version>` and `@better-auth/scim@<patched-version>`. All four user-deletion call sites now invoke `deleteSessions(userId)` before `deleteUser(userId)` so sessions are evicted from secondary storage at the same time the user row is removed. ### Workarounds If users cannot upgrade immediately: - **Configuration-level**: set `session.storeSessionInDatabase: true`. Subsequent user-delete writes reach the session table and the database cascade removes rows. Increases write volume for high-throughput sessions but eliminates the gap. - **Code-level (admin path)**: when calling `auth.api.removeUser`, also call `auth.api.revokeUserSessions({ body: { userId } })`, which uses `deleteSessions` internally. - **Code-level (SCIM path)**: wrap their SCIM provider's deprovisioning hook to call `auth.api.revokeUserSessions(...)` after the SCIM DELETE. - **Code-level (anonymous path)**: in `onLinkAccount`, explicitly call `internalAdapter.deleteSessions(anonymousUser.user.id)` before allowing the new session to be issued. ### Impact - **Stale session validity**: a deleted user's existing session cookie continues to authenticate against `getSessionFromCtx` until the session TTL elapses (default 7 days). Within that window, the deleted user retains their pre-existing read and write surface. - **SCIM-driven deprovisioning gap**: organizations using SCIM to revoke offboarded employees' access do not, in fact, revoke active sessions. The deleted account remains usable for up to 7 days after deprovisioning. ### Credit Reported by @iruizsalinas. ### Resources - [CWE-613: Insufficient Session Expiration](https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/613.html) - [CWE-672: Operation on a Resource after Expiration or Release](https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/672.html) - [CWE-459: Incomplete Cleanup](https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/459.html)

Source published

7 Jul 2026 20:56:45 UTC

Source modified

10 Sep 2026 03:50:51 UTC

Observed here

24 Oct 2026 13:17:17 UTC

Source terms

GitHub Advisory Database · CC-BY-4.0

Original source record · Cite this exact observation · Complete original publisher JSON

This view projects the publisher's source fields for reading; the original JSON retains additional fields and CVE enrichment containers. Attribution: osv · GitHub Advisory Database · CC-BY-4.0. Source text is retained; field grouping and change labels are provided by ChangeIntel.

CVSS_V3 · CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:H/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:L/A:N

Publisher rating · LOW