defu: Prototype pollution via `__proto__` key in defaults argument
Historical advisory saved 24 Oct 2026 13:17:17 UTC. The publisher may have updated it since then. Latest advisory.
osv · GHSA-737v-mqg7-c878
Published### Impact Applications that pass unsanitized user input (e.g. parsed JSON request bodies, database records, or config files from untrusted sources) as the first argument to `defu()` are vulnerable to prototype pollution. A crafted payload containing a `__proto__` key can override intended default values in the merged result: ```js import { defu } from 'defu' const userInput = JSON.parse('{"__proto__":{"isAdmin":true}}') const config = defu(userInput, { isAdmin: false }) config.isAdmin // true — attacker overrides the server default ``` ### Root Cause The internal `_defu` function used `Object.assign({}, defaults)` to copy the defaults object. `Object.assign` invokes the `__proto__` setter, which replaces the resulting object's `[[Prototype]]` with attacker-controlled values. Properties inherited from the polluted prototype then bypass the existing `__proto__` key guard in the `for...in` loop and land in the final result. ### Fix Replace `Object.assign({}, defaults)` with object spread (`{ ...defaults }`), which uses `[[DefineOwnProperty]]` and does not invoke the `__proto__` setter. ### Affected Versions <= 6.1.4 ### Credits Reported by [@BlackHatExploitation](https://github.com/BlackHatExploitation)
- Source published
- 4 Apr 2026 06:17:53 UTC
- Source modified
- 10 Sep 2026 03:50:43 UTC
- Saved here
- 24 Oct 2026 13:17:17 UTC
- Source terms
- GitHub Advisory Database · CC-BY-4.0
Original source record · Cite this exact observation · Complete original publisher JSON
Source: osv · GitHub Advisory Database · CC-BY-4.0. The publisher's wording is preserved. ChangeIntel groups the information and labels changes. The JSON record includes additional source fields.
CVSS_V3 · CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:N
Publisher rating · HIGH