better-auth before 1.6.2 OAuth State Validation Bypass
Exploitation and risk
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cve-program · CVE-2026-67335
Publishedbetter-auth versions before 1.6.2 fail to validate the OAuth state parameter against the stored nonce when using cookie-backed state storage without PKCE. Attackers can forge the state parameter and supply an attacker-controlled authorization code to create authenticated sessions bound to the attacker's external identity or persistently link attacker accounts to victim profiles.
- Source published
- 1 Aug 2026 12:22:17 UTC
- Source modified
- 3 Aug 2026 15:38:08 UTC
- Saved here
- 23 Oct 2026 15:48:27 UTC
- Source terms
- CVE Program Terms of Use
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CVSS 4.0 · 6.0 CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:H/AT:P/PR:N/UI:P/VC:N/VI:H/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N
CVSS 3.1 · 5.3 CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:N
euvd · EUVD-2026-51852
Publishedbetter-auth versions before 1.6.2 fail to validate the OAuth state parameter against the stored nonce when using cookie-backed state storage without PKCE. Attackers can forge the state parameter and supply an attacker-controlled authorization code to create authenticated sessions bound to the attacker's external identity or persistently link attacker accounts to victim profiles.
Additional publisher context
EUVD source date text has no stated timezone and is retained without inventing a UTC instant. Related bulletin membership is not an alias, common cause or applicability claim. A missing vector with a zero score is treated as unrated. Complete vendor/product and underlying source evidence remains in the original JSON.
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datePublished: Aug 1, 2026, 12:22:17 PM
dateUpdated: Aug 3, 2026, 3:38:08 PM
- Source published
- Aug 1, 2026, 12:22:17 PM (timezone not stated)
- Source modified
- Aug 3, 2026, 3:38:08 PM (timezone not stated)
- Saved here
- 17 Nov 2026 17:42:30 UTC
- Source terms
- ENISA EUVD · source terms and attribution apply
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EUVD CVSS 4.0 · 6.0 CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:H/AT:P/PR:N/UI:P/VC:N/VI:H/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N
nvd · CVE-2026-67335
Publishedbetter-auth versions before 1.6.2 fail to validate the OAuth state parameter against the stored nonce when using cookie-backed state storage without PKCE. Attackers can forge the state parameter and supply an attacker-controlled authorization code to create authenticated sessions bound to the attacker's external identity or persistently link attacker accounts to victim profiles.
Additional publisher context
NVD analysis and CPE criteria are source context, not proof that a package or your environment is affected. Complete affected data, logical configurations and SSVC are retained in the original JSON.
Source analysis status: Deferred
Weakness classifications: CWE-287
Original publisher date fields
published: 2026-08-01T13:17:04.403
lastModified: 2026-09-08T20:34:34.997
- Source published
- 1 Aug 2026 13:17:04 UTC
- Source modified
- 8 Sep 2026 20:34:34 UTC
- Saved here
- 25 Oct 2026 15:18:51 UTC
- Source terms
- NIST NVD usage terms; underlying source attribution retained
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Source: nvd · NIST NVD usage terms; underlying source attribution retained. The publisher's wording is preserved. ChangeIntel groups the information and labels changes. The JSON record includes additional source fields.
CVSS 4.0 · [email protected] · Secondary · 6.0 CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:H/AT:P/PR:N/UI:P/VC:N/VI:H/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:X/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X
CVSS 3.1 · [email protected] · Secondary · 5.3 CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:N
osv · GHSA-wxw3-q3m9-c3jr
Published### Am I affected? Users are affected if all of the following are true: - The application uses `better-auth` at a version below `1.6.2` (or `@better-auth/sso` paired with such a version). - `betterAuth({ account: { storeStateStrategy } })` is set to `"cookie"`. The default `"database"` is not affected. - The application wires at least one OAuth provider through `genericOAuth({ config })` with `pkce: false`, or it supplies a custom `getToken` or `tokenUrl` that does not require the stored `codeVerifier`. Stock social providers with PKCE on are not affected. - The provider returns arbitrary `code` values to the configured callback URL. If users are on `[email protected]` or later, they are not affected. Fix: 1. Upgrade to `[email protected]` or later (current stable is `1.6.10`). 2. If users cannot upgrade, see workarounds below. ### Summary In `parseGenericState`, the cookie branch decrypted the `oauth_state` cookie and validated expiry, but did not compare the incoming OAuth `state` query parameter to the nonce that `generateGenericState` issued at sign-in. Any callback to `/api/auth/oauth2/callback/<providerId>` that arrived with a forged `state` and any `code` was therefore accepted as long as the browser still held a live `oauth_state` cookie. With `pkce: false` (or any `getToken` path that does not enforce a code-verifier round-trip), an attacker who forced the victim to deliver an attacker-controlled authorization code to the callback would mint a session bound to the attacker's external identity in the victim's browser. Account-linking flows behaved the same way, binding the attacker's external account to an authenticated victim row. ### Details The cookie branch of `parseGenericState` did not compare the cookie's stored nonce to the incoming `state` parameter. The database branch (the default) was not affected because the verification row is keyed by `state` and the lookup itself enforces equality. The fix re-binds the cookie to the nonce: `generateGenericState` writes `oauthState: state` into the encrypted payload before storage, and `parseGenericState` rejects when `parsedData.oauthState !== state`. The same primitive covers every caller (`generic-oauth`, social, account-link, oauth-proxy passthrough, OIDC SSO, SAML relay state). ### Patches Fixed in `[email protected]` via [PR #8949](https://github.com/better-auth/better-auth/pull/8949) (commit `9deb7936a`, merged 2026-04-09). The cookie branch of `parseGenericState` now rejects when the encrypted payload's nonce does not match the incoming `state` parameter; the database branch gained a defense-in-depth equality check. ### Workarounds If users cannot upgrade immediately: - **Switch `storeStateStrategy` back to `"database"`** (the default). This closes the cookie-only bypass without a code change. - **Enable `pkce: true`** on every affected `genericOAuth` provider. The `codeVerifier` is the missing primitive that the attacker cannot supply. ### Impact - **Forced-login (CSRF on OAuth callback)**: the attacker forces the victim's browser into an authenticated session bound to the attacker's external identity, allowing the attacker to observe the victim's actions inside the application. - **Persistent account linking**: account-link flows bind the attacker's external account to the victim's authenticated row, granting persistent access until the link is removed. ### Credit Reported by @Jvr2022 via private advisory disclosure, and by @alavesa (PatchPilots audit) via the public duplicate [issue #8897](https://github.com/better-auth/better-auth/issues/8897). ### Resources - [CWE-352: Cross-Site Request Forgery (CSRF)](https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/352.html) - [CWE-345: Insufficient Verification of Data Authenticity](https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/345.html) - [CWE-287: Improper Authentication](https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/287.html) - [RFC 6749 §10.12: Cross-Site Request Forgery](https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/rfc6749#section-10.12) - [RFC 7636: Proof Key for Code Exchange](https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/rfc7636)
- Source published
- 15 May 2026 17:33:40 UTC
- Source modified
- 2 Aug 2026 03:56:45 UTC
- Saved here
- 24 Oct 2026 13:17:17 UTC
- Source terms
- GitHub Advisory Database · CC-BY-4.0
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Source: osv · GitHub Advisory Database · CC-BY-4.0. The publisher's wording is preserved. ChangeIntel groups the information and labels changes. The JSON record includes additional source fields.
CVSS_V3 · CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:N
Publisher rating · MODERATE