NATS has mTLS verify_and_map authentication bypass via incorrect Subject DN matching
Historical advisory saved 24 Oct 2026 13:19:41 UTC. The publisher may have updated it since then. Latest advisory.
osv · GHSA-3f24-pcvm-5jqc
Published### Background NATS.io is a high performance open source pub-sub distributed communication technology, built for the cloud, on-premise, IoT, and edge computing. One authentication model supported is mTLS, deriving the NATS client identity from properties of the TLS Client Certificate. ### Problem Description When using mTLS for client identity, with `verify_and_map` to derive a NATS identity from the client certificate's Subject DN, certain patterns of RDN would not be correctly enforced, allowing for authentication bypass. This does require a valid certificate from a CA already trusted for client certificates, and `DN` naming patterns which the NATS maintainers consider highly unlikely. So this is an unlikely attack. Nonetheless, administrators who have been very sophisticated in their `DN` construction patterns might conceivably be impacted. ### Affected Versions Fixed in nats-server 2.12.6 & 2.11.15 ### Workarounds Developers should review their CA issuing practices.
- Source published
- 24 Mar 2026 21:51:08 UTC
- Source modified
- 10 Sep 2026 03:50:36 UTC
- Saved here
- 24 Oct 2026 13:19:41 UTC
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- GitHub Advisory Database · CC-BY-4.0
Original source record · Cite this exact observation · Complete original publisher JSON
Source: osv · GitHub Advisory Database · CC-BY-4.0. The publisher's wording is preserved. ChangeIntel groups the information and labels changes. The JSON record includes additional source fields.
CVSS_V3 · CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:L/A:N
Publisher rating · MODERATE