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An improper signature verification vulnerability was found in coreos-installer. A specially crafted gzip installation image can bypass the image signature verification and as a consequence can lead to the installation of unsigned content. A…

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cve-program · CVE-2021-20319

Published

An improper signature verification vulnerability was found in coreos-installer. A specially crafted gzip installation image can bypass the image signature verification and as a consequence can lead to the installation of unsigned content. An attacker able to modify the original installation image can write arbitrary data, and achieve full access to the node being installed.

Source published
4 Mar 2022 17:05:50 UTC
Source modified
3 Aug 2024 17:37:23 UTC
Saved here
23 Oct 2026 15:48:27 UTC
Source terms
CVE Program Terms of Use

Original source record · Cite this exact observation · Complete original publisher JSON

Source: cve-program · CVE Program Terms of Use. The publisher's wording is preserved. ChangeIntel groups the information and labels changes. The JSON record includes additional source fields.

euvd · EUVD-2021-2149

Published

An improper signature verification vulnerability was found in coreos-installer. A specially crafted gzip installation image can bypass the image signature verification and as a consequence can lead to the installation of unsigned content. An attacker able to modify the original installation image can write arbitrary data, and achieve full access to the node being installed.

Additional publisher context

EUVD source date text has no stated timezone and is retained without inventing a UTC instant. Related bulletin membership is not an alias, common cause or applicability claim. A missing vector with a zero score is treated as unrated. Complete vendor/product and underlying source evidence remains in the original JSON.

Original publisher date fields

datePublished: Mar 4, 2022, 5:05:50 PM

dateUpdated: Aug 3, 2024, 5:37:23 PM

5 related source bulletins · separate from aliases

RHSA-2021:4008: Red Hat Security Advisory: OpenShift Container Platform 4.6.49 security update

CVE-2021-20319

RHSA-2021:3934: Red Hat Security Advisory: OpenShift Container Platform 4.9.4 packages and security update

CVE-2021-20319

RHSA-2021:3926: Red Hat Security Advisory: OpenShift Container Platform 4.8.17 security and bug fix update

CVE-2021-20319

RHSA-2021:3930: Red Hat Security Advisory: OpenShift Container Platform 4.7.36 security and bug fix update

CVE-2021-20319

RHSA-2022:0055: Red Hat Security Advisory: OpenShift Container Platform 4.10.3 bug fix and security update

CVE-2014-3577 · CVE-2021-20319 · CVE-2021-21684 · CVE-2021-21685 · CVE-2021-21686 · CVE-2021-21687 · CVE-2021-21688 · CVE-2021-21689 · CVE-2021-21690 · CVE-2021-21691 · CVE-2021-21692 · CVE-2021-21693 · CVE-2021-21694 · CVE-2021-21695 · CVE-2021-21696 · CVE-2021-21697 · CVE-2021-21698 · CVE-2021-41190 · CVE-2021-41772 · CVE-2021-44716 · CVE-2021-44717 · CVE-2022-0532 · CVE-2022-20612 · CVE-2022-20617

Source published
Mar 4, 2022, 5:05:50 PM (timezone not stated)
Source modified
Aug 3, 2024, 5:37:23 PM (timezone not stated)
Saved here
18 Nov 2026 01:42:49 UTC
Source terms
ENISA EUVD · source terms and attribution apply

Original source record · Cite this exact observation · Complete original publisher JSON

Source: euvd · ENISA EUVD · source terms and attribution apply. The publisher's wording is preserved. ChangeIntel groups the information and labels changes. The JSON record includes additional source fields.

nvd · CVE-2021-20319

Published

An improper signature verification vulnerability was found in coreos-installer. A specially crafted gzip installation image can bypass the image signature verification and as a consequence can lead to the installation of unsigned content. An attacker able to modify the original installation image can write arbitrary data, and achieve full access to the node being installed.

Additional publisher context

NVD analysis and CPE criteria are source context, not proof that a package or your environment is affected. Complete affected data, logical configurations and SSVC are retained in the original JSON.

Source analysis status: Modified

Weakness classifications: CWE-347

Original publisher date fields

published: 2022-03-04T18:15:08.060

lastModified: 2026-06-17T03:33:39.947

1 source CPE criteria · context only
  • cpe:2.3:a:redhat:coreos-installer:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*

The original JSON retains the logical configuration operators, exclusions and version bounds.

Source published
4 Mar 2022 18:15:08 UTC
Source modified
17 Jun 2026 03:33:39 UTC
Saved here
24 Oct 2026 17:17:33 UTC
Source terms
NIST NVD usage terms; underlying source attribution retained

Original source record · Cite this exact observation · Complete original publisher JSON

Source: nvd · NIST NVD usage terms; underlying source attribution retained. The publisher's wording is preserved. ChangeIntel groups the information and labels changes. The JSON record includes additional source fields.

CVSS 3.1 · [email protected] · Primary · 7.8 CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H

CVSS 2.0 · [email protected] · Primary · 6.8 AV:N/AC:M/Au:N/C:P/I:P/A:P

osv · GHSA-3r3g-g73x-g593

Published

### Impact coreos-installer fails to correctly verify GPG signatures when decompressing gzip-compressed artifacts. This allows bypass of signature verification in cases where coreos-installer decompresses a downloaded OS image, allowing an attacker who can modify the OS image to compromise a newly-installed system. Default installations from ISO or PXE media in Fedora CoreOS, RHEL CoreOS, and RHEL for Edge are **not** affected, as coreos-installer installs from an OS image shipped as part of the install media. These flows are affected: 1. Installing with `--image-file`, `--image-url`, or `coreos.inst.image_url`. For example, if a user has a local mirror of installation images, an attacker could replace an image with a gzip-compressed alternative (even if the file extension is `.xz`). The result: ``` $ coreos-installer install --image-url http://localhost:8080/image.xz /dev/loop0 Downloading image from http://localhost:8080/image.xz Downloading signature from http://localhost:8080/image.xz.sig > Read disk 749.9 MiB/749.9 MiB (100%) gpg: Signature made Mon 20 Sep 2021 02:41:50 PM EDT gpg: using RSA key 8C5BA6990BDB26E19F2A1A801161AE6945719A39 gpg: BAD signature from "Fedora (34) <[email protected]>" [ultimate] Install complete. ``` Notice that GPG reports a bad signature, but coreos-installer continues anyway. Automation that relies on coreos-installer's exit status will not notice either. 2. `coreos-installer download --decompress --image-url`: ``` $ coreos-installer download --decompress --image-url http://localhost:8080/image.xz > Read disk 749.9 MiB/749.9 MiB (100%) gpg: Signature made Mon 20 Sep 2021 02:41:50 PM EDT gpg: using RSA key 8C5BA6990BDB26E19F2A1A801161AE6945719A39 gpg: BAD signature from "Fedora (34) <[email protected]>" [ultimate] ./image ``` Again, coreos-installer reports success. 3. Installing with default parameters, when **not** installing from the image built into live ISO or PXE media, if the hosting service is compromised or if an active attacker gains control of the HTTPS response. 4. `coreos-installer download --decompress` if the hosting service is compromised or if an active attacker gains control of the HTTPS response. ### Patches The vulnerability is [fixed](https://github.com/coreos/coreos-installer/pull/659) in coreos-installer 0.10.1. ### Workarounds For `coreos-installer download`, do not use the `-d` or `--decompress` options. For `coreos-installer install`, manually inspect the stderr output. If `BAD signature` appears, do not boot from the target disk. Note, however, that some OS services may have already accessed data on the compromised disk. ### References For more information, see [PR 655](https://github.com/coreos/coreos-installer/pull/655). ### For more information If you have any questions or comments about this advisory, [open an issue in coreos-installer](https://github.com/coreos/coreos-installer/issues/new/choose) or email the CoreOS [development mailing list](https://lists.fedoraproject.org/archives/list/[email protected]/).

Source published
12 Oct 2021 16:06:47 UTC
Source modified
10 Sep 2026 03:49:08 UTC
Saved here
24 Oct 2026 13:19:54 UTC
Source terms
GitHub Advisory Database · CC-BY-4.0

Original source record · Cite this exact observation · Complete original publisher JSON

Source: osv · GitHub Advisory Database · CC-BY-4.0. The publisher's wording is preserved. ChangeIntel groups the information and labels changes. The JSON record includes additional source fields.

CVSS_V3 · CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H

Publisher rating · HIGH

osv · RUSTSEC-2022-0103

Published

The coreos-installer is a program to fetch a disk image and stream it to a target disk. During the installation process the installation image gpg signatures are verified. The signature verification can be bypassed for gzip-compressed images due to a flaw in gzip coreos-installer wrapper. When the decoder encounters the gzip trailer, it signals EOF to its output and does not continue reading from its input. As a result, earlier wrappers don't notice that they've reached EOF. In particular, the GPG wrapper does not check the exit code of GPG. Thus, if an attacker can substitute an attacker-controlled gzipped disk image, installation will complete successfully without a valid signature. This vulnerability impacts only specific, User-Provisioned Infrastructure (UPI) installation methods where coreos-installer is used and where gzip-compressed images are configured as the installation source. The Installer-Provisioned Infrastructure (IPI) bare-metal installs do use coreos-installer, but this installation method uses an install image embedded in the live OS image (ISO or PXE image), therefore is not affected by this vulnerability. This vulnerability is specific to some upstream Fedora CoreOS installation flows.

Source published
4 Mar 2022 12:00:00 UTC
Source modified
21 Dec 2025 14:11:01 UTC
Saved here
24 Oct 2026 13:19:54 UTC
Source terms
OSV · upstream source license applies

Original source record · Cite this exact observation · Complete original publisher JSON

Source: osv · OSV · upstream source license applies. The publisher's wording is preserved. ChangeIntel groups the information and labels changes. The JSON record includes additional source fields.

CVSS_V3 · CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H

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