Claude Code: Sandbox Escape via Git Worktree Path Confusion Allows Unsandboxed Code Execution
Exact source revision recorded 24 Oct 2026 13:17:17 UTC. It does not establish the source's current position. Latest evidence.
osv · GHSA-7835-87q9-rgvv
PublishedClaude Code's worktree handling allowed creation of worktrees named ".git" and navigation to worktrees outside the sandbox context, enabling git directory confusion attacks. By exploiting symlink manipulation and git fsmonitor execution during worktree operations, an attacker could overwrite files in the user's home directory (such as .zshenv), leading to code execution outside of seatbelt sandbox restrictions. Reliably exploiting this required the user to clone a malicious repository containing prompt injection content and run Claude Code against it. Users on standard Claude Code auto-update have received this fix automatically. Users performing manual updates are advised to update to the latest version. Thank you to hackerone.com/metnew for reporting this issue.
- Source published
- 24 Jul 2026 16:54:09 UTC
- Source modified
- 24 Jul 2026 17:01:27 UTC
- Observed here
- 24 Oct 2026 13:17:17 UTC
- Source terms
- GitHub Advisory Database · CC-BY-4.0
Original source record · Cite this exact observation · Complete original publisher JSON
This view projects the publisher's source fields for reading; the original JSON retains additional fields and CVE enrichment containers. Attribution: osv · GitHub Advisory Database · CC-BY-4.0. Source text is retained; field grouping and change labels are provided by ChangeIntel.
CVSS_V4 · CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:P/PR:N/UI:P/VC:H/VI:H/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N
Publisher rating · HIGH