Forge: AES-GCM authentication bypass via unvalidated tagLength option
Collected exploitation and prediction evidence
Risk source coverageCISA KEV is observed exploitation evidence. FIRST EPSS is a dated prediction of exploitation in the next 30 days. Missing scores are unknown. This collector requests predictions only for explicit CVE aliases in the public NuGet archive; Microsoft release views retain their existing prediction scope.
No collected risk observation for these identifiers. This does not establish absence of exploitation or a zero probability.
cve-program · CVE-2026-119186
PublishedForge (also called node-forge) is a native implementation of Transport Layer Security in JavaScript. Prior to 1.4.1, node-forge did not validate the AES-GCM tagLength option passed to start() during decryption through forge.cipher.createDecipher(). When an application derived tagLength from received data or used an unset or zero-like configuration value, a value that converted to zero together with an empty or missing authentication tag caused the calculated and supplied tags to compare as empty, so decipher.finish() accepted unauthenticated ciphertext. Applications that omit tagLength to use the 128-bit default or pass a fixed valid tag length are unaffected. This issue is fixed in version 1.4.1.
- Source published
- 29 Oct 2026 19:17:26 UTC
- Source modified
- 29 Oct 2026 20:24:15 UTC
- Observed here
- 29 Oct 2026 21:48:56 UTC
- Source terms
- CVE Program Terms of Use
Original source record · Cite this exact observation · Complete original publisher JSON
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CVSS 3.1 · 5.9 CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:N
euvd · EUVD-2026-113363
PublishedForge (also called node-forge) is a native implementation of Transport Layer Security in JavaScript. Prior to 1.4.1, node-forge did not validate the AES-GCM tagLength option passed to start() during decryption through forge.cipher.createDecipher(). When an application derived tagLength from received data or used an unset or zero-like configuration value, a value that converted to zero together with an empty or missing authentication tag caused the calculated and supplied tags to compare as empty, so decipher.finish() accepted unauthenticated ciphertext. Applications that omit tagLength to use the 128-bit default or pass a fixed valid tag length are unaffected. This issue is fixed in version 1.4.1.
EUVD source date text has no stated timezone and is retained without inventing a UTC instant. Related bulletin membership is not an alias, common cause or applicability claim. A missing vector with a zero score is treated as unrated. Complete vendor/product and underlying source evidence remains in the original JSON.
Original publisher date fields
datePublished: Oct 29, 2026, 7:17:26 PM
dateUpdated: Oct 29, 2026, 8:24:15 PM
1 related source bulletins · separate from aliases
msrc_CVE-2026-119186: Forge: AES-GCM authentication bypass via unvalidated tagLength option
CVE-2026-119186
- Source published
- Oct 29, 2026, 7:17:26 PM (timezone not stated)
- Source modified
- Oct 29, 2026, 8:24:15 PM (timezone not stated)
- Observed here
- 6 Nov 2026 01:44:39 UTC
- Source terms
- ENISA EUVD · source terms and attribution apply
Original source record · Cite this exact observation · Complete original publisher JSON
This view projects the publisher's source fields for reading; the original JSON retains additional fields and CVE enrichment containers. Attribution: euvd · ENISA EUVD · source terms and attribution apply. Source text is retained; field grouping and change labels are provided by ChangeIntel.
EUVD CVSS 3.1 · 5.9 CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:N
nvd · CVE-2026-119186
PublishedForge (also called node-forge) is a native implementation of Transport Layer Security in JavaScript. Prior to 1.4.1, node-forge did not validate the AES-GCM tagLength option passed to start() during decryption through forge.cipher.createDecipher(). When an application derived tagLength from received data or used an unset or zero-like configuration value, a value that converted to zero together with an empty or missing authentication tag caused the calculated and supplied tags to compare as empty, so decipher.finish() accepted unauthenticated ciphertext. Applications that omit tagLength to use the 128-bit default or pass a fixed valid tag length are unaffected. This issue is fixed in version 1.4.1.
NVD analysis and CPE criteria are source context, not proof that a package or your environment is affected. Complete affected data, logical configurations and SSVC are retained in the original JSON.
Source analysis status: Undergoing Analysis
Weakness classifications: CWE-354 · CWE-1284
Original publisher date fields
published: 2026-10-29T20:17:29.500
lastModified: 2026-10-30T17:18:03.880
- Source published
- 29 Oct 2026 20:17:29 UTC
- Source modified
- 30 Oct 2026 17:18:03 UTC
- Observed here
- 30 Oct 2026 23:47:40 UTC
- Source terms
- NIST NVD usage terms; underlying source attribution retained
Original source record · Cite this exact observation · Complete original publisher JSON
This view projects the publisher's source fields for reading; the original JSON retains additional fields and CVE enrichment containers. Attribution: nvd · NIST NVD usage terms; underlying source attribution retained. Source text is retained; field grouping and change labels are provided by ChangeIntel.
CVSS 3.1 · [email protected] · Secondary · 5.9 CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:N
osv · GHSA-5cwg-6vw7-rj6p
Published### Summary The AES-GCM mode in forge.cipher does not validate the tagLength option passed to start(). With a tagLength of 0 or a value that converts to 0 (such as null, false, '' or '0'), the authentication tag is empty, and decipher.finish() returns true for any ciphertext and additional data when the supplied tag is empty or missing. Fixed in node-forge 1.4.1. ### Details `modes.gcm.prototype.start()` in `lib/cipherModes.js` stored the `tagLength` option without validation, and `lib/cipher.js` documented it as accepting "0-128". After processing the data, `afterFinish()` truncates the 16-byte tag with `truncate(16 % (tagLength / 8))`. For a `tagLength` that converts to 0, this is `16 % 0 = NaN`, and truncating by `NaN` empties the tag. On decryption, the start-time check that the supplied `tag` has `tagLength / 8` bytes passes for an empty tag, and the final tag comparison compares two empty strings, so `decipher.finish()` returns `true` for any ciphertext and additional data. NIST SP 800-38D section 5.2.1.2 allows only tag lengths of 128, 120, 112, 104 and 96 bits, plus 64 and 32 bits for certain applications. The fix validates `tagLength` in `start()`, for both encryption and decryption. A missing, `null` or `undefined` `tagLength` uses the default of 128 bits. Any other value is converted with `Number()` and must be one of 128, 120, 112, 104, 96, 64 or 32; otherwise `start()` throws "Invalid tag length.". Numeric strings such as `'128'` are still accepted. With a validated `tagLength`, an empty tag no longer matches the expected tag length and is rejected. ### Patches Fixed in node-forge 1.4.1. `cipher.start()` now throws an error unless `tagLength` is one of the tag lengths allowed by NIST SP 800-38D (128, 120, 112, 104, 96, 64 or 32 bits); a `null` or `undefined` `tagLength` means the default of 128 bits. ### Workarounds Do not derive `tagLength` from received data. Pass a fixed `tagLength` (or omit it to use the default of 128 bits), and check that the received tag has the expected length before calling `start()`, for example `if(tag.length !== 16) { throw new Error('Invalid tag.'); }` before `decipher.start({iv: iv, tag: tag});`. ### Proof of concept Start an AES-GCM decipher with `tagLength: 0` and an empty tag, as an application does when it derives the tag length from a received empty tag, and feed it arbitrary bytes that were never encrypted under the key: ```js var decipher = forge.cipher.createDecipher('AES-GCM', key); decipher.start({iv: iv, tag: '', tagLength: 0}); decipher.update(forge.util.createBuffer('any attacker-chosen bytes')); decipher.finish(); // <= 1.4.0: true // 1.4.1: start() throws "Invalid tag length." ``` `tagLength` values `null`, `false` and `'0'` (with an empty tag), and `tagLength: 0` with no `tag` option, give the same result on <= 1.4.0. The fix adds regression tests in `tests/unit/aes.js`. ### Impact Applications that decrypt AES-GCM data with `forge.cipher.createDecipher()` (`'AES-GCM'`) and pass a zero-like `tagLength` are affected. Typical cases are a tag length derived from the received tag, or an unset configuration value: ```js var decipher = forge.cipher.createDecipher('AES-GCM', key); decipher.start({iv: iv, tag: receivedTag, tagLength: receivedTag.length * 8}); decipher.update(forge.util.createBuffer(receivedCiphertext)); if(decipher.finish()) { /* attacker-supplied data accepted */ } ``` An attacker who can send a ciphertext with an empty tag to such an application can make it accept attacker-chosen ciphertext as authentic. Because GCM encryption is a stream cipher, an attacker who knows (part of) a captured message's plaintext can also change that plaintext to chosen values. The default (no `tagLength` option, 128 bits) and any fixed valid `tagLength` are not affected.
- Source published
- 30 Oct 2026 23:02:09 UTC
- Source modified
- 30 Oct 2026 23:15:05 UTC
- Observed here
- 30 Oct 2026 23:45:44 UTC
- Source terms
- GitHub Advisory Database · CC-BY-4.0
Original source record · Cite this exact observation · Complete original publisher JSON
This view projects the publisher's source fields for reading; the original JSON retains additional fields and CVE enrichment containers. Attribution: osv · GitHub Advisory Database · CC-BY-4.0. Source text is retained; field grouping and change labels are provided by ChangeIntel.
CVSS_V3 · CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:N
Publisher rating · MODERATE