Public mode

No access to your tenant or devices. Every item links to its source. What this means

Sources need attention Customize Public modeDiscuss ChangeIntel on Discord

Distribution affected by pull-through cache credential exfiltration via www-authenticate bearer realm

Historical advisory saved 24 Oct 2026 13:19:41 UTC. The publisher may have updated it since then. Latest advisory.

osv · GHSA-3p65-76g6-3w7r

Published

hi guys, commit: 40594bd98e6d6ed993b5c6021c93fdf96d2e5851 (as-of 2026-01-31) contact: GitHub Security Advisory (https://github.com/distribution/distribution/security/advisories/new) ## summary in pull-through cache mode, distribution discovers token auth endpoints by parsing `WWW-Authenticate` challenges returned by the configured upstream registry. the `realm` URL from a bearer challenge is used without validating that it matches the upstream registry host. as a result, an attacker-controlled upstream (or an attacker with MitM position to the upstream) can cause distribution to send the configured upstream credentials via basic auth to an attacker-controlled `realm` URL. this is the same vulnerability class as CVE-2020-15157 (containerd), but in distribution’s pull-through cache proxy auth flow. ## severity HIGH note: the baseline impact is credential disclosure of the configured upstream credentials. if a deployment uses broader credentials for upstream auth (for example cloud iam credentials), the downstream impact can be higher; i am not claiming this as default for all deployments. ## impact credential exfiltration of the upstream authentication material configured for the pull-through cache. attacker starting positions that make this realistic: - supply chain / configuration: an operator configures a proxy cache to use an upstream that becomes attacker-controlled (compromised registry, stale domain, or a malicious mirror) - network: MitM on the upstream connection in environments where the upstream is reachable over insecure transport or a compromised network path ## affected components - `registry/proxy/proxyauth.go:66-81` (`getAuthURLs`): extracts bearer `realm` from upstream `WWW-Authenticate` without validating destination - `internal/client/auth/session.go:485-510` (`fetchToken`): uses the realm URL directly for token fetch - `internal/client/auth/session.go:429-434` (`fetchTokenWithBasicAuth`): sends credentials via basic auth to the realm URL ## reproduction attachment: `poc.zip` (local harness) with canonical and control runs. the harness is local and does not contact a real registry: it uses two local HTTP servers (upstream + attacker token service) to demonstrate whether basic auth is sent to an attacker-chosen realm. ```bash unzip -q -o poc.zip -d poc cd poc make canonical make control ``` expected output (excerpt): ``` [CALLSITE_HIT]: getAuthURLs::configureAuth [PROOF_MARKER]: basic_auth_sent=true realm_host=127.0.0.1 account_param=user authorization_prefix=Basic ``` control output (excerpt): ``` [CALLSITE_HIT]: getAuthURLs::configureAuth [NC_MARKER]: realm_validation=PASS basic_auth_sent=false ``` ## suggested remediation validate that the token `realm` destination is within the intended trust boundary before associating credentials with it or sending any authentication to it. one conservative option is strict same-host binding: only accept a realm whose host matches the configured upstream host. ## fix accepted when - distribution does not send configured upstream credentials to an attacker-chosen realm URL - a regression test covers the canonical and blocked cases [addendum.md](https://github.com/user-attachments/files/24984637/addendum.md) [poc.zip](https://github.com/user-attachments/files/24984638/poc.zip) [PR_DESCRIPTION.md](https://github.com/user-attachments/files/24984639/PR_DESCRIPTION.md) [RUNNABLE_POC.md](https://github.com/user-attachments/files/24984640/RUNNABLE_POC.md) best, oleh

Source published
6 Apr 2026 17:52:52 UTC
Source modified
10 Sep 2026 03:50:42 UTC
Saved here
24 Oct 2026 13:19:41 UTC
Source terms
GitHub Advisory Database · CC-BY-4.0

Original source record · Cite this exact observation · Complete original publisher JSON

Source: osv · GitHub Advisory Database · CC-BY-4.0. The publisher's wording is preserved. ChangeIntel groups the information and labels changes. The JSON record includes additional source fields.

CVSS_V3 · CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N

Publisher rating · HIGH

ChangeIntel

An IT change radar: releases, security, known issues, retirements, documentation changes, and service status from public sources. Every item links to supporting evidence; dates and statuses can change after they are read.

Sources read 22 Nov 13:22 UTC · 274 of 275 readable · 270 fully read · documentation 469/469 current