Public mode

No access to your tenant or devices. Every item links to its source. What this means

Sources need attention Customize Public modeDiscuss ChangeIntel on Discord

9Router: Authentication Bypass in Public LLM API via Spoofable X-9r-Real-Ip Header

Exploitation and risk

Source status

CISA KEV lists vulnerabilities known to be exploited. FIRST EPSS estimates the likelihood of exploitation in the next 30 days. An unavailable score does not mean zero risk.

Which CVEs have scores here?

This view includes predictions for CVE identifiers explicitly listed in public NuGet advisories. Microsoft release pages have their own prediction coverage. Check source status for the scope and latest checks.

No exploitation or prediction data is available here for these CVEs. This does not mean they are safe or unlikely to be exploited.

cve-program · CVE-2026-56681

Published

9Router is an AI router & token saver. Prior to 0.5.6, 9Router deployments that allow requests to reach Next.js without the sanitizing custom-server.js wrapper trust the client-supplied X-9r-Real-Ip header in src/dashboardGuard.js when isLocalRequest decides whether canAccessPublicLlmApi may skip API-key validation for /api/v1/* routes. A remote unauthenticated attacker can set X-9r-Real-Ip to 127.0.0.1 and be classified as a local client, including on the verified GET /api/v1/models route. This permits unauthorized use of the instance owner's configured LLM providers, consumption of paid credits, and enumeration of configured providers and models. This issue is fixed in version 0.5.6.

Source published
22 Sep 2026 16:02:25 UTC
Source modified
28 Sep 2026 19:31:54 UTC
Saved here
23 Oct 2026 15:48:27 UTC
Source terms
CVE Program Terms of Use

Original source record · Cite this exact observation · Complete original publisher JSON

Source: cve-program · CVE Program Terms of Use. The publisher's wording is preserved. ChangeIntel groups the information and labels changes. The JSON record includes additional source fields.

CVSS 3.1 · 7.3 CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:L/A:L

euvd · EUVD-2026-84541

Published

9Router is an AI router & token saver. Prior to 0.5.6, 9Router deployments that allow requests to reach Next.js without the sanitizing custom-server.js wrapper trust the client-supplied X-9r-Real-Ip header in src/dashboardGuard.js when isLocalRequest decides whether canAccessPublicLlmApi may skip API-key validation for /api/v1/* routes. A remote unauthenticated attacker can set X-9r-Real-Ip to 127.0.0.1 and be classified as a local client, including on the verified GET /api/v1/models route. This permits unauthorized use of the instance owner's configured LLM providers, consumption of paid credits, and enumeration of configured providers and models. This issue is fixed in version 0.5.6.

Additional publisher context

EUVD source date text has no stated timezone and is retained without inventing a UTC instant. Related bulletin membership is not an alias, common cause or applicability claim. A missing vector with a zero score is treated as unrated. Complete vendor/product and underlying source evidence remains in the original JSON.

Original publisher date fields

datePublished: Sep 22, 2026, 4:02:25 PM

dateUpdated: Sep 28, 2026, 7:31:54 PM

Source published
Sep 22, 2026, 4:02:25 PM (timezone not stated)
Source modified
Sep 28, 2026, 7:31:54 PM (timezone not stated)
Saved here
15 Nov 2026 15:53:47 UTC
Source terms
ENISA EUVD · source terms and attribution apply

Original source record · Cite this exact observation · Complete original publisher JSON

Source: euvd · ENISA EUVD · source terms and attribution apply. The publisher's wording is preserved. ChangeIntel groups the information and labels changes. The JSON record includes additional source fields.

EUVD CVSS 3.1 · 7.3 CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:L/A:L

nvd · CVE-2026-56681

Published

9Router is an AI router & token saver. Prior to 0.5.6, 9Router deployments that allow requests to reach Next.js without the sanitizing custom-server.js wrapper trust the client-supplied X-9r-Real-Ip header in src/dashboardGuard.js when isLocalRequest decides whether canAccessPublicLlmApi may skip API-key validation for /api/v1/* routes. A remote unauthenticated attacker can set X-9r-Real-Ip to 127.0.0.1 and be classified as a local client, including on the verified GET /api/v1/models route. This permits unauthorized use of the instance owner's configured LLM providers, consumption of paid credits, and enumeration of configured providers and models. This issue is fixed in version 0.5.6.

Additional publisher context

NVD analysis and CPE criteria are source context, not proof that a package or your environment is affected. Complete affected data, logical configurations and SSVC are retained in the original JSON.

Source analysis status: Deferred

Weakness classifications: CWE-807

Original publisher date fields

published: 2026-09-22T16:17:48.350

lastModified: 2026-09-28T20:17:10.540

Source published
22 Sep 2026 16:17:48 UTC
Source modified
28 Sep 2026 20:17:10 UTC
Saved here
25 Oct 2026 14:19:10 UTC
Source terms
NIST NVD usage terms; underlying source attribution retained

Original source record · Cite this exact observation · Complete original publisher JSON

Source: nvd · NIST NVD usage terms; underlying source attribution retained. The publisher's wording is preserved. ChangeIntel groups the information and labels changes. The JSON record includes additional source fields.

CVSS 3.1 · [email protected] · Secondary · 7.3 CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:L/A:L

osv · GHSA-5mj8-gf6m-fhw8

Published

## Summary 9router determines whether an incoming request originates from localhost by trusting the X-9r-Real-Ip HTTP request header. This header is intended to be produced and sanitized exclusively by the bundled custom-server.js layer from the TCP socket address. In deployment modes where requests reach Next.js directly (the header is never stripped/regenerated), a remote, unauthenticated attacker can simply send X-9r-Real-Ip: 127.0.0.1 and be treated as a local client. This bypasses the API-key requirement on the public LLM API (/api/v1/*), granting unauthenticated access to the instance owner's configured provider resources. ## Affected Component - src/dashboardGuard.js - isLocalRequest() — trusts the client-supplied X-9r-Real-Ip header to decide loopback origin - canAccessPublicLlmApi() — grants access to /api/v1/* when isLocalRequest() returns true, skipping API-key validation - Verified affected route: GET /api/v1/models - Product version tested: 9router-app 0.5.4 (Next.js 16.2.9) ## Root Cause The authorization layer makes a security decision based on a client-controllable HTTP header. isLocalRequest() reads X-9r-Real-Ip and, if its value is a loopback address (127.0.0.1), classifies the request as local. The design assumes this header can only be set by the trusted custom-server.js wrapper (which derives it from the unspoofable socket address and strips any inbound copy). When the application is served without that wrapper, Next.js passes the attacker-supplied header through unchanged, so the trust assumption is violated: ```text Untrusted Client Input ↓ X-9r-Real-Ip: 127.0.0.1 ↓ isLocalRequest() → true ↓ canAccessPublicLlmApi() → allowed (API key not required) ↓ 200 OK ``` ## Attack Scenario 1. The instance is deployed in a mode that does not use custom-server.js, and the LLM API is reachable by the attacker (the default bind is 0.0.0.0). 2. The attacker sends a normal request to /api/v1/models and receives 401 Unauthorized (API key required for remote access). 3. The attacker re-sends the identical request with the single added header X-9r-Real-Ip: 127.0.0.1. 4. The request is classified as local, the API-key check is skipped, and the attacker receives 200 OK with the owner's model catalog and ongoing access to the LLM API. ## Proof of Concept ### Baseline Request <img width="1211" height="402" alt="Screenshot 2026-06-19 174727" src="https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/170b635f-1bd6-4dfd-ad85-30a03a9f6f72" /> ### Exploit Request <img width="1207" height="816" alt="Screenshot 2026-06-19 174844" src="https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/b7b4efde-c071-4aa2-ab13-9bde7c88a7b8" /> The only difference between the two requests is the addition of X-9r-Real-Ip: 127.0.0.1. ## Impact An unauthenticated remote attacker who can reach the service can bypass API-key enforcement on the public LLM API and act as a trusted local client. Consequences include: - Unauthorized use of the owner's configured LLM provider connections - Consumption of paid API credits / financial loss to the instance owner - Abuse of upstream provider accounts via the proxy - Enumeration of configured providers and available models ## Remediation - Do not trust X-9r-Real-Ip (or any X-9r-* header) when received directly from clients. - Derive the client address for authorization from a trusted transport-level source, e.g. req.socket.remoteAddress, rather than a request header. - If custom-server.js is required for the security model, fail closed when its trusted marker is absent, and explicitly strip/reject any inbound client-supplied X-9r-* headers at the edge. - Document supported, secure startup modes so the application is not run in a configuration where the header is attacker-controllable.

Source published
22 Sep 2026 16:34:06 UTC
Source modified
22 Sep 2026 17:15:10 UTC
Saved here
24 Oct 2026 13:17:17 UTC
Source terms
GitHub Advisory Database · CC-BY-4.0

Original source record · Cite this exact observation · Complete original publisher JSON

Source: osv · GitHub Advisory Database · CC-BY-4.0. The publisher's wording is preserved. ChangeIntel groups the information and labels changes. The JSON record includes additional source fields.

CVSS_V3 · CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:L/A:L

Publisher rating · HIGH

ChangeIntel

An IT change radar: releases, security, known issues, retirements, documentation changes, and service status from public sources. Every item links to supporting evidence; dates and statuses can change after they are read.

Sources read 16 Nov 08:58 UTC · 274 of 275 readable · 252 fully read · 18 waiting for GitHub's hourly limit · documentation 469/469 current